The question depends upon the true construction of Section 28. There is no doubt that the Arbitrator is expected to make his award within four months of his entering on the reference or on his being called upon to act or within such extended time as the Court may allow. Reading Clause 3 of the Schedule along with Section 28 one finds that the power to enlarge the time is vested in the Court and not in the Arbitrator. Clause 3 and Section 28(1) exclude by necessary implication the power of the Arbitrator to enlarge the time. This is emphasised by Section 28(2) which provides that even when such a provision giving the Arbitrator power to enlarge the time is contained in the agreement, that provision shall be void and of no effect. The head-note of Section 28 brings out the force of this position in law by providing that the power is of the Court only to enlarge time for making the award.
11. Sub-section (2) of Section 28, however, indicates one exception to the above rule that the Arbitrator cannot enlarge the time, and that is when the parties agree to such an enlargement. The occasion for the Arbitrator to enlarge the time occurs only after he is called upon to proceed with the arbitration or he enters upon the reference. Hence, it is clear that if the parties agree to the enlargement of time after the Arbitrator has entered on the reference, the Arbitrator has the power to enlarge it in accordance with the mutual agreement or consent of the parties.
That such a consent must be a post reference consent, is also clear from Section 28(2) which renders null and void a provision in the original agreement to that effect. In a sense where a provision is made in the original agreement that the Arbitrator may enlarge the time, such a provision always implies mutual consent for enlargement but such mutual consent initially expressed in the original agreement does not save the provision from being void. It is, therefore, clear that the Arbitrator gets the jurisdiction to enlarge the time for making the award only in a case where after entering on the Arbitration the parties to the arbitration agreement consent to such enlargement of time."
In the circumstances, if the Arbitral Tribunal insisted upon appropriate consent to extend the time, no fault could be found with. At the same time, if respondent No.1 was not willing to give such consent, the Arbitral Tribunal had to go on with the matter and make the award within the statutory period. The Division Bench was not right in observing that the Arbitral Tribunal showed undue haste in the matter.
23. In our view, the Division Bench was not right and justified in allowing the appeal and setting aside the judgment and order passed by the Single Judge. We, therefore, allow this appeal, set aside the judgment and order passed by the Division Bench of the High Court of Delhi and restore the judgment and order dated 10.02.2006 passed by the Single Judge of the High Court of Delhi.
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Electrical Manufacturing Company Ltd. Vs. Power Grid Corporation of India Ltd. & ANR
[Civil Appeal No. 6568 of 2016 arising out of SLP (C) No.17475/2008]
Uday Umesh Lalit.J
Dated;July 20, 2016
Citation:(2016) 8 SCC 667,AIR 2016 SC 4798
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