Supreme Court: Under which circumstances a subsequent change of law will not render an earlier decision on a pure question of law ineffective as res judicata

The second limb of the High Court's reasoning, that Vineeta Sharma constitutes a 'change in law' which overrides res judicata is equally unsustainable. It is true that in Mathura Prasad Bajoo Jaiswal (supra), this Court in Para 9 held that a subsequent change in law can render an earlier decision on a pure question of law ineffective as res judicata. However, this exception applies only where the legal basis of the earlier decision has been undermined by the subsequent pronouncement. {Para 40}

41. The question, therefore, is whether Vineeta Sharma effects any change in the law relevant to the 2013 order. The answer, in our view, is in the negative. The 2013 order proceeded on the basis that even assuming the daughters are not coparceners and the partition is valid, the father died intestate and the daughters have a right in the father's share Under Section 8 of the H.S. Act. Vineeta Sharma (supra) deals with the scope of the 2005 Amendment vis-à-vis coparcenary rights and the saving clause for pre-2004 partitions. It holds, inter alia, that daughters become coparceners by birth, that the 2005 Amendment is retroactive in nature, and that Section 6(5) saves only partitions effected before 20.12.2004 by registered deed or court decree. What Vineeta Sharma (supra) does not do is alter the settled position which was the foundation of the 2013 order, that where a Hindu male dies intestate, his property devolves Under Section 8 on all Class I heirs including daughters. The "basis" of the 2013 judgment remains entirely undisturbed by Vineeta Sharma. The High Court's reasoning that Vineeta Sharma (supra) did away with the basis of the 2013 order is, with respect, erroneous.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 7939 of 2026 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 23709 of 2024)

B.S. Lalitha and Ors. Vs. Bhuvanesh and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Augustine George Masih and Sanjay Karol, JJ.

Author: Augustine George Masih, J.

Citation: 2026 INSC 499, MANU/SC/0483/2026

Dated: MAY 15, 2026.

Read full judgment here: Click here.

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From Possession to Precedent: Unraveling Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act

 The landscape of Hindu women’s inheritance rights has witnessed seismic judicial shifts in the past two years. Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956—once hailed as a watershed for converting limited estates into absolute ownership—now stands at the crossroads of conflicting interpretations. Recent Supreme Court and Bombay High Court pronouncements have both expanded and constrained its ambit, compelling the apex Court to refer the matter to a larger bench for definitive resolution.

Introduction

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What is the difference between section 14(1) and 14(2) of Hindu Succession Act, 1956?

 Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, is a pivotal provision that transformed women's property rights under Hindu law. The two subsections work together but serve distinct purposes in defining a Hindu woman's ownership rights.

Section 14(1): General Rule of Absolute Ownership

Section 14(1) establishes the fundamental principle that "any property possessed by a female Hindu, whether acquired before or after the commencement of this Act, shall be held by her as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner". This provision converts what was previously limited ownership into absolute ownership.

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Important provisions of Civil minor Acts(Part 2)

 

1) Important provisions of Registration Act 1908.

https://www.lawweb.in/2022/09/important-provisions-of-registration.html

2) Important provisions of Mental Healthcare Act, 2017

https://www.lawweb.in/2020/04/important-provisions-of-mental.html

3) Notes on Hindu succession Act 1956 as amended in the year 2005.

https://www.lawweb.in/2019/05/notes-on-hindu-succession-act-1956.html

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What are Kinds of guardians under Hindu Law?

 Under Hindu law, there are several kinds of guardians who are recognized to protect the interests of individuals who may not be capable of making their own decisions or protecting their rights. These guardians play different roles and have various responsibilities. The kinds of guardians under Hindu law include:

• 1) Natural Guardian (Section 6 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956): Natural guardians are the parents of a minor. The mother and father are recognized as the natural guardians of their minor children. The father is the primary natural guardian, but the mother is also a natural guardian in certain circumstances. The natural guardian has the duty to take care of the minor's person and property.

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Notes on applicability of custom in Indian law

 Definition of Custom: 

As per S 3 of Hindu Marriage Act, 

1. the expressions “custom” and “usage” signify any rule which, having been continuously and uniformly observed for a long time, has obtained the force of law among Hindus in any local area, tribe, community, group or family:

Provided that the rule is certain and not unreasonable or opposed to public policy; and Provided further that in the case of a rule applicable only to a family it has not been discontinued by the family;

Custom, in the context of law, refers to a long-established practice or rule of conduct that has gained the force of law within a particular society or community. It is a source of law that complements statutory law. Customs are often unwritten and transmitted orally from generation to generation, but they can also be found in written records, such as ancient texts or court decisions.

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Supreme Court expounds the law relating to right of illegitimate child in father's ancestral property

K. Conclusion

54. We now formulate our conclusions in the following terms:

(i) In terms of Sub-section (1) of Section 16, a child of a marriage which is null and void Under Section 11 is statutorily conferred with legitimacy irrespective of whether (i) such a child is born before or after the commencement of Amending Act 1976; (ii) a decree of nullity is granted in respect of that marriage under the Act and the marriage is held to be void otherwise than on a petition under the enactment;

(ii) In terms of Sub-section (2) of Section 16 where a voidable marriage has been annulled by a decree of nullity Under Section 12, a child 'begotten or conceived' before the decree has been made, is deemed to be their legitimate child notwithstanding the decree, if the child would have been legitimate to the parties to the marriage if a decree of dissolution had been passed instead of a decree of nullity;

(iii) While conferring legitimacy in terms of Sub-section (1) on a child born from a void marriage and Under Sub-section (2) to a child born from a voidable marriage which has been annulled, the legislature has stipulated in Sub-section (3) of Section 16 that such a child will have rights to or in the property of the parents and not in the property of any other person;

(iv) While construing the provisions of Section 3(1)(j) of the HSA 1956 including the proviso, the legitimacy which is conferred by Section 16 of the HMA 1955 on a child born from a void or, as the case may be, voidable marriage has to be read into the provisions of the HSA 1956. In other words, a child who is legitimate Under Sub-section (1) or Sub-section (2) of Section 16 of the HMA would, for the purposes of Section 3(1)(j) of the HSA 1956, fall within the ambit of the explanation 'related by legitimate kinship' and cannot be regarded as an 'illegitimate child' for the purposes of the proviso;

(v) Section 6 of the HSA 1956 continues to recognize the institution of a joint Hindu family governed by the Mitakshara law and the concepts of a coparcener, the acquisition of an interest as a coparcener by birth and rights in coparcenary property. By the substitution of Section 6, equal rights have been granted to daughters, in the same manner as sons as indicated by Sub-section (1) of Section 6;

(vi) Section 6 of the HSA 1956 provides for the devolution of interest in coparcenary property. Prior to the substitution of Section 6 with effect from 9 September 2005 by the Amending Act of 2005, Section 6 stipulated the devolution of interest in a Mitakshara coparcenary property of a male Hindu by survivorship on the surviving members of the coparcenary. The exception to devolution by survivorship was where the deceased had left surviving a female relative specified in Class I of the Schedule or a male relative in Class I claiming through a female relative, in which event the interest of the deceased in a Mitakshara coparcenary property would devolve by testamentary or intestate succession and not by survivorship. In terms of Sub-section (3) of Section 6 as amended, on a Hindu dying after the commencement of the Amending Act of 2005 his interest in the property of a Joint Hindu family governed by the Mitakshara law will devolve by testamentary or intestate succession, as the case may be, under the enactment and not by survivorship. As a consequence of the substitution of Section 6, the Rule of devolution by testamentary or intestate succession of the interest of a deceased Hindu in the property of a Joint Hindu family governed by Mitakshara law has been made the norm;

(vii) Section 8 of the HSA 1956 provides general Rules of succession for the devolution of the property of a male Hindu dying intestate. Section 10 provides for the distribution of the property among heirs of Class I of the Schedule. Section 15 stipulates the general Rules of succession in the case of female Hindus dying intestate. Section 16 provides for the order of succession and the distribution among heirs of a female Hindu;

(viii) While providing for the devolution of the interest of a Hindu in the property of a Joint Hindu family governed by Mitakshara law, dying after the commencement of the Amending Act of 2005 by testamentary or intestate succession, Section 6(3) lays down a legal fiction namely that 'the coparcenary property shall be deemed to have been divided as if a partition had taken place'. According to the Explanation, the interest of a Hindu Mitakshara coparcener is deemed to be the share in the property that would have been allotted to him if a partition of the property has taken place immediately before his death irrespective of whether or not he is entitled to claim partition;

(ix) For the purpose of ascertaining the interest of a deceased Hindu Mitakshara coparcener, the law mandates the assumption of a state of affairs immediately prior to the death of the coparcener namely, a partition of the coparcenary property between the deceased and other members of the coparcenary. Once the share of the deceased in property that would have been allotted to him if a partition had taken place immediately before his death is ascertained, his heirs including the children who have been conferred with legitimacy Under Section 16 of the HMA 1955, will be entitled to their share in the property which would have been allotted to the deceased upon the notional partition, if it had taken place; and

(x) The provisions of the HSA 1956 have to be harmonized with the mandate in Section 16(3) of the HMA 1955 which indicates that a child who is conferred with legitimacy Under Sub-sections (1) and (2) will not be entitled to rights in or to the property of any person other than the parents. The property of the parent, where the parent had an interest in the property of a Joint Hindu family governed under the Mitakshara law has to be ascertained in terms of the Explanation to Sub-section (3), as interpreted above.

55. Before concluding, it would be necessary to clarify that the reference to the three Judge Bench in this batch of cases is confined to Joint Hindu families governed by Mitakshara law. This Court has, therefore, dwelt on the interpretation of the provisions of the HSA 1956 in relation to Joint Hindu families of that class.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal Nos. 2844 of 2011,

Revanasiddappa and Ors. Vs. Mallikarjun and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, C.J.I., J.B. Pardiwala and Manoj Misra, JJ.

Author: Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, C.J.I.

Decided On: 01.09.2023

Citation: 2023/INSC/783 : MANU/SC/0956/2023.

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Privy Council: The principle of joint tenancy is unknown to Hindu law except in the case of the joint property of an undivided Hindu family

 With reference to this decision Lord Watson observed:

There are two substantial reasons why it ought not to be followed as an authority. In the first place it appears to their Lordships that the learned Judges of the High Court of Madras were not justified in importing into the construction of a Hindu will an extremely technical rule of English conveyancing. The principle of joint tenancy appears to be unknown to Hindu law, except in the case of coparcenary between the members of an undivided family. In the second place the learned Judges misapprehended the law of England, because it is clear, according to that law, that a conveyance, or an agreement to convey his or her personal interest by one of the joint tenants, operates as severance.

12. In their Lordships' opinion this is a clear ruling that the principle of joint tenancy is unknown to Hindu law except in the case of the joint property of an undivided Hindu family governed by the Mitakshara law which under that law passes by survivorship. There could therefore be no question of these grants creating a joint tenancy as opposed to a tenancy in common, even if according to English law the terms of these instruments admitted of such a construction.

13. As to the question whether these grants were made to these two brothers severally or as members of a joint family that depends on the intention of the donor as expressed in the grants. Prima facie a gift to a member of a joint Hindu family is his separate property and will only become joint family property when it descends to his sons, unless he himself has made it joint family property by throwing it into the common stock. There is nothing in the terms of these maintenance grants to these two brothers to suggest that the Government intended to make a grant to a joint family.

 BEFORE THE PRIVY COUNCIL

Decided On: 12.01.1933

Bahu Rani and Ors. Vs. Rajendra Baksh Singh

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Thankerton, John Wallis and Lancelot Sanderson, JJ.

Author: John Wallis, J.

Citation: MANU/PR/0002/1933

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Supreme Court: Daughter's Right To Inherit Self-Acquired Property Of Father Dying Intestate Recognized Under Customary Hindu Law

 Our Analysis

66. Right of a widow or daughter to inherit the self-acquired property or share received in partition of a coparcenary property of a Hindu male dying intestate is well recognized not only under the old customary Hindu Law but also by various judicial pronouncements and thus, our answer to the question Nos. 1 and 2 are as under :-

“If a property of a male Hindu dying intestate is a self-acquired property or obtained in partition of a co-parcenery or a family property, the same would devolve by inheritance and not by survivorship, and a daughter of such a male Hindu would be entitled to inherit such property in preference to other collaterals.”

67. In the case at hands, since the property in question was admittedly the self-acquired property of Marappa Gounder despite the family being in state of jointness upon his death intestate, his sole surviving daughter Kupayee Ammal, will inherit the same by inheritance and the property shall not devolve by survivorship.

Supreme Court

JUSTICE S. ABDUL NAZEER JUSTICE KRISHNA MURARI

ARUNACHALA GOUNDER (DEAD) BY LRS. Vs. PONNUSAMY AND ORS.

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6659 OF 2011

20th January 2022

Author: KRISHNA MURARI, J.

Citation:  2022 ALL SCR (ONLINE) 59.

Read full Judgment here: Click here

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Supreme Court: Joint Family In DV Act Mean Members Live Together As Family & Not As Understood In Hindu Law

  In our view, the D.V. Act is a piece of Civil Code which is applicable to every woman in India irrespective of her religious affiliation and/or social background for a more effective protection of her rights guaranteed under the Constitution and in order to protect women victims of domestic violence occurring in a domestic relationship. Therefore, the expression 'joint family' cannot mean as understood in Hindu Law. Thus, the expression 'family members living together as a joint family', means the members living jointly as a family. In such an interpretation, even a girl child/children who is/are cared for as foster children also have a right to live in a shared household and are conferred with the right Under Sub-section (1) of Section 17 of the D.V. Act. When such a girl child or woman becomes an aggrieved person, the protection of Sub-section (2) of Section 17 comes into play. {Para 36}

 43. Further, the expression 'family members living together as a joint family' is not relatable only to relationship through consanguinity, marriage or adoption. As observed above, the expression 'joint family' does not mean a joint family as understood in Hindu Law. It would mean persons living together jointly as a family. It would include not only family members living together when they are related by consanguinity, marriage or adoption but also those persons who are living together or jointly as a joint family such as foster children who live with other members who are related by consanguinity, marriage or by adoption. Therefore, when any woman is in a domestic relationship as discussed above, is subjected to any act of domestic violence and becomes an aggrieved person, she is entitled to avail the remedies under the D.V. Act.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 511 of 2022

Prabha Tyagi Vs.  Kamlesh Devi

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Whether step mother can execute agreement of sale regarding immovable property as karta if she has inherited it alongwith her step daughters from her husband?

There is no dispute about the fact that the suit properties were the separate properties of Dajiba. After his demise somewhere

in the year 1966-67 his widow i.e. defendant no.1 and daughters,

who are the plaintiffs simultaneously succeeded to his estate in view of Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act. However, in view of provision of Section 19 of that Act, all these heirs of Dajiba would inherit as tenants in common and not as joint tenants. Once such a devolution is understood, the matter becomes clear like a day light. The very theory of existence of a karta and legal necessity presupposes that the sharers are joint, which is not the case in the matter in hand. By virtue of such mode of succession by the widow and four daughters of Dajiba receiving the suit properties as his heirs, they take their individual shares as tenants in common. In the bsence of the suit properties being joint, therefore, there was no question of the step mother - defendant no.1 acting as a manager or karta of the family. She, therefore, had no right to deal with the suit properties even for legal necessity.It has been held that under Hindu Law coparcenership is a necessary qualification for becoming a manager of joint Hindu family and since a widow cannot be a coparcener she is not legally entitled to become a manager. 

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

BENCH AT AURANGABAD

SECOND APPEAL NO.1648 OF 2005

Kamalabai  Vitthalrao Jadhav Vs Darubai W/o. Dajiba

CORAM : MANGESH S. PATIL, J.

Pronounced on : 31-03-2022

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Whether children born out of void marriage are class 1 Legal heirs as S 8 of the Hindu Succession Act?

This Court in the matter of Laxmibai

and others vrs. Limbabai, reported in 1983 Mh.L.J.103, has

recorded a finding that the children born out of the marriage

which is void cannot be termed illegitimate one and they are

covered by the expression ‘son and daughter - class-I' for

Scheduled 8 of the Hindu Succession Act.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

CIVIL APPELLATER JURISDICTION

SECOND APPEAL NO. 269 OF 1992

 Shri Vishnu Laxman Padule Vs  Laxman Rama Padule,

CORAM: N.W.SAMBRE, J .

DATE : 9 JANUARY, 2020.

Citation: 2021(2) MHLJ 288

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Whether the daughter can get a partition of ancestral property by disowning relinquishment deed?

 The plaintiffs, while admitting the execution of sale deed Ex.A-2, refute the release deed. The recital in the release deed refers the execution of sale deed Ex.A-2 in respect of 0.91 cents and about the receipt of Rs. 2,32,060/- each by the plaintiffs 1 and 2, as consideration for relinquishing their right in the remaining property, left by their father.{Para 11}

12. Two reasons are mentioned in Ex.A-4 for the cancellation of the release deed Ex.A-3. First, it was obtained by fraud and misrepresentation. They came to know about it, when they applied for encumbrance certificate. Second, the plaintiffs were not paid the full amount agreed by the defendants 1 to 5. These two reasons found in the deed of cancellation conspicuously not mentioned in the plaint. Further, for the first reason, the plaintiffs have not mentioned the date of their application for E.C (encumbrance certificate) or evidence to show they applied for E.C (encumbrance certificate). For the second reason (i.e.,) short payment of the money agreed, the amount paid and the exact amount unpaid neither pleaded nor proved.

13. By filing the partition suit, the plaintiffs disown their own document namely the release deed Ex.A-4 duly registered and presumed to be an official act performed regularly. If the terms of contract reduced into writing and duly registered is sought to be excluded by oral evidence, the burden is on the plaintiffs to adduce evidence sufficient to exclude the written evidence, as per section 92 of the Evidence Act.

16. Section 91 and section 92 proviso (i) of Indian Evidence Act, clearly lay down the rule when a written evidence could be excluded by oral evidence is permissible. In this case, the due execution of release deed Ex.A-3 is proved through the document and through the attesting witness D.W-2. To disprove it, the plaintiffs have not placed sufficient evidence to establish same was executed by misleading them and the consideration mentioned in the release deed not paid to them.

19. After executing a release deed (Ex.A-3) on 12.07.2006, the plaintiffs had cancelled the said release deed (Ex.A.4) on 17.08.2006 without any notice to the beneficiary of the release deed. Later, without any further relief of declaration in respect of those deeds, the suit for partition filed. When Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, restrains the Courts from entertaining suits filed for mere declaration as to right when the plaintiffs are able to seek further relief, and same omitted to do so. Therefore, for the reasons stated above, this Court confirms the decree and judgment of the Additional District Court, Fast Track Court No. V, Coimbatore and dismissed the Appeal with costs.

 In the High Court of Madras

(Before G. Jayachandran, J.)

Tmt. Karuppathal  Vs P. Ponnusamy, (deceased) 

A.S. No. 809 of 2009

Decided on February 17, 2021,

Citation: 2021 SCC OnLine Mad 677

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

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Whether the court can take into consideration change in the law as well as changes due to subsequent events in the final decree proceeding or appeal in partition suit?

  Once the constitution of coparcenary changes by birth or death, shares have to be worked out at the time of actual partition. The shares will have to be determined in changed scenario. The severance of status cannot come in the way to give effect to statutory provision and change by subsequent event. The statutory fiction of partition is far short of actual partition, it does not bring about the disruption of the joint family or that of coparcenary is a settled proposition of law. For the reasons mentioned above, we are also of the opinion that mere severance of status by way of filing a suit does not bring about the partition and till the date of the final decree, change in law, and changes due to the subsequent event can be taken into consideration. {Para 99}

125. The severance of status may take place from the date of filing of a suit; however, a decree is necessary for working out the results of the same, and there may be a change of rights during the pendency of the suit for allotting definite shares till final decree is passed. There are cases in which partition can be reopened on the ground of fraud or mistake, etc. or on certain other permissible grounds. In appropriate cases, it can be reopened at the instance of minor also.

129. Resultantly, we answer the reference as under:

iv) The statutory fiction of partition created by proviso to Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 as originally enacted did not bring about the actual partition or disruption of coparcenary. The fiction was only for the purpose of ascertaining share of deceased coparcener when he was survived by a female heir, of Class­I as specified in the Schedule to the Act of 1956 or male relative of such female. The provisions of the substituted Section 6 are required to be given full effect. Notwithstanding that a preliminary decree has been passed the daughters are to be given share in coparcenary equal to that of a son in pending proceedings for final decree or in an appeal.

Supreme Court of India

Vineeta Sharma vs Rakesh Sharma on 11 August, 2020

Author: Arun Mishra

ARUN MISHRA, J,S. Abdul Nazeer J,M.R. Shah J.

Dated:August 11, 2020.
Read full Judgment here: Click here

Citation: 2020 SCC OnLine SC 641,2021(1) MHLJ648.

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Whether the court can presume that wife had consented to adopt the child if she was present in the adoption ceremony?

  Learned single judge upon noticing that the

provisions of the proviso to section 7 of the 1956 Act are, in

part, pari materia to clause (c) of section 8 of the 1956 Act, by

applying the interpretation accorded to clause (c) of section 8 of

the 1956 Act by the Apex Court in Brajendra Singh’s case

(supra), held that the requirement of consent of the wife, under

the proviso to section 7 of the 1956 Act, cannot be dispensed

with where there is no dissolution of marriage even though the

wife might be estranged from her husband and staying

separate. In our considered view, the learned single judge was

right in holding that the consent of even an estranged wife for

taking in adoption would be required, if the marriage has not

been dissolved. No doubt, consent of wife would not be

required where the marriage has been dissolved or the wife has

completely renounced the world or has ceased to be a Hindu or

has been declared by a court of competent jurisdiction to be of

unsound mind. But, here, it has not been proved that the

marriage was dissolved. Rather, the document produced is to

the contrary. Further, there is nothing on record to suggest that

Phoolmati has completely renounced the world or has ceased

to be a Hindu or has been declared of unsound mind by any

court. Mere staying separate from one's husband may amount

to renouncing the husband but not the world. Under the

circumstances, Phoolmati's consent was required before her

husband could take in adoption.

11. Noticeably, there is no evidence brought on record

to demonstrate that consent of Phoolmati was obtained or was

there, before her husband allegedly took the appellant in

adoption. In Ghisalal v. Dhapubai, (2011) 2 SCC 298, the

Apex Court after laying emphasis on the mandatory

requirement of obtaining consent of wife before the husband

could validly take a son or a daughter in adoption, interpreted

the term consent, in paragraph 26 of the judgment, as follows:

“26. The term “consent” used in the proviso to Section 7

and the Explanation appended thereto has not been

defined in the Act. Therefore, while interpreting these

provisions, the court shall have to keep in view the legal

position obtaining before enactment of the 1956 Act, the

object of the new legislation and apply the rule of

purposive interpretation and if that is done, it would be

reasonable to say that the consent of wife envisaged in

the proviso to Section 7 should either be in writing or

reflected by an affirmative/positive act voluntarily and

willingly done by her. If the adoption by a Hindu male

becomes subject-matter of challenge before the court, the

party supporting the adoption has to adduce evidence to

prove that the same was done with the consent of his wife.

This can be done either by producing document

evidencing her consent in writing or by leading evidence to

show that wife had actively participated in the ceremonies

of adoption with an affirmative mindset to support the

action of the husband to take a son or a daughter in

adoption. The presence of wife as a spectator in the

assembly of people who gather at the place where the

ceremonies of adoption are performed cannot be treated

as her consent. In other words, the court cannot presume

the consent of wife simply because she was present at the

time of adoption. The wife's silence or lack of protest on

her part also cannot give rise to an inference that she had

consented to the adoption.”

(Emphasis supplied)

12. From the decision noticed above, the legal principle

deducible is that the party propounding an adoption by a Hindu

male, who has a living wife, has to adduce evidence to prove

that the same was done with the consent of his wife. This can

be done either by producing document evidencing her consent

in writing or by leading evidence to show that wife had actively

participated in the ceremonies of adoption with an affirmative

mindset to support the action of the husband to take a son or a

daughter in adoption. In other words, the court cannot presume

the consent of wife simply because she was present at the time

of adoption. The wife's silence or lack of protest on her part also

cannot give rise to an inference that she had consented to the

adoption.

ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT

Case :- SPECIAL APPEAL No. - 22 of 2021

Appellant :- Bhanu Pratap Singh

Respondent :- State Of U.P. And 3 Others

Coram:

Hon'ble Manoj Misra,J.

Hon'ble Rohit Ranjan Agarwal,J.

Order Date :- 22.2.2021

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Supreme Court: Major unmarried daughter not suffering from any physical or mental abnormality can not claim maintenance from her father U/S 125 of CRPC

1) By virtue of Section 125(1)(c), an

unmarried daughter even though she has attained

majority is entitled for maintenance, where such

unmarried daughter is by reason of any physical or

mental abnormality or injury is unable to maintain

itself. The Scheme under Section 125(1) Cr.P.C.,

thus, contemplate that claim of maintenance by a

daughter, who has attained majority is admissible

only when by reason of any physical or mental

abnormality or injury, she is unable to maintain

herself. 

2)  The purpose and object of Section 125 Cr.P.C. as

noted above is to provide immediate relief to

applicant in a summary proceedings, whereas right

under Section 20 read with Section 3(b) of Act, 1956

contains larger right, which needs determination by a

Civil Court, hence for the larger claims as enshrined

under Section 20, the proceedings need to be

initiated under Section 20 of the Act and the

legislature never contemplated to burden the

Magistrate while exercising jurisdiction under

Section 125 Cr.P.C. to determine the claims

contemplated by Act, 1956.

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 615 o f 2020

ABHILASHA  Vs  PARKASH 

Author: ASHOK BHUSHAN,J.

Dated:September 15, 2020.

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Important Notes on Hindu Law

1) Notes on Hindu succession Act 1956 as amended in the year 2005

https://www.lawweb.in/2019/05/notes-on-hindu-succession-act-1956.html

2) NOTES ON JOINT FAMILY PROPERTY UNDER HINDU LAW

https://www.lawweb.in/2018/06/notes-on-joint-family-property-under.html

3) NOTES ON HINDU MARRIAGE ACT

https://www.lawweb.in/2018/06/notes-on-hindu-marriage-act.html

4) Notes on changes brought about by Hindu Succession( Amendment) Act,2005

https://www.lawweb.in/2018/06/notes-on-changes-about-by-hindu.html

5) Whether family of son will inherit property of father if son murders his father?

https://www.lawweb.in/2019/07/whether-family-of-son-will-inherit.html

6) Partial partition of joint Hindu family property can be permitted in exceptional circumstances

 If suit for partition were allowed to be instituted in fragments, the jurisdiction of the trial Court and the forum of appeal might be altered; it might be of paramount importance to a party litigant whether he should have a first appeal or a second appeal to the High Court, and whether he should at all be permitted to seek the judgment of the judicial committee with regard to the matters in controversy. The rule further ensures a just partition; parties might otherwise be greatly prejudiced as regards equitable distribution, retention of possession, liability for improvements, and adjustment of accounts. It need not be disputed that there may be a very special cases where the application of the rule may be justly relaxed."

14. In Kenchegowda v. Siddegowda, , the Hon'ble

Supreme Court held that "when all the joint family properties are not made the subject-matter of the suit, nor the co-sharers have been impleaded, the suit for partial partition is not maintainable,"

Bombay High Court

Govindrao S/O Gangaramji Ajmire vs Dadarao @ Shrawan S/O Gangaramji ... on 6 April, 2004

https://www.lawweb.in/2013/09/partial-partition-can-be-permitted-in.html

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Whether children born to adoptee father prior to his adoption can inherit his property in Adoptive family?

 Since the succession has opened after the death of Laxman on 10th

January, 1987, therefore, succession has to be in accordance with

the Act and not as per Hindu law as all text, rule or interpretation

of Hindu law prior to commencement of the Act have ceased to

have any effect unless expressly provided for in the said Act. This

Court in a Judgment reported as Bhaiya Ramanuj Pratap Deo v.

Lalu Maheshanuj Pratap Deo(1981) 4 SCC 613 held that a bare perusal of

Section 4 would indicate that any custom or usage as part of Hindu

law in force will cease to have effect after the enforcement of

Hindu Succession Act with respect to any matter for which

provision is made in the Act.

14. The principle that the Act will be applicable on the date succession

opens is well settled. Reference may be made to a judgment reported

as Bhanwar Singh v. Puran & Ors. (2008) 3 SCC 87, wherein this Court

held that the Act brought about a sea of change in the matter of

inheritance and succession amongst Hindus. Section 4 of the Act

contains a non- obstante provision in terms whereof any text, rule

or interpretation of Hindu Law or any custom or usage as part of

that law in force immediately before the commencement of the

Act, ceased to have effect with respect to any matter for which

provision is made therein save as otherwise expressly provided.

15. Since there is no provision of denying the rights of succession to

the natural born son of an adoptee father, therefore, the succession

will be in terms of the provisions of the Act alone.

In my opinion, the fictional severance of ties with the

natural family would not mean that her children would

cease to be her children or can be considered to be not

her children by means of a legal fiction. If by virtue of

the definition in Section 3(j) even the illegitimate

children of a Hindu female have been given a right to

inherit her property, then it would not be permissible to

say that her legitimate children should be excluded

because they were born to her prior to the date of her

husband’s adoption. If, however, the Legislature had

specifically provided for this, then effect must be given

to such a provision and the wishes of the Legislature

respected. Where, however, there is no such clear

provision, such exclusion would appear to be against

the plain language of the enactment and it would not

be proper to come to any such conclusion.”

21. In view of the provisions of the Act which do not make any

distinction between the son born to a father prior or after adoption

of his father and that there is no provision which bars the natural

born son to inherit the property of his natural father, therefore, the

High Court has rightly upheld the rights of the sons of Laxman. In

fact, in the Full Bench judgment of Bombay High Court in Martand

Jiwajee Patil, it has been held that the natural father retains the

right to give in adoption his son born before his own adoption.

Therefore, if he has a right to give his son in adoption, such son has

a right to inherit property by virtue of being an agnate. There was

a full blood relationship between the three sons and the daughter

who was born after adoption. All the children of Laxman are

entitled to inherit the property of their natural father and mother in

accordance with the provisions of the Act as succession has opened

after the death of Laxman in 1987 and subsequently the mother in

the year 1992.

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 6642-6643 OF 2010

KALINDI DAMODAR GARDE  Vs MANOHAR LAXMAN KULKARNI 

HEMANT GUPTA, J.

Dated:FEBRUARY 07, 2020.
Citation: (2020) 4 SCC 335

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Whether co-sharer can sell specific portion of property?

11. Thus, it is clear that when the property in dispute is joint in nature, then although the co-sharer can sell the property to the extent of his share, but he cannot sell the specific piece of land. A co-sharer can alienate the property only to the extent of his share and alienation of the property beyond his share is void. 

 It is well established principle of law that unless and until the property is partitioned, the co-sharer can only sell to the extent of his share, but he cannot sell any specific portion of the land.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH (GWALIOR BENCH)

Second Appeal No. 373 of 2001

Decided On: 07.03.2019

 Parmal Singh  Vs.  Ghanshyam and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Gurpal Singh Ahluwalia, J.

Citation: AIR 2019 MP 131

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Whether S 6 of Hindu Succession amendment Act 2005 is prospective in nature?

The text of the amendment itself clearly provides that the right conferred on a 'daughter of a coparcener' is 'on and from the commencement of Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005'. Section 6(3) talks of death after the amendment for its applicability. In view of plain language of the statute, there is no scope for a different interpretation than the one suggested by the text of the amendment. An amendment of a substantive provision is always prospective unless either expressly or by necessary intendment it is retrospective Shyam Sunder v. Ram Kumar MANU/SC/0405/2001 : (2001) 8 SCC 24, Paras 22 to 27. In the present case, there is neither any express provision for giving retrospective effect to the amended provision nor necessary intendment to that effect. Requirement of partition being registered can have no application to statutory notional partition on opening of succession as per unamended provision, having regard to nature of such partition which is by operation of law. The intent and effect of the Amendment will be considered a little later. On this finding, the view of the High Court cannot be sustained.

18. Contention of the Respondents that the Amendment should be read as retrospective being a piece of social legislation cannot be accepted. Even a social legislation cannot be given retrospective effect unless so provided for or so intended by the legislature. In the present case, the legislature has expressly made the Amendment applicable on and from its commencement and only if death of the coparcener in question is after the Amendment. Thus, no other interpretation is possible in view of express language of the statute. The proviso keeping dispositions or alienations or partitions prior to 20th December, 2004 unaffected can also not lead to the inference that the daughter could be a coparcener prior to the commencement of the Act. The proviso only means that the transactions not covered thereby will not affect the extent of coparcenary property which may be available when the main provision is applicable. Similarly, Explanation has to be read harmoniously with the substantive provision of Section 6(5) by being limited to a transaction of partition effected after 20th December, 2004. Notional partition, by its very nature, is not covered either under proviso or under Sub-section 5 or under the Explanation.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 7217 of 2013, 

Decided On: 16.10.2015

 Prakash Vs.  Phulavati 

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