What is the difference between presumption of law and presumption of fact ?

 The Indian Evidence Act distinguishes between two fundamental types of presumptions that courts can draw during legal proceedings. Understanding their differences is crucial for comprehending how evidence law operates.

Definition of Presumptions

A presumption is defined as an inference of the existence or non-existence of a fact, rather than evidence itself. According to Black's Law Dictionary, it is "a legal inference, or assumption that a fact exists, based on the known or proven existence of some other fact or group of facts".

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Supreme Court: Even if disclosure statement made by Accused is not admissible U/S 27 of Evidence Act but it is relevant U/S 8 of evidence Act as his conduct

 e) The conduct of the Appellant in leading the Investigating Officer and others to a drain nearby his house and the discovery of the knife from the drain is a relevant fact Under Section 8 of the Evidence Act. In other words, the evidence of the circumstance simpliciter that the Appellant pointed out to the Investigating Officer the place where he threw away the weapon of offence i.e., knife would be admissible as 'conduct' Under Section 8 irrespective of the fact whether the statement made by the Accused contemporaneously with or antecedent to such conduct falls within the purview of Section 27 of the Evidence Act.

59. Even while discarding the evidence in the form of discovery panchnama, the conduct of the Appellant herein would be relevant Under Section 8 of the Evidence Act. The evidence of discovery would be admissible as conduct Under Section 8 of the Evidence Act quite apart from the admissibility of the disclosure statement Under Section 27 of the Evidence Act, as this Court observed in A.N. Venkatesh and Anr. v. State of Karnataka,   MANU/SC/0468/2005 : (2005) 7 SCC 714:

9. By virtue of Section 8 of the Evidence Act, the conduct of the Accused person is relevant, if such conduct influences or is influenced by any fact in issue or relevant fact. The evidence of the circumstance, simpliciter, that the Accused pointed out to the police officer, the place where the dead body of the kidnapped boy was found and on their pointing out the body was exhumed, would be admissible as conduct Under Section 8 irrespective of the fact whether the statement made by the Accused contemporaneously with or antecedent to such conduct falls within the purview of Section 27 or not as held by this Court in Prakash Chand v. State (Delhi Admn.) [  MANU/SC/0147/1978 : 1978:INSC:234 : (1979) 3 SCC 90: 1979 SCC (Cri) 656: AIR 1979 SC 400]. Even if we hold that the disclosure statement made by the Accused-Appellants (Ex. P-15 and P-16) is not admissible Under Section 27 of the Evidence Act, still it is relevant Under Section 8. ...

The conduct, in order to be admissible, must be such that it has close nexus with a fact in issue or relevant fact. Explanation 1 makes it clear that the mere statements as distinguished from acts do not constitute "conduct" unless those statements "accompany and explain acts other than statements". Such statements accompanying the acts are considered to be evidence of res gestae. 

206. We have already noticed the distinction highlighted in Prakash Chand case (supra) between the conduct of an Accused which is admissible Under Section 8 and the statement made to a police officer in the course of an investigation which is hit by Section 162 Code of Criminal Procedure The evidence of the circumstance, simpliciter, that the Accused pointed out to the police officer, the place where stolen articles or weapons used in the commission of the offence were hidden, would be admissible as "conduct" Under Section 8 irrespective of the fact whether the statement made by the Accused contemporaneously with or antecedent to such conduct, falls within the purview of Section 27, as pointed out in Prakash Chand case. In Om Prakash case (supra) this Court held that: (SCC p.262, para 14)

Even apart from the admissibility of the information Under Section 27, the evidence of the investigating officer and the panchas that the Accused had taken them to PW 11 (from whom he purchased the weapon) and pointed him out and as corroborated by PW 11 himself would be admissible Under Section 8 of the Evidence Act as conduct of the Accused.

(Emphasis supplied)

61. However, in the aforesaid context, we would like to sound a note of caution. Although the conduct of an Accused may be a relevant fact Under Section 8 of the Evidence Act, yet the same, by itself, cannot be a ground to convict him or hold him guilty and that too, for a serious offence like murder. Like any other piece of evidence, the conduct of an Accused is also one of the circumstances which the court may take into consideration along with the other evidence on record, direct or indirect. What we are trying to convey is that the conduct of the Accused alone, though may be relevant Under Section 8 of the Evidence Act, cannot form the basis of conviction.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 437 of 2015

Decided On: 03.05.2024

Anees Vs. The State Govt. of NCT

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, C.J.I., J.B. Pardiwala and Manoj Misra, JJ.

Author: J.B. Pardiwala, J.

Citation:  MANU/SC/0379/2024,2024 INSC 368.

Read full Judgment here: Click here.Click here.

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What are exceptions to the rule that burden of proof is on the prosecution to prove the guilt of the Accused ?

i. Principles of law governing the applicability of Section 106 of the Evidence Act

35. Section 106 of the Evidence Act reads as follows:

106. Burden of proving fact especially within knowledge.- When any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him.

Illustration

(a) When a person does an act with some intention other than that which the character and circumstances of the act suggest, the burden of proving that intention is upon him.

(b) A is charged with travelling on a railway without a ticket. The burden of proving that he had a ticket is on him.

36. Section 106 of the Evidence Act referred to above provides that when any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him. The word "especially" means facts that are pre-eminently or exceptionally within the knowledge of the Accused. The ordinary Rule that applies to the criminal trials that the onus lies on the prosecution to prove the guilt of the Accused is not in any way modified by the Rule of facts embodied in Section 106 of the Evidence Act. Section 106 of the Evidence Act is an exception to Section 101 of the Evidence Act. Section 101 with its illustration (a) lays down the general Rule that in a criminal case the burden of proof is on the prosecution and Section 106 is certainly not intended to relieve it of that duty. On the contrary, it is designed to meet certain exceptional cases in which it would be impossible, or at any rate disproportionately difficult, for the prosecution to establish the facts which are, "especially within the knowledge of the Accused and which, he can prove without difficulty or inconvenience".

37. In Shambhu Nath Mehra v. The State of Ajmer   MANU/SC/0023/1956 : 1956:INSC:15 : AIR 1956 SC 404, this Court while considering the word "especially" employed in Section 106 of the Evidence Act speaking through Vivian Bose, J., observed as under:

11. ... The word "especially" stresses that it means facts that are pre-eminently or exceptionally within his knowledge. If the Section were to be interpreted otherwise, it would lead to the very startling conclusion that in a murder case the burden lies on the Accused to prove that he did not commit the murder because who could know better than he whether he did or did not.

22. Thus, Section 106 of the Evidence Act will apply to those cases where the prosecution has succeeded in establishing the facts from which a reasonable inference can be drawn regarding the existence of certain other facts which are within the special knowledge of the Accused. When the Accused fails to offer proper explanation about the existence of said other facts, the court can always draw an appropriate inference.

23. When a case is resting on circumstantial evidence, if the Accused fails to offer a reasonable explanation in discharge of burden placed on him by virtue of Section 106 of the Evidence Act, such a failure may provide an additional link to the chain of circumstances. In a case governed by circumstantial evidence, if the chain of circumstances which is required to be established by the prosecution is not established, the failure of the Accused to discharge the burden Under Section 106 of the Evidence Act is not relevant at all. When the chain is not complete, falsity of the defence is no ground to convict the Accused.

(Emphasis supplied)

39. In Tulshiram Sahadu Suryawanshi and Anr. v. State of Maharashtra,   MANU/SC/0748/2012 : 2012:INSC:401 : (2012) 10 SCC 373, this Court observed as under:

23. It is settled law that presumption of fact is a Rule in law of evidence that a fact otherwise doubtful may be inferred from certain other proved facts. When inferring the existence of a fact from other set of proved facts, the court exercises a process of reasoning and reaches a logical conclusion as the most probable position. The above position is strengthened in view of Section 114 of the Evidence Act, 1872. It empowers the court to presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have happened. In that process, the courts shall have regard to the common course of natural events, human conduct, etc. in addition to the facts of the case. In these circumstances, the principles embodied in Section 106 of the Evidence Act can also be utilised. We make it clear that this Section is not intended to relieve the prosecution of its burden to prove the guilt of the Accused beyond reasonable doubt, but it would apply to cases where the prosecution has succeeded in proving facts from which a reasonable inference can be drawn regarding the existence of certain other facts, unless the Accused by virtue of his special knowledge regarding such facts, failed to offer any explanation which might drive the court to draw a different inference. It is useful to quote the following observation in State of W.B. v. Mir Mohammad Omar and Ors. [  MANU/SC/0535/2000 : 2000:INSC:422 : (2000) 8 SCC 382: 2000 SCC (Cri) 1516]: (SCC p. 393, para 38)

38. Vivian Bose, J., had observed that Section 106 of the Evidence Act is designed to meet certain exceptional cases in which it would be impossible for the prosecution to establish certain facts which are particularly within the knowledge of the Accused. In Shambhu Nath Mehra v. The State of Ajmer [  MANU/SC/0023/1956 : 1956:INSC:15 : AIR 1956 SC 404: 1956 Cri LJ 794] the learned Judge has stated the legal principle thus:

11. This lays down the general Rule that in a criminal case the burden of proof is on the prosecution and Section 106 is certainly not intended to relieve it of that duty. On the contrary, it is designed to meet certain exceptional cases in which it would be impossible, or at any rate disproportionately difficult, for the prosecution to establish facts which are "especially" within the knowledge of the Accused and which he could prove without difficulty or inconvenience.

The word "especially" stresses that. It means facts that are pre-eminently or exceptionally within his knowledge.

(Emphasis supplied)

The law does not enjoin a duty on the prosecution to lead evidence of such character which is almost impossible to be led or at any rate extremely difficult to be led. The duty on the prosecution is to lead such evidence which it is capable of leading, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case. Here it is necessary to keep in mind Section 106 of the Evidence Act which says that when any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him. Illustration (b) appended to this Section throws some light on the content and scope of this provision and it reads:

(b) A is charged with travelling on a railway without ticket. The burden of proving that he had a ticket is on him.

15. Where an offence like murder is committed in secrecy inside a house, the initial burden to establish the case would undoubtedly be upon the prosecution, but the nature and amount of evidence to be led by it to establish the charge cannot be of the same degree as is required in other cases of circumstantial evidence. The burden would be of a comparatively lighter character. In view of Section 106 of the Evidence Act there will be a corresponding burden on the inmates of the house to give a cogent explanation as to how the crime was committed. The inmates of the house cannot get away by simply keeping quiet and offering no explanation on the supposed premise that the burden to establish its case lies entirely upon the prosecution and there is no duty at all on an Accused to offer any explanation.

22. Where an Accused is alleged to have committed the murder of his wife and the prosecution succeeds in leading evidence to show that shortly before the commission of crime they were seen together or the offence takes place in the dwelling home where the husband also normally resided, it has been consistently held that if the Accused does not offer any explanation how the wife received injuries or offers an explanation which is found to be false, it is a strong circumstance which indicates that he is responsible for commission of the crime. ...

31. The pristine Rule that the burden of proof is on the prosecution to prove the guilt of the Accused should not be taken as a recognized doctrine as though it admits no process of intelligent reasoning. The doctrine of presumption is not alien to the above rule, nor would it impair the temper of the rule. On the other hand, if the traditional Rule relating to burden of proof of the prosecution is allowed to be wrapped in pedantic coverage, the offenders in serious offences would be the major beneficiaries and the society would be the casualty.

32. In this case, when the prosecution succeeded in establishing the afore-narrated circumstances, the court has to presume the existence of certain facts. Presumption is a course recognized by the law for the court to rely on in conditions such as this.

33. Presumption of fact is an inference as to the existence of one fact from the existence of some other facts, unless the truth of such inference is disproved. Presumption of fact is a Rule in law of evidence that a fact otherwise doubtful may be inferred from certain other proved facts. When inferring the existence of a fact from other set of proved facts, the court exercises a process of reasoning and reaches a logical conclusion as the most probable position. The above principle has gained legislative recognition in India when Section 114 is incorporated in the Evidence Act. It empowers the court to presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have happened. In that process the court shall have regard to the common course of natural events, human conduct etc. in relation to the facts of the case.

34. When it is proved to the satisfaction of the Court that Mahesh was abducted by the Accused and they took him out of that area, the Accused alone knew what happened to him until he was with them. If he was found murdered within a short time after the abduction the permitted reasoning process would enable the Court to draw the presumption that the Accused have murdered him. Such inference can be disrupted if the Accused would tell the Court what else happened to Mahesh at least until he was in their custody.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 437 of 2015

Decided On: 03.05.2024

Anees Vs. The State Govt. of NCT

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, C.J.I., J.B. Pardiwala and Manoj Misra, JJ.

Author: J.B. Pardiwala, J.

Citation:  MANU/SC/0379/2024,2024 INSC 368

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Leading judgment of Supreme court on appreciation of DNA evidence

We may remember that Section 112 of the Evidence Act was enacted at a time when the modern scientific advancement and DNA test were not even in contemplation of the Legislature. The result of DNA test is said to be scientifically accurate. Although Section 112 raises a presumption of conclusive proof on satisfaction of the conditions enumerated therein but the same is rebuttable. The presumption may afford legitimate means of arriving at an affirmative legal conclusion. While the truth or fact is known, in our opinion, there is no need or room for any presumption. Where there is evidence to the contrary, the presumption is rebuttable and must yield to proof. Interest of justice is best served by ascertaining the truth and the court should be furnished with the best available science and may not be left to bank upon presumptions, unless science has no answer to the facts in issue. In our opinion, when there is a conflict between a conclusive proof envisaged under law and a proof based on scientific advancement accepted by the world community to be correct, the latter must prevail over the former.

18. We must understand the distinction between a legal fiction and the presumption of a fact. Legal fiction assumes existence of a fact which may not really exist. However presumption of a fact depends on satisfaction of certain circumstances. Those circumstances logically would lead to the fact sought to be presumed. Section 112 of the Evidence Act does not create a legal fiction but provides for presumption.

19. The husband's plea that he had no access to the wife when the child was begotten stands proved by the DNA test report and in the face of it, we cannot compel the Appellant to bear the fatherhood of a child, when the scientific reports prove to the contrary. We are conscious that an innocent child may not be bastardized as the marriage between her mother and father was subsisting at the time of her birth, but in view of the DNA test reports and what we have observed above, we cannot forestall the consequence. It is denying the truth. "Truth must triumph" is the hallmark of justice.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 24 of 2014 (Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 8852 of 2008)

Decided On: 06.01.2014

 Nandlal Wasudeo Badwaik  Vs. Lata Nandlal Badwaik and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

C.K. Prasad and J.S. Khehar, JJ.

Citation: (2014) 2 SCC 576

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Distinction between legal fiction and presumption of a fact.

We must understand the distinction between a legal fiction and the presumption of a fact. Legal fiction assumes existence of a fact which may not really exist. However presumption of a fact depends on satisfaction of certain circumstances. Those circumstances logically would lead to the fact sought to be presumed. Section 112 of the Evidence Act does not create a legal fiction but provides for presumption. The husband’s plea that he had no access to the wife when the child was begotten stands proved by the DNA test report and in the face of it, we cannot compel the appellant to bear the fatherhood of a child, when the scientific reports prove to the contrary. We are conscious that an innocent child may not be bastardized as the marriage between her mother and father was subsisting at the time of her birth, but in view of the DNA test reports and what we have observed above, we cannot forestall the consequence. It is denying the truth. “Truth must triumph” is the hallmark of justice.

Supreme Court of India

Nandlal Wasudeo Badwaik vs Lata Nandlal Badwaik & Anr. on 6 January, 2014

Citation; 2014 (crimes) 10 SC,(2014) 2 SCC576

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