Supreme Court: Divorced Muslim Woman Entitled To Recover Gifts Given by her father To her Husband At the time of Marriage

 It is difficult to agree with the reasoning of the High Court. The primary basis for not giving the amount and gold in question to the Appellant, as it appears from the perusal of the judgment, was the apparent contradiction between the statement of the Kazi i.e. marriage Registrar and the father of the Appellant. The former stated in evidence that the entry recording the amount and gold being given to the husband was erroneously done so and it should have been that the said amount(s) were only given without specifying, to whom, the father of the Appellant on the other hand stated that he had given the amount(s) in question to the Respondent. The High Court observed that since the father was directly responsible for giving the said amount(s), it would be prudent to accept his version of events. What, apparently, the High Court lost sight of is the end result of the proceedings in which the said statement of the father was given. Those proceedings were concerned with Section 498A-Indian Penal Code and Section(s) 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, and despite such a direct statement by the father of the Appellant the learned Trial Court seized of the matter acquitted the Respondent, a conclusion which appears to have attained finality. Then, it cannot be said, in our view, that the evidentiary value of that statement is either equal to or greater than the statement of the marriage registrar. The High Court records that the latter statement regarding writing and overwriting in the entry in the marriage register is proved by him having produced the same before the Court. When that is the case, we are at a loss to understand why his statement in entirety should not be accepted. Mere allegation as to his conduct being suspicious on account of overwriting in the marriage register is not sufficient to discard his testimony.

{Para 8}

9. This case presents the possibility of two interpretations and whereas it is a settled rule that this Court under its plenary, Article 136 jurisdiction does not interfere with the findings of the High Court simply because there are two views possible, this case, in our considered view, does not fall under this exception for the High Court missed the purposive construction goalpost and instead proceeded to adjudicate the matter purely as a civil dispute. The Constitution of India prescribes an aspiration for all, i.e. equality which is, obviously, yet to be achieved. Courts, in doing their bit to this end must ground their reasoning in social justice adjudication. To put it in context, the scope and object of 1986 Act is concerned with securing the dignity and financial protection of a Muslim women post her divorce which aligns with the rights of a women Under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The construction of this Act, therefore, must keep at the forefront equality, dignity and autonomy and must be done in the light of lived experiences of women where particularly in smaller towns and rural areas, inherent patriarchal discrimination is still the order of the day.

  IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 5164 of 2025 

Decided On: 02.12.2025

Rousanara Begum Vs. S.K. Salahuddin and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Sanjay Karol and N. Kotiswar Singh, JJ.

Author: Sanjay Karol, J.

Citation: 2025 INSC 1375, MANU/SC/1611/2025.

Print Page

Supreme Court: For Valid Oral Gift (Hiba) of immovable property under Muslim Law, Public Possession Must Be Proved; Absence Of Mutation Raises Doubt

 The precedents are that to constitute a valid conveyance through an oral gift, the three contemporaneous conditions of declaration by donor, acceptance by donee, possession by donee and to continue to establish possession through contemporaneous evidence to show that Hiba is acted upon. The Hiba is not used as a surprise instrument and cannot sprout into a transfer of property as per the convenience of a party. Moreover, to keep in line with the sanctity of Hiba, it is in the interest of the donor, donee and a third person interested in the subject matter that Hiba is acted upon by completing all three essential requirements in public knowledge rather than in secrecy. The Courts appreciate fulfilment of contemporaneous requirements and possession through evidence while recognising conveyance through an oral gift. Possession is one of the important conditions to constitute a valid oral gift. The courts presume possession of a party from the circumstances pleaded and proved. In the case at hand, there is a consistent revenue record, Ex. P-2, Ex. P-3, Ex. P-4, Ex. P-5 and Exs. D-9 to D-43 showing in the revenue records that the names of Defendants are entered in ROR and their predecessors in interest, both in the title and possession columns. The Plaintiff places oral evidence, and the circumstances summed up above do not inspire confidence for accepting that there has been a valid oral gift in any capacity, i.e., as a daughter or otherwise, in favour of Plaintiff. The impugned judgments presume possession in favour of Plaintiff on ipse dixit statements, and the courts below fell in grave error in not appreciating the long lapse of years and continued silence of Plaintiff vis-à-vis the Suit Property. The next limb is whether Ex. P-8 satisfies as a Memorandum recording the past transaction and would come to the aid of the Plaintiff, at least to the extent of 10 acres said to have been given. Ex. P-8 bears L T I of

Khadijabee. The plaint in OS No. 68 of 1971 is marked as D-44. Khadijabee has signed the plaint in Urdu, and during cross-examination, PW2 specifically stated that Khadijabee was signing, not affixing her L T I. This inconsistency remained unexplained. Further, under Ex. P-8, in clause 5, which reads that the donee shall hereafter peacefully hold and possess and enjoy the land property with all its inclusions without any interference, claim or demand whatsoever from the donor. Ex. P-8 belies the possession and transfer said to have been made on 05.12.1988. From the above, except the self-serving and oral evidence from interested witnesses of Plaintiff, there is no evidence on possession, whether actual or constructive, having been delivered to Plaintiff. On the other hand, the Exhibits relied on by the Plaintiff, coupled with D-8 to D-43, do not enable, presuming that the Plaintiff continued to be in possession of 10 acres of the suit schedule. The High Court was liberal in explaining away the minor variations, if any, in Ex. P-8 do not adversely affect the Plaintiff’s claim. With respect, we are unable to subscribe to the said view. Consequently, the claim of the Plaintiff under Hiba and Ex. P-8, for want of evidence on possession, fails, and the point is answered in favour of the Defendants. {Para 39}

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 12512 of 2025 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 16996 of 2022)

Decided On: 07.10.2025

Dharmrao Sharanappa Shabadi and Ors. Vs. Syeda Arifa Parveen

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Ahsanuddin Amanullah and S.V. Bhatti, JJ.

Author: S.V. Bhatti, J.

Citation:  2025 INSC 1187,MANU/SC/1384/2025.

Print Page

Bombay HC: Whether husband can be prosecuted under the provisions of Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Act 2019 if he has given Talaq-e-Ahsan to his wife ?

 Section 4 of the said Act provides for pronouncement of Talaq. Any muslim husband, who pronounces Talaq referred to in Section 3upon his wife shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine. For this purpose, we will have to consider the definition given in Section 2(c) of word ‘Talaq’. The said Section 2(c) defines word ‘Talaq’ means ‘Talaq-ebiddat’ or any other similar form of Talaq having the effect of instantaneous or irrevocable divorce pronounced by the Muslimhusband. Section 3 provides any pronouncement of Talaq by a Muslim husband upon his wife, by words, either spoken or in electric form or in any other manner whatsoever, shall be void and illegal. Therefore, for Section 3 also the definition that has been given in Section 2(c) of the said Act will have to be considered. Once again, if we consider Section 2(c) of the said Act, then Talaq means Talaq-e-biddat or any other form of Talaq, which is having instantaneous effect or irrevocable effect of the pronouncement. All other forms of Talaq were not prohibited or barred and, therefore, the Single Bench of Kerala High Court has, therefore, considered Talaq-e-Ahsan and Talaq-e-Hasan as well as Talaq-e-biddat.Talaq-e-biddat in short was the practice of pronouncement of triple Talaq i.e. thrice the words to be uttered, “I divorce you” at one go. Certainly, we are required to consider the three Judge Bench decision in Zohara Khatoon (Supra) which has been taken note of i.e. paragraph No.22 thereof in the Coordinate Bench decision in Shaikh Taslim Shaikh Hakim (Supra), wherein three distinct modes of bringing a Muslim marriage to dissolution were considered. Here, we cannot consider only the irrevocable effect. What has been described in the definition of Talaq is instantaneous and irrevocable. Here, in the FIR itself, respondent No.2 has stated that the notice which applicant No.1 had given on 28.12.2023, had stated that what was given to her was Talaq-e-Ahsan i.e. one pronouncement of Talaq. Even the statements of witnesses are on the same line. In the charge-sheet itself, the copy of the said notice dated 23.12.2023 has been given wherein it is written that he was pronouncing one Talaq i.e. Talaq-e-Ahsan as per Shariyat. Thereafter, it appears that the final Talaqnama has been given on 24.03.2024, wherein it was mentioned that after 23.12.2023 within 90 days, neither respondent No.2 had resumed cohabitation and there was no resumption of physical relations between them. The legal effect of Talaq-e-Ahsan has come into play. When the facts are admitted and taking into consideration the law, what was prohibited was the Talaq-e-bidat and not Talaq-e-Ahsan, it would be an abuse of process of law, if the applicants are asked to face the trial and therefore, case is made out for quashment of the FIR and the proceedings. {Para 7}

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

BENCH AT AURANGABAD

CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO.2559 OF 2024

Tanveer Ahmed s/o Sadik Patel Vs The State of Maharashtra

CORAM : SMT. VIBHA KANKANWADI &

SANJAY A. DESHMUKH, JJ.

PRONOUNCED ON : 23 APRIL 2025

Citation: 2025:BHC-AUG:11620-DB

 (Per Smt. Vibha Kankanwadi, J.) 

Read full Judgment here: Click here.

Print Page

Bombay HC: Whether parents- in -law of wife can be prosecuted under the provisions of Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Act 2019?

 Before we proceed further, important point to be noted is that the present FIR is not registered for the offence punishable under Section 498-A of Indian Penal Code or any other Sections. Even now after the notice was served to respondent No.2, no argument has been made on her behalf that the police have failed to register the offence under Section 498-A of Indian Penal Code. The FIR is for the offence punishable under Section 4 of the said Act. In fact, if this FIR is to be construed to Section 4 of the said Act, then it is restricted against husband only. The father-in-law and mother-in-law cannot be included in such offence. There is no question of Section 34 of Indian Penal Code involved in such FIRs. There cannot be a common intention of pronouncement of Talaq. Therefore, even at this stage also, we can say that it would be an abuse of process of law if the matter is asked to be proceeded for the offence punishable under Section 4 of the said Act against the father-in-law and mother-in-law. {Para 6}

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

BENCH AT AURANGABAD

CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO.2559 OF 2024

Tanveer Ahmed s/o Sadik Patel Vs The State of Maharashtra

CORAM : SMT. VIBHA KANKANWADI &

SANJAY A. DESHMUKH, JJ.

PRONOUNCED ON : 23 APRIL 2025

Citation: 2025:BHC-AUG:11620-DB

 (Per Smt. Vibha Kankanwadi, J.) :-

Print Page

Under which circumstances the legal guardian of muslim minor is competent to sell or . mortgage the property of the minors?

SECTION 108 OF B.R. VERMA'S COMMENTARY ON MOHAMMEDAN LAW:

108. Power of guardian.- A legal guardian shall be entitled to exercise the following powers:

(a) He may sell or mortgage immovable property of the minor in the following cases (but not otherwise)

(i) where he can obtain double the value of the property;

(ii) where it is necessary to do so for the maintenance of the minor, the minor having no other property'

(iii) where debts are due from the deceased person from whom the minor inherits the property or any legacies have to be paid and there are no means of paying them;

(iv) where the expenses exceed the income of the property;

(v) where the property is falling into decay;

(vi) where the property has been usurped and the guardian has reason to fear that there is no chance of fair restitution ;

(vii) where it is to manifest advantage of the minor.

(b) he may borrow money and sell or pledge the movable imperative property of the minor where the necessity, such as, for food, clothing or nursing.

(c) He may carry on business on behalf of the minor if it can be done by ordinary prudence and there is no reason to believe it to be hazardous.

(d) He may enter into any contract on behalf of and for the benefit of the minor.

(e) He may surrender a right or preemption of the minor,

IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA

Decided On: 12.05.2009

Gulzar Singh Vs. Julphan and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Vinod Kumar Sharma, J.

Citation:  Gulzar Singh vs. Julphan and Ors. (12.05.2009 - PHHC) : MANU/PH/0455/.

Print Page

Kerala HC: Muslim Wife Residing Separately From Husband On His Contracting Second Marriage Can Claim Maintenance Under CrPC /BNSS

 The Muslim Personal Law, though, permits the husband to contract a second marriage during the subsistence of the first marriage in exceptional circumstances, specifically mandates that the husband is bound to treat both wives equally and equitably. A Muslim wife who resides separately from her husband on his contracting a second marriage is not disentitled from claiming her statutory right of maintenance under CrPC/BNSS [See Badruddin v Aisha Begum (1957) All. LJ. 300]. The fact that the husband has a second wife and is liable to maintain her cannot be a factor in denying maintenance to the first wife or reducing the quantum of maintenance she is entitled to.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

RPFC NO. 334 OF 2022

 HASEENA  Vs  SUHAIB

PRESENT

 DR. JUSTICE KAUSER EDAPPAGATH

Dated:  15TH DAY OF JANUARY 2025

Citation: 2025:KER:2953.

Print Page

Bombay HC: Mere desire of a child at a tender age is not a sole factor to be considered for deciding child custody

In view of the above, now it is settled that it is the

interest of the children that needs to be considered. Mere desire

of a child at a tender age is not a sole factor to be considered for

taking decision in respect of the custody. The child at the tender

age is not fully aware of his welfare. There is always tendency to

be with parent with whom they are residing. They are mostly

influenced by tutoring by the parents. Interaction with child is

thus influenced by such parents. In the present case also, this

court interacted with the children. The children naturally stated

that they are happy with the father. However, it must be

considered that presently children are in custody of the father

and as expected, answer has come in favour of the father. 

{Para 12}

13. So far as better company and care is concerned, it is

seen that almost every member in the family of the husband is

occupied in the business. There is only grand-mother of the

children who is in the house for whole day. In the house of the

wife, she is always at home. She stays with her parents. There

are other relatives in the family. So far as deprivation of the

company is concerned, it needs to be noted that both the parties

are staying in the same town. Distance between the houses of

husband and wife is not more than 2 km. Thus, visitation by

parent would not be much difficult. Husband can always meet

children at convenient place. Husband and wife are related to

each other even prior to marriage. One more factor needs to be

considered is that there is one female child who is staying with

mother. If all the siblings stay together it would help children in

growing together. Being female child she requires care and

attention of the mother. Under Muslim Law, custody of the

children below 7 years is required to be with the wife.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

BENCH AT AURANGABAD

FIRST APPEAL NO. 1708 OF 2024 WITH CA/7330/2024 IN FA/1708/2024

Mukhtar S/o. Yunus Sayyad, Vs  Habiba W/o. Mukhtar Sayyad,

CORAM : KISHORE C. SANT, J.

PRONOUNCED ON : 28th AUGUST, 2024

Print Page

Allahabad HC: Oral gift deed under Muslim Law reduced in to writing which is not registered document can not be subjected to S. 47-A of Stamp Act

It is nobodies case that the hiba/gift deed was presented for registration. Once this fact is admitted by respondents that gift deed/hiba was not presented for registration, then proceedings under Section 47(A) of Indian Stamp Act cannot be pressed to service. Further, Section 47-A of the Act can only be applicable when any instrument/document is presented for registration and not otherwise. If the auhorities were of the view that hiba/git deed was required for payment of stamp duty, then the proceedings u/S 33 of the Stamp Act should have been initiated and not u/s 47-A of the Act. {Para 12}

13. This Court on various occasions has held that the proceedings under Section 47-A of the Stamp Act cannot be initiated for unregistered documents.

 In the High Court of Allahabad

(Before Piyush Agrawal, J.)

Writ - C No. - 41137 of 2010

Sahas Degree College,Vs State of U.P., 

Decided on August 8, 2024

Citation: 2024 SCC OnLine All 4199.

Print Page

Bombay HC: Motor accident claim tribunal should not grant compensation as per apportionment provided by personal law of the parties but must grant compensation as per their dependency

Shri Kazi, the learned Counsel appearing for the appellants, submitted that as per the principles of Mohammedan law, appellant No. 1 father Abdul Raheman being the heir of deceased Mohammed Shafi is entitled to half of the total compensation and mother and widow to the extent of 1/4th each. We gave anxious consideration on this aspect. However, the compensation is being paid taking into consideration the dependency of the claimants. We are of the opinion that we are not guided by the apportionment as provided under the Mohammedan law. 

{Para 5}

6. Appellant No. I father Abdul Raheman is aged 61 whereas mother of deceased is aged about 43. At the time of incident, appellant No. 3 Shahnazbanu was hardly aged about 28. Her dependency is comparatively more than appellants Nos. 1 and 2, taking into consideration her age. We, therefore, feel that it would be just and reasonable to pay half of the amount of compensation to appellant No. 3 and rest of the amount in equal share i.e. 1/4th to each appellant No. 1 and 2.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Decided On: 30.11.1988

Abdul Rahman and Ors. Vs. Dayaram and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

M.M. Qazi and Ashok A. Desai, JJ.

Author: Ashok A. Desai, J.

Citation: 1989 (2) T.A.C. 423, 1(1989)ACC226,  MANU/MH/0742/1988.

Print Page

Whether criminal revision is maintainable against the order passed by the Magistrate under Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act?

 Section 6 of the Code of Criminal Procedure enumerates the classes of Criminal Courts and they include Judicial Magistrate of the First Class, Metropolitan Magistrate and the Judicial Magistrate of the Second Class. Section 12(3)(b), Cr.P.C. shows that a Chief Judicial Magistrate exercises general control over all Magistrates. Section 10(1) Cr.P.C. provides that all Assistant Sessions Judges shall be subordinate to the Sessions Judge in whose Court they exercise jurisdiction. Sub-section (1) of Section 397, Cr.P.C. lays down that the High Court or any Sessions Judge may call for and examine the record of any proceedings before any. inferior Criminal Court constituted within its or his local jurisdiction for the purpose of satisfying itself or himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed and as to regularity of proceedings of any such inferior Court. The explanation to this sub-section provides that all Magistrates, whether Executive or Judicial, and whether exercising original or appellate jurisdiction, shall be deemed to be inferior to the Sessions Judge for the purpose of this sub-section and of Section 398. In view of Section 6 of Cr.P.C. all Judicial Magistrates (First Class or Second Class), Metropolitan Magistrates and Executive Magistrates are Criminal Courts. By virtue of the explanation of Sub-section (1) of Section 397, Cr.P.C, all Magistrates shall be deemed to be inferior to the Sessions judge. It, therefore, follows that all Magistrates are inferior Criminal Courts and, consequently, the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order passed by them or the regularity of any proceedings of such Magistrates can be examined by the High Court or the Sessions Judge under Sub-section (1) of Section 397. The power conferred by Sub-section (1) of Section 397, Cr.P.C. is in very wide terms. There is nothing to indicate that any order passed by a Magistrate under the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986, would not fall within the purview of Sub-section (1) of Section 397, Cr.P.C. As mentioned earlier, the Legislature has not made any such provision in the Act which may indicate that any finality is attached to the orders passed by the Magistrate. Therefore, the correctness, legality or propriety of any order passed or proceedings conducted by a Magistrate under the Act can be examined by the High Court or the Sessions Judge under Sub-section (1) of Section 397, Cr.P.C. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the view taken in Salim v. Judicial Magistrate, Haridwr 1996 JIC 30, that a revision does not lie against an order passed by a Magistrate under the Act does not lay down correct law. {Para 9}

10. Our answer to the question referred by the learned Single Judge is, therefore, as follows :

'Against an order passed by a Magistrate under the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986, a revision is maintainable before the Sessions Judge under Section 397, Cr.P.C.'

IN THE HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD

Criminal Revision No. 1430 of 1999

Decided On: 24.05.2002

Saman Ismail Vs. Rafiq Ahmad and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

G.P. Mathur and R.P. Misra, JJ.

Author: G.P. Mathur, J.

Citation: 2002 Cri L J 3648 (All) (DB),MANU/UP/1313/2002.

Print Page

What are necessary pre-requisite for giving of gift as per muslim law?

 According to Muslim Personal Law in India, a gift is known as "Hiba". The gift under Muslim law is given effect by a declaration of gift by the donor and its acceptance by the donee. Here's how it is done:

1. Declaration (Offer) by the Donor (Offeror):
   • The donor must declare the gift clearly and unambiguously.
   • The declaration should specify the subject matter of the gift.
   • The declaration must be made during the lifetime of the donor.

Print Page

What basic principles the court should follow while deciding child custody dispute?

Principles governing custody of minor children

53. In our judgment, the law relating to custody of a child is fairly well-settled and it is this. In deciding a difficult and complex question as to custody of minor, a Court of law should keep in mind relevant statutes and the rights flowing therefrom. But such cases cannot be decided solely by interpreting legal provisions. It is a humane problem and is required to be solved with human touch. A Court while dealing with custody cases, is neither bound by statutes nor by strict Rules of evidence or procedure nor by precedents. In selecting proper guardian of a minor, the paramount consideration should be the welfare and well-being of the child. In selecting a guardian, the Court is exercising parens patriae jurisdiction and is expected, nay bound, to give due weight to a child's ordinary comfort, contentment, health, education, intellectual development and favourable surroundings. But over and above physical comforts, moral and ethical values cannot be ignored. They are equally, or we may say, even more important, essential and indispensable considerations. If the minor is old enough to form an intelligent preference or judgment, the Court must consider such preference as well, though the final decision should rest with the Court as to what is conducive to the welfare of the minor.

55. We are unable to appreciate the approach of the Courts below. This Court in catena of decisions has held that the controlling consideration governing the custody of children is the welfare of children and not the right of their parents.

[Emphasis supplied]

14. This Court has consistently held that welfare of the child is of paramount consideration and not personal law and statute. In Ashish Ranjan v. Anupam Tandon and Anr. MANU/SC/1013/2010 : 2010:INSC:836 : (2010) 14 SCC 274, this Court held as under:

19. The statutory provisions dealing with the custody of the child under any personal law cannot and must not supersede the paramount consideration as to what is conducive to the welfare of the minor. In fact, no statute on the subject, can ignore, eschew or obliterate the vital factor of the welfare of the minor.

16. Another principle of law which is settled with reference to custody of the child is the wish of the child, if she is capable of. Reference can be made to Rohith Thammana Gowda v. State of Karnataka and ors.' case (supra). It was held as under:

13. We have stated earlier that the question 'what is the wish/desire of the child' can be ascertained through interaction, but then, the question as to 'what would be the best interest of the child' is a matter to be decided by the court taking into account all the relevant circumstances.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 1345 of 2024.

Decided On: 04.03.2024

Shazia Aman Khan and Ors. Vs. The State of Orissa and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

C.T. Ravikumar and Rajesh Bindal, JJ.

Author: Rajesh Bindal, J.

Citation:- MANU/SC/0160/2024.

Print Page

Important provisions of Civil minor Acts(Part 1)

 

1) Important provisions of motor vehicle Act

https://www.lawweb.in/2019/09/important-provisions-of-motor-vehicle.html

2) Important provisions of The family courts Act 1984

https://www.lawweb.in/2023/09/important-provisions-of-family-courts.html

3) Important provisions of Maharashtra Regional and town planning Act 1966

https://www.lawweb.in/2022/08/important-provisions-of-maharashtra.html

Print Page

What is basic concept of Muta marriage under muslim law and its implication on child born from such marriage?

 Muta marriage also known as temporary marriage, is a concept in Shia Islam that allows for a time-bound contractual marriage between a man and a woman. This type of marriage has a fixed duration specified in the contract, and it ends automatically when that duration expires. The duration can range from a few hours to several years, as agreed upon by the parties involved.

The concept of Muta has been a subject of controversy and debate within the broader Muslim community. While Shia Muslims consider it permissible under certain conditions, Sunni Muslims generally do not recognize or accept the practice. Many Sunni scholars argue that temporary marriage contradicts the principles of permanence and stability emphasized in traditional Islamic marriages.

Implications on Children:

Print Page

What are different types of traditional divorce under muslim law?

 In Islamic law, divorce is known as "Talaq," and there are different types of divorce recognized within the Sunni and Shia traditions. It's important to note that the details and interpretations of these concepts may vary among different schools of thought within Islam.

1. 1) Talaq:

   • Talaq-e-Ahsan: This is the most preferred and considered the most proper form of divorce. It involves a single pronouncement of divorce, followed by a waiting period (iddah) during which the wife cannot remarry. If the wife is not pregnant, the waiting period is three menstrual cycles; if she is pregnant, it lasts until the child is born.
   • 2)Talaq-e-Hasan:
   It consists of three pronouncements made during three consecutive menstrual cycles, with a waiting period (iddah) following the final pronouncement.

Print Page

Allahabad HC: Unmarried Daughter Has Right To get Maintenance Under Domestic Violence Act, Irrespective Of Her Religion & Age

In my opinion, in the above words, the Supreme Court has recognized that the scope of DV Act, 2005 is quite wide. The statement of object and reasons which finds place at the top of any particular enactment may be of utility while interpreting the provisions of law. The objective of enacting this Act has been worded as below:-

“An Act to provide for more effective protection of the rights of women guaranteed under the Constitution who are victims of violence of any kind occurring within the family and for matter connected therewith or incidental thereto.” {Para 12}

13. In my view the legislature, while enacting this Act had this realisation in mind that though existing provision of law provide for rights of maintenance to eligible persons, however the procedural delays defeat the very purpose. The enactment seeks to grant a quicker relief where the aggrieved woman has been subjected to domestic violence and was in a domestic relationship with the respondent. This explains the use of words “more effective protection to women”, hence it is being held that where a sufferer has a right to obtain maintenance as provided in criminal law or in civil law or personal law and that she has been subjected to domestic violence from a person who stood in domestic relationship, she may resort to quicker method of obtaining reliefs under section 12 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005.

14. From perusal of the judgments as have been referred to earlier, there remains no doubt that unmarried daughter, whether Hindu or Muslim has a right to obtain maintenance, irrespective of her age. This is made clear again that the courts have to look for other laws applicable when the question pertains to right to be maintained. However, where issue does not pertain to mere maintenance, the independent rights are available to an aggrieved under section 20 of the DV Act itself.

 ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT

MATTERS UNDER ARTICLE 227 No. - 3046 of 2023

 Naimullah Sheikh And Another Vs State Of U.P. And 3 Others

Author; Hon'ble Mrs. Jyotsna Sharma,J.

Delivered on 10.01.2024.

Neutral Citation No. - 2024:AHC:4853

Print Page

Important judgments on permanent Alimony under S 25 of Hindu Marriage Act and Muslim law

 

1) Whether faithful mistress can be granted permanent alimony?

It is fundamental principle of law that in order to claim a relief from the Court of law, there must be a legal right based on a legal status. When the status of a woman as "wife" is not recognized by provisions of the Act, which confers the right for permanent alimony, she cannot be entertained for grant of relief in the absence of recognition of her status by the Act.

24. For the reasons discussed above, with due respect, it is held that the decisions of the Bombay High Court, upholding right of maintenance to "illegitimate wife" (or "faithful mistress") by liberal construction of word "wife" as contained in section 25 of HM Act, cannot be said to be a good law and are required to be overruled to that extent.

Bombay High Court

Bhausaheb @ Sandu S/O Raghuji ... vs Leelabai W/O Bhausaheb Magar on 7 July, 2003

Equivalent citations: AIR 2004 Bom 283, II (2004) DMC 321, 2003 (4) MhLj 1019

Bench: N Dabholkar, A Naik, N Patil.

https://www.lawweb.in/2012/02/permanent-alimony-under-hindu-marriage.html

Print Page

What are the grounds for dissolution of marriage under the Dissolution of Muslim Marriage Act 1939?

 As per S 2 of the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939, a woman married under Muslim Law can obtain a decree for the dissolution of her marriage on the following grounds:

1. The whereabouts of the husband have not been known for a period of four years.{Missing}

2. The husband has neglected or failed to provide for her maintenance for a period of two years.

3. The husband has been sentenced to imprisonment for a period of seven years or more.

4. The husband has failed to perform marital obligations without reasonable cause  for a period of three years.

5. The husband has been impotent at the time of marriage and continues to be so.

6. The husband has been insane for a period of two years or is suffering {from leprosy}deleted or a virulent venereal disease.

7. She was married before she attained the age of fifteen years and she has repudiated the marriage before attaining the age of  eighteen years:

8. The husband has treated her with cruelty.

9. On any other ground which is recognized as valid for the dissolution of marriage under muslim law

      These are the grounds on which a woman married under Muslim Law can seek a decree of dissolution of marriage under the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939.

Print Page

Supreme Court: Divorced Muslim woman is entitled to get maintenance from her husband U/S 125 of CRPC as long as she does not remarry

Cumulative reading of the relevant portions of judgments of this Court in Danial Latifi (supra) and Iqbal Bano (supra) would make it crystal clear that even a divorced Muslim woman would be entitled to claim maintenance from her divorced husband, as long as she does not remarry. This being a beneficial piece of legislation, the benefit thereof must accrue to the divorced Muslim women. {Para 29}

30. In the light of the aforesaid discussion, the impugned orders are hereby set aside and quashed. It is held that even if a Muslim woman has been divorced, she would be entitled to claim maintenance from her husband under Section 125 of the Cr.P.C. after the expiry of period of iddat also, as long as she does not remarry.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 2309 of 2009 

Decided On: 04.12.2009

Shabana Bano Vs. Imran Khan

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

B. Sudershan Reddy and Deepak Verma, JJ.

Author: Deepak Verma, J.

Citation:2010 ALL MR (cri)278 , MANU/SC/1859/2009

Print Page

Important provisions of Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939

 2. Grounds for decree for dissolution of marriage.—A woman married under Muslim law shall be entitled to obtain a decree for the dissolution of her marriage on any one or more of the following grounds, namely:

(i) that the whereabouts of the husband have not been known for a period of four years;

(ii) that the husband has neglected or has failed to provide for her maintenance for a period of two years;

(iii) that the husband has been sentenced to imprisonment for a period of seven years or upwards;

(iv) that the husband has failed to perform, without reasonable cause, his marital obligations for a period of three years;

(v) that the husband was impotent at the time of the marriage and continues to be so;

(vi) that the husband has been insane for a period of two years or is suffering from 2[* * *] a virulent venereal disease;

(vii) that she, having been given in marriage by her father or other guardian before she attained the age of fifteen years, repudiated the marriage before attaining the age of eighteen years:

Provided that the marriage has not been consummated;

(viii) that the husband treats her with cruelty, that is to say,—

(a) habitually assaults her or makes her life miserable by cruelty of conduct even if such conduct does not amount to physical illtreatment, or

(b) associates with women of evil repute or leads an infamous life, or

(c) attempts to force her to lead an immoral life, or

(d) disposes of her property or prevents her exercising her legal rights over it, or

(e) obstructs her in the observance of her religious profession or practice, or

(f) if he has more wives than one, does not treat her equitably in accordance with the injunctions of the Qoran;

(ix) on any other ground which is recognised as valid for the dissolution of marriages under Muslim law:

Print Page