Whether step children are entitled to get maintenance from step parents?

 In my opinion, while construing Section 125 of the Code also, in
the absence of any definition or explanation to the effect that the words
“legitimate or illegitimate child” would also include a stepchild, that
word will have to be given its natural meaning and if so construed, the
legitimate or illegitimate child would mean only a child which has been
given birth by a woman from whom the maintenance is being claimed. A
stepdaughter is not an illegitimate child but a daughter of one’s spouse
born through another spouse. Section 125 contemplates blood relation
which gives rise to moral and legal obligation to maintain a person. 
48 I am dealing with a statute which is secular in nature and is not
controlled   as   such   by   the   provisions   of   the   Hindu   Adoptions   and
Maintenance Act, 1956, although it would be apposite to keep those

provisions in view while considering the petition under Section 125 of
the Code. The language used in Section 125 of the Code is plain and
unambiguous. The words “legitimate or illegitimate” as used in Section
125 must, therefore, be presumed to carry its plain literal meaning in the
absence of any evidence that it was intended to mean something else or
include a stepchild also. 
49 It is not open to this Court to supply the omission by extending the
meaning of the word of the words “legitimate or illegitimate child” in the
guise of interpretation by analogy or implication only because this Court
feels that it will be in conformity with the principles of social justice and
equity. 
The   analogy   explained   by   the   Supreme   Court   in   the   case   of
Kirtikant  (supra)  would   apply   in   the   present   case.   The   children   of
another have not been mentioned in the entire Section 125 of the Cr.
P.C. nor any right has been conferred on them to claim maintenance.
There was an enactment in the United Kingdom known as the Family
Relations Act, which, of course, now stands repealed and substituted
with a new enactment. The provisions therein provided that where step
– parent or common law partner of someone with a child had been
standing in the role of parent, known as in loco parentis, the Court would
order   that  person   to  pay  child  support,   even   though   they   were   not
biologically related to the child. 
53 However, child support could also be ordered where the person
was   found   to   be   a   “parent”,   which   was   defined   under   the   Family
Relations Act as under: 
“ A “parent” includes
(a) a guardian or guardian the person of a child, or 
(b) a stepparent of a child if
(i) the stepparent contributed to the support and maintenance of the
child for at least one year, and
(ii)the   proceeding   under   this   Act   by   or   against   the   stepparent   is
commenced   within   one   year   after   the   date   the   stepparent   last
contributed to the support and maintenance of the child;
54 Section 1(2) of the Act stated as under: 

“(2) For the purpose of paragraph (b) of the definition of “parent” in
subsection (1), a person is the stepparent of a child if the person and a
parent of the child 
(a) are or were married, or 
(b) lived together in a marriage­like relationship for a period of at least 2
years and, for the purposes of this Act, the marriage­like relationship may
be between persons of the same gender.”
55 Thus, the Court could order a step­parent to pay child support in
three contingencies: 
“The step­parent:
was either in a marriage­like (common law) relationship with the child’s
parent for at least two years   OR married to the child’s parent for any
length of time; AND contributed to the child’s support or maintenance for
at least one  year;  AND  last contributed  to the child’s maintenance  or
support within one y ear of the date that the child support claim was filed

with the court.”

56 However, it is for the Legislature to look into this issue in the
interest   of   a   helpless   child   who   is   thrown   out   by   his   stepfather   or
stepmother and there is none to take care of such child. 
57 With  the   above,   this   petition   is   allowed.   The   impugned   order
dated   30.03.2015   passed   by   the   Principal   Judge,   Family   Court,
Bhavnagar is hereby ordered to be quashed.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION (MAINTAINANCE) NO. 2666 of 2015


MANJULABEN PRAKSHBHAI SARVAIYA. V STATE OF GUJARAT & 1..

CORAM: MR.JUSTICE J.B.PARDIWALA
Date : 08/10/2015

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