Showing posts with label arbitration proceeding. Show all posts
Showing posts with label arbitration proceeding. Show all posts

Sunday, 2 March 2025

What is Role of the Waterfall Mechanism in Arbitration Proceedings?


 In arbitration proceedings, financial mechanisms such as the waterfall mechanism
play a critical role in ensuring the structured allocation of funds, especially when disputes involve complex financial agreements. A recent arbitral tribunal directive has highlighted how this mechanism operates within arbitration, particularly in managing payments through escrow accounts. This article explores the relationship between the waterfall mechanism and arbitration proceedings, shedding light on its practical implications.

The waterfall mechanism is a structured and sequential approach to fund allocation. It ensures that payments are made in a predefined order of priority, much like water cascading down a series of steps. Higher-priority obligations are addressed first, and only once they are satisfied can funds flow to lower-priority obligations.

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Saturday, 16 June 2018

Whether Arbitrator has power to set aside order terminating arbitration proceeding?

 We thus are of the view that principles underlying Order 9 Rule 13 can very well be invoked by the arbitrator. There is nothing on record to indicate that parties have agreed to the contrary. The issue, which has arisen for consideration has engaged attention of different High Courts from time to time. Patna High Court in M/s. Senbo Engineering Ltd. v. State of Bihar and Ors., MANU/BH/0350/2003 : AIR 2004 Patna 33, had occasion to consider the order terminating the proceedings Under Section 25(a). Patna High Court after considering the provision has held that arbitral tribunal has power to review on sufficient cause being shown. In paragraph 32, following has been laid down:

32. I find the submissions of Mr. Chatterjee well founded. Mr. Chatterjee has relied upon the provisions of the Act itself (that is to say, the internal aids to interpretation) in support of the point that on sufficient cause being shown, the arbitral tribunal has full authority and power to recall an order Under Section 25(a) of the Act. I think that one would arrive at the same conclusion on the basis of some external aids to interpretation.
27. Referring to judgment of this Court in Grindlays Bank Ltd. (supra) and Anil Sood v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court II, MANU/SC/2366/2000 : (2001) 10 SCC 534, Patna High Court further laid down in Paragraph 39 as given below:

39. The two Supreme Court decisions under the Industrial Disputes Act are also a pointer in the direction that the arbitral tribunal must be held to have the power of procedural review and the authority to recall, on sufficient cause being shown, an order terminating the proceeding Under Section 25(a) of the Act. The second question too is, thus, answered in the affirmative and in favour of the Petitioner.
32. We endorse the views of Patna High Court, Delhi High Court and Madras High Court as noted above, in so far as they have held that the arbitral tribunal after termination of proceedings Under Section 25(a) on sufficient cause being shown can recall the order and re-commence the proceedings.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 15036 of 2017 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 16636 of 2015)

Decided On: 20.09.2017

 Srei Infrastructure Finance Limited  Vs. Tuff Drilling Private Limited
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Whether Arbitrator can apply principles of Civil procedure code and Evidence Act to arbitration proceeding?

There cannot be a dispute that the power exercised by the arbitral tribunal is a quasi-judicial. In view of the provisions of the 1996 Act, which confers various statutory powers and obligations on the arbitral tribunal, we do not find any such distinction between the statutory tribunal constituted under the statutory provisions or Constitution in so far as the power of procedural review is concerned. We have already noticed that Section 19 provides that arbitral tribunal shall not be bound by the Rules of procedure as contained in Code of Civil Procedure. Section 19 cannot be read to mean that arbitral tribunal is incapacitated in drawing sustenance from any provisions of Code of Civil Procedure. This was clearly laid down in Nahar Industrial Enterprises Limited v. Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, MANU/SC/1330/2009 : (2009) 8 SCC 646. In Paragraph 98(n), following was stated:

(n) It is not bound by the procedure laid down under the Code. It may however be noticed in this regard that just because the Tribunal is not bound by the Code, it does not mean that it would not have jurisdiction to exercise powers of a court as contained in the Code. "Rather, the Tribunal can travel beyond the Code of Civil Procedure and the only fetter that is put on its powers is to observe the principles of natural justice," (See Industrial Credit and Investment Corpn. of India Ltd. v. Grapco Industries Ltd.)

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 15036 of 2017 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 16636 of 2015)

Decided On: 20.09.2017

 Srei Infrastructure Finance Limited  Vs. Tuff Drilling Private Limited

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
A.K. Sikri and Ashok Bhushan, JJ.

Citation: (2018) 11 SCC 470
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Sunday, 31 December 2017

Whether in arbitration proceeding parties can exclude jurisdiction of all other courts where more than one court has jurisdiction?

I think the controversy has been set at naught by the latest judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court rendered in Indus Mobile Distribution Private Limited v. Datawind Innovations Private Limited & Ors., MANU/SC/0456/2017 : 2017(5) Scale 60. In this judgment, Hon'ble Supreme Court has taken note of all other several cases, which have also been referred by both the parties before me. The Apex Court reiterated that once the seat of arbitration has been fixed, it would have in the nature of exclusive jurisdiction clause as to the courts which exercise supervisory powers over the arbitration. In paragraphs 20 and 21 of such judgment, the Hon'ble Apex Court has further held as under:

"20. A conspectus of all the aforesaid provisions shows that the moment the seat is designated, it is akin to an exclusive jurisdiction clause. On the facts of the present case, it is clear that the seat of arbitration is Mumbai and Clause 19 further makes it clear that jurisdiction exclusively vests in the Mumbai courts. Under the Law of Arbitration, unlike the Code of Civil Procedure which applies to suits filed in courts, a reference to "seat" is a concept by which a neutral venue can be chosen by the parties to an arbitration clause. The neutral venue may not in the classical sense have jurisdiction - that is, no part of the cause of action may have arisen at the neutral venue and neither would any of the provisions of Section 16 to 21 of the CPC be attracted. In arbitration law however, as has been held above, the moment "seat" is determined, the fact that the seat is at Mumbai would vest Mumbai courts with exclusive jurisdiction for purposes of regulating arbitral proceedings arising out of the agreement between the parties.

21. It is well settled that where more than one court has jurisdiction, it is open for parties to exclude all other courts."

IN THE HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND AT NAINITAL

Civil Revision No. 35/2017 and Appeal from Order No. 275/2017

Decided On: 31.05.2017

Nagar Palika Parishad Vs.Ramesth Construction Pvt. Ltd.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
S.K. Gupta, J.

Citation: AIR 2017(NOC)1046 UTR
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Saturday, 16 December 2017

What is scope of interference of higher court during arbitration proceeding?


Solely because a superior court
appoints the arbitrator or issues directions or has
retained some control over the arbitrator by requiring
him to file the award in this Court, it cannot be regarded
as a court of first instance as that would go contrary to
the definition of the term ‘court’ as used in the dictionary
clause as well as in Section 31(4). Simply put, the
principle is not acceptable because this Court cannot
curtail the right of a litigant to prefer an appeal by stating
that the doors are open to this Court and to consider it
as if it is an original court. Original jurisdiction in this
Court has to be vested in law. Unless it is so vested and
the Court assumes, the court really scuttles the forum
that has been provided by the legislature to a litigant.
That apart, as we see, the said principle is also contrary
to what has been stated in Kumbha Mawji. It is worthy
to note that this Court may make a reference to an
arbitrator on consent but to hold it as a legal principle 
that it can also entertain objections as the original court
will invite a fundamental fallacy pertaining to
jurisdiction.
58. In Surjit Singh Atwal (supra), a three-Judge
Bench had opined that applications under Section 8 and
under Section 20, though clearly applications anterior to
the reference, lead to a reference. Such applications are
undoubtedly applications “in the matter of a reference”
and may fall within the purview of Section 31(4) of the
Act even though these applications are made before any
reference has taken place. The purpose of referring to
the said authority is that the principle stated in Kumbha
Mawji (supra) has been elaborated in Surjit Singh
Atwal (supra). It is to be borne in mind that the Court
that has jurisdiction to entertain the first application is
determinative by the fact as to which Court has the
jurisdiction and retains the jurisdiction. In this regard,
an example may be cited. When arbitrator is not
appointed under the Act and the matter is challenged
before the High Court or, for that matter, the Supreme
Court and, eventually, an arbitrator is appointed and 
some directions are issued, it will be inappropriate and
inapposite to say that the superior court has the
jurisdiction to deal with the objections filed under
Sections 30 and 33 of the Act. The jurisdiction of a Court
conferred under a statute cannot be allowed to shift or
become flexible because of a superior court’s interference
in the matter in a different manner.
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1093 OF 2006

The State of Jharkhand & Ors. V M/s Hindustan Construction Co. Ltd. 
Dated:December 14, 2017
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Friday, 1 December 2017

Whether Arbitration Proceeding is maintainable after Imposition Of Moratorium U/S.14 Of Insolvency And Bankruptcy Code?

The mandate of the new Insolvency Code is that the moment an
insolvency petition is admitted, the moratorium that comes into
effect under Section 14(1)(a) expressly interdicts institution or
continuation of pending suits or proceedings against Corporate
Debtors.
6) This being the case, we are surprised that an arbitration
proceeding has been purported to be started after the imposition of
the said moratorium and appeals under Section 37 of the Arbitration
Act are being entertained. Therefore, we set aside the order of
the District Judge dated 06.07.2017 and further state that the
effect of Section 14(1)(a) is that the arbitration that has been
instituted after the aforesaid moratorium is non est in law.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 16929 OF 2017
(Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 18195/2017)

ALCHEMIST ASSET RECONSTRUCTION COMPANY LTD. Vs M/S. HOTEL GAUDAVAN PVT. LTD. & ORS. 
Dated:October 23, 2017.
Citation: AIR 2017 SC 5124
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Saturday, 25 November 2017

Whether other party can be directed to produce income tax assessment orders in arbitration proceeding?

If we look at the words used in these two sections, they very clearly state that particulars contained in any return or statement made by a party, or document produced along therewith are confidential, and no court shall pass any order requiring the Government or a Government servant to produce any such statement, document or return. It is a settled principle of law that the words used in a statute are to be read as they are used, to the extent possible, to ascertain the meaning thereof. Both these provisions contained a bar only against the Government officers from producing the documents mentioned therein. There is no bar therein against a party to produce any such document. In Tulsiram Sanganaria and Anr. v. Srimati Anni Rai and Ors. reported in MANU/SC/0443/1971 : 1971 (1) SCC 284, a bench of three Judges of this Court interpreted an identical provision in Section 54(1) of the Income Tax Act, 1922, and held that the said provision created a bar on the production of the documents mentioned therein by the officials and other servants of the Income Tax Department, and made it obligatory on them to treat as confidential the records and documents mentioned therein, but the Assessee or his representative-in-interest could produce assessment orders as evidence, and such evidence was admissible. Thus, if a claim is to be decided on the basis of an order of assessment, the claimant as well cannot be denied the right to seek a direction to the party concerned to produce the assessment order. It is this very prayer which has been allowed by the earlier order dated 27.3.2007 passed by the then Arbitrator, and also by the subsequent order dated 16.9.2011 passed by the Arbitral Tribunal, and in our view rightly so. There is no substance in the second objection as well.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 8426 of 2013 (Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 28418/2012)

Decided On: 23.09.2013

 Delta Distilleries Limited Vs. United Spirits Limited and Anr.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
A.K. Patnaik and H.L. Gokhale, JJ.
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Whether court will permit production of documents of one party in arbitration proceeding if it will jeopardise interest of said party?



Arbitration - Production of document - Applicant filed application to direct to Superintendent of Police CBI to produce charge-sheet and other documents filed in criminal complaint on file of Special Judge for CBI cases before arbitral Tribunal - Hence, this Application - Whether, documents which were directed to be produced before arbitrator were to be produced by Superintendent of Police, CBI - Held, discretion was conferred on Court to order request made by arbitral Tribunal or party by ordering that evidence could be produced directly to the arbitral tribunal - Arbitral proceedings were initiated at instance of applicant for recovery of sum from Respondent in respect of excess payments made to Respondent - Thus, Applicant had to prove his case on its own evidence without taking support from evidence of Respondent - Proceedings before arbitral Tribunal and CBI Court were totally two different proceedings and they were different in content and consequence - Further, evidentiary value of charge-sheet itself was questionable and if produced it could jeopardise interest of Respondent before Criminal Court - Thus, applicant had not made out case to exercise discretion in their favour under Section 27 of Act 1996 - Application dismissed.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADRAS

A. No. 3481 of 2006

Decided On: 29.09.2006

 Ennore Port Ltd. Vs.Hindustan Construction Co. Ltd.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
S. Rajeswaran, J.
Citation : AIR 2007 Mad 73
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Monday, 30 October 2017

Whether damages can be granted in arbitration proceeding without proof of having suffered injury?

Bharat Coking (supra) and Brijpaul (supra), no doubt, are
authorities for the proposition that the Court even in arbitration cases
should be conscious of and ordinarily should not refuse claims towards
loss of profits. At the same time, the reference to Section 73 – which
finds express mention in Brijpaul (supra) clarifies that damages claimed
cannot be granted as a matter of course; some material evidence is
necessary. In this case, the extensions led to claims for payments on
various accounts and heads during the extended period. The cumulative
effect of the award and the impugned judgment is such that the majority
of such heads of claim for extra expenditure, increased salary and other
overheads for the additional period have been granted. They are based
upon certain formulae under the contract. However, in the case of the
claim of general loss of profits, having nexus with the value of the
contract, the Court finds that there is no worthwhile evidence – apart
from the line of questioning adopted by the claimants.
10. That in arbitration proceedings, just as in civil cases, an injured
party can claim damages, does not necessarily translate into an award for
damages towards loss of profits unless some diligence is exercised by the
party (in the present case, Ahluwalia claiming it). In other words, a claim
for damages (general or special) in the proceedings, cannot as a matter of
course, result in an award, without proof of having suffered injury. 
 IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

Pronounced on: 17.10.2017
 FAO (OS) (COMM) 143/2017, C.M. APPL.25112/2017
AHLUWALIA CONTRACT (INDIA) LIMITED .
V
THE UNION OF INDIA .....

CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S. RAVINDRA BHAT
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S.P. GARG
Dated:OCTOBER 17, 2017
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Friday, 15 September 2017

How does a Court give effect to arbitration agreements?



1. Where one party wants to institute arbitration and another one is uncooperative, Court may pass order compelling arbitration.


2. Where litigation is initiated over a claim falling within the scope of arbitration agreement, Court may dismiss the suit on grounds of lack of jurisdiction.



3. Depending on the law at the seat, the Court may have powers to support the tribunal - witnesses, documents, opinions. Courts where parties or witnesses are located may make orders. One needs to look at local legislation. 

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Sunday, 20 November 2016

Whether arbitrator should complete arbitration proceeding within time stipulated by statute?

 The question depends upon the true construction of Section 28. There is no doubt that the Arbitrator is expected to make his award within four months of his entering on the reference or on his being called upon to act or within such extended time as the Court may allow. Reading Clause 3 of the Schedule along with Section 28 one finds that the power to enlarge the time is vested in the Court and not in the Arbitrator. Clause 3 and Section 28(1) exclude by necessary implication the power of the Arbitrator to enlarge the time. This is emphasised by Section 28(2) which provides that even when such a provision giving the Arbitrator power to enlarge the time is contained in the agreement, that provision shall be void and of no effect. The head-note of Section 28 brings out the force of this position in law by providing that the power is of the Court only to enlarge time for making the award.
11. Sub-section (2) of Section 28, however, indicates one exception to the above rule that the Arbitrator cannot enlarge the time, and that is when the parties agree to such an enlargement. The occasion for the Arbitrator to enlarge the time occurs only after he is called upon to proceed with the arbitration or he enters upon the reference. Hence, it is clear that if the parties agree to the enlargement of time after the Arbitrator has entered on the reference, the Arbitrator has the power to enlarge it in accordance with the mutual agreement or consent of the parties.
That such a consent must be a post reference consent, is also clear from Section 28(2) which renders null and void a provision in the original agreement to that effect. In a sense where a provision is made in the original agreement that the Arbitrator may enlarge the time, such a provision always implies mutual consent for enlargement but such mutual consent initially expressed in the original agreement does not save the provision from being void. It is, therefore, clear that the Arbitrator gets the jurisdiction to enlarge the time for making the award only in a case where after entering on the Arbitration the parties to the arbitration agreement consent to such enlargement of time."
In the circumstances, if the Arbitral Tribunal insisted upon appropriate consent to extend the time, no fault could be found with. At the same time, if respondent No.1 was not willing to give such consent, the Arbitral Tribunal had to go on with the matter and make the award within the statutory period. The Division Bench was not right in observing that the Arbitral Tribunal showed undue haste in the matter.
23. In our view, the Division Bench was not right and justified in allowing the appeal and setting aside the judgment and order passed by the Single Judge. We, therefore, allow this appeal, set aside the judgment and order passed by the Division Bench of the High Court of Delhi and restore the judgment and order dated 10.02.2006 passed by the Single Judge of the High Court of Delhi.
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Electrical Manufacturing Company Ltd. Vs. Power Grid Corporation of India Ltd. & ANR
[Civil Appeal No. 6568 of 2016 arising out of SLP (C) No.17475/2008]
Uday Umesh Lalit.J
Dated;July 20, 2016
Citation:(2016) 8 SCC 667,AIR 2016 SC 4798
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Sunday, 3 July 2016

Whether unregistered partnership firm can initiate arbitration proceeding?

Having regard to our conclusion that Arbitral Proceedings will not come under the expression "other proceedings" of Section 69(3) of the Partnership Act, the ban imposed under the said Section 69 can have no application to Arbitral proceedings as well as the Arbitration Award. Therefore, the appeal stands allowed, 
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
M/s. Umesh Goel Vs. Himachal Pradesh Cooperative Group Housing Society Ltd.
[Civil Appeal No.7916 of 2009]
Fakkir Mohamed Ibrahim Kalifulla, J.
Dated: 29 June 2016
Citation:AIR 2016 SC3116,(2016) 11 SCC313
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Wednesday, 20 April 2016

Whether principles of Evidence Act and Civil procedure code are applicable in Arbitration proceeding?

 I am therefore, of the view that even in arbitration proceedings though strict provisions ofEvidence Act and Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 are not applicable and though the arbitral tribunal is not bound by the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act and Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, the arbitral tribunal is bound to consider the principles of Evidence Act and the Code of Civil Procedure and has to follow the principles of natural justice.
Bombay High Court
Rashmi Housing Pvt. Ltd vs Pan India Infraprojects Private ... on 17 December, 2014
Bench: R.D. Dhanuka
ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION
ARBITRATION PETITION NO. 600 OF 2011
Citation; 2015 (7) ALLMR 290
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Tuesday, 4 August 2015

When court fees is payable in respect of arbitration proceeeding?

 The concept of "Court fee" cannot be equated with the concept of "Tax". The Court fee cannot be intended to collect and/or generate to be a revenue except to collect the cost of administration of civil justice. [ (1973) 1 SCC 162 - The Secretary, Government of Madras, Home Department & anr. v. Zenith Lamp and Electrical Ltd., (1996) 1 SCC 345 - Secretary to Government of Madras & anr vs. P.R.Sriramulu & anr. ] 34 If there is lacuna in the Court Fees Act, the Court cannot 1 (2010) 3 S.C.C. 34 24  interpret the existing provision to bring in the present case under the ambit of Court Fee Act. There is nothing pointed out that Suit Valuation Act and the Court Fee Act applies to the value of the arbitration also, which is not plaint, both for the purposes of jurisdiction and the Court fee. There is no practice of paying any court fee at the time of filing petitions, irrespective of the claim amount, before the Arbitrator under the Act and/or even under Section 89 of Code of Civil Procedure (CPC). The direction to refund of court fee on reference to Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) under Section 89 of CPC cannot be overlooked as it covers arbitration proceedings also. [Salem Advocate Bar Association T.N. vs. Union of India] 1 The purpose and object of Arbitration Act also play an important role while interpreting the provisions in question.
35 Therefore, on a plain and simple reading of this provision, whosoever wants to file Application or Petition and/or appeal to set aside the award or modify the Arbitral Award, need to pay one half of the ad-valorem fees on the amount or value of the amount of award sought to be set aside or modified. This, in my view, contemplates that there is a monetary award passed against the party, which the 1 (2005) 6 SCC 344 25 aggrieved party wants to challenge by such application or petition or by appeal to set aside or modify the said award under theArbitration Act, which is subject to ad valorem Court fees as prescribed in Article 3A of Schedule I and not otherwise.
Bombay High Court
Saraswat Co-Operative Bank Ltd vs Unknown on 25 February, 2011
Bench: Anoop V.Mohta
Citation;2013(1)ARBLR129 BOM
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Sunday, 2 August 2015

Whether creditor can resort to arbitration proceeding when mortgaged security is in his favour?

 The second submission proceeds on a logical fallacy. When a creditor, who has a mortgaged security in his favour, confines the claim in arbitration for the recovery of monies due and outstanding, he does not relinquish the mortgaged security or abandon his right to bring the mortgaged security to sale by subsequently instituting a suit as envisaged in Order XXXIV Rule 14. The creditor cannot enforce a right in rem in the course of arbitral proceedings. Hence, a claim for the enforcement of the mortgaged security cannot be entertained in arbitration. But when the creditor asserts a money claim simpliciter in the course of arbitral proceedings, the law does not compel him to relinquish his mortgaged security as a condition for asserting the money claim in arbitration or to abandon his right as a secured creditor to bring the mortgaged property to sale by filing an independent suit in accordance with Order XXXIV Rule 14. Consequently a secured creditor can invoke the provisions of Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 which is a provision 7 of 11 APP(L).131.2013 incidental to or ancillary to the arbitration proceedings for seeking an interim measure of protection that would ensure that the fruits of the arbitral award are not destroyed or lost by dealings of the debtor with the properties in the meantime. That is exactly what has been done by the secured creditors and correctly accepted by the learned Single Judge.
Bombay High Court
Deccan Chronicle Holdings ... vs L & T Finance Limited on 8 August, 2013
Bench: Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, S.C. Gupte
                              
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