Supreme Court: 2018 Amendment To Specific Relief Act Is Not Retrospective

 Specific Relief Act, 1963 - 2018 Amendment - Supreme Court clarified that the 2018 amendment to the Act of 1963, which made the grant of specific performance of contracts a mandatory relief, has no retrospective effect and does not apply to suits or transactions that arose before its enforcement on October 1, 2018. [Relied on Katta Sujatha Reddy v. Siddamsetty Infra Projects (P) Ltd. 2023 1 SCC 355; Siddamsetty Infra Projects (P.) Ktd. V. Katta Sujatha Reddy 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3214; Paras 34-38].

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA 

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION 

SLP (C) No. 26848-26849/2018; 

ANNAMALAI Vs VASANTHI AND OTHERS

J.B. PARDIWALA; J., MANOJ MISRA; J.

Author: MANOJ MISRA, J.

Dated: October 29, 2025

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Bombay HC: When substantive rights of accused are violated, said order will be intermediate order and criminal revision is maintainable against said order

 Here in this case, the learned Magistrate applied that provision of law which was not at all applicable to the case in hand before him, therefore, definitely it had affected the right of the accused. Consequently it cannot be said that, the order which was passed by the learned Magistrate was purely "interlocutory order" as contemplated under Section 397 (2) of Code of Criminal Procedure. The learned Additional Sessions Judge was justified in setting aside the said order by exercising his power under Section 397 (1) of Code of Criminal Procedure. There is no merit in the present writ petition much less to invoke the constitutional powers of this Court under Article 226 and 227, hence the writ petition is hereby dismissed. Rule is discharged. {Para 11}

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (AURANGABAD BENCH)

Criminal Writ Petition No. 1848 of 2019

Decided On: 11.12.2019

Hitendra Vs. Shankar and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Vibha Kankanwadi, J.

Citation:  MANU/MH/3561/2019.

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Supreme Court: Section 143A of Negotiable Instruments Act on Interim Compensation is not retrospective

In our view, the applicability of Section 143A of the Act must, therefore, be held to be prospective in nature and confined to cases where offences were committed after the introduction of Section 143A, in order to force an Accused to pay such interim compensation.

23. We must, however, advert to a decision of this Court in Surinder Singh Deswal and Ors. v. Virender Gandhi MANU/SC/0793/2019 : (2019) 8 SCALE 445 where Section 148 of the Act which was also introduced by the same Amendment Act 20 of 2018 from 01.09.2018 was held by this Court to be retrospective in operation. As against Section 143A of the Act which applies at the trial stage that is even before the pronouncement of guilt or order of conviction, Section 148 of the Act applies at the appellate stage where the Accused is already found guilty of the offence Under Section 138 of the Act. It may be stated that there is no provision in Section 148 of the Act which is similar to Sub-Section (5) of Section 143A of the Act. However, as a matter of fact, no such provision akin to Sub-section (5) of Section 143A was required as Sections 421 and 357 of the Code, which apply post-conviction, are adequate to take care of such requirements. In that sense said Section 148 depends upon the existing machinery and principles already in existence and does not create any fresh disability of the nature similar to that created by Section 143A of the Act. Therefore, the decision of this Court in Surinder Singh Deswal MANU/SC/8202/2007 : (2007) 13 SCC 492 stands on a different footing.

24. In the ultimate analysis, we hold Section 143A to be prospective in operation and that the provisions of said Section 143A can be applied or invoked only in cases where the offence Under Section 138 of the Act was committed after the introduction of said Section 143A in the statute book. Consequently, the orders passed by the Trial Court as well as the High Court are required to be set aside. The money deposited by the Appellant, pursuant to the interim direction passed by this Court, shall be returned to the Appellant along with interest accrued thereon within two weeks from the date of this order.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 1160 of 2019 

Decided On: 30.07.2019

 G.J. Raja Vs. Tejraj Surana

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

U.U. Lalit and Vineet Saran, JJ.

Citation: AIR 2019 SC 3817,2019(5) MHLJ 761

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Whether S 6 of Hindu Succession amendment Act 2005 is prospective in nature?

The text of the amendment itself clearly provides that the right conferred on a 'daughter of a coparcener' is 'on and from the commencement of Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005'. Section 6(3) talks of death after the amendment for its applicability. In view of plain language of the statute, there is no scope for a different interpretation than the one suggested by the text of the amendment. An amendment of a substantive provision is always prospective unless either expressly or by necessary intendment it is retrospective Shyam Sunder v. Ram Kumar MANU/SC/0405/2001 : (2001) 8 SCC 24, Paras 22 to 27. In the present case, there is neither any express provision for giving retrospective effect to the amended provision nor necessary intendment to that effect. Requirement of partition being registered can have no application to statutory notional partition on opening of succession as per unamended provision, having regard to nature of such partition which is by operation of law. The intent and effect of the Amendment will be considered a little later. On this finding, the view of the High Court cannot be sustained.

18. Contention of the Respondents that the Amendment should be read as retrospective being a piece of social legislation cannot be accepted. Even a social legislation cannot be given retrospective effect unless so provided for or so intended by the legislature. In the present case, the legislature has expressly made the Amendment applicable on and from its commencement and only if death of the coparcener in question is after the Amendment. Thus, no other interpretation is possible in view of express language of the statute. The proviso keeping dispositions or alienations or partitions prior to 20th December, 2004 unaffected can also not lead to the inference that the daughter could be a coparcener prior to the commencement of the Act. The proviso only means that the transactions not covered thereby will not affect the extent of coparcenary property which may be available when the main provision is applicable. Similarly, Explanation has to be read harmoniously with the substantive provision of Section 6(5) by being limited to a transaction of partition effected after 20th December, 2004. Notional partition, by its very nature, is not covered either under proviso or under Sub-section 5 or under the Explanation.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 7217 of 2013, 

Decided On: 16.10.2015

 Prakash Vs.  Phulavati 

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Whether standard rent will be payable from date of filing of application for grant of standard rent?

However, it is to be noted that the direction to pay standard rent has been given from the date of execution of the sale deed in favour of the landlady. The standard rent has been directed to be paid from 1-3-2008 till filing of the suit. This finding has again been confirmed by the appellate Court. It is, however, to be noted that the landlady had sought determination of standard rent by filing an application in that regard alongwith the suit for eviction. The suit in question was filed in October 2010 and in the application for fixation of standard rent, a prayer was made to fix the same from 1-11-2010 onwards. When an application is moved for fixing standard rent under Section 8(1) of the said Act, on such standard rent being fixed, it would be ideal for the same to be directed to be paid from the date of the application. The reason for the landlady to seek determination of standard rent is because she found the same to be on a lower side. She therefore sought the same to be fixed by moving an application under Section 8(1) of the said Act. There could not have been a direction to pay the same retrospectively. Reference in this regard can be made to the decision of the Nagpur High Court in Kewalchand Kastoorchand v. Samirmal Jaini and another MANU/NA/0060/1952 : 1953 NLJ 294. It has been held by the Division Bench that once fair rent is determined, the same would have prospective operation and such fair rent can be directed to be paid from the date such application is moved.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (NAGPUR BENCH)

Writ Petition No. 211 of 2015

Decided On: 30.06.2016

 Zainab Bee Vs. Prabhakar Rajaram Kharwade

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:A.S. Chandurkar, J.

Citation: 2017(2) MHLJ 374

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S 311-A of CRPC is not retrospective,it is prospective in nature?

After referring to Section 5 of the Identification of
Prisoners Act, 1980 in Ram Babu Misra’s case, this Court
suggested that a suitable legislation be made along its lines to
provide for investiture of Magistrates with powers to issue
directions to any person including an accused person to give
specimen signatures and handwriting. Accordingly, a new Section
311-A was inserted in the Criminal Procedure Code. Section
311-A Cr.P.C. reads as under:-
“Section 311A. Power of Magistrate to order person to give specimen
signatures or handwriting.-If a Magistrate of the first class is satisfied
that, for the purposes of any investigation or proceeding under this
Code, it is expedient to direct any person, including an accused
person, to give specimen signatures or handwriting, he may make an
order to that effect and in that case the person to whom the order
relates shall be produced or shall attend at the time and place
specified in such order and shall give his specimen signatures or
handwriting:
Provided that no order shall be made under this section unless the
person has at some time been arrested in connection with such
investigation or proceeding.”
The said amendment is prospective in nature and not
retrospective.
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 224 OF 2012
SUKH RAM 
V
STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH
Citation: 2016 CRLJ 4146 SC

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When change in law will operate retrospectively?

Reference may also be made upon the decision of this Court in Anant Gopal Sheorey v. State of Bombay AIR 1958 SC 915 where the legal position was stated in the following words: "4. The question that arises for decision is whether to a pending prosecution the provisions of the amended Code have become applicable. There is no controversy on the general principles applicable to the case. No person has a vested right in any course of procedure. He has only the right of prosecution or defence in the manner prescribed for the time being by or for the Court in which the case is pending and if by an Act of Parliament the mode of procedure is altered he has no other right than to proceed according to the altered mode. See Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes on p. 225; The Colonial Sugar Refining Co. Ltd. v. Irving (1905) A.C. 369, 372). In other words a change in the law of procedure operates retrospectively and unlike the law relating to vested right is not only prospective.
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Ramesh Kumar Soni Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh on 26 February, 2013

[Criminal Appeal No. 353 of 2013 arising out of S.L.P. (CRL.) No.5663 of 2011]

T.S. THAKUR, J.
Citation:(2013) 14 SCC 696

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