Supreme Court: What are parameters for grant of bail in the cases of dowry death?

 The impugned order has led to travesty of justice. It was expected of the High Court to consider the bail application keeping in mind:-

(i) The nature of the alleged crime;

(ii) The punishment provided by the BNS 2023 for the alleged crime; (iii) The relations between the accused and the deceased, i.e., being husband and wife;

(iv) The place where the incident occurred;

(v) The postmortem report indicating that the cause of death was asphyxia due to strangulation and most importantly, the statutory presumption of commission of offence as envisaged under Section 118 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, erstwhile Section 113-B of the Evidence Act, 1872. {Para 19}

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 770/2026

Date of Order: 09.02.2026

Chetram Verma Vs. State Of U.P.

Citation: MANU/SCOR/2834/2026.

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What is basic concept of Dowry death as per provisions of IPC?

 Dowry death is defined in Section 304B IPC. It applies when a woman dies by burns, bodily injury, or otherwise than under normal circumstances within 7 years of marriage, and it is shown that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or his relatives for, or in connection with, demand for dowry; in such a case, the law treats it as dowry death.

Essentials

For Section 304B IPC, these ingredients must be proved:

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When there is charge U/S 302 of IPC, whether accused can be convicted U/S 304B of IPC?

 Yes, in an appropriate case an accused charged under Section 302 IPC may still be convicted under Section 304B IPC, provided the facts necessary to establish dowry death were put to the accused and no prejudice or failure of justice is caused.

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Supreme court: What parameters the court should keep in mind while deciding bail application in Dowry death case?

 In dowry-death cases, courts must be mindful of the broader societal impact, given that the offence strikes at the very root of social justice and equality. Allowing alleged prime perpetrators of such heinous acts to remain on bail, where the evidence indicates they actively inflicted physical, as well as mental, torment, could undermine not only the fairness of the trial but also public confidence in the criminal justice system.

13. In light of these concerns, we find that Accused No. 2 and Accused No. 3 do not deserve the continued protection of bail. The gravity of the allegations, ranging from demands for costly gifts to the infliction of brutal injuries, demonstrates a strong prima facie case against them. Moreover, Section 304B Indian Penal Code (dowry death) prescribes a stringent standard because of the grave nature of the offence and the systemic harm it perpetuates. Where the facts clearly indicate direct involvement in the fatal events, courts must act with an abundance of caution. Thus, permitting the father-in-law and mother-in-law to remain at large would run counter to the ends of justice, especially when the evidence reflects a probable nexus between their persistent dowry demands, physical cruelty, and the deceased's death. Consequently, their bail warrants cancellation so that a fair and unimpeded trial may take place, in keeping with the legislative intent behind anti- dowry laws.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 1051 of 2025

Decided On: 03.03.2025

Shabeen Ahmad Vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Vikram Nath and Sandeep Mehta, JJ.

Author: Vikram Nath, J.

Citation: AIR 2025 SC 1404,MANU / SC / 0301 / 2025,[ 2025 ] 3 SCR 367,( 2025 ) 4 SCC 172.

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Grandmothers Behind Bars: Is "Care of Grandchildren" a Valid Bail Ticket in Dowry Death Cases?

 In the chaotic aftermath of a Dowry Death (Section 304B IPC or Section 80 BNSS) case, the entire matrimonial family often finds themselves behind bars. A common desperation plea arises from the incarcerated mother-in-law: "Release me, for there is no one to look after my cattle or my deceased daughter-in-law’s children."

While emotionally compelling, does this argument hold water in a court of law? Let’s decode the current legal position of the Supreme Court and High Courts on these specific bail grounds.

1. The Legal Framework: The "Woman" Privilege

Before diving into specific pleas, it is crucial to understand the statutory advantage women possess.

Under Section 437(1) of the CrPC (retained as Section 480 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023), a court may grant bail to a person accused of a non-bailable offence—even one punishable with life imprisonment—if that person is a woman, sick, or infirm.

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Delhi HC: Cruelty simpliciter is not enough to constitute the offence U/S 498A IPC

Furthermore, in Jayedeepsinh Pravinsinh Chavda vs. State of Gujarat, MANU/SC/1308/2024 : (2025) 2 SCC 116 the Supreme Court while considering the guilt of the husband under Section 498A IPC observed that cruelty simpliciter is not enough to constitute the offence under Section 498A IPC; rather it must be done either with an intention to cause injury or to drive the person to commit suicide or with an intention to coerce her and her relatives to meet unlawful demands. Mere cruelty is not enough to constitute the offence. {Para 32}

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI

CRL.M.C. 4785/2017

Decided On: 13.08.2025

Gainda Lal Vs. The State Govt of NCT of Delhi and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Neena Bansal Krishna, J.

Citation: 2025 DHC 6826, MANU/DE/6021/2025.

Read full judgment here: Click here.

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Delhi HC: How to appreciate evidence in case of offence U/S 498A of IPC and Dowry death?

 Furthermore, in Jayedeepsinh Pravinsinh Chavda vs. State of Gujarat, MANU/SC/1308/2024 : (2025) 2 SCC 116 the Supreme Court while considering the guilt of the husband under Section 498A IPC observed that cruelty simpliciter is not enough to constitute the offence under Section 498A IPC; rather it must be done either with an intention to cause injury or to drive the person to commit suicide or with an intention to coerce her and her relatives to meet unlawful demands. Mere cruelty is not enough to constitute the offence. {Para 32}

33. In the present case, to bring in the clause of cruelty leading to the death of the woman, it may be noted that Ms. Shashi had died not because of any act of cruelty but for natural reasons, as stated by CW-1 and rightly noted by learned ASJ. Therefore, Clause (a) to the Explanation annexed to Section 498A IPC is not attracted.

34. Now, Clause (b) to Section 498A IPC needs to be examined to assess whether there are any allegations, which even prima facie make out that the deceased was subjected to harassment with a view to coerce her or persons related to her to meet any unlawful demand of property or valuable security.

35. In Dara Lakshmi Narayana vs. State of Telangana, MANU/SC/1309/2024 the Supreme Court while dealing with the components of Section 498A IPC and to ascertain whether the same are attracted on vague allegations raised by the wife, observed that the contents of the Complaint may be assessed to see if there is any kind of cruelty as contemplated in Clause 1 or if there is any harassment for dowry as contemplated in Clause 2 is made out. If the allegations in the FIR are found to be vague and ambiguous and lack precise allegations which are alleged after the notice of divorce, then it may be concluded that the FIR has been lodged as a retaliatory measure intended to settle the score with the husband and his relatives. In such a situation, the quashing of the FIR is justified.

36. Furthermore, the above observations were reiterated in the case of Digambar, (supra), that where the FIR or the Complaint even if taken on the face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute a case against the accused, the quashing of proceedings would be justified. Only stating cruelty has been committed by the Appellants, would not amount to an offence under Section 498A IPC.

39. It is quite understandable that he being a father, he would have been highly traumatised on account of the untimely death of his daughter. However, it is quite evident from the first statement of the Complainant that no details of the alleged harassment of the daughter was mentioned.

41. The next statement made by the Complainant was under Section 164 Cr.P.C. wherein also, similar allegations were made. However, as already noted above, no specific incidents which have been detailed in this Complaint.

43. However, Petitioner has neither given any date nor given any proof of giving any money, especially when he himself has stated that he was an Auto driver and had financial constraints. Such bald assertions, in the given situation, cannot be held to be even making out a prima facie case of harassment.

44. When the Petitioner's daughter became pregnant for the second time, he brought her to his house in the 5th month as there was threat to liquidate her in case she gave birth to the second child. He brought her to his house and left her in the matrimonial home after the birth of the second child. Pertinently, the Complainant has made contradictory statements in so much as if the Respondents had threatened to kill the Petitioner's daughter on birth of a girl child, no father would leave the daughter in the matrimonial home in the face of such imminent threat.

45. It is further claimed that there was consistent demand of Rs.2 Lacs in the name of both the children or else they threatened to kill the daughter. He sold his plot at Surya Colony, Faridabad and gave Rs.1 Lakh, despite which his daughter was killed. However, no evidence has been placed on record of either the ownership or sale or of the date on which this money was given. This assumes importance as the Petitioner's daughter died within 40 days of birth of second daughter. To accept the alleged sale and payment, some cogent evidence about the alleged demands and payment should have been disclosed by the Petitioner. Such bald assertions cannot be considered to even disclose the case of harassment.

46. The statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C. of Sunny, brother of the deceased, Ms. Shashi was also recorded, who stated that he had gone to meet Ms. Shashi at her matrimonial home on Holi when he found her crying and her in-Laws were harassing her. He, on return to their home, informed the same to the Petitioner.

48. However, merely because the deceased was crying, cannot per se make out any case of dowry harassment. The statements of the brother, Sunny and sister, Poonam also in no way establish even prima facie that Shashi was being harassed by her in laws for meeting their demands.

49. Furthermore, in the Petitioner's Complaint as well, aside from vague assertions that there was a constant demand of money, there are no specific incidents which have been detailed in this Complaint. The amount of Rs.45- 50,000 has been stated to have been given in Chuchak at the time of birth of the daughter and cannot be termed as a demand. There was nothing on record to even remotely suggest that there was any harassment of the deceased for fulfilling their demands for money.

50. The allegations in the Complain and the statements of the witnesses reflect that essentially the Petitioner was aggrieved by the death of his daughter and believed it to be on account of cruelty meted out to her. However, the learned ASJ had concluded that the death was on account of natural reasons and discharged the Respondents No. 3 to 5 under Section 304B IPC. This Order never got challenged and cannot be re-agitated now.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI

CRL.M.C. 4785/2017

Decided On: 13.08.2025

Gainda Lal Vs. The State Govt of NCT of Delhi and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Neena Bansal Krishna, J.

Citation: 2025 DHC 6826, MANU/DE/6021/2025

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Latest Supreme Court judgments on dowry death

 Several significant Supreme Court judgments in 2025 have clarified the application of dowry death provisions and reinforced the importance of establishing all essential ingredients.

Baljinder Singh v. State of Punjab (June 2025)

The Supreme Court firmly rejected a Black Cat Commando's plea for exemption from surrender in a dowry death case, emphasizing that military service provides no immunity from domestic crimes. In this case, the accused was convicted under Section 304B IPC for strangling his wife within two years of marriage after continuous dowry harassment. The Punjab and Haryana High Court had upheld his 10-year sentence in May 2025, and the Supreme Court refused to grant any exemption, stating that "participating in Operation Sindoor doesn't give you immunity from committing atrocity at home".

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Supreme Court: What precaution the court should take while granting bail in dowry death cases?

In dowry-death cases, courts must be mindful of the broader societal impact, given that the offence strikes at the very root of social justice and equality. Allowing alleged prime perpetrators of such heinous acts to remain on bail, where the evidence indicates they actively inflicted physical, as well as mental, torment, could undermine not only the fairness of the trial but also public confidence in the criminal justice system.

13. In light of these concerns, we find that Accused No. 2 and Accused No. 3 do not deserve the continued protection of bail. The gravity of the allegations, ranging from demands for costly gifts to the infliction of brutal injuries, demonstrates a strong prima facie case against them. Moreover, Section 304B Indian Penal Code (dowry death) prescribes a stringent standard because of the grave nature of the offence and the systemic harm it perpetuates. Where the facts clearly indicate direct involvement in the fatal events, courts must act with an abundance of caution. Thus, permitting the father-in-law and mother-in-law to remain at large would run counter to the ends of justice, especially when the evidence reflects a probable nexus between their persistent dowry demands, physical cruelty, and the deceased's death. Consequently, their bail warrants cancellation so that a fair and unimpeded trial may take place, in keeping with the legislative intent behind anti- dowry laws.

15. We also find it necessary to express our concern over the seemingly mechanical approach adopted by the High Court in granting bail to the Respondent Accused. While the Court did note the absence of prior criminal records, it failed to fully consider the stark realities of the allegations. It is unfortunate that in today's society, dowry deaths remain a grave social concern, and in our opinion, the courts are duty- bound to undertake deeper scrutiny of the circumstances under which bail is granted in these cases. The social message emanating from judicial orders in such cases cannot be overstated: when a young bride dies under suspicious circumstances within barely two years of marriage, the judiciary must reflect heightened vigilance and seriousness. A superficial application of bail parameters not only undermines the gravity of the offence itself but also risks weakening public faith in the judiciary's resolve to combat the menace of dowry deaths. It is this very perception of justice, both within and outside the courtroom, that courts must safeguard, lest we risk normalizing a crime that continues to claim numerous innocent lives. 

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 1051 of 2025 

Decided On: 03.03.2025

Shabeen Ahmad Vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Vikram Nath and Sandeep Mehta, JJ.

Author: Vikram Nath, J.

 Citation: 2025 INSC 307, MANU/SC/0301/2025.

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Supreme Court Acquits Husband in Dowry Death Case: Holds Prosecution Failed to Prove Cruelty or Harassment “Soon Before Death,” Presumption Under Section 113-B Evidence Act Not Applicable Due to Contradictory Testimonies

In the cross-examination, PW-7 stated that police had recorded his statements on 3rd April 1998 and 7th April 1998, which were marked as exhibits DG and DH, respectively. He accepted that the allegation that the Accused used to maltreat his sister on account of insufficient dowry given in the marriage and having brought broken furniture is not found in both the police statements. He also stated that the demand for a refrigerator, a motorcycle, and a mixi does not find place in both statements. Therefore, the version of PW-7 in his examination-in-chief about the demands of dowry is a significant and relevant omission. Hence, this amounts to a contradiction. The public prosecutor claimed that the demand for a refrigerator, a motorcycle, and a mixi was mentioned in his third statement, which was recorded on 23rd June 1998. The third statement, recorded belatedly, obviously appears to be an afterthought. As regards his statement that the Accused used to give a beating to his sister, it seems that he got this information when he visited the matrimonial home of his sister three months after the marriage. It is a very vague allegation. Moreover, the witness has not stated that this was disclosed to him by his deceased sister. Assuming that what he has said is correct, this incident of beating must have taken place between 25th June 1996 till end of September 1996. Therefore, this incident did not happen soon before the death. It is not his case that when the deceased allegedly visited his house nine to ten days before the incident, she complained about any cruelty or any harassment. Thus, none of the three statements of the witnesses contain any specific instances of cruelty or harassment.

{Para 16}

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 1076 of 2014

Decided On: 31.01.2025

Karan Singh Vs. State of Haryana

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Abhay Shreeniwas Oka,  and Ujjal Bhuyan, , JJ.

Author:Abhay Shreeniwas Oka, J.

 Citation: 2025 INSC 133,MANU/SC/0132/2025.

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Delhi HC: Whether accused is entitled to be released on bail in the case of dowry death if wife has died in parental home and not in matrimonial home?

To recapitulate, in the present case, according to the accused/applicant, offence under Section 304B IPC is not made out because the deceased died at her parental and not matrimonial home; and that there being no allegation of dowry harassment during the period between 15.03.2023 when the deceased shifted to her parental home and 27.04.2023 when she committed suicide, the period is too large a period to be taken as a period contemplated by the phrase "soon before her death" used in the said provision. {Para 6}

7. I am unable to convince myself that merely because the deceased committed suicide in her parental home and not in her matrimonial home, it is not a case of dowry death. Place where a tormented lady gets compelled to kill herself has no bearing. For purposive interpretation of the provision under Section 304B IPC, it is the existence and continuance of matrimony which has to be kept in mind and not the place(s) to which the deceased shifts herself before taking her life.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI

Bail Appln. 4627/2024

Decided On: 07.04.2025

Vinay Vs. State Govt. of NCT of Delhi

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Girish Kathpalia, J.

Citation: MANU/DE/2357/2025.

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What is distinction between Section 113A and Section 113B of Evidence Act?

It is relevant to note that Under Section 113B, the Court shall presume dowry death unlike Section 113A where the provision says that Court may presume abetment of suicide. This is the vital difference between the two provisions which raises presumption as regards abetment of suicide. When the Courts below want to apply Section 113A of the Evidence Act, the condition precedent is that there has to be first some cogent evidence as regards cruelty & harassment. In the absence of any cogent evidence as regards harassment or abetment in any form like aiding or instigating, the court cannot straightway invoke Section 113A and presume that the Accused abetted the commission of suicide. {Para 13}

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 1408 of 2015

Decided On: 09.01.2025

Ram Pyarey Vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan, JJ.

Citation: 2025 INSC 71,MANU/SC/0074/2025.

Read full Judgment here: Click here.

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Supreme Court: Whether the court must draw presumption under S 113A of Evidence Act if there is no cogent evidence as regards cruelty & harassment

The law as regards the abetment of suicide punishable Under Sections 306 of the Indian Penal Code is now well settled. It appears that the Courts below laid much emphasis on Section 113B of the Evidence Act, 1872 (for short, "the Evidence Act"). Sections 113A {S 117 of BSA} & 113B of the Evidence Act {S 118 of BSA} talks about presumption. Sections 113A {S 117 of BSA} and 113B {S 118 of BSA}respectively read thus:{Para 12}

113A. {S 117 of BSA} Presumption as to abetment of suicide by a married woman.- When the question is whether the commission of suicide by a woman had been abetted by her husband or any relative of her husband and it is shown that she had committed suicide within a period of seven years from the date of her marriage and that her husband or such relative of her husband had subjected her to cruelty, the Court may presume, having regard to all the other circumstances of the case, that such suicide had been abetted by her husband or by such relative of her husband.

Explanation.- For the purposes of this section, "cruelty" shall have the same meaning as in Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860).

113B.{S 118 of BSA} Presumption as to dowry death.- When the question is whether a person has committed the dowry death of a woman and it is shown that soon before her death such woman had been subjected by such person to cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, the Court shall presume that such person had caused the dowry death.

Explanation.- For the purposes of this section, "dowry death" shall have the same meaning as in Section 304B of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860).

13. It is relevant to note that Under Section 113B {S 118 of BSA}, the Court shall presume dowry death unlike Section 113A {S 117 of BSA} where the provision says that Court may presume abetment of suicide. This is the vital difference between the two provisions which raises presumption as regards abetment of suicide. When the Courts below want to apply Section 113A of the Evidence Act, the condition precedent is that there has to be first some cogent evidence as regards cruelty & harassment. In the absence of any cogent evidence as regards harassment or abetment in any form like aiding or instigating, the court cannot straightway invoke Section 113A and presume that the Accused abetted the commission of suicide.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 1408 of 2015

Decided On: 09.01.2025

Ram Pyarey Vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan, JJ.

Citation: 2025 INSC 71,MANU/SC/0074/2025.

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Bombay HC: Husband Convicted For Causing Dowry Death Cannot Inherit Deceased Wife's Property Under Hindu Succession Act

 The position in law which thus emerges is that, the disqualification incorporated in section 25 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, is based on public policy that a person who causes death of the person whose property he seeks to inherit, cannot be permitted to take advantage of his own felonious act. The disqualification of the murderer to inherit the property of the person he murdered, even before statutory recognition, was

premised on the principles of justice, equity and good conscience.

The avowed object to disqualify such a person was to disallow a

person to accelerate his inheritance by causing death of the person whose property he seeks to inherit. {Para 19}

20. Secondly, the expression, “a person who commits the murder

or abets the commission of murder,” is required to be so construed as to advance the aforesaid object. The term, “murder” has not been defined in the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. The definition of the offence of murder under section 300 of the Penal Code which is a technical definition for imposing punishment prescribed under section 302 of the Penal Code cannot be readily imported to construe the term, “murder” under section 25 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. It is not the correct approach to interpret the term used in one enactment dealing with inheritance and succession by importing the definition of a similar term used in a Penal Statute. Plainly Hindu Succession Act, 1956 and the Penal Code, 1860 do not operate in the same field. Therefore, the term, “murder” ought to receive its ordinary and common parlance connotation. If so construed, it implies causing the death of the person or abetting the causing of death of the person, whose property is sought to be inherited, by the person who is alleged to have incurred the disqualification.

21. Thirdly, the particular section of the Penal Code under which the person accused of causing death is convicted, is not of decisive significance. Nor the factum of conviction, as such, is peremptory. Conversely, even if a person is convicted for an offence punishable under sec.302 of the Penal Code that, by itself, may not sustain the disqualification by a Civil Court under sec.25 of Hindu Succession Act, 1956. The factum of the person, who has allegedly incurred disqualification, having committed the murder of the deceased has to be decided independently on evidence before the Civil Court.

22. In the light of the aforesaid principles, reverting to the

controversy at hand, in my considered view, the Department is not justified in questioning the competence of the petitioner on the sole ground that the husband of the deceased has been convicted for the offence punishable under section 304-B and not 302 of the Penal Code. In the context of the disqualification under section 25 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, there does not appear much qualitative difference in the offences punishable under section 302 and 304-B.

28. The conspectus of the aforesaid consideration is that a person who has caused the dowry death of a woman, falls within the dragnet of disqualification prescribed under section 25 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, if the said factum is proved to the satisfaction of the Civil Court. Therefore, the Department was not justified in questioning the competence of the petitioner on the count that the husband of the deceased has not been convicted for the offence punishable under section 302 but under section 304-B of the Penal Code. The Department’s requisition thus stands dispensed with.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

TESTAMENTARY AND INTESTATE JURISDICTION

TESTAMENTARY PETITION NO.807 of 2020

Pawan Jain Vs Sejal Anurag Jain ...Deceased

CORAM : N. J. JAMADAR, J.

PRONOUNCED ON : JULY 02, 2024

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Under which circumstance the court can convict accused for offences U/S 498A and S 306 of IPC even though accused were not charged under those sections?

 Omission to frame charge does not disable the court from convicting the Accused for the offence which is found to have been proved on the evidence on record. The code has ample provisions to meet a situation like the one before us. From the statement of charge framed Under Section 304B and in the alternative Section 306, it is clear that all the facts and ingredients for framing the charge for offence Under Section 306 existed. The mere omission on the part of the trial judge to mention Section 306 Indian Penal Code with 498A would not preclude this Court from convicting the Accused for the said offence when found proved. In the charge framed Under Section 304B of Indian Penal Code, it has been clearly mentioned that the Accused has subjected the deceased to such cruelty and harassment as to drive her to commit suicide by self-immolation and as such non-framing of the specific charge would not be fatal in the instant case as no injustice is being caused to the Accused. {Para 28}

29. This Court in K. Prema S. Rao and Anr. v. Yadla Srinivasa Rao and Ors. MANU/SC/0890/2002 : (2003) 1 SCC 217 has held that mere omission or defect in framing of charge would not be fatal if from the statement of charge Under Section 304B and in the alternative Section 498A, it is clear that all facts and ingredients for framing of charge Under Section 306 existed in the case, same would suffice. It was further held that:

22. Mere omission or defect in framing charge does not disable the criminal court from convicting the Accused for the offence which is found to have been proved on the evidence on record. The Code of Criminal Procedure has ample provisions to meet a situation like the one before us. From the statement of charge framed Under Section 304-B and in the alternative Section 498-A Indian Penal Code (as quoted above) it is clear that all facts and ingredients for framing charge for offence Under Section 306 Indian Penal Code existed in the case. The mere omission on the part of the trial Judge to mention Section 306 Indian Penal Code with Section 498-A Indian Penal Code does not preclude the court from convicting the Accused for the said offence when found proved. In the alternate charge framed Under Section 498-A Indian Penal Code, it has been clearly mentioned that the Accused subjected the deceased to such cruelty and harassment as to drive her to commit suicide. The provisions of Section 221 Code of Criminal Procedure take care of such a situation and safeguard the powers of the criminal court to convict an Accused for an offence with which he is not charged although on facts found in evidence, he could have been charged for such offence. Section 221 Code of Criminal Procedure needs reproduction:

221. Where it is doubtful what offence has been committed.-(1) If a single act or series of acts is of such a nature that it is doubtful which of several offences the facts which can be proved will constitute, the Accused may be charged with having committed all or any of such offences, and any number of such charges may be tried at once; or he may be charged in the alternative with having committed some one of the said offences.

(2) If in such a case the Accused is charged with one offence, and it appears in evidence that he committed a different offence for which he might have been charged under the provisions of Sub-section (1), he may be convicted of the offence which he is shown to have committed, although he was not charged with it.

23. The provision of Sub-section (2) of Section 221 read with Sub-section (1) of the said Section can be taken aid of in convicting and sentencing Accused 1 of offence of abetment of suicide Under Section 306 Indian Penal Code along with or instead of Section 498-A Indian Penal Code.

24. Section 215 allows the criminal court to ignore any error in stating either the offence or the particulars required to be stated in the charge, if the Accused was not, in fact, misled by such error or omission in framing the charge and it has not occasioned a failure of justice. See Section 215 Code of Criminal Procedure which reads:

215. Effect of errors.-No error in stating either the offence or the particulars required to be stated in the charge, and no omission to state the offence or those particulars, shall be regarded at any stage of the case as material, unless the Accused was in fact misled by such error or omission, and it has occasioned a failure of justice.

25. As provided in Section 215 Code of Criminal Procedure omission to frame charge Under Section 306 Indian Penal Code has not resulted in any failure of justice. We find no necessity to remit the matter to the trial court for framing charge Under Section 306 Indian Penal Code and direct a retrial for that charge. The Accused cannot legitimately complain of any want of opportunity to defend the charge Under Section 306 Indian Penal Code and a consequent failure of justice. The same facts found in evidence, which justify conviction of the Appellant Under Section 498-A for cruel treatment of his wife, make out a case against him Under Section 306 Indian Penal Code of having abetted commission of suicide by the wife. The Appellant was charged for an offence of higher degree causing "dowry death" Under Section 304-B which is punishable with minimum sentence of seven years' rigorous imprisonment and maximum for life. Presumption Under Section 113-A of the Evidence Act could also be raised against him on same facts constituting offence of cruelty Under Section 498-A Indian Penal Code. No further opportunity of defence is required to be granted to the Appellant when he had ample opportunity to meet the charge Under Section 498-A Indian Penal Code.

30. In the aforesaid background and the evidence on record as already noticed by us hereinabove, it can be safely noted that High Court ought to have examined as to whether Accused could have been convicted for an offence for which no charge was framed and not undertaking of such an exercise would result in failure of justice? Thus, it will have to be seen from the facts unfolded in the present case as to whether the Accused was aware of the basic ingredients of the offence for which they are being tried and whether the main facts sought to be established against them were explained to them clearly and whether they got a fair chance to defend themselves. If the answer is in the affirmative, then necessarily this Court will have to proceed further and examine as to whether Accused can be convicted for the offence not charged and if the answer is in the negative it would result in acquittal of the Accused for said offence. In the instant case the dying declaration of the deceased would clearly indicate that deceased was mentally traumatized and she was unable to tolerate the torture and harassment meted out by the Accused person on account of which she committed suicide. It is this taunting or mental torture which she could not withstand and forced her to commit suicide by self- immolation. In that view of the matter, we are of the considered opinion that Accused persons are liable to be convicted for the offence punishable Under Section 306 Indian Penal Code though charge was not framed. 

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 3274 of 2023 

Decided On: 19.10.2023

Paranagouda and Ors. Vs. The State of Karnataka and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

S. Ravindra Bhat and Aravind Kumar, JJ.

Author: Aravind Kumar, J.

Citation: MANU/SC/1171/2023.

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Whether demand of money for construction of a house can be treated as a demand for dowry?

 In the light of the above provision that defines the word “dowry” and takes in its ambit any kind of property or valuable security, in our opinion, the High Court fell into an error by holding that the demand of money for construction of a house cannot be treated as a dowry demand. We, therefore, declare that any money or property or valuable security demanded by any of the persons mentioned in Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, at or before or at any time after the marriage which is reasonably connected to the death of a married woman, would necessarily be in connection with or in relation to the marriage unless, the facts of a given case clearly and unequivocally point otherwise.”

[emphasis added] {Para 12}

Supreme Court

CHIEF JUSTICE OF INDIA N. V. RAMANA JUSTICE A. S. BOPANNA JUSTICE HIMA KOHLI

STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH Vs. JOGENDRA & ANR.

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 190 OF 2012

11th January 2022

Author: Hima Kohli, J.

Citation:  2022 ALL SCR (ONLINE) 29

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Supreme Court Guidelines for Trial of Dowry death cases

36. At the cost of repetition, the law under Section 304B,

IPC read with Section 113B, Evidence Act can be summarized below:

i. Section 304B, IPC must be interpreted keeping in mind the

legislative intent to curb the social evil of bride burning and

dowry demand.

ii. The prosecution must at first establish the existence of the

necessary ingredients for constituting an offence under Section

304B, IPC. Once these ingredients are satisfied, the rebuttable

presumption of causality, provided under Section 113B,

Evidence Act operates against the accused.

iii. The phrase “soon before” as appearing in Section 304B,

IPC cannot be construed to mean ‘immediately before’. The

prosecution must establish existence of “proximate and live

link” between the dowry death and cruelty or harassment for

dowry demand by the husband or his relatives.

iv. Section 304B, IPC does not take a pigeonhole approach in

categorizing death as homicidal or suicidal or accidental. The

reason for such non categorization is due to the fact that death

occurring “otherwise than under normal circumstances” can, in

cases, be homicidal or suicidal or accidental.

v. Due to the precarious nature of Section 304B, IPC read with

113B, Evidence Act, Judges, prosecution and defence should

be careful during conduction of trial.

vi. It is a matter of grave concern that, often, Trial Courts record

the statement under Section 313, CrPC in a very casual and

cursory manner, without specifically questioning the accused

as to his defense. It ought to be noted that the examination of

an accused under Section 313, CrPC cannot be treated as a

mere procedural formality, as it based on the fundamental

principle of fairness. This aforesaid provision incorporates the

valuable principle of natural justice “audi alteram partem” as it

enables the accused to offer an explanation for the

incriminatory material appearing against him. Therefore, it

imposes an obligation on the court to question the accused

fairly, with care and caution.

vii. The Court must put incriminating circumstances before the

accused and seek his response. A duty is also cast on the

counsel of the accused to prepare his defense since the

inception of the Trial with due caution, keeping in

consideration the peculiarities of Section 304B, IPC read with

Section 113B, Evidence Act.

viii. Section 232, CrPC provides that, “If, after taking the evidence

for the prosecution, examining the accused and hearing the

prosecution and the defence on the point, the Judge considers

that there is no evidence that the accused committed the offence,

the Judge shall record an order of acquittal”. Such discretion

must be utilized by the Trial Courts as an obligation of best

efforts.

ix. Once the Trial Court decides that the accused is not eligible to

be acquitted as per the provisions of Section 232, CrPC, it must

move on and fix hearings specifically for ‘defence evidence’,

calling upon the accused to present his defense as per the

procedure provided under Section 233, CrPC, which is also an

invaluable right provided to the accused.

x. In the same breath, Trial Courts need to balance other

important considerations such as the right to a speedy trial. In

this regard, we may caution that the above provisions should

not be allowed to be misused as delay tactics.

xi. Apart from the above, the presiding Judge should follow the

guidelines laid down by this Court while sentencing and imposing appropriate punishment.

xii. Undoubtedly, as discussed above, the menace of dowry death is

increasing day by day. However, it is also observed that

sometimes family members of the husband are roped in, even

though they have no active role in commission of the offence

and are residing at distant places. In these cases, the Court

need to be cautious in its approach.

Reportable

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL Nos. 1735-1736

OF 2010

SATBIR SINGH & ANOTHER  Vs  STATE OF HARYANA 

Author: N. V. RAMANA, CJI.

Dated:MAY 28, 2021

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Supreme Court: Court should not discharge accused for an offence U/S 306 of IPC while confirming charge U/S 304B of IPC

This Court in the case of Bhupendra (supra) has in

paragraph 30 held as under:

“30. We are, therefore, of the opinion that Section

306 IPC is much broader in its application and

takes within its fold one aspect of Section 304B

IPC. These two sections are not mutually exclusive.

If a conviction for causing a suicide is based on

Section 304B IPC, it will necessarily attract

Section 306 IPC. However, the converse is not true.

Having heard learned counsel parties, considering

the totality of the circumstances and keeping in view the

suicide notes as well as the statements of witnesses, we

are of the opinion that respondents no.1 and 2 ought not

to have been discharged of the offence under Section 306

IPC, especially when the charges under Section 304B IPC

and other related sections had already been framed and

confirmed.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.601 OF 2021

BHAGWANRAO MAHADEO PATIL  Vs  APPA RAMCHANDRA SAVKAR 

Dated: July 14, 2021

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Whether court should suspend sentence of parents of husband for suicide of wife if they were residing separately?

 It is to be noted that nowadays the commitment of suicide by women, due to dowry harassment, are rising day by day. On the other hand, the in-laws are escaping from their liability saying that they are not living with their son, even though they are living separately, but, they are inducing their son for getting dowry, by way of, money, jewels, two wheeler, car etc., It is also to be noted that since the in-laws are not residing with their son and the victim women, and on that ground, they are seeking suspension of sentence, and this Court has also considered several petitions, on such ground. Taking advantage of that, a wrong message has gone to the Society that the parents can easily

escape from their liability and the alleged offence. It is to be further noted that mere giving a birth to a child, and providing shelter and good education, and motivating their child to get a job alone is not enough, and the first and foremost responsibility of the parents is that they should groom their children as responsible citizens.  {Para 6}

7. From the materials available on record, there are materials against the petitioners / accused 2 and 3 also, and the learned Sessions Judge, on proper appreciation of materials available on record against the petitioners / accused 2 and 3, convicted them for the offence under Section 498-A of IPC, and acquitted

them of the charge under Section 304-B of IPC.

8. Given the nature and gravity of offence committed by the accused, this Court is not inclined to suspend the sentence. Finding no merits, this miscellaneous petition shall stand dismissed.

MADRAS HIGH COURT

 Crl.M.P.No.2926 of 2021 in

Crl.A.No.114 of 2021

CORAM: P.VELMURUGAN, J.

Dated; 29.03.2021

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Supreme Court: Precaution to be taken by the court while suspending the sentence of a convict of dowry death

Section 389 provides that, pending any appeal by a convicted

person, the Appellate Court may, for reasons to be recorded by it in writing, order that the execution of the sentence or order appealed against, be suspended and, also, if he is in confinement, that he be released on bail. 

27. As the discretion under Section 389(1) is to be exercised

judicially, the Appellate Court is obliged to consider whether any cogent ground has been disclosed, giving rise to substantial doubts about the validity of the conviction and whether there is likelihood of unreasonable delay in disposal of the appeal.

31. In Kalyan Chadra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan and Anr (2004) 7 SCC 528, this Court held:-

“11. The law in regard to grant or refusal of bail is very well

settled. The Court granting bail should exercise its

discretion in a judicious manner and not as a matter of

course. Though at the stage of granting bail a detailed

examination of evidence and elaborate documentation of

the merits of the case need not be undertaken, there is a

need to indicate in such orders reasons for prima facie

concluding why bail was being granted particularly where

the accused is charged of having committed a serious

offence. Any order devoid of such reasons would suffer from

non-application of mind.”

36. There is a difference between grant of bail under Section 439 of the CrPC in case of pre-trial arrest and suspension of sentence under  Section 389 of the CrPC and grant of bail, post conviction. In the earlier case there may be presumption of innocence, which is a fundamental postulate of criminal jurisprudence, and the courts may be liberal, depending on the facts and circumstances of the case, on the principle that bail is the rule and jail is an exception, as held by this Court in Dataram Singh v. State of U.P. and Anr. (supra).However, in case of post conviction bail, by suspension of  operation of the sentence, there is a finding of guilt and the question of presumption of innocence does not arise. Nor is the principle of bail being the rule and jail an exception attracted, once there is conviction upon trial. Rather, the Court considering an application for suspension of sentence and grant of bail, is to consider the prima facie merits of the appeal, coupled with other factors. There should be strong compelling reasons for grant of bail, notwithstanding an order of conviction, by suspension of sentence, and this strong and compelling reason must be recorded in the order granting bail, as mandated in Section 389(1) of the Cr.P.C.

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 520 OF 2020

PREET PAL SINGH  Vs  THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH 

Indira Banerjee, J.

Dated: AUGUST 14, 2020

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