Showing posts with label time limit. Show all posts
Showing posts with label time limit. Show all posts

Sunday, 24 December 2017

Whether Court can impose time limit upon cross-examination?


While, therefore, I quite agree that the Court should not as a rule impose a particular time limit as regards the cross-examination of a party or a witness, I am unable to assent to the proposition that the Court has no discretion or control in such a matter. Obviously, the Court must have such power. Otherwise, the work of the Court would be impossible. On the whole, therefore, I am satisfied that the order made by the learned Magistrate is not open to any exception and that there is no ground to interfere with that order.


IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Criminal Revn. Appln. No. 1427 of 1954

Decided On: 17.12.1954

Yeshpal Jashbhai Parikh Vs. Rasiklal Umedchand Parikh

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Y.V. Dixit, J.

Citation : AIR 1955 Bom 318

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Sunday, 4 December 2016

Whether proceeding for contempt of court is maintainable if no time limit is fixed for compliance of order?

In our opinion, if no time limit is fixed for compliance of the order, action for contempt of court in such a case is not maintainable in law. In the present case, no time limit is fixed for compliance of the order, whose disobedience is complained of herein. Hence, the petition is not maintainable in law and is accordingly dismissed.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
CCC No. 925/2016 (Civil)
Decided On: 25.10.2016

 N. Rajanna Vs. Rajaneesh Goel and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:H.G. Ramesh and K.N. Phaneendra, JJ.
Citation : 2016 SCC Online KAR 6469
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Sunday, 20 November 2016

Whether arbitrator should complete arbitration proceeding within time stipulated by statute?

 The question depends upon the true construction of Section 28. There is no doubt that the Arbitrator is expected to make his award within four months of his entering on the reference or on his being called upon to act or within such extended time as the Court may allow. Reading Clause 3 of the Schedule along with Section 28 one finds that the power to enlarge the time is vested in the Court and not in the Arbitrator. Clause 3 and Section 28(1) exclude by necessary implication the power of the Arbitrator to enlarge the time. This is emphasised by Section 28(2) which provides that even when such a provision giving the Arbitrator power to enlarge the time is contained in the agreement, that provision shall be void and of no effect. The head-note of Section 28 brings out the force of this position in law by providing that the power is of the Court only to enlarge time for making the award.
11. Sub-section (2) of Section 28, however, indicates one exception to the above rule that the Arbitrator cannot enlarge the time, and that is when the parties agree to such an enlargement. The occasion for the Arbitrator to enlarge the time occurs only after he is called upon to proceed with the arbitration or he enters upon the reference. Hence, it is clear that if the parties agree to the enlargement of time after the Arbitrator has entered on the reference, the Arbitrator has the power to enlarge it in accordance with the mutual agreement or consent of the parties.
That such a consent must be a post reference consent, is also clear from Section 28(2) which renders null and void a provision in the original agreement to that effect. In a sense where a provision is made in the original agreement that the Arbitrator may enlarge the time, such a provision always implies mutual consent for enlargement but such mutual consent initially expressed in the original agreement does not save the provision from being void. It is, therefore, clear that the Arbitrator gets the jurisdiction to enlarge the time for making the award only in a case where after entering on the Arbitration the parties to the arbitration agreement consent to such enlargement of time."
In the circumstances, if the Arbitral Tribunal insisted upon appropriate consent to extend the time, no fault could be found with. At the same time, if respondent No.1 was not willing to give such consent, the Arbitral Tribunal had to go on with the matter and make the award within the statutory period. The Division Bench was not right in observing that the Arbitral Tribunal showed undue haste in the matter.
23. In our view, the Division Bench was not right and justified in allowing the appeal and setting aside the judgment and order passed by the Single Judge. We, therefore, allow this appeal, set aside the judgment and order passed by the Division Bench of the High Court of Delhi and restore the judgment and order dated 10.02.2006 passed by the Single Judge of the High Court of Delhi.
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Electrical Manufacturing Company Ltd. Vs. Power Grid Corporation of India Ltd. & ANR
[Civil Appeal No. 6568 of 2016 arising out of SLP (C) No.17475/2008]
Uday Umesh Lalit.J
Dated;July 20, 2016
Citation:(2016) 8 SCC 667,AIR 2016 SC 4798
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Monday, 5 January 2015

Whether court can fix time limit for cross examination of witness?

As a general rule, the Court would not be justified in imposing a time limit upon the cross-examination of a witness. But the Court may, in the course of a trial, come to the conclusion that the cross-examination has been unnecessary or irrelevant or even rambling, and in such a case the Court has power to control the cross-examination of a witness by counsel of the opposite party. Such power should be exercised in a reasonable way.
It is therefore clear that the trial Court at no stage of the proceeding should lose con trol over the same and should see that the cross-examination does not go on in a rambling way or extend to questions impermissible under the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act. Subject to these qualifications the powers of a trial Court are wide and indeed they should be. We are sure that the learned trial Magistrate will bear in mind the observations made by Sir James Fitzjames Stephen quoted by us above and will not allow the cross-examination which is not permissible Under Section 146 or any other provisions of the Indian Evidence Act. To allow the accused to cross-examine the complainant merely because the complainant has chosen the arena of the Magistrate's Court and to assail his character not for the purposes covered by the provisions of the Evidence Act but for some other purposes such as embarrassing him and to ask such other further questions which are not relevant but which will only embarrass and expose him to other proceedings will amount to an abuse of the process of the Court.
Bombay High Court
Dr. Baburao Patel vs Bal Thackeray And Anr. on 4 March, 1977
Equivalent citations: 1977 CriLJ 1637

Bench: Shah, Jahagirdar
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