Tuesday, 28 August 2018

Leading Judgments of Supreme court

Leading judgment of Supreme court on Divorce by mutual consent


1) Applying the above to the present situation, we are of the view that where the Court dealing with a matter is satisfied that a case is made out to waive the statutory period Under Section 13B(2), it can do so after considering the following:

i) the statutory period of six months specified in Section 13B(2), in addition to the statutory period of one year Under Section 13B(1) of separation of parties is already over before the first motion itself;

ii) all efforts for mediation/conciliation including efforts in terms of Order XXXIIA Rule 3 Code of Civil Procedure/Section 23(2) of the Act/Section 9 of the Family Courts Act to reunite the parties have failed and there is no likelihood of success in that direction by any further efforts;

iii) the parties have genuinely settled their differences including alimony, custody of child or any other pending issues between the parties;

iv) the waiting period will only prolong their agony.

19. The waiver application can be fled one week after the first motion giving reasons for the prayer for waiver.

20. If the above conditions are satisfied, the waiver of the waiting period for the second motion will be in the discretion of the concerned Court.

21. Since we are of the view that the period mentioned in Section 13B(2) is not mandatory but directory, it will be open to the Court to exercise its discretion in the facts and circumstances of each case where there is no possibility of parties resuming cohabitation and there are chances of alternative rehabilitation.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 11158 of 2017 (Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 20184 of 2017)

Decided On: 12.09.2017

 Amardeep Singh Vs. Harveen Kaur
Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
A.K. Goel and U.U. Lalit, JJ.
Civil appeal No: 11158/2017.
Citation:(2017) 8 SCC 746,AIR 2017 SC 4417.
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2)Whether  cheque dishonour case can be closed even in absence of complainant?
Though compounding requires consent of both parties, even in absence of such consent, the Court, in the interests of justice, on being satisfied that the complainant has been duly compensated, can in its discretion close the proceedings and discharge the accused.
Reportable
Supreme Court of India
M/S Meters And Instruments ... vs Kanchan Mehta on 5 October, 2017
Author: A K Goel
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3) Leading judgment on grant of compensation under motor accident claim petition
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 25590 of 2014, 
Decided On: 31.10.2017
National Insurance Company Limited Vs. Pranay Sethi and Ors.
Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Dipak Misra, C.J.I., A.K. Sikri, A.M. Khanwilkar, Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud and Ashok Bhushan, JJ.
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4)Guidelines of Bombay high court for disposal for motor accident claim petition
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CIVIL APPELATE JURISDICTION
PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION NO.128 OF 2004
Anil Prabhakar Tadkalkar
vs.
State of Maharashtra
CORAM : A.S.OKA & R.D.DHANUKA, JJ.
Dated:DECEMBER 21 ,2016
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5) Landmark judgment of Supreme court revolutionizing MACT Cases

“23. In cases of death, where the liability of
the insurer is not disputed, the insurance
companies should, without waiting for the
decision of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal
or a settlement before the Lok Adalat,
endeavour to pay to the family (legal
representatives) of the deceased, compensation
as per the standard formula determined by the
decisions of this Court.”
S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A

Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (C) Nos.11801-11804/2005

JAI PRAKASH Vs M/S. NATIONAL INSURANCE CO. & ORS.

Date : 13/05/2016 
CORAM :
 HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE FAKKIR MOHAMED IBRAHIM KALIFULLA
 HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S.A. BOBDE
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6) Leading Judgment on right of divorced wife to get maintenance


Admittedly, in the instant case, the respondent is a divorced wife. The marriage ties between the parties do not subsist. The decree for divorce was passed on 15th of July, 1995 and since then, she is under no obligation to live with the petitioner. But though the marital relations came to an end by the divorce granted by the Family Court under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act, the respondent continues to be "wife" within the meaning of Section 125 Cr.P.C. on account of Explanation (b) to Sub-section (1) which provides as under :-
"Explanation. - For the purposes of this Chapter -
(a) ...................................................................
(b) "wife" includes woman who has been divorced by, or has obtained a divorce from her husband and has not remarried."
On account of the Explanation quoted above, a woman who has been divorced by her husband on account of a decree passed by the Family Court under the Hindu Marriage Act, continues to enjoy the status of a wife for the limited purpose of claiming Maintenance Allowance from her ex-husband.
Supreme Court of India
Rohtash Singh vs Smt. Ramendri And Ors on 2 March, 2000
Bench: S. Saghlr Ahmad, D.P. Wadhwa
Special Leave Petition (crl.) 2763 of 1999
Citation:2000 (2) SCR 58
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7) Whether resistance to execution of decree by transferee pendente lite is maintainable? 
No doubt if the resistance was made by a transferee pendente lite of the judgment debtor, the scope of the adjudication would be shrunk to the limited question whether he is such transferee and on a finding in the affirmative regarding that point the execution court has to hold that he has no right to resist in view of the clear language contained in Rule 102. Exclusion of such a transferee from raising further contentions is based on the salutary principle adumbrated in Section 52 of the Transfer of property Act.
Supreme Court of India
Silverline Forum Pvt. Ltd vs Rajiv Trust And Another on 31 March, 1998
Bench: K Thomas, S R Babu
Citation;998IIIAD(SC)249, AIR1998SC1754, 
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8) Leading judgment of Supreme Court on summoning of additional accused as per S 319 of CRPC
110. We accordingly sum up our conclusions as follows:

Question Nos. 1 & III

Q.1 What is the stage at which power under Section 319 Code of Criminal Procedure can be exercised?

AND

Q. III Whether the word "evidence" used in Section 319(1) Code of Criminal Procedure has been used in a comprehensive sense and includes the evidence collected during investigation or the word "evidence" is limited to the evidence recorded during trial?

A. In Dharam Pal's case, the Constitution Bench has already held that after committal, cognizance of an offence can be taken against a person not named as an accused but against whom materials are available from the papers filed by the police after completion of investigation. Such cognizance can be taken under Section 193 Code of Criminal Procedure and the Sessions Judge need not wait till 'evidence' under Section 319 Code of Criminal Procedure becomes available for summoning an additional accused.

Section 319 Code of Criminal Procedure, significantly, uses two expressions that have to be taken note of i.e. (1) Inquiry (2) Trial. As a trial commences after framing of charge, an inquiry can only be understood to be a pre-trial inquiry. Inquiries under Sections 200, 201, 202 Code of Criminal Procedure; and under Section 398 Code of Criminal Procedure are species of the inquiry contemplated by Section 319 Code of Criminal Procedure Materials coming before the Court in course of such enquiries can be used for corroboration of the evidence recorded in the court after the trial commences, for the exercise of power under Section 319 Code of Criminal Procedure, and also to add an accused whose name has been shown in Column 2 of the chargesheet.

In view of the above position the word 'evidence' in Section 319 Code of Criminal Procedure has to be broadly understood and not literally i.e. as evidence brought during a trial.

Question No. II

Q. II Whether the word "evidence" used in Section 319(1) Code of Criminal Procedure could only mean evidence tested by cross-examination or the court can exercise the power under the said provision even on the basis of the statement made in the examination-in-chief of the witness concerned?

A. Considering the fact that under Section 319 Code of Criminal Procedure a person against whom material is disclosed is only summoned to face the trial and in such an event under Section 319(4) Code of Criminal Procedure the proceeding against such person is to commence from the stage of taking of cognizance, the Court need not wait for the evidence against the accused proposed to be summoned to be tested by cross-examination.

Question No. IV

Q. IV What is the nature of the satisfaction required to invoke the power under Section 319 Code of Criminal Procedure to arraign an accused? Whether the power under Section 319(1) Code of Criminal Procedure can be exercised only if the court is satisfied that the accused summoned will in all likelihood be convicted?

A. Though under Section 319(4)(b) Code of Criminal Procedure the accused subsequently impleaded is to be treated as if he had been an accused when the Court initially took cognizance of the offence, the degree of satisfaction that will be required for summoning a person under Section 319 Code of Criminal Procedure would be the same as for framing a charge. The difference in the degree of satisfaction for summoning the original accused and a subsequent accused is on account of the fact that the trial may have already commenced against the original accused and it is in the course of such trial that materials are disclosed against the newly summoned accused. Fresh summoning of an accused will result in delay of the trial-therefore the degree of satisfaction for summoning the accused (original and subsequent) has to be different.

Question No. V

Q. V Does the power under Section 319 Code of Criminal Procedure extend to persons not named in the FIR or named in the FIR but not charge-sheeted or who have been discharged?

A. A person not named in the FIR or a person though named in the FIR but has not been chargesheeted or a person who has been discharged can be summoned under Section 319 Code of Criminal Procedure provided from the evidence it appears that such person can be tried along with the accused already facing trial. However, in so far as an accused who has been discharged is concerned the requirement of Sections 300 and 398 Code of Criminal Procedure has to be complied with before he can be summoned afresh.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal Nos. 1750, 1751 of 2008.

Decided On: 10.01.2014


 Hardeep Singh Vs. State of Punjab 
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