Law Web: Supreme Court: Discrepancies In Evidence Against Delinquent Not A Ground To Interfere With Findings Of Disciplinary authority

It is not the case of no evidence or that the findings are

perverse. The finding that the respondent is guilty of misconduct

has been interfered with only on the ground that there are

discrepancies in the evidence of the Department. The

discrepancies in the evidence will not make it a case of no

evidence. The Inquiry Officer has appreciated the evidence and

returned a finding that the respondent is guilty of misconduct.

15. The disciplinary authority agreed with the findings of the enquiry

officer and had passed an order of punishment. An appeal before

the State Government was also dismissed. Once the evidence has

been accepted by the departmental authority, in exercise of power

of judicial review, the Tribunal or the High Court could not interfere

with the findings of facts recorded by reappreciating evidence as if

the Courts are the Appellate Authority. We may notice that the

said judgment has not noticed larger bench judgments in S. Sree

Rama Rao and B.C. Chaturvedi as mentioned above. Therefore,

the orders passed by the Tribunal and the High Court suffer from

patent illegality and thus cannot be sustained in law. Accordingly,

appeal is allowed and orders passed by the Tribunal and the High

Court are set aside and the order of punishment imposed is

restored.

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8071 OF 2014

THE STATE OF KARNATAKA Vs N. GANGARAJ

HEMANT GUPTA, J.

Dated:FEBRUARY 14, 2020.

1. The State is in appeal aggrieved against an order passed by the

High Court of Karnataka on 25th August, 2011 whereby the

challenge to an order passed by the Karnataka Administrative

Tribunal1 on 12th March, 2009 setting aside the punishment of

dismissal from the service imposed upon the respondent remained

unsuccessful.

2. The respondent was working as a Police Inspector at Mysore from

31st July, 1997 to 31st October, 1998. On the complaint of one

Nirmala, the Lokayukta Police had laid a trap. On the basis of a

criminal complaint lodged, Crime No. 15/1998 was registered

against respondent in Mysore Lokayukta Police Station under

1 for short, ‘Tribunal’

Section 7, 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) under the Prevention of

Corruption Act, 1998. A charge sheet against the respondent was

filed in the Court of Special Judge, Mysore for the offences

punishable under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The said

criminal trial resulted in the acquittal of the respondent.

3. In addition to the criminal trial, the respondent was also

proceeded against for the misconduct in departmental

proceedings. The respondent was served with a charge sheet. The

respondent faced departmental proceedings on the following two

charges:

“1. You, the Accused Police Officer, Sri. N. Gangaraj,

while working as Police Inspector in City Crime Record

Bureau of the office of the Commissioner of Police,

Mysore City from 31/07/97 to 31/10/98, one Miss.

Chandrika resident of Nandanavana, Ulsoor, Bangalore

City, has lodged a complaint dated 08/08/98 with Sri.

Kempaiah, Commissioner of Police, Mysore City, against

one Mr. Mahendra of Indiranagar, Bangalore, stating

that he promised to marry her and taken her in car No.

KA-05-9795 along with his friends and raped her. She

has requested therein to take action against Mr.

Mahendra and his friends. The Commissioner of Police,

Mysore City has sent the said petition to Police

Inspector, City Crime Branch, Mysore for enquiry and to

send the report. You being a responsible Police Officer,

shown utter misconduct in managing to obtain a Xerox

copy of the said petition through illegal means and

contacting the wife of the Driver of above said vehicle

demanded illegal gratification of Rs.40,000/- and

negotiating the deal for Rs.20,000/- with instructions to

the party to pay the amount on 27/08/98 at your

residence.

2. Even though the petition of Miss. Chandrika, lodged

with the Commissioner of Police, Mysore City was not at

all concerned to you, you managed to get it’s copy with

ulterior motto through illegal means and contacted Mrs.

B.J. Nirmala wife of Mr. Sampathkumar, Driver of car No.

KA-05-9795 by sending Mr. Puttaraju CHC 141 and Mr.

Shivakumar CPC 22 to Bangalore and also contacted

the above parties over telephone and demanded

Rs.40,000/- as illegal gratification for not including the

car in the case. When the parties were not agreed to

pay, you negotiated the amount to Rs.20,000/-. Being a

responsible Police Officer and knowing fully well that

accepting illegal gratification is against to Rule 7, 13(1)

(d) and 13(2) of P.C. Act, you behaved in a way to bring

down the prestige of the department, showing

dereliction of duty, utter misconduct and an at of

unbecoming of a Police Officer as well as a Government

Servant.”

4. The respondent denied the charges. The Deputy Superintendent of

Police, West Circle, Mangalore was appointed as the Inquiry Officer

(IO). The IO returned a finding that the charges levelled against

the respondent have been proved. Thereafter, a second showcause

notice was issued to the respondent. Considering the

contentions of the respondent, the Director General and the

Inspector General of Police passed an order of dismissal of the

respondent from service on 30th September, 2005. The period of

suspension was ordered to be treated as the period of suspension

only. The respondent filed an appeal before the Government which

came to be dismissed on 8th September, 2006.

5. Aggrieved against the order of punishment, the respondent

invoked the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. The Tribunal set aside the

order of punishment by holding that the criminal court on the same

set of facts has not placed reliance on the deposition of the

witnesses, therefore, it was not proper on the part of the

Disciplinary Authority to rely upon such evidence to come to the

conclusion that the respondent has demanded an amount of

Rs.40,000/- and he settled for Rs.20,000/-. The Tribunal further did

not agree with the findings of the IO or the Disciplinary Authority

that the charges have been proved as there is no charge on record

of receipt of Rs.20,000/-. The Tribunal further held that the water

in which the hands of the respondent were washed, turned pink

due to the ink of the pen, as deposed by PW-3 Balaraju in his

statement. The High Court found that similar evidence has not

been accepted in criminal trial and that there are discrepancies in

the evidence of the witnesses which make it unreliable. The High

Court recorded the following four discrepancies in the

departmental proceedings:

“(i) In the complaint Smt. Nirmala says that on

26.08.1998 for the first time she met the applicant in

his house at Mysore but in the deposition, she states

that she went to the house of the applicant on

27.08.1998 for the first time along with panch witness

Saroja and the money was offered;

(ii) If the evidence of PW.4 Puttaraju CHC 141 is to be

believed, he and PW.5 Shivakumar CPC 22 went to the

house of complainant Nirmala on 13.08.1998, whereas

the evidence of PW.5 shows that both of them went to

the house of the complainant on 14.08.1998. According

to the complaint both of them had gone to the

complainant’s house on 24.08.1998 and not earlier;

(iii) According to the complainant she had given

complaint in the first instance in English Written by her

and later the present complaint, marked in the inquiry

was got typed; the original complaint given in English

has been suppressed.

(iv) The complaint was registered on 27.08.1998

whereas the evidence shows that panch witness had

been informed to come on 26.08.1998. The complaint

does not say anywhere that she had gone to the office

of the Lokayukta Police on 26.08.1998.”

6. The Disciplinary Authority has taken into consideration the

evidence led before the IO to return a finding that the charges

levelled against the respondent stand proved.

7. We find that the interference in the order of punishment by the

Tribunal as affirmed by the High Court suffers from patent error.

The power of judicial review is confined to the decision-making

process. The power of judicial review conferred on the

constitutional court or on the Tribunal is not that of an appellate

authority.

8. In State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors. v. S. Sree Rama Rao2, a

three Judge Bench of this Court has held that the High Court is not

a court of appeal over the decision of the authorities holding a

departmental enquiry against a public servant. It is concerned to

determine whether the enquiry is held by an authority competent

in that behalf, and according to the procedure prescribed in that

behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated.

The Court held as under:

“7. …The High Court is not constituted in a proceeding

under Article 226 of the Constitution a court of appeal

over the decision of the authorities holding a

departmental enquiry against a public servant: it is

concerned to determine whether the enquiry is held by

an authority competent in that behalf, and according to

the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether

the rules of natural justice are not violated. Where there

is some evidence, which the authority entrusted with

2 AIR 1963 SC 1723

the duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and which

evidence may reasonably support the conclusion that

the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it is not

the function of the High Court in a petition for a writ

under Article 226 to review the evidence and to arrive

at an independent finding on the evidence….”

9. In B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India & Ors.3, again, a three

Judge Bench of this Court has held that power of judicial review is

not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which

the decision is made. Power of judicial review is meant to ensure

that the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that

the conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily correct in

the eyes of the court. The Court/Tribunal in its power of judicial

review does not act as an appellate authority to reappreciate the

evidence and to arrive at its own independent findings on the

evidence. It was held as under:

“12. Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but

a review of the manner in which the decision is made.

Power of judicial review is meant to ensure that the

individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that

the conclusion which the authority reaches is

necessarily correct in the eye of the court. When an

inquiry is conducted on charges of misconduct by a

public servant, the Court/Tribunal is concerned to

determine whether the inquiry was held by a competent

officer or whether rules of natural justice are complied

with. Whether the findings or conclusions are based on

some evidence, the authority entrusted with the power

to hold inquiry has jurisdiction, power and authority to

reach a finding of fact or conclusion. But that finding

must be based on some evidence. Neither the technical

rules of Evidence Act nor of proof of fact or evidence as

defined therein, apply to disciplinary proceeding. When

the authority accepts that evidence and conclusion

receives support therefrom, the disciplinary authority is

3 (1995) 6 SCC 749

entitled to hold that the delinquent officer is guilty of

the charge. The Court/Tribunal in its power of judicial

review does not act as appellate authority to

reappreciate the evidence and to arrive at its own

independent findings on the evidence. The

Court/Tribunal may interfere where the authority held

the proceedings against the delinquent officer in a

manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or

in violation of statutory rules prescribing the mode of

inquiry or where the conclusion or finding reached by

the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence. If the

conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable person

would have ever reached, the Court/Tribunal may

interfere with the conclusion or the finding, and mould

the relief so as to make it appropriate to the facts of

each case.

13. The disciplinary authority is the sole judge of

facts. Where appeal is presented. The appellate

authority has co- extensive power to reappreciate the

evidence or the nature of punishment. In a disciplinary

inquiry the strict proof of legal evidence and findings on

that evidence are not relevant. Adequacy of evidence or

reliability of evidence cannot be permitted to be

canvassed before the Court/Tribunal. In Union of India v.

H.C. Goel [(1964) 4 SCR 781], this Court held at page

728 that if the conclusion, upon consideration of the

evidence, reached by the disciplinary authority, is

perverse or suffers from patent error on the face of the

record or based on no evidence at all, a writ of certiorari

could be issued.”

10. In High Court of Judicature at Bombay through its Registrar

v. Shashikant S. Patil & Anr.4, this Court held that interference

with the decision of departmental authorities is permitted if such

authority had held proceedings in violation of the principles of

natural justice or in violation of statutory regulations prescribing

the mode of such enquiry while exercising jurisdiction under Article

226 of the Constitution. It was held as under:

4 (2000) 1 SCC 416

“16. The Division Bench of the High Court seems to

have approached the case as though it was an appeal

against the order of the administrative/disciplinary

authority of the High Court. Interference with the

decision of departmental authorities can be permitted,

while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the

Constitution if such authority had held proceedings in

violation of the principles of natural justice or in

violation of statutory regulations prescribing the mode

of such enquiry or if the decision of the authority is

vitiated by considerations extraneous to the evidence

and merits of the case, or if the conclusion made by the

authority, on the very face of it, is wholly arbitrary or

capricious that no reasonable person could have arrived

at such a conclusion, or grounds very similar to the

above. But we cannot overlook that the departmental

authority (in this case the Disciplinary Committee of the

High Court) is the sole judge of the facts, if the enquiry

has been properly conducted. The settled legal position

is that if there is some legal evidence on which the

findings can be based, then adequacy or even reliability

of that evidence is not a matter for canvassing before

the High Court in a writ petition filed under Article 226

of the Constitution.”

11. In State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur v. Nemi Chand Nalwaya5,

this Court held that the courts will not act as an appellate court

and reassess the evidence led in the domestic enquiry, nor

interfere on the ground that another view is possible on the

material on record. If the enquiry has been fairly and properly held

and the findings are based on evidence, the question of adequacy

of the evidence or the reliable nature of the evidence will not be

ground for interfering with the findings in departmental enquiries.

The Court held as under:

“7. It is now well settled that the courts will not act

as an appellate court and reassess the evidence led in

5 (2011) 4 SCC 584

the domestic enquiry, nor interfere on the ground that

another view is possible on the material on record. If

the enquiry has been fairly and properly held and the

findings are based on evidence, the question of

adequacy of the evidence or the reliable nature of the

evidence will not be grounds for interfering with the

findings in departmental enquiries. Therefore, courts

will not interfere with findings of fact recorded in

departmental enquiries, except where such findings are

based on no evidence or where they are clearly

perverse. The test to find out perversity is to see

whether a tribunal acting reasonably could have arrived

at such conclusion or finding, on the material on record.

Courts will however interfere with the findings in

disciplinary matters, if principles of natural justice or

statutory regulations have been violated or if the order

is found to be arbitrary, capricious, mala fide or based

on extraneous considerations. (vide B. C. Chaturvedi vs.

Union of India - 1995 (6) SCC 749, Union of India vs. G.

Gunayuthan - 1997 (7) SCC 463, and Bank of India vs.

Degala Suryanarayana - 1999 (5) SCC 762, High Court

of Judicature at Bombay vs. Shahsi Kant S Patil - 2001

(1) SCC416).

xx xx xx

12. The fact that the criminal court subsequently

acquitted the respondent by giving him the benefit of

doubt, will not in any way render a completed

disciplinary proceedings invalid nor affect the validity of

the finding of guilt or consequential punishment. The

standard of proof required in criminal proceedings being

different from the standard of proof required in

departmental enquiries, the same charges and

evidence may lead to different results in the two

proceedings, that is, finding of guilt in departmental

proceedings and an acquittal by giving benefit of doubt

in the criminal proceedings. This is more so when the

departmental proceedings are more proximate to

the incident, in point of time, when compared to the

criminal proceedings. The findings by the criminal court

will have no effect on previously concluded domestic

enquiry. An employee who allows the findings in the

enquiry and the punishment by the disciplinary

authority to attain finality by non-challenge, cannot

after several years, challenge the decision on the

ground that subsequently, the criminal court has

acquitted him.”

13. In another judgement reported as Union of India v. P.

Gunasekaran (2015) 2 SCC 610, this Court held that while reappreciating evidence

the High Court cannot act as an appellate authority in the

disciplinary proceedings. The Court held the parameters as to

when the High Court shall not interfere in the disciplinary

proceedings:

“13. Under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of

India, the High Court shall not:

(i) re-appreciate the evidence;

(ii) interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in case

the same has been conducted in accordance with law;

(iii) go into the adequacy of the evidence;

(iv) go into the reliability of the evidence;

(v) interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which

findings can be based.

(vi) correct the error of fact however grave it may appear

to be;

(vii) go into the proportionality of punishment unless it

shocks its conscience.”

14. On the other hand learned counsel for the respondent relies upon

the judgment reported as Allahabad Bank v. Krishna Narayan

Tewari 2017 2 SCC 308, wherein this Court held that if the disciplinary authority

records a finding that is not supported by any evidence whatsoever

or a finding which is unreasonably arrived at, the Writ Court could

interfere with the finding of the disciplinary proceedings. We do not

find that even on touchstone of that test, the Tribunal or the High

Court could interfere with the findings recorded by the disciplinary

authority. It is not the case of no evidence or that the findings are