Supreme Court: S 156(3) CrPC Order Is Pre-Cognizance Step, Sanction Under S 197 CrPC Not Required At That Stage

 The scheme of CrPC does not contemplate any embargo on the direction for registration of an FIR or the conduct of investigation at the pre-cognizance stage. To hold otherwise would amount to introducing a restriction not envisaged by the legislature. The process of criminal law is sequential: information of a cognizable offence must first be received; an FIR must then be registered; investigation must follow; a report under Section 173 of CrPC must thereafter be submitted; and it is only at that stage that the question of taking cognizance arises. {Para 126}

127. The requirement of sanction is, therefore, a condition precedent only for taking cognizance and not for the registration of an FIR or for the conduct of investigation. Any interpretation that makes the registration of an FIR contingent upon prior sanction would invert this statutory scheme and render the provisions relating to investigation unworkable.

129. The bar under Sections 196 and 197 of CrPC would operate

only in respect of the latter course. It could not have been invoked to deny the former. The Trial Court, therefore, fell in error in declining to exercise jurisdiction under Section 156(3) of CrPC on the ground of absence of prior sanction, and the High Court, in affirming such view, has adopted an interpretation which cannot be sustained in law.” [Emphasis supplied]

28. Thus, it is clear that the impugned order, insofar as it extends the benefit of the protective umbrella of sanction to the respondents at the stage of direction for registration of FIR under Section 156(3) CrPC, is per se unsustainable in the eyes of law.

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026

(Arising out of SLP(Crl.) No(s). 1137 of 2025)

SRI ANUMANDALA RAJESH REDDY Vs STATE OF KARNATAKA AND ANR. 

Author: Mehta, J.

Citation: 2026 INSC 1039.

Dated: AUGUST 24, 2026.

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Bombay HC: Whether Sanction authority must give sanction for prosecution if the work for which bribe was given had already completed?

 From above testimony of sanctioning authority, as pointed out, it is emerging that this authority has also received documents comprising of processed papers which were already dispatched to both, Passport Office at Pune as well as concerned police station. If this was admitted, then as pointed out, on the day of main trap dated 23rd December 2005, there was no work with accused and rather it was already processed and forwarded to the concerned office. If this was the situation, then, as rightly held by the trial court, this authority ought to have refused to accord sanction by noting that there was no motive or work of complainant to offer bribe or for accused to accept the same. Therefore, there are reason to hold that there is no complete application of mind to the entire documents received by this sanctioning authority. {Para 21}

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (AURANGABAD BENCH)

Criminal Appeal No. 526 of 2011 and Criminal Application No. 1151 of 2024 in Criminal Appeal No. 526 of 2011

Decided On: 11.03.2026

The State of Maharashtra Vs. Navnath Dipa Vetal

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Abhay S. Waghwase, J.

Citation: MANU/MH/2382/2026,2026 NCBHC-AUG 10345.

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Bombay HC: Whether prosecution must prove sanction for prosecution even though advocate for accused has admitted it?

 The defence has admitted the sanction to prosecute the appellant. However, even though the sanction order passed by the sanctioning authority to prosecute the appellant is admitted, the prosecution is still duty-bound to prove that the sanctioning authority had applied its mind while according sanction. It is against the safeguard of Article 311 of the Constitution of India and also against Section 19 of the PC Act. Even though the said sanction order has been admitted by the defence, it is well established that an Advocate appearing for the accused has no authority to admit any document contrary to the interest of the accused. Advocate is not appointed to give admission on behalf of accused contrary to law. As per provision of Section 58 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, now Section 53 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, though there is admission of fact, the Court may require proof of it. The prosecution in such case is duty-bound prove a mandatory requirement of Section 19 that sanctioning authority applied mind while according sanction and such admission of document is not substitute to it. Mere admitting the document is not sufficient and proving the fact that the mind was applied by the sanctioning authority while according sanction, is mandatory requirement of law. Such admission does not dispense with proof. It must be fulfilled. In this case, the prosecution has failed to prove that the sanctioning authority applied its mind and then accorded the sanction to prosecute the appellant. Thus, sanction to prosecute the appellant is not proved. {Para 9}

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (AURANGABAD BENCH)

Criminal Appeal No. 76 of 2018

Decided On: 05.12.2025

Sharad Vs. The State of Maharashtra and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Sanjay A. Deshmukh, J.

Citation: MANU/MH/9292/2025.

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Bombay HC: Officers Appointed To Assess Electricity Theft Are 'Public Servants', Court Can't Issue Process Against Them Without Sanction U/S 197 CrPC

 Section 169 of the Electricity Act, 2003 which defines the term public servants in pursuance to Section 21 of the Indian Penal Code includes the servants or the employees under Section 126 of the Electricity Act, 2003. As discussed above, the Board has authorized various officers including the Junior Engineers and linemen to detect the theft. Hence, they are covered under the definition of public servants in Section 169 of the Electricity Act, 2003. Therefore, the Court is of the view that the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class erred in issuing the process against the petitioners without sanction as required under Section 197 of the Criminal Procedure Code. This issue was not dealt with at all. The impugned order also does not reflect the application of mind. Hence, the petition deserves to be allowed. {Para 22}

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

BENCH AT AURANGABAD

CRIMINAL WRIT PETITION NO. 744 OF 2008

 Syed Naeemuddin S/o Syed Khaja, Vs The State of Maharashtra.

 CORAM : S.G. MEHARE, J.

PRONOUNCED ON : SEPTEMBER 12, 2024.

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What are provisions for sanction or deemed sanction for prosecution of public servant under S 218 of BNSS?

 218. Prosecution of Judges and public servants.—(1) When any person who is or was a Judge or Magistrate or a public servant not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the Government is accused of any offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty, no Court shall take cognizance of such offence except with the previous sanction save as otherwise provided in the Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act, 2013 (1 of 2014)—

(a) in the case of a person who is employed or, as the case may be, was at the time of commission of the alleged offence employed, in connection with the affairs of the Union, of the Central Government;

(b) in the case of a person who is employed or, as the case may be, was at the time of commission of the alleged offence employed, in connection with the affairs of a State, of the State Government:

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Is it possible for the court to convict the accused based on a signature comparison if the original signature is not available?

The High Court fortunately realised the pitfall in the reasoning of the Trial Court. But in an over-anxiety to somehow convict A-7, the High Court adopted a very peculiar route, namely that of undertaking the task of comparing the admitted signatures/ handwritings with the disputed ones Under Section 73 of the Evidence Act. {Para 130}

131. For invoking Section 73, there must first have been some signature or writing admitted or proved to the satisfaction of the Court, to have been written or made by that person. The Section empowers the Court also to direct any person present in Court to write any words or figures for the purpose of enabling the Court to compare the words or figures.

132. There was no signature or writing available before the High Court, which had been admitted or proved to the satisfaction of the Court to have been written or made. The High Court did not also direct A-7 to write any words or figures for the purpose of enabling a comparison. Without following the procedure so prescribed in Section 73, the High Court invented a novel procedure, to uphold the conviction handed over by the Trial Court through a wrong reasoning.

133. In fact, the High Court considered Exhibit P-75 to be the document containing the admitted handwritings and signatures of A-7 and compared what was found therein with the handwritings/signatures found in Exhibits P-66, P-76, P-90 and P-92.

134. But what was contained in Exhibit P-75 was never admitted by A- 7 to be in his handwriting. Exhibit P-75 was marked through PW-30, the handwriting expert, and not even by the I.O. At least if the I.O. had identified and marked the specimen writings and signatures of A-7 as Exhibit P-75, it was possible for the prosecution to contend that the specimen signatures stood proved. But the I.O. did not identify Exhibit P-75. PW-30 through whom Exhibit P-75 was marked did not directly obtain the specimen writings of A-7. The statement of PW-30 that the specimen writings of A-7 are in Exhibit P-75 was only hearsay evidence, as he did not directly obtain those specimen signatures. Thus, Exhibit P- 75 never stood proved.

135. Even in the questioning Under Section 313 of the Code, no specific question was put to A-7 whether Exhibits P-66, P-76, P-90, P-92 and P- 75 were in his handwritings and whether they contained his signatures. Therefore, what was contained in Exhibit P-75 was not even admitted signatures.

136. In the absence of either admission or proof of the admitted signatures, the High Court could not have resorted to Section 73 of the Evidence Act.

137. In view of the above, the finding recorded by the Trial Court and the High Court as though A-7 committed forgery and cheating by making applications for the issue of demand drafts in the names of bogus firms is wholly unsustainable.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal Nos. 2417 of 2010, 16 of 2011 and 2444 of 2010

Decided On: 15.06.2023

A. Srinivasulu  Vs. The State Rep. by the Inspector of Police

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

V. Ramasubramanian and Pankaj Mithal, JJ.

Author: V. Ramasubramanian, J.

Citation: MANU/SC/0723/2023.

Read full Judgment here: Click here

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Sanction for Prosecution of Public Servants: Basic Principles from the Supreme Court

The principles emerging from the aforesaid decisions are summarised hereunder:

39.1. Protection of sanction is an assurance to an honest and sincere officer to perform his duty honestly and to the best of his ability to further public duty. However, authority cannot be camouflaged to commit crime.

39.2. Once act or omission has been found to have been committed by public servant in discharging his duty it must be given liberal and wide construction so far its official nature is concerned. Public servant is not entitled to indulge in criminal activities. To that extent Section 197 Code of Criminal Procedure has to be construed narrowly and in a restricted manner.

39.3. Even in facts of a case when public servant has exceeded in his duty, if there is reasonable connection it will not deprive him of protection Under Section 197 Code of Criminal Procedure. There cannot be a universal Rule to determine whether there is reasonable nexus between the act done and official duty nor is it possible to lay down such rule.

39.4. In case the assault made is intrinsically connected with or related to performance of official duties, sanction would be necessary Under Section 197 Code of Criminal Procedure, but such relation to duty should not be pretended or fanciful claim. The offence must be directly and reasonably connected with official duty to require sanction. It is no part of official duty to commit offence. In case offence was incomplete without proving, the official act, ordinarily the provisions of Section 197 Code of Criminal Procedure would apply. {Para 39}

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal Nos. 2417 of 2010, 16 of 2011 and 2444 of 2010

Decided On: 15.06.2023

A. Srinivasulu  Vs. The State Rep. by the Inspector of Police

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

V. Ramasubramanian and Pankaj Mithal, JJ.

Author: V. Ramasubramanian, J.

Citation: MANU/SC/0723/2023.

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Supreme Court: Prosecution of accused for an offence under IPC can continue even if sanction for prosecution under Prevention of Corruption Act is not forthcoming

We decline to deviate from the view taken by the High

Court that the charge against the petitioner for offence

punishable under the Indian Penal Code can continue

irrespective of the fact that sanction in respect of

offence punishable under Prevention of Corruption Act,

1988 is not forthcoming. To that extent, we find no

infirmity in the conclusion reached by the High Court.

Our understanding of the impugned judgment is that

the High Court has made it clear that if sanction to

prosecute the petitioner for offence punishable under

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 is not or has not been

granted, the question of proceeding against the

petitioner for that charge does not arise.

S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A

RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No(s). 2787/2020

SATYABRAT GUPTA Vs THE STATE OF JHARKHAND 

Dated : 29-07-2020 

CORAM :

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE A.M. KHANWILKAR

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE DINESH MAHESHWARI

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJIV KHANNA

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Whether the second trial of accused under the Prevention of Corruption Act is maintainable if the first trial was invalid for want of sanction for prosecution?

In Baij Nath Tripathi v. The State of Bhopal and Anr. (MANU/SC/0099/1957 : AIR 1957 SC 494), a Constitution Bench of this of Court was dealing with the case of a sub-inspector of police from the then State of Bhopal, who was prosecuted by the Special Judge, Bhopal and convicted of offences punishable Under Section 161 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 5 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. He was sentenced by the Trial Court to undergo nine months' rigorous imprisonment on each count. In an appeal before the Judicial Commissioner against the said conviction and sentence, it was held that since no sanction according to law had been given for the prosecution of the accused, the Special Judge had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case and that the trial was invalid and void ab-initio, hence quashed relegating the parties to the position as if no legal charge-sheet had been submitted against the Appellant. The accused was then tried for a second time before another Special Judge to which prosecution, the accused took exception on the ground that a second trial was impermissible having regard to the provisions of Article 20(2) of the Constitution of India and Section 403 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. A similar contention was raised by Sudhakar Dube, another Sub-Inspector of Police who was similarly tried and prosecuted but the Special Judge finding the sanction order to be incompetent had quashed the proceedings. Dube was also thereupon sought to be tried for the second time which second trial was assailed by him in writ petition before this Court. The short question that fell for consideration in the above backdrop, was whether the Petitioners had been prosecuted and punished within the meaning of Article 20 of the Constitution of India or tried by a Court of competent jurisdiction within the meaning of Section 403(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It was urged on behalf of the Respondent, that in case the previous trial was null and void and non-est, a second trial was legally permissible. That contention found favour with the Court. Relying upon Yusofalli Mulla v. The King MANU/PR/0016/1949 : AIR 1949 PC 264, Basdeo Agarwalla v. King Emperor MANU/FE/0002/1945 : AIR 1945 FC 16 and Budha Mal v. State of Delhi Criminal Appeal No. 17 of 1952, it was held that the accused had neither been tried by a Court of competent jurisdiction nor was there any accusation or conviction in force within the meaning of Section 403 of Code of Criminal Procedure to stand as a bar against their prosecution for the same offences.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 1867 of 2012

Decided On: 24.07.2015

 Nanjappa  Vs.  State of Karnataka

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Whether the court can acquit accused if prosecution under the Prevention of Corruption Act proceeded without valid sanction for prosecution?

 In addition to the competent of the court, Section 403 of the Code speaks of there having been a trial and the trial having ended in an acquittal. From what we have said above, it will be clear that the fact that all the witnesses for the prosecution as well as for the defence had been examined before Mr. Ganguly and the further fact that the Appellant was also examined Under Section 342 cannot in law be deemed to be a trial at all. It would be only repetition to say that for proceedings to amount to a trial they must be held before a court which is in fact competent to hold them and which is not of opinion that it has no jurisdiction to hold them. A fortiori it would also follow that the ultimate order made by it by whatever name it is characterised cannot in law operate as an acquittal. In the Privy Council case it was interpreted by Sir John Beaumont who delivered the opinion of the Board to be an order of discharge. It is unnecessary for us to say whether such an order amounts to an order of discharge in the absence of any express provision governing the matter in the Code or it does not amount to an order of discharge. It is sufficient to say that it does not amount to an order of acquittal as contemplated by Section 403(1) and since the proceedings before the Special Judge ended with that order it would be enough to look upon it merely as an order putting a stop to the proceedings. For these reasons we hold that the trial and eventual conviction of the Appellant by Mr. Bhattacharjee were valid in law and dismiss the appeal.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 1867 of 2012

Decided On: 24.07.2015

 Nanjappa  Vs.  State of Karnataka

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

T.S. Thakur and Amitava Roy, JJ.

Citation :AIR 2015 SC 3060,MANU/SC/0788/2015

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Supreme Court: Grant of sanction for prosecution of a public servant is only an administrative function

The Appellant has relied upon the judgments of this Court in Mohd. Iqbal Ahmed v. State of A.P. MANU/SC/0181/1979 : (1979) 4 SCC 172 and State of Karnataka v. Ameerjan MANU/SC/7922/2007 : (2007) 11 SCC 273 to challenge the sanction order. In Mohd. Iqbal Ahmed (supra) it was observed that a valid sanction is the one that is granted by the Sanctioning Authority after being satisfied that a case for sanction is made out constituting the offence. It is important to be mindful of the observations made by the Court as reproduced below:

3. [...] what the Court has to see is whether or not the Sanctioning Authority at the time of giving sanction was aware of the facts constituting the offence and applied its mind for the same...

Similarly, in Ameerjan (supra), it was observed:

10. [...] Ordinarily, before passing an order of sanction, the entire records containing the materials collected against the Accused should be placed before the sanctioning authority. In the event, the order of sanction does not indicate application of mind as (sic to) the materials placed before the said authority before the order of sanction was passed, the same may be produced before the court to show materials had in fact been produced.

Therefore, what the law requires is the application of mind by the Sanctioning Authority on the material placed before it to satisfy itself of prima facie case that would constitute the offence. On the said aspect, the later decision of this Court in State of Maharashtra v. Mahesh G. Jain MANU/SC/0561/2013 : (2013) 8 SCC 119 has referred to several decisions to expound on the following principles of law governing the validity of sanction:

14.1. It is incumbent on the prosecution to prove that the valid sanction has been granted by the sanctioning authority after being satisfied that a case for sanction has been made out.

14.2. The sanction order may expressly show that the sanctioning authority has perused the material placed before it and, after consideration of the circumstances, has granted sanction for prosecution.

14.3. The prosecution may prove by adducing the evidence that the material was placed before the sanctioning authority and its satisfaction was arrived at upon perusal of the material placed before it.

14.4. Grant of sanction is only an administrative function and the sanctioning authority is required to prima facie reach the satisfaction that relevant facts would constitute the offence.

14.5. The adequacy of material placed before the sanctioning authority cannot be gone into by the court as it does not sit in appeal over the sanction order.

14.6. If the sanctioning authority has perused all the materials placed before it and some of them have not been proved that would not vitiate the order of sanction.

14.7. The order of sanction is a prerequisite as it is intended to provide a safeguard to a public servant against frivolous and vexatious litigants, but simultaneously an order of sanction should not be construed in a pedantic manner and there should not be a hypertechnical approach to test its validity.

The contention of the Appellant, therefore, fails and is rejected.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 1781 of 2009

Decided On: 27.11.2019

Vinod Kumar Garg Vs. State (Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi)

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Whether prosecution under Prevention of Corruption Act is maintainable if it is investigated by a police officer who was not authorised to conduct it?

The last contention of the Appellant is predicated on Section 17 of the Act and the fact that the investigation in the present case was not conducted by the police officer by the rank and status of the Deputy Superintendent of Police or equal, but by Inspector Rohtash Singh (PW-5) and Inspector Shobhan Singh (PW-7). The contention has to be rejected for the reason that while this lapse would be an irregularity and unless the irregularity has resulted in causing prejudice, the conviction will not be vitiated and bad in law. The Appellant has not alleged or even argued that any prejudice was caused and suffered because the investigation was conducted by the police officer of the rank of Inspector, namely Rohtash Singh (PW-5) and Shobhan Singh (PW-7).

20. This Court in Ashok Tshering Bhutia v. State of Sikkim MANU/SC/0156/2011 : (2011) 4 SCC 402 referring to the earlier precedents has observed that a defect or irregularity in investigation however serious, would have no direct bearing on the competence or procedure relating to cognizance or trial. Where the cognizance of the case has already been taken and the case has proceeded to termination, the invalidity of the precedent investigation does not vitiate the result, unless a miscarriage of justice has been caused thereby. Similar is the position with regard to the validity of the sanction. A mere error, omission or irregularity in sanction is not considered to be fatal unless it has resulted in a failure of justice or has been occasioned thereby. Section 19(1) of the Act is matter of procedure and does not go to the root of the jurisdiction and once the cognizance has been taken by the court under the Code, it cannot be said that an invalid police report is the foundation of jurisdiction of the court to take cognizance and for that matter the trial.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 1781 of 2009

Decided On: 27.11.2019

Vinod Kumar Garg Vs. State (Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi)

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Indu Malhotra and Sanjiv Khanna, JJ.

Citation: (2020) 2 SCC 88

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Whether court can consider issue of sanction for prosecution of public servant at the stage of judgment?

 It has also been observed by this Court that, at times, the issue

whether the alleged act is intricately connected with the discharge of

official functions and whether the matter would come within the

expression ‘while acting or purporting to act in discharge of their official

duty’, would get crystalized only after evidence is led and the issue of

sanction can be agitated at a later stage as well. In P.K. Pradhan vs. State

of Sikkim represented by the Central Bureau of Investigation13, this

Court stated:-

“15. Thus, from a conspectus of the aforesaid

decisions, it will be clear that for claiming protection

under Section 197 of the Code, it has to be shown by

the accused that there is reasonable connection

between the act complained of and the discharge of

official duty. An official act can be performed in the

discharge of official duty as well as in dereliction of

it. For invoking protection under Section 197 of the

Code, the acts of the accused complained of must be

such that the same cannot be separated from the

discharge of official duty, but if there was no

reasonable connection between them and the

performance of those duties, the official status

furnishes only the occasion or opportunity for the

acts, then no sanction would be required. If the case

as put forward by the prosecution fails or the defence

13 (2001) 6 SCC 704

establishes that the act purported to be done is in

discharge of duty, the proceedings will have to be

dropped. It is well settled that question of sanction

under Section 197 of the Code can be raised any time

after the cognizance; maybe immediately after

cognizance or framing of charge or even at the time of

conclusion of trial and after conviction as well. But

there may be certain cases where it may not be

possible to decide the question effectively without

giving opportunity to the defence to establish that

what he did was in discharge of official duty. In order

to come to the conclusion whether claim of the

accused that the act that he did was in course of the

performance of his duty was a reasonable one and

neither pretended nor fanciful, can be examined

during the course of trial by giving opportunity to the

defence to establish it. In such an eventuality, the

question of sanction should be left open to be decided

in the main judgment which may be delivered upon

conclusion of the trial.”

(underlined by us)

Reportable

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO .1837 OF 2019

STATION HOUSE OFFICER, CBI/ACB/BANGALORE 

Vs  B.A. SRINIVASAN 

Dated:December 05, 2019.

Uday Umesh Lalit, J.

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Whether protection U/S 197 of CRPC is available to public servant after retirement?

However as regards charges for the offences punishable under the Indian Penal Code concerned the High Court was absolutely right in setting aside the order of the Special Judge. Unlike Section 19 of the POC Act, the protection Under Section 197 of Code of Criminal Procedure is available to the concerned public servant even after retirement. 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 2168 of 2010

Decided On: 17.12.2014

 State of Punjab Vs.  Labh Singh

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Dipak Misra and U.U. Lalit, JJ.

Citation: 2015 ALL SCR 648

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Whether time limit should be fixed for grant of sanction for prosecution of public servant?

In my view, the Parliament should consider the Constitutional imperative of Article 14 enshrining the rule of law wherein 'due process of law' has been read into by introducing a time limit in Section 19 of the P.C. Act 1988 for its working in a reasonable manner. The Parliament may, in my opinion, consider the following guidelines:

a) All proposals for sanction placed before any Sanctioning Authority, empowered to grant sanction for the prosecution of a public servant under Section 19 of the P.C. Act must be decided within a period of three months of the receipt of the proposal by the concerned authority.

b) Where consultation is required with the Attorney General or the Solicitor General or the Advocate General of the State, as the case may be, and the same is not possible within the three months mentioned in Clause (a) above, an extension of one month period may be allowed, but the request for consultation is to be sent in writing within the three months mentioned in (a) above. A copy of the said request will be sent to the prosecuting agency or the private complainant to intimate them about the extension of the time limit.

c) At the end of the extended period of time limit, if no decision is taken, sanction will be deemed to have been granted to the proposal for prosecution, and the prosecuting agency or the private complainant will proceed to file the chargesheet/complaint in the court to commence prosecution within 15 days of the expiry of the aforementioned time limit.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 1193 of 2012 

Decided On: 31.01.2012

 Subramanian Swamy Vs. Manmohan Singh and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

A.K. Ganguly and G.S. Singhvi, JJ.

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Whether it is mandatory to obtain sanction for prosecution if offence has no nexus with official duties of public servant?

Other judgments relied on by the counsel for the Respondent lays down the same proposition. Learned Counsel for the Appellant has also placed reliance on N.K. Ganguly v. Central Bureau of Investigation, MANU/SC/1326/2015 : (2016) 2 SCC 143, where this Court in paragraph No. 35 laid down following:

35. From a perusal of the case law referred to supra, it becomes clear that for the purpose of obtaining previous sanction from the appropriate Government Under Section 197 Code of Criminal Procedure, it is imperative that the alleged offence is committed in discharge of official duty by the Accused. It is also important for the Court to examine the allegations contained in the final report against the Appellants, to decide whether previous sanction is required to be obtained by the Respondent from the appropriate Government before taking cognizance of the alleged offence by the learned Special Judge against the Accused. In the instant case, since the allegations made against the Appellants in the final report filed by the Respondent that the alleged offences were committed by them in discharge of their official duty, therefore, it was essential for the learned Special Judge to correctly decide as to whether the previous sanction from the Central Government Under Section 197 Code of Criminal Procedure was required to be taken by the Respondent, before taking cognizance and passing an order issuing summons to the Appellants for their presence.

18. No exception can be taken to the proposition as laid down in the above case. 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 744 of 2019 

Decided On: 30.04.2019

 S.K. Miglani Vs.  State NCT of Delhi

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Ashok Bhushan and K.M. Joseph, JJ.

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Whether court can pass order U/S 156(3) of CRPC against public servant without valid sanction for prosecution?

 The apprehension expressed by the learned ASG possibly arises from the observations in Suresh Chand Jain v. State of Madhya Pradesh7 followed in Mohd. Yousuf v. Afaq Jahan8. Thus, the observations are to the effect that even at a pre-cognizance stage Under Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, it is open to the Magistrate to direct the police to register an FIR and that even if the Magistrate does not say in so many words while directing investigation Under Section 156(3) of the Code that an FIR should be registered, it is the duty of the officer in charge of the police station to register the FIR regarding the cognizable offence disclosed by the complainant because that police officer could take further steps contemplated in Chapter XII of the Code only thereafter.

36. The complete controversy referred to aforesaid and the conundrum arising in respect of the interplay of the P.C. Act offences read with the Code of Criminal Procedure is, thus, required to be settled by a larger Bench.

37. The papers may be placed before Hon'ble the Chief Justice of India for being placed before a Bench of appropriate strength.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 457 of 2018 

Decided On: 27.03.2018

 Manju Surana Vs.   Sunil Arora and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Jasti Chelameswar and Sanjay Kishan Kaul, JJ.

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Whether Sanction U/S 197 CrPC is required If Offence Has no Nexus With Duties Of Public Servant?

The High Court quashed the complaint
essentially on two grounds; First, no sanction under
Section 197 of the Cr.P.C was obtained by the

prosecution for filing the complaint against
respondent No. 2 and the second, there are
contradictions in the statement of the complainant
and the witnesses.
8. In our view, both the grounds, which found
favour with the High Court for quashing the
complaint, are not well founded and hence legally
unsustainable.
9. So far as the first ground is concerned, we
have perused the complaint filed by the appellant
against respondent No. 2. Having regard to the
nature of the allegations made by the complainant
against respondent No. 2, who was the Police
Officer(SHO) at the relevant time, we are of the view
that no prior sanction to prosecute respondent No.
2 under Section 197 of the Cr.P.C. was required for
filing such complaint.

10. In other words, it cannot be contended that
respondent No. 2 committed the alleged offences
while acting in discharge of his official duties or
while purporting to act in discharge of his official
duties so as to attract the rigor of Section 197 of the
Cr.P.C.
11. In our view, in order to attract the rigor of
Section 197 of the Cr.P.C., it is necessary that the
offence alleged against a Government Officer must
have some nexus or/and relation with the discharge
of his official duties as a Government Officer. In this
case, we do not find it to be so.

NON REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL No.579 OF 2019
(Arising out of S.L.P.(Crl.) No.21 of 2018)

Devendra Prasad Singh Vs State of Bihar

Abhay Manohar Sapre, J.
Dated: April 02, 2019.

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Landmark Supreme court Judgment on SC and ST prevention of Atrocities Act

Our conclusions are as follows:

i) Proceedings in the present case are clear abuse of process of court and are quashed.

ii) There is no absolute bar against grant of anticipatory bail in cases under the Atrocities Act if no prima facie case is made out or where on judicial scrutiny the complaint is found to be prima facie mala fide. We approve the view taken and approach of the Gujarat High Court in Pankaj D Suthar (supra) and Dr. N.T. Desai (supra) and clarify the judgments of this Court in Balothia (supra) and Manju Dew (supra);

iii) In view of acknowledged abuse of law of arrest in cases under the Atrocities Act, arrest of a public servant can only be after approval of the appointing authority and of a non-public servant after approval by the S.S.P. which may be granted in appropriate cases if considered necessary for reasons recorded. Such reasons must be scrutinized by the Magistrate for permitting further detention.

iv) To avoid false implication of an innocent, a preliminary enquiry may be conducted by the DSP concerned to find out whether the allegations make out a case under the Atrocities Act and that the allegations are not frivolous or motivated.

v) Any violation of direction (iii) and (iv) will be actionable by way of disciplinary action as well as contempt.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 416 of 2018 (Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 5661 of 2017)

Decided On: 20.03.2018

 Subhash Kashinath Mahajan Vs. The State of Maharashtra and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

A.K. Goel and U.U. Lalit, JJ.

Citation:AIR 2018 SC 1498
Read full judgment here: Click here

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Whether sanction for prosecution of government servant not by given appointing authority is valid?

 Contention regarding validity of sanction: Ext.P19 is the sanction order for prosecution against A-1 and the same was under the signature of the then Chief Secretary, Government of Meghalaya. PW-18, Sri Kharkongor, Secretary in the Political Department, Government of Meghalaya was examined through whom Ext. P9 sanction order was exhibited.

25. Learned Counsel for A-1 contended that Under Section 6 of PC Act "no court shall take cognizance of offence unless previous sanction is obtained........" and so far as A-1 is concerned, Chief Secretary is not the competent authority to remove A-1 and A-1 was appointed by the Governor and the Governor of Meghalaya is the appointing authority, and therefore the sanction should be to the satisfaction of the Governor and Chief Secretary is only the authority communicating the sanction and the prosecution has not adduced any material to show that appointing authority-Governor of Meghalaya was satisfied that the relevant material to approve the sanction for prosecuting A-1 was placed before him.

26. The learned Counsel for the Respondents had taken us through the evidence of PW-18 and submitted that the Chief Secretary accorded the sanction on the basis of report of CBI placed before him and other materials as reflected in the note sheet of the file and then accorded the sanction for prosecuting A-1 and there is valid sanction for prosecution of A-1. Referring to the evidence of PW-18, the courts observed that the then Chief Secretary accorded the sanction on the basis of the report of CBI as reflected in the note sheet of the file and the sanction order does not suffer from any infirmity.

27. As per Article 166(2) of the Constitution of India, all orders and other instruments made and executed in the name of Governor shall be authenticated in such manner as may be specified in rules to be made by the Governor and the validity of an order or instrument which is so authenticated shall not be called in question on the ground that it is not an order or instrument made or executed by the Governor. It was not suggested to PW-18 that Chief Secretary has no power whatsoever to authenticate the orders and instruments made and executed in the name of Governor. During trial, the first accused also did not insist for production of the file nor suggested that the sanction order was not approved by the Governor. Referring to Article 166 of the Constitution of India, the trial court observed that the State must be having certain rules where orders and other instruments made and executed in the name of the Governor to be authenticated by certain officers of the State Government, the trial court negatived the contention of the first accused challenging the validity of sanction. We find no merit in the contention challenging the validity of sanction to prosecute first accused.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 2056 of 2014 (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 553/2011) and Criminal Appeal Nos. 2057-58 of 2014 (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) Nos. 2203-2204/2011)

Decided On: 16.09.2014

 Edmund S. Lyngdoh Vs. State of Meghalaya

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