Supreme Court: Claimant is not entitled to get compensation in motor accident if he fails to prove identity of offending vehicle in the accident

 5.3 All the above evidence, circumstances and

considerations reinforce that the factum of involvement of

the offending vehicle as claimed and asserted by the

claimants was not proved. The claimants failed to

discharge their obligation on this count which was to be

the primary step. Given the above strong evidentiary

considerations, even on the principle of the

preponderance of probabilities, the involvement of Tata

Magic vehicle with registration number MH-13-B-2719

could not be concluded and was not established.

5.4 It was correct on the part of the High Court to

conclude that mere mentioning of Tata Magic by name in

the inquest Panchnama or in the FIR would not be

sufficient to hold that it was the same Tata Magic

belonging to respondent No.1 and insured with

respondent No.2 in absence of its clear identification.

6. It is a settled position of law that in a motor- accident

claim petition, the initial burden to prove the factum of

accident and involvement of offending vehicle lie on the

claimants. It is the claimants who have to discharge this

primary burden by establishing the occurrence of the

accident and the involvement as well as identity of the

vehicle at least on prima facie basis. Only then the onus to

disprove shifts to the other side.

Non-Reportable

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.6794 of 2025

VANITA & ORS. Vs M/S SHRIRAM INSURANCE COMPANY LTD. & ANR. 

Author: N.V. ANJARIA, J.

Citation: 2025 INSC 1077

Dated: SEPTEMBER 04, 2025.

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Tripura HC : Pillion Rider Not Covered Under Act-Only Motor Insurance Policy Without Additional Premium

In view of the above and considering facts and circumstances of the present case on hand, this Court is of the considered view that since the policy is only an Act policy issued by the respondent-Insurance company to the insurer and the son of the appellants i.e. the victim was only an occupant of the rider of the motor cycle, cannot be considered as 'third party' of the vehicle. The doctrine of ‘pay and recovery’ also cannot be applied to the facts of the case, since the Insurance company is not liable to pay the compensation in view of the above discussions. {Para 13}

HIGH COURT OF TRIPURA AGARTALA

 MAC APP 59 OF 2026. 

Sri Ranjan Chakraborty Vs Sri Debabrata Saha,

BEFORE HON‟BLE JUSTICE DR. T. AMARNATH GOUD 

Citation: TRHC010007842026 2026:THC:1222

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Place Of Insurer's Office Doesn't Confer Territorial Jurisdiction For Motor Accident Claim : Supreme Court Explains S.166(2) MV Act

In the present case, the claimant himself impleaded the insurer as a party to the claim application and it raised an objection to territorial jurisdiction before the Tribunal itself. As the claim application of the claimant awaits adjudication by the Tribunal on merits, the requirements of Section 166(2) of the Act of 1988 have to be satisfied and Section 21(1) of the Code is not attracted.

I. Consideration of the impugned order:

15. When the averments made in the claim application are examined in this backdrop, it becomes clear that the claimant resides at Chittoor, Andhra Pradesh, as pleaded. The accident occurred in District Tirupati. There is no averment in the claim application stating that the claimant carries on business elsewhere. Even the driver of the offending vehicle is stated to reside in District Chittoor. It is, thus, clear that no part of cause of action had arisen within the local limits of District Chennai so as to clothe the Tribunal there with territorial jurisdiction. The error committed by the Tribunal at Chennai in holding that it had territorial jurisdiction was rightly corrected by the High Court by setting aside that order. It is true that the Act of 1988 is a piece of legislation intended at redressing the hardships flowing from a motor vehicle accident, amongst other objects. It must be interpreted keeping these objectives in mind. However, an interpretation which does not flow from the plain reading of the statutory provisions despite a purposive interpretation cannot be commended. An interpretation that does not find any statutory support cannot be accepted and an interpretation that is in tune with the plain language of the statute ought to be preferred.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 10706 of 2026

Decided On: 16.09.2026

K. Rashik Vs. National Insurance Company Ltd. and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Ujjal Bhuyan and A.S. Chandurkar, JJ.

Author: A.S. Chandurkar, J.

Citation:2026 INSC 996,MANU/SC/1027/2026

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Pending Appeal, New Schedule: Calcutta HC Applies Enhanced Section 163-A Compensation to a 2004 Accident in Urmila Halder

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Section 163-A — Second Schedule — Notification dated 22.05.2018 substituting the Second Schedule — Whether the substituted (enhanced) Schedule can be applied to compute compensation where the accident occurred prior to the date of the notification but the claim/appeal was still pending on that date — Held, yes.

The claimant's daughter, aged 22 years, died in a motor accident on 11.12.2004. A claim under Section 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 was filed before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Sealdah, which computed compensation under the structured formula then prevailing in the Second Schedule and awarded ₹1,14,500 by judgment dated 17.12.2008. The claimant preferred a first appeal seeking enhancement. During the pendency of the appeal, the Central Government, by notification dated 22.05.2018, substituted the Second Schedule to Section 163-A, replacing the age-and-income-linked formula with fixed lump-sum compensation, prescribing ₹5,00,000 for death.

Held: The right to claim compensation under Section 163-A accrues on the date of the accident and is not disturbed by a subsequent amendment to the Second Schedule. However, the Second Schedule prescribes only the mode and modality of computing the quantum of an already-existing statutory liability; it does not itself create or extinguish liability. Since the appeal remained pending and undecided as on the date the substituted Schedule came into force, the enhanced/substituted Schedule — and not the Schedule as it stood on the date of the accident — governs computation of compensation. The claimant was accordingly held entitled to the fixed sum of ₹5,00,000 prescribed under the substituted Schedule, notwithstanding that the accident had occurred nearly fourteen years earlier, and the insurer was directed to pay the balance amount (₹5,00,000 minus the sum already awarded) within two months.

Ratio: A beneficial amendment to the Second Schedule under Section 163-A, altering only the computational formula for an existing no-fault liability, applies to all claims/appeals pending adjudication on the date the amendment comes into force, irrespective of the date of the accident, since the amendment does not create a new cause of action but merely revises the yardstick for quantifying a liability that already exists.

Subsequent history: The insurer's appeal against this judgment was dismissed by the Supreme Court in The New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Urmila Halder (Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (C) No. 6260 of 2019, decided on 8.02.2024), which affirmed the above reasoning and upheld the award of ₹5,00,000.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA

F.M.A. No. 446 of 2010 and F.M.A.T. No. 278 of 2009

Decided On: 09.08.2018

Urmila Halder Vs. New India Assurance Co. Ltd. and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Dipankar Datta and Shampa Sarkar, JJ.

Author: Dipankar Datta, J.

Citation: MANU/WB/1123/2018.

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No Prescription, No Problem? What MAC Tribunals Really Do With Unsupported Medical Bills in Motor Accident Claims

 The short answer

The weight of judicial authority favours claimants: medical bills need not be tied to an individually traceable prescription slip to be accepted in a Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (MACT). What matters is whether the bills are referable to the period and nature of treatment, and whether they are corroborated by the claimant's oral testimony or the hospital record. The absence of a prescription is a factor the Tribunal may weigh — particularly where the insurer specifically challenges the bills or the medicines appear unconnected to the injury — but it is not, by itself, a ground for wholesale rejection.

The governing principle: linkage over paperwork

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P & H High court: The presence of doctors or the chemists for proving medicine bills must be confined only to extraordinary situations where the documents themselves are seriously in doubt.

 The practice of merely marking them but not exhibiting them in evidence and looking for proof by examination of a chemist is quite a needless exercise. The Tribunals must be more pragmatic in their approach while dealing with the cases for motor accident victims and invoke the power which is vested in them under Sections 168 and 169 in such a fashion that they do not shackle themselves by unrealistic procedures to meet the ends of justice/Unless the bills seem fabricated or there is something very peculiar elicited at the trial to doubt genuineness of the bills, the Tribunal dealing with the motor accident cases ought not to be looking for evidence through a chemist who had issued the bills. The production of the bills relating to the purchase of medicines during the period of hospitalization and oral evidence given by the party about purchasing of medicines ought to be taken as sufficient proof of authentication and admissibility of these documents. {Para 2}

3. Similarly, the practice of summoning doctors even for merely marking the MLR reports must be stopped. It must be remembered that the procedure under the M.V. Act is summary in character and documents which are maintained in the Government hospitals in the regular course of business require no more proof and a mere copy produced at the trial shall be received as public documents satisfying the requirements under Section 76 of the Indian Evidence Act. The summoning of the documents from lawful custody or copy of the document duly authenticated by the seal of the hospital which has issued the MLR must themselves be taken as sufficient proof for the same and the procedures that go to prolong the proceedings or delay them must be immediately curtailed by the Tribunals.

4. Even as regards the examination of doctors, it should be confined only to securing appropriate proof of disability and in special circumstances where there is a prolonged treatment or a requirement for a continuous treatment even beyond the period of trial, the attempt of the Tribunal must be to elicit from the doctors the prognosis for cure and the likely expenses that may have to be incurred in future. With a view to devise a procedure adopted in the manner of assigning dates for doctors and the need to save time for professionals like doctors, they must stay confined to what are most essential features to assist the Court to understand the nature of injuries and assess disability, if any to the claimant. They shall not be merely called to Courts for exhibiting some documents like MLR, period of treatment, etc. A hospital document produced by a party which is duly authenticated must be taken as sufficient as proof of the documents themselves and the requirement to produce the doctor for mere production of hospital documents must be immediately given up.

5. Some directions as regards the procedure become necessary only because it is a recurrent theme in our Tribunals that they reject the medical bills or keep out of reckoning the hospital records only because either the chemist is not examined or the doctor is not before the Court to speak about the hospital records. The presence of doctors or the chemists must be confined only to extraordinary situations where the documents themselves are seriously in doubt.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA

F.A.O. No. 12 of 1994 (O&M)

Decided On: 09.02.2012

Parsanni Vs. Sube Singh and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

K. Kannan, J.

Citation: 2011 SCC ONLINE P&H 2510,MANU/PH/4065/2012

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MP HC: Medicine bills filed in motor accident claim petition cannot be said to be authentic and genuine without there being any seal or GST/Sales Tax number

After hearing learned counsel for the parties and going through the record, when this Court wanted to know from Shri Kapil Patwardhan that there are several bills of purchase of medicines from one 'Maa Pharmacy' starting from Exhibit P-11 to Exhibit P-108 and none of them bears GST number or seal of Maa Pharmacy, then how these bills are admissible in evidence, He has no answer to this query of the Court. {Para 4}

12.  Similarly, bills from Ex P-11 to Ex.P-108 are also required to be deducted from the amount awarded by the tribunal, inasmuch as, these bills cannot be said to be authentic and genuine without there being any seal or GST/Sales Tax number. Shri Rakesh Jain submits that the claimant has produced bills of Rs.91,607/- for purchase of medicines from Maa Pharmacy.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH (JABALPUR BENCH)

Misc. Appeal No. 565 of 2022

Decided On: 13.03.2025

Shriram General Insurance Company Ltd. Vs. Rakesh Valtiya and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Vivek Agarwal, J.

Citation: 2025:MPHC-JBP:12927, MANU/MP/0988/2025

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Injury, Not Blame: Proving “Grievous Hurt” in a No-Fault Claim under Section 164 of the Motor Vehicles Act

 The governing idea

Section 164 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 creates a fixed-compensation, no-fault remedy. In an injury claim, the central questions are not who drove negligently or who was responsible for the collision, but whether: (i) an accident arose out of the use of the vehicle concerned; (ii) the claimant sustained bodily injury because of that accident; and (iii) the injury legally qualifies as “grievous hurt.” On proof of those foundational facts, the owner or authorised insurer is liable to pay the statutory sum of ₹2,50,000; Section 164(2) expressly relieves the claimant of proving any wrongful act, neglect or default.

This distinction may be expressed in one sentence:

Vehicle involvement and causal connection must be proved; fault and blame need not be proved.

That is the conceptual dividing line. Section 164 of motor vehicle Act dispenses with an inquiry into negligence, but it does not dispense with proof that the identified motor vehicle was involved in an accident arising out of its use and that the accident caused a legally recognised grievous hurt.

Why Section 164 of motor vehicle Act matters

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What is distinction between S 163-A and 164 of Motor vehicle Act?

 How Urmila Halder and Chandrakant Ravji Dore guide the transition from the former structured-compensation regime to the present fixed-sum remedy

Why the distinction matters

Sections 163-A and 164 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 share a common social-welfare objective: compensation without requiring the claimant to establish negligence. They are nevertheless not interchangeable. Section 163-A belonged to the former Second Schedule regime, whereas present Section 164—operational from 1 April 2022—creates a fixed statutory remedy of Rs.5 lakh for death and Rs.2.5 lakh for grievous hurt.

Two decisions illuminate different aspects of this transition. In The New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Urmila Halder, the Supreme Court held that the beneficial amendment to the Second Schedule notified on 22 May 2018 could apply to a pending Section 163-A case even though the accident predated the notification. In Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation v. Chandrakant Ravji Dore, the Bombay High Court held that negligence and contributory negligence cannot defeat or reduce compensation under present Section 164.

The first case concerns the temporal application of a revised computational mechanism under old Section 163-A. The second concerns the nature and operation of present Section 164. A MACT must preserve that distinction.

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Supreme Court: Amendment in S 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, which came into effect on 22nd May, 2018, would relate to an accident which had occurred prior to the said date

The short point for consideration before this Court is whether the amendment in Section 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, which came into effect by a Gazette Notification on 22nd May, 2018, would relate to an accident which had occurred prior to the said date. {Para 4}

 10. The order of the High Court is well discussed and we agree with the view taken. We may, however, add that a beneficial legislation would necessarily entail the benefit to be passed on to the claimant in the absence of any specific bar to the same. In the present case, the liability of the appellant-Insurance Company has not been interfered with. 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. ... of 2024 (Arising Out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 6260 of 2019)

Date of Order: 08.02.2024

The New India Assurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Urmila Halder

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Ahsanuddin Amanullah and Sandeep Mehta, JJ.

Citation: MANU/SCOR/20390/2024.

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Bombay HC: In a proceeding U/S 163-A or S 164 of the Motor vehicle Act, it is not open for the insurer to raise any defence of negligence on the part of the victim

 For the aforesaid reasons, we answer the question arising by holding that in a proceeding under Section 163-A of the Act, it is not open for the insurer to raise any defence of negligence on the part of the victim. {Para 9}

(Emphasis supplied)

Further, the Supreme Court in the case of Gohar Mohammed Vs. U.P. SRTC2 has reiterated that the claimant is not required to plead or establish any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of vehicle or driver or any other person for payment of compensation under Section 164 of the MV Act. Relevant paragraph of the aforesaid decision is reproduced below: -

48. The aforesaid provision has been brought where the claimant(s) is not required to plead or establish any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner(s) of the vehicle(s) or of any other person for payment of compensation. Therefore, sub-section (1) has been given overriding effect limiting the liability to pay compensation to the tune of Rs 5 lakhs in case of death and Rs 2:50 lakhs in case of grievous hurt to the legal heirs or to the victims), as the case may be.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

First Appeal No. 1431 of 2025

Decided On: 09.06.2026

Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation Vs. Chandrakant Ravji Dore

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Aarti Sathe, J.

Citation: 2026:BHC-AS:23333,MANU/MH/4806/2026.

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Bombay HC: Insurer Must Pay Third-Party Compensation Despite Premium Cheque Dishonour If Cancellation Not Informed To RTA

Insurance - Motor vehicle accident - Liability of insurer - Dishonour of premium cheque - Present appeal filed by Insurance Company challenging Commissioner's award of compensation to claimants, contending that the policy was void ab initio due to dishonour of the premium cheque and prior intimation to the vehicle owner - Whether the Insurance Company is liable to indemnify third parties under the Motor Vehicles Act despite the dishonour of the premium cheque and subsequent communication to the insured - Held, the Court relied on the principle established in *Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. V/s Inderjit Kaur and Others*, affirming that once an insurance policy is issued, the insurer incurs a statutory obligation to indemnify third parties under Sections 147(5) and 149(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act, regardless of the non-payment of the premium. The Court noted that the insurer cannot escape its statutory liability by citing a contractual dispute with the insured, especially when it failed to comply with GR.24 of the India Motor Tariff Advisory Committee Rules, which mandates notification to the Regional Transport Authority (RTA) regarding policy cancellation. While the insurer is liable to pay the compensation to the claimants, the Court invoked the 'pay and recover' principle, allowing the insurer to recover the paid amount from the vehicle owner, who was also found negligent for failing to act upon the intimation of the dishonoured cheque. Appeal dismissed; order modified to include 'pay and recover' directive.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (NAGPUR BENCH)

First Appeal No. 129 of 2026

Decided On: 20.07.2026

HDFC Ergo General Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Dipali and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Pravin S. Patil, J.

 Citation: 2026:BHC-NAG:9250, MANU/MH/5347/2026

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Supreme Court: Functional Disability Can't Be Reduced in Motor Accident Claim Just Because Victim Was Retained In A Specified Role

The calculation of functional disability depends on assessing the victim’s earning capacity in the open, competitive market, rather than on retention in a specific, highly accommodated role. Evidence before the High Court, specifically the Career Growth Letter dated 06.02.2018 from her employer, confirmed that the Claimant lost out on her normal career growth and promotional progression, including advancement to the positions of General Manager, Director, or Vice President, as a result of the accident. Therecord further indicates that she is able to perform her current duties only through specially created software, flexible working hours, and extreme accommodations provided by her employer as an act of corporate compassion. {Para 19}

20. Based on the official Medical Board Report issued by Vardhman Mahavir Medical College & Safdarjung Hospital, which evaluated the Claimant and certified a 100% PPI of the whole body due to post-traumatic head injury with cortical blindness, pelvic fracture, and a permanent colostomy, the compensation calculation shifts from the High Court’s 80% assessment to a 100% functional disability because the Claimant’s capacity to independently secure, sustain, or advance employment in the open labour market has been entirely extinguished.

NON-REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 12085 OF 2026

RELIANCE GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY

LIMITED Vs PRIYANKA DAS AND OTHERS 

Author: S.V.N. BHATTI, J.

Citation:  2026 INSC 950.

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Andhra Pradesh HC: Legal Heirs Can Claim Compensation under S.163A MV Act even If Deceased Driver Was Negligent

It is evident that the accident resulted in the death of the deceased and, therefore, the claim petition under Section 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 is maintainable, having regard to the object of the Act, which is a beneficial and welfare legislation. Even assuming that the deceased was negligent and contributed to the accident, in view of the amendment brought by Act 32 of 2019, the claimants would be entitled to compensation of Rs. 5,00,000/- in the case of death as contemplated under Section 164 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. Though the accident had occurred prior to the said amendment, at the time of final adjudication by this Court, the claimants are entitled to be granted the maximum benefit so as to ensure award of just and reasonable compensation.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI

MACMA No. 262 of 2023

Decided On: 07.05.2026

Veerapaneni Venkata Subhashini and Ors. Vs. Arikatla Venkata Rathnam and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Venkateswarlu Nimmagadda, J.

Citation:  MANU/AP/1296/2026.

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Supreme Court Lays Down Law On Using ITRs (Income tax return)To Assess Victim's Income in Motor Accident Claims

 In the considered view of this Court, there can be no hard and fast formula for computing the annual income of a deceased person/claimant. ITRs being a statutory document are an important reference point when it comes to assessing one’s income, for the purposes of compensation under the Motor Vehicle Act. {Para 17}

18. We find force in the submission put forth by Mr. J.R Midha, learned senior counsel. There must be a bifurcation made between salaried individuals and self-employed individuals when it comes to assessment of annual income. In our view, for salaried individuals, only the ITR of the previous year will be sufficient for showcasing the annual income from salary. The reason for considering only the preceding year is that the financial impact of promotions is significant and may be reflected in the ITR for only that year. A situation may also arise whereby the deceased/claimant might not have completed a year in the promoted position before the accident or might not have filed ITR for such period. In such cases the Court concerned shall take reference to the promotion letter and other corroboratory financial statements.

19. When it comes to self-employed / individuals carrying out their own business, in our view, the average of the income specified in the ITRs of up to the previous three years is to be taken as a reference point for assessment of annual income from their business. There may also be a scenario where only one or two ITRs have been filed. Given such scenarios and the fluctuation of income in these professions, surrounding circumstances are also to be taken into consideration. These would include:

a) The nature of the business (including geographic location,

category etc.);

b) Growth pattern of the business and impact of death on the

business;

c) Potential growth of business (for instance certain

businesses are capital intensive at the outset and are

profitable at scale/in the future);

d) Negative income (certain businesses may require losses in

the initial years, which may not reflect the true financial

standing); and

e) Any other relevant factor relating to the business.

20. The date when the ITRs are filed would also become a relevant consideration, as there may be scenarios where inflated income is showcased after death/injury. In these circumstances, the surrounding factors of the business would become more relevant. However, if sufficiently supported by financial statements, such ITRs may also be taken into consideration.

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. OF 2026

(Arising out of SLP(C) No. 27220 of 2024)

RASHMIREKHA TRIPATHY AND ANR. Vs THE BRANCH MANAGER (LEGAL CLAIMS), SRIRAM GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED AND ORS.

Author: SANJAY KAROL, J.

Citation: 2026 INSC 661

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Supreme Court: Scene sketches showing post-impact vehicle positions cannot be used to infer contributory negligence against smaller vehicles.

 The following principles can be laid out from the above judgments:

A. Charge Sheet creates a prima facie case of negligence.

B. Criminal acquittals do not displace this prima facie civil liability.

C. Scene sketches showing post-impact vehicle positions cannot be used to infer contributory negligence against smaller vehicles.

{Para 21}

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal Nos. 10755-10758 of 2026

Decided On: 19.08.2026

Reena Vs. The Managing Director, Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

S.V. Bhatti and N.V. Anjaria, JJ.

Author: S.V. Bhatti, J.

Citation:  2026 INSC 889,MANU/SC/0910/2026.

Read full judgment here: Click here.

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Supreme Court Explains that Acquittal In Criminal Case Per Se Won't Prove Lack Of Negligence in Motor Accident Claim

We preface a few of the well-established precedents in the adjudication of Motor Vehicle Accident claims:

A. Police investigation records, including the FIR and final Charge-Sheet, constitute valid, admissible, and reliable prima facie evidence to establish rash and negligent driving in MACT proceedings. Further, a subsequent acquittal in a criminal case does not affect the assessment of tortious liability under the MV Act.1

B. Criminal proceedings and civil MACT Claim Petitions operate in entirely distinct legal realms, as the degree of "culpable rashness" required Under Section 304-A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 ("IPC") is significantly higher than civil negligence under the law of torts. The findings, quashment, or acquittals in Criminal Court cannot control or dictate the outcome of MACT proceedings, which must be evaluated independently on civil standards.2

C. A site map or accident sketch cannot be read in isolation or used as the sole basis to record contributory negligence against a deceased driver in the absence of corroborating ocular evidence. Furthermore, the non-examination of all potential witnesses is not fatal to a claim if the existing record adequately establishes negligence.3

D. The spot where a lighter vehicle is found lying on a site map post-accident cannot be assumed to be the spot where the collision occurred, nor that it was being driven on the wrong side, as a collision with a heavy, speeding vehicle naturally pushes or drags the smaller vehicle forward. The Charge Sheet points towards prima facie driver complicity, and site maps alone cannot establish contributory negligence without direct contra evidence.4

E. Motor accident Claim Petitions Under Section 166 of the MV Act must be adjudicated on the touchstone of "preponderance of probability" rather than proof beyond reasonable doubt. Further, Under Section 173 of the MV Act, the Appellate Court is required to carefully marshal all oral and documentary evidence before reversing a reasoned MACT award.5 {Para 20}

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal Nos. 10755-10758 of 2026

Decided On: 19.08.2026

Reena Vs. The Managing Director, Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

S.V. Bhatti and N.V. Anjaria, JJ.

Author: S.V. Bhatti, J.

Citation:  2026 INSC 889,MANU/SC/0910/2026.

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Supreme Court: The major married son who is also earning and not fully dependent on the deceased, would be still covered by the expression “legal representative” of the deceased and entitled to get compensation

5.1.1. While holding that the legal representatives of the

deceased are entitled to move an application for

compensation by virtue of clause (c) of Section 166(1) of the

Act, it was observed,

“…The major married son who is also earning

and not fully dependent on the deceased,

would be still covered by the expression “legal

representative” of the deceased. This Court

in Manjuri Bera had expounded that liability

to pay compensation under the Act does not

cease because of absence of dependency of

the legal representative concerned…”

(Para 12)

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. OF 2026

(Arising out of SLP (C) No.18553 of 2023)

SAMEEM BEGUM AND OTHERS  Vs K. VENKAT SWAMY AND ANOTHER.

Author: N.V. ANJARIA, J.

Citation: 2026 INSC 864.

Dated: AUGUST 14, 2026.

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Supreme Court: No Motor Accident Compensation For Murder Inside Vehicle

 We are of the view that even on this lighter standard, there

is no causal link that has been established. A perusal of the

judgments of the Courts below in a sense assume that the injuries

suffered by the deceased took place while Dilip and Anand were

in the car. How such a conclusion came about, is best known to

them. The evidence-on-record does not point to any forensic

proof having been recovered from the car for example - blood,

skin cells, hair etc. Neither it is anybody’s case that Dilip’s car is

involved in any collision. All that has been said is that the injuries sustained by Anand were by hard and blunt objects. Now true it is that the claimants need not establish the particular manner in which injuries have been sustained by the injured or the deceased but that does not mean that simply because there was a car somehow involved in a chain of circumstances that led to his death, the provisions of MVA would apply. Some link whatsoever between the car, and the death has to be established.

{Para 13}

14. Pursuant to the aforesaid discussion, there is an alleged

accidental murder and there is a motor vehicle, but the

relationship between the two specifically involving a motor

vehicle has not been established. There cannot be, consequently,

any liability under the MVA. Judgments of the Courts below are

set aside. The appeals are allowed. 

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NOS. OF 2026

(Arising out of SLP(C) Nos.9002-03 of 2026)

DILIP AGARWAL Vs RAJSHRI AGARWAL & ORS.

SANJAY KAROL, J.

Dated: July 22, 2026.

Citation: 2026 INSC 736.

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Supreme Court: Whether Insurance Company is liable to pay compensation if motor accident is done by driver who is minor child?

Section 4 of the Motor Vehicles Act prohibits driving of a vehicle by any person under the age of eighteen years in any public place. Section 5 of the Act imposes a statutory responsibility upon the owners of the motor vehicles not to cause or permit any person who does not satisfy the provisions of Sections 3 or 4 to drive the vehicle. {Para 15}

16. The vehicle in question admittedly was being driven by Karan Arora who was aged about fifteen years. The Tribunal, as noticed hereinbefore, in our opinion, rightly held that Karan Arora did not hold any valid licence on the date of accident, namely 5.2.1997.

17. The learned single Judge as also the Division Bench of the High Court did not put unto themselves a correct question of law. They proceeded on a wrong premise that it was for the Insurance Company to prove breach of conditions of the contract of insurance.

18. The High Court did not advert to itself the provisions of Sections 4 and 5 of the Motor Vehicles Act and thus misdirected itself in law.

19. This aspect of the matter has been considered by this Court in Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Prithvi Raj   MANU/SC/0685/2008 : AIR2008SC1408 wherein upon taking into consideration a large number of decisions, it was held that the Insurance Company was not liable.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 5876 of 2008 

Decided On: 24.09.2008

United India Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Rakesh Kumar Arora and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

S.B. Sinha and Cyriac Joseph, JJ.

Citation: 2008 INSC 1087,MANU/SC/8090/2008,2009 AIR SC 24.

Read full judgment here: Click here.

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