Wednesday 1 February 2017

Whether sanction for prosecution of public servant is vitiated if different authorities have given different opinion before final decision?

In Sethi Auto Service Station and another v. Delhi
Development Authority and others (2009) 1 SCC 180
, this Court observed as
under: -
“14. It is trite to state that notings in a
departmental file do not have the sanction of law to
be an effective order. A noting by an officer is an
expression of his viewpoint on the subject. It is no
more than an opinion by an officer for internal use
and consideration of the other officials of the
department and for the benefit of the final
decision-making authority. Needless to add that
internal notings are not meant for outside exposure.
Notings in the file culminate into an executable
order, affecting the rights of the parties, only when
it reaches the final decision-making authority in the
department, gets his approval and the final order is
communicated to the person concerned.”
10. In view of the law laid down by this Court, as above, we
are of the opinion that the sanction cannot be held invalid only
for the reason that in the administrative notings different
authorities have opined differently before the competent
authority took the decision in the matter. It is not a case
where the Finance Minister was not the competent authority

to grant the sanction. What is required under Section 19 of
the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 is that for taking the
cognizance of an offence, punishable under Sections 7, 10, 11,
13 and 15 of the Act committed by the public servant, is
necessary by the Central Government or the State
Government, as the case may be, and in the case of a public
servant, who is neither employed in connection with affairs of
the Union or the State, from the authority competent to
remove him. Sub-section (2) of Section 19 of the Act provides
that where for any reason whatsoever any doubt arises as to
whether the previous sanction, as required under sub-section
(1) should be given by the Central Government or the State
Government or any authority, such sanction shall be given by
that Government or authority which could have been
competent to remove the public servant from his office at the
time when the offence was alleged to have been committed.
Sub-section (3) of Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption
Act, 1988 provides as under: -
“(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), -
(a) no finding, sentence or order passed by a
special Judge shall be reversed or altered by a
court in appeal, confirmation or revision on the
ground of the absence of, or any error,
omission or irregularity in, the sanction
required under sub-section (1), unless in the
opinion of that court, a failure of justice has in
fact been occasioned thereby;
(b) no court shall stay the proceedings under this
Act on the ground of any error, omission or
irregularity in the sanction granted by the
authority, unless it is satisfied that such error,
omission or irregularity has resulted in a
failure of justice;
(c) no court shall stay the proceedings under this
Act on any other ground and no court shall
exercise the powers of revision in relation to
any interlocutory order passed in any inquiry,
trial, appeal or other proceedings.”
11. Having gone through the copy of note-sheets relating to
sanction in question placed before us as part of rejoinder
affidavit, it is evident that there had been proper application of
mind on the part of the competent authority before the
sanction was accorded. Our perusal of the said record does
not indicate that any decision was taken by the competent
authority, at any point of time, not to grant sanction so as to
give the decision to grant sanction the colour of a review of any
such earlier order, as has been contended before us. The
opinion of CVC, which was reaffirmed and ultimately prevailed
in according the sanction, cannot be said to be irrelevant for
the reason that clause (g) of Section 8 of the Central Vigilance
Commission Act, 2003 provides that it is one of the functions
of the CVC to tender advice to the Central Government on
such matters as may be referred to it by the Government.
Reportable
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 2491 OF 2014
Vivek Batra 
V
Union of India and others 
Dated:October 18, 2016.
Citation: (2017) 1 SCC 69

This appeal is directed against judgment and order dated
29.10.2013, passed by the High Court of Judicature at
Bombay in Criminal Writ Petition No. 3654 of 2012, whereby
the petition challenging the sanction dated 09.10.2012 for
prosecution of the appellant under Section 13 of the
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 is dismissed.
2. Brief facts of the case are that the appellant is an officer
of cadre of Indian Revenue Service (for short “IRS”), who
entered into the service through 1992 batch. It is stated that
an FIR RC No. BA1/2005/A0017 was registered on
04.04.2005 by Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI)
(Respondent No. 4) in respect of disproportionate assets to the
known sources of the appellant. The prosecution case is that
the appellant has amassed the assets valued at
Rs.1,27,38,353/- in his name and in the names of his wife
and minor son during the check period 04.01.1993 to
31.03.2004, which is disproportionate to the known sources
of his income. The investigation took almost six years to get
completed, which revealed that a sum of Rs.56,30,296/- was
invested by the appellant through Benami transactions in the
names of his wife and son in two companies, namely, M/s.
ARJ Impex Private Limited and M/s. Malik Hospitality Services
Private Limited. According to CBI, the appellant’s wife
Priyanka Batra incorporated a company, M/s. ARJ Impex
Limited, to engage in import-export business, and then sold
her shares in the company to her two uncles, namely, Karan
Singh and Vijay Kumar. The company’s main source of
income was unsecured loans obtained from various companies
and individuals, many of which were never paid back, several
of these loans were from Priyanka Batra herself. Further,
though the sale of income of the company was minimal, itPage 3
Page 3 of 11
acquired assets of Rs.85,70,770/- during the check period. It
appears that Karan Singh and Vijay Kumar had incorporated
another company called M/s. Malik Hospitality Services,
whose main source of income was unsecured loans from
various individuals and companies. The company had
acquired assets of Rs.20,52,013/- and had unrepaid loans of
Rs.26,77,000/- during the check period. Priyanka Batra was
connected to Malik Hospitality Services as a public notice
appeared in Nav Bharat Times, showing her as the intended
purchaser of a property that was to be bought for the
company.
3. The appellant was arrested on 02.09.2010, and after
about three days released on bail. He was placed under
suspension by the authority concerned. The CBI sought
sanction for prosecution of the appellant from the competent
authority on which the file was processed, and at the first
stage on 03.05.2011 advice of Central Vigilance Commission
(CVC) was sought by the Finance Department. On
01.09.2011, the CVC recommended that the sanction for
prosecution be granted. The department concerned (Finance
Department) endorsed the matter again on 01.11.2011 for
fresh opinion of the CVC. But the CVC, through its Office
Memorandum dated 02.11.2011, reiterated its opinion. The
Finance Department thereafter referred the matter to
Department of Personnel and Training (for short “DOPT”) for
its views. The DOPT did not appreciate the stand of the
Finance Department that the sanction should be accorded
only if the CBI provides sufficient evidence and communicated
the same through letter dated 29.03.2012. However, it
observed that administrative warning could be issued to the
appellant for not intimating the transactions to Finance
Department. Through letter dated 28.05.2012, the DOPT
conveyed that insufficiency of evidence can be tested in the
court of law and sanction for prosecution can be granted.
Finally, the competent authority, vide its order dated
09.10.2012, granted sanction for prosecution of the appellant,
who challenged the same before the High Court in the writ
petition, which was dismissed by the impugned order.
4. Mr. K.K. Venugopal, learned senior counsel appearing on
behalf of the appellant, argued that there was categorical
opinion of the Finance Department that the evidence laid
before it was not sufficient to grant sanction for prosecution.
It is pointed out that there was difference of opinion between
Finance Ministry and the CVC. Not only this, even DOPT
opined that warning to the officer could be sufficient. It is
further submitted that the earlier competent authority
(Finance Minister, Government of India) had referred the
matter back to the CVC, as such, the sanction for prosecution
stood declined, and grant of the sanction by the successor
Finance Minister cannot be said to be a valid sanction for
prosecution. It is further argued that the Rules of Business
are not followed, as such, it cannot be said that the sanction
was accorded by the competent authority. In support of his
argument learned senior counsel placed reliance on Nazir
Ahmad v. King-Emperor1
, and argued that where a power is
given to do a certain thing in a certain way, the thing must be
done in that way or not at all.
5. We have considered the submissions of learned senior
counsel, and perused the record.
1 AIR 1936 PC 253
6. Before further discussion, we thing it just and proper to
quote relevant part of Government of India (Allocation of
Business) Rules, 1961. Sub-rules (3) and (4) of Rule 3 of the
Rules read as under: -
“(3) Where sanction for the prosecution of any
person for any offence is required to be
accorded –
a) If he is a Government servant, by the
Department which is the Cadre
Controlling authority for the service of
which he is a member, and in any other
case, by the Department in which he was
working at the time of commission of the
alleged offence;
b) If he is a public servant other than a
Government servant, appointed by the
Central Government, by the Department
administratively concerned with the
organization in which he was working at
the time of commission of the alleged
offence; and
c) In any other case, by the Department
which administers the Act under which
the alleged offence is committed;
Provided that where, for offences alleged
to have been committed, sanction is required
under more than one Act, it shall be competent
for the Department which administers any of
such Acts to accord sanction under all such
Acts.Page 7
Page 7 of 11
(4) Notwithstanding anything contained in
sub-rule (3), the President may, by general or
special order, direct that in any case or class of
case, the sanction shall be by the Department
of Personnel and Training.”
7. There is no dispute that for an IRS officer Cadre
Controlling Authority is the Finance Minister of the
Government of India. In Bachhittar Singh v. The State of
Punjab2
, Constitution Bench of this Court has held that the
business of the State is a complicated one and has necessarily
to be conducted through the agency of large number of
officials and authorities.
8. In Jasbir Singh Chhabra and others v. State of
Punjab and others3
, this Court held as under: -
“35. It must always be remembered that in a
democratic polity like ours, the functions of the
Government are carried out by different individuals
at different levels. The issues and policy matters
which are required to be decided by the Government
are dealt with by several functionaries some of
whom may record notings on the files favouring a
particular person or group of persons. Someone
may suggest a particular line of action, which may
not be conducive to public interest and others may
suggest adoption of a different mode in larger public
interest. However, the final decision is required to
be taken by the designated authority keeping in
2
[1962] Supp. 3 SCR 713
3
(2010) 4 SCC 192
view the larger public interest. The notings recorded
in the files cannot be made basis for recording a
finding that the ultimate decision taken by the
Government is tainted by mala fides or is influenced
by extraneous considerations……”
9. In Sethi Auto Service Station and another v. Delhi
Development Authority and others (2009) 1 SCC 180
, this Court observed as
under: -
“14. It is trite to state that notings in a
departmental file do not have the sanction of law to
be an effective order. A noting by an officer is an
expression of his viewpoint on the subject. It is no
more than an opinion by an officer for internal use
and consideration of the other officials of the
department and for the benefit of the final
decision-making authority. Needless to add that
internal notings are not meant for outside exposure.
Notings in the file culminate into an executable
order, affecting the rights of the parties, only when
it reaches the final decision-making authority in the
department, gets his approval and the final order is
communicated to the person concerned.”
10. In view of the law laid down by this Court, as above, we
are of the opinion that the sanction cannot be held invalid only
for the reason that in the administrative notings different
authorities have opined differently before the competent
authority took the decision in the matter. It is not a case
where the Finance Minister was not the competent authority

to grant the sanction. What is required under Section 19 of
the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 is that for taking the
cognizance of an offence, punishable under Sections 7, 10, 11,
13 and 15 of the Act committed by the public servant, is
necessary by the Central Government or the State
Government, as the case may be, and in the case of a public
servant, who is neither employed in connection with affairs of
the Union or the State, from the authority competent to
remove him. Sub-section (2) of Section 19 of the Act provides
that where for any reason whatsoever any doubt arises as to
whether the previous sanction, as required under sub-section
(1) should be given by the Central Government or the State
Government or any authority, such sanction shall be given by
that Government or authority which could have been
competent to remove the public servant from his office at the
time when the offence was alleged to have been committed.
Sub-section (3) of Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption
Act, 1988 provides as under: -
“(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), -
(a) no finding, sentence or order passed by a
special Judge shall be reversed or altered by a
court in appeal, confirmation or revision on the
ground of the absence of, or any error,
omission or irregularity in, the sanction
required under sub-section (1), unless in the
opinion of that court, a failure of justice has in
fact been occasioned thereby;
(b) no court shall stay the proceedings under this
Act on the ground of any error, omission or
irregularity in the sanction granted by the
authority, unless it is satisfied that such error,
omission or irregularity has resulted in a
failure of justice;
(c) no court shall stay the proceedings under this
Act on any other ground and no court shall
exercise the powers of revision in relation to
any interlocutory order passed in any inquiry,
trial, appeal or other proceedings.”
11. Having gone through the copy of note-sheets relating to
sanction in question placed before us as part of rejoinder
affidavit, it is evident that there had been proper application of
mind on the part of the competent authority before the
sanction was accorded. Our perusal of the said record does
not indicate that any decision was taken by the competent
authority, at any point of time, not to grant sanction so as to
give the decision to grant sanction the colour of a review of any
such earlier order, as has been contended before us. The
opinion of CVC, which was reaffirmed and ultimately prevailed
in according the sanction, cannot be said to be irrelevant for
the reason that clause (g) of Section 8 of the Central Vigilance
Commission Act, 2003 provides that it is one of the functions
of the CVC to tender advice to the Central Government on
such matters as may be referred to it by the Government.
12. For the reasons, as discussed above, we find no reason to
interfere with the impugned order passed by the High Court
dismissing the writ petition. Accordingly, the appeal is
dismissed. The interim order dated 25.11.2014, passed by
this Court, is hereby vacated. The trial court is directed to
conclude the trial expeditiously. However, we clarify that we
have not given any opinion as to the merits of the case. There
shall be no order as to costs.
……………………………..J.
[Ranjan Gogoi]
……………………………..J.
[Prafulla C. Pant]
New Delhi;
October 18, 2016.
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