Supreme Court: What must be the nature of enquiry which is Necessary To Dismiss Employee from service For Suppression Of Criminal Antecedents?

 Needless to say, knowledge of a fact is a necessary

pre-requisite for its non-disclosure. The very concept of

suppression presupposes an awareness of that which is

suppressed; one cannot be said to have withheld or

concealed something of which one had no knowledge in

the first place. It would be both illogical and unjust to

hold a candidate liable for suppression of information

that was never within his knowledge to begin with.

Therefore, where the very existence of a criminal

antecedent is not shown to have been within the

candidate's knowledge at the relevant time, he cannot be

held to have suppressed or furnished false information

in that regard, there being no suppression of a fact that

was, to him, non-existent. {Para 31}

32. We hasten to add that such lack of awareness of

the existence of a criminal antecedent is itself a fact that

must be established by the candidate, the onus being

upon him to substantiate the claim before the employer.

A bare plea of ignorance, without cogent and reliable

material to assert such claim, will not suffice to escape

liability. Were it otherwise, the requirement of disclosure

in verification forms would be rendered illusory, open to

circumvention by simply pleading ignorance. In the

present case, as discussed above, we find that the

appellant's consistent claim of bona fide ignorance of the

NCR stands duly established by documentary evidence

on record.

33. The second prong of the enquiry to be undertaken

is whether the criminal antecedent, and the

suppression, if any, is of such nature that merits

termination of employment. In the present case, we

observe that although sufficient opportunity was

granted to the appellant to put forth his case, the

authorities have not undertaken such enquiry. They

have not considered the specific facts and circumstances

and have proceeded under the presumption that

existence of the criminal antecedent would

automatically render the appellant ineligible for the post.

There have been no specific findings regarding the

specific nature of the offence and its impact on the

nature of the post held by the appellant, and the

subsequent discharge of the appellant has not been

given due consideration.

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.________OF 2026

[ @ SLP(CIVIL) NO. 7197 OF 2026 ]

SHATRUGHN YADAV Vs THE FERTILIZERS AND CHEMICALS TRAVANCORE LTD. (F.A.C.T.) AND OTHERS 

Author: AUGUSTINE GEORGE MASIH, J.

Citation: 2026 INSC 829

Dated: AUGUST 11, 2026.

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Case Analysis of Supreme Court Judgment: The Superintending Engineer vs. The Labour Court, Madurai & Others

 

1.0 Factual Matrix: The Foundation of the Dispute

This analysis details a decade-long legal battle catalyzed by an employee's fundamental act of misconduct, which culminated in a landmark Supreme Court judgment clarifying a crucial intersection of Indian criminal and service law. The initial fraud set in motion a series of judicial interventions that tested the relationship between criminal probation and departmental disciplinary action. This section outlines the core facts that served as the genesis of the entire dispute.

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Orissa HC: Mere absence of affidavit supporting allegations against Judicial Officer does not warrant automatic dismissal of complaint and departmental proceedings

 The Hon'ble Chief Justice of India, vide D.O. letter No. CJI/CC/Comp/2014/1405 dated 03-10-2014, issued a circular, that was later circulated as a guideline by the Government of India, Ministry of Law and Justice as per Annexure-3 for dealing with the complaints against the subordinate judiciary, read as -

“As you are aware, recently, Hon'ble the CJI, vide his D.O. No. CJI/CC/Comp/2014/1405 dt. 03.10.2014 addressed to the Chief Justice of all the High Courts has asked the High Courts and subordinate judiciary not to entertain any complaint against a judicial officer it is accompanied by sworn affidavits and verifiable material to substantiate the allegation. Expressing concern over the large number of complaints being filed against subordinate judiciary by people having vested interest and personal agenda, Hon'ble CJI has directed that authenticity of the complaints must be ascertained before any action is taken on it. In view of the provisions of the Article 235 of the Constitution, further action relating to the grievance/complants against the judicial officers lies at the High Court level.”

The letter imports specific directives to the Chief Justices of all the High Courts, emphasising that complaints against judicial officers should not be entertained unless accompanied by sworn affidavits and verifiable material to substantiate the allegations. This guideline was issued to address the concerns over the rising number of complaints against the subordinate judiciary, often filed by individuals with vested interests and personal agendas. The Hon'ble CJI underscored the necessity of ensuring the authenticity of such complaints before taking any action to prevent unwarranted harassment of judicial officers. {Para 7}

8. A plain reading of the guideline is sufficient to understand its object. The words “accompanied by sworn affidavits” and “verifiable material to substantiate the allegation” have to be read together in a complete and comprehensive manner. It emerges, that, merely because a complaint is not supported by sworn affidavits, it does not automatically warrant an outright dismissal. In the complete and comprehensive reading of the said guideline, a complaint is not supposed to be ignored from its very inception without even verifying the legitimacy of the complaint as nowhere in the guideline the High Court is debarred from initiating its own enquiry over any complaint where the allegations prima facie reveals verifiable material supporting the complaint subject to an enquiry on the authenticity of the allegations against a concerned judicial officer. The object of initiating an enquiry in the first place is to ensure that serious allegations can be investigated thoroughly, even if the initial complaint lacks sworn affidavit, which underscores the High Court's authority and discretion in managing the subordinate judiciary.

While the guideline aims to protect judicial officers from unwarranted harassment, it does not eliminate the possibility of addressing genuine issues faced by individuals or communities due to the actions of a judicial officer. The High Court retains the responsibility to ascertain the authenticity of the complaints and take appropriate action based on verified facts. The requirement for sworn affidavits and verifiable material ensures that the process is fair and that decisions are not arbitrary. This is a kind of precaution suggested to protect the judicial officers from unwarranted harassment.

9. The concerned guideline issued by the Hon'ble CJI is designed to balance the need to protect judicial officers from frivolous complaints with the necessity of addressing genuine grievances. It is to uphold the principles of fairness, non-arbitrariness, and judicial independence, ensuring that the judiciary function effectively and impartially. The guideline is to reinforce the importance of due process in handling complaints against judicial officers. It ensures that complaints are evaluated based on evidence and merit, thereby upholding the rule of law.

 In the High Court of Orissa at Cuttack

(Before S.K. Sahoo and Chittaranjan Dash, JJ.)

Santosh Kumar Agarwal Vs Orissa High Court and Others.

W.P. (C) No. 17678 of 2024

Decided on August 8, 2024

Citation: 2024 SCC OnLine Ori 1952.

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In departmental enquiry, whose statement will carry more weightage, either the delinquent or the Inquiry officer?

 The main ground on which the respondent attacked the order dated September 16, 1954, was that at the enquiry held by Mr. Byrne, he was not given an opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses, who deposed against him, and that the findings reached at such enquiry could not be accepted. But the question is whether that allegation has been made out. In para. 7 of his petition, the respondent stated :

"Despite repeated verbal requests of the petitioner, the Inquiry Officer did not permit him to cross-examine any witness, who deposed against him." {Para 7}

8. But this was contradicted by Mr. Byrne, who filed a counter-affidavit, in which he stated :

"(4) That it is incorrect that no opportunity was given to the petitioner at the time of the oral enquiry to cross-examine the witnesses who had deposed against the petitioner.

(5) That all witnesses were examined in petitioner's presence and he was asked by me at the end of each examination whether he had any questions to put.

(6) That the petitioner only put questions to one witness Shri P. Govindan Nair, and to others he did not."

9. On this affidavit, Mr. Byrne was examined in Court, and he repeated these allegations and added :

"I have distinct recollection that I asked Shri T.R. Varma to put questions in cross-examination to witnesses."

10. It was elicited in the course of his further examination that he did not make any note that he asked Shri T.R. Varma to put questions in cross-examination to witnesses, and that that might have been due to a slip on his part.

11. We have thus before us two statements, one by Mr. Byrne and the other by the respondent, and they are in flat contradiction of each other. The question is which of them is to be accepted. When there is a dispute as to what happened before a court or tribunal, the statement of the Presiding Officer in regard to it is generally taken to be correct, and there is no reason why the statement of Mr. Byrne should not be accepted as true. He was admittedly an officer holding a high position, and it is not suggested that there was any motive for him to give false evidence. There are moreover, features in the record, which clearly show that the statement of Mr. Byrne must be correct. The examination of witnesses began on April 20, 1953, and four witnesses were examined on that date, among them being Sri C.B. Tawakley. If, as stated by the respondent, he asked for permission to cross-examine witnesses, and that was refused, it is surprising that he should not have put the complaint in writing on the subsequent dates on which the enquiry was continued. To one of the witnesses Sri P. Govindan Nair, he did actually put a question in cross-examination, and it is difficult to reconcile this with his statement that permission had been refused to cross-examine the previous witnesses. A reading of the deposition of the witnesses shows that the Enquiring Officer himself had put searching questions, and elicited all relevant facts. It is not suggested that there was any specific matter in respect of which cross-examination could have been but was not directed. We think it likely that the respondent did not cross-examine the witnesses because there was nothing left for him to cross-examine. The learned Judges gave two reasons for accepting the statement of the respondent in preference to that of Mr. Byrne. One is that there was no record made in the depositions of the witnesses that there was no cross-examination. But what follows from this ? That, in fact, there was no cross-examination, which is a fact; not that the request of the respondent to cross-examine was disallowed. Then again, the learned Judges say that the respondent was present at the hearing of the writ petition before them, that they put questions to him, and formed the opinion that he was sufficiently intelligent, and that it was difficult to believe that he would not have cross-examined the witnesses. We are of opinion that this was a consideration which ought not to have been taken into account in a judicial determination of the question, and that it should have been wholly excluded. On a consideration of the record and of the probabilities, we accept the statement of Mr. Byrne as true, and hold that the respondent was not refused permission to cross-examine the witnesses, and that the charge that the enquiry was defective for this reason cannot be sustained.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 118 of 1957

Decided On: 18.09.1957

Union of India (UOI) Vs. T.R. Varma

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Sudhi Ranjan Das, C.J., B.P. Sinha, J.L. Kapur, A.K. Sarkar and T.L. Venkatarama Aiyyar, JJ.

Author: T.L. Venkatarama Aiyyar, J.

Citation: MANU/SC/0121/1957,1957 AIR 882, 1958 SCR 499

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Can the court set aside the order of Compulsory Retirement if it Was Passed To Circumvent Disciplinary Proceedings?

 Dehors the aforesaid allegations of institutional bias and malice, having perused the material placed on record, we find merit in the other grounds taken by the appellant. It is noticed that though FR 56(j) contemplates that the respondents have an absolute right to retire a government servant in public interest and such an order could have been passed against the appellant any time after he had attained the age of fifty years, the respondents did not take any such decision till the very fag end of his career. The impugned order of

compulsory retirement was passed in this case on 27th September, 2019 whereas the appellant was to superannuate in ordinary course in January, 2020. There appears an apparent contradiction in the approach of the respondents who had till as late as in July, 2019 continued to grade the appellant as ‘Outstanding’ and had assessed his integrity as ‘Beyond doubt’. But in less than three months reckoned therefrom, the respondents had turned turtle to arrive at the conclusion that he deserved to be compulsorily retired. If the appellant was worthy of being continued in service for little short of a decade after he had attained the age of 50 years and of being granted an overall grade of 9 on the scale of 1 - 10 on 31st July, 2019 it has not been shown as to what had transpired thereafter that made the respondents resort to FR 56(j) and invoke the public interest doctrine to compulsorily retire him with just three months of service left for his retirement, in routine. In such a case, this Court is inclined to pierce the smoke screen and on doing so, we are of the firm view that the order of compulsory retirement in the given facts and circumstances of the case cannot be sustained. The said order is punitive in nature and was passed to short-circuit the disciplinary proceedings pending against the appellant and ensure his immediate removal. The impugned order passed by the respondents does not pass muster as it fails to satisfy the underlying test of serving the interest of the public. {Para 39}

40. In view of the above discussion, it is deemed appropriate to reverse the impugned judgment dated 31st May, 2022 and quash and set aside the order dated 27th September, 2019 passed by the respondents, compulsorily retiring the appellant. Resultantly, the adverse consequences if any, flowing from the said order of compulsory retirement imposed on the appellant, are also set aside. 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

 CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION 

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6161 OF 2022;

CAPTAIN PRAMOD KUMAR BAJAJ Vs UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER

Coram: A.S. BOPANNA; J., HIMA KOHLI; J. 

Author: HIMA KOHLI, J.

Dated:  MARCH 03, 2023 

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Study material on Disciplinary Inquiry

 https://drive.google.com/file/d/1FIPxcavzCItAmL2ncoJnEnkNB91oTbzb/view?usp=sharing

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Whether government servant turning hostile in Session trial amounts to misconduct?

Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, we first examine Petitioner's contention that the act of turning hostile does not amount to misconduct. Perjury is an offence punishable under Section 191 of the Indian Penal Code (for short "I. P. Code"). If the petitioner had committed offence of perjury, the Sessions Judge ought to have issued notice to him and tried him for that offence. Whether he had committed offence of perjury or not can be established by the Sessions Judge alone. The same cannot be established in a disciplinary enquiry. The law provides for a complete mechanism to punish a person committing office of perjury. Turning hostile, by itself, is not an offence. The only Court competent to record a finding of commission of perjury was the Sessions Judge. The appointing authority, not being an expert, would otherwise not be in a position to gauge the factors leading to hostility of the witness. After considering the testimony of the petitioner, the Sessions Judge has thought it appropriate not to issue notice to him for trial for the offence punishable U/Sec. 191 of the I.P. Code. Therefore, it is difficult to hold that the act of giving testimony before Sessions Judge as misconduct and to punish the petitioner for the same. {Para 7}

8. One may morally expect a witness to stand by his previous statement during trial. For a government servant, a higher degree of responsibility could be expected by assisting the prosecution to bring home guilt of the accused by sticking to the statement previously recorded. However, whether this 'expectation' could be extended to an extent that the act becomes a misconduct capable of being punished is the issue. 

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (AURANGABAD BENCH)

Writ Petition No. 2352 of 2018

Abdul Rauf Mohammed Khaja  Vs. The State of Maharashtra and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Mangesh S. Patil and Sandeep V. Marne, JJ.

Author: Sandeep V. Marne, J.

Decided On: 14.10.2022.

Citation: MANU/MH/3660/2022

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Allahabad HC: Only Governor Can Take Action Under Art. 351 Of CSR If Govt Servant Is Found Guilty Of Grave Misconduct After Retirement

 A bare perusal of the afore-quoted provision of Article 351-A

of the CSR shows that once the government servant retires, it is the Governor who has the right of withholding or withdrawing the pension or any part of it, permanently or for a specified period. The Governor under the said provision has also the right of recovery from the pension of the whole or part of any pecuniary loss caused to the Government, if the employee is found in departmental or judicial proceedings to have caused pecuniary loss to Government by misconduct or negligence during his service or he has been found guilty of gross misconduct. {Para 17}

18. It is, thus, clear that after retirement, withholding or

withdrawing a pension and ordering the recovery from pension is permissible to be caused only by the Governor i.e. the State

Government in terms of the Rules of Business, not only in case

such employee is found causing pecuniary loss to the Government by his misconduct or negligence but also in a cases when the employee concerned is found guilty of grave misconduct.

19. The provision of first proviso appended to Article 351-A of

the CSR clearly prohibits institution of departmental proceedings except with the sanction of Governor if such proceedings were not instituted while the employee was on duty either before retirement or during re-employment. Thus, Article 351-A of CSR puts a prohibition of initiating the departmental proceedings in a case of retired government servant, however, such proceedings are permissible to be instituted with the sanction of Governor, that too, in respect of an event which took place not more than four years before institution of such proceedings. The provision further provides that departmental enquiry in such an event shall be conducted by such authority and at such place as the Governor may direct and in accordance with the procedure applicable.

 ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT

Case :- SPECIAL APPEAL No. - 408 of 2021

Appellant :- Gaya Prasad Yadav

Respondent :- State Of U.P.Thru.Prin.Secy.Home Lucknow And

Anther

Coram: 

Hon'ble Devendra Kumar Upadhyaya,J.

Hon'ble Shree Prakash Singh,J.

Order Date :- 23.9.2022

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Whether principles of natural justice violated if an enquiry report is not given to a delinquent employee?

 As stated above, Annexure – A8 enquiry report and PR

minutes were given to the applicant only along with Annexure – A7 show cause notice after the Government accepted the findings in the enquiry report and provisionally decided to impose a penalty. It is pertinent to note that the enquiry officer and the disciplinary authority in the instant case were not one and the same. This is in violation of the principles of natural justice and the same cannot be condoned at all, as held in B. Karunakar's Case (supra)

“The findings or recommended punishment by the

enquiry officer are likely to affect the mind of the

disciplinary authority in his concluding the guilt or

penalty to be imposed. The delinquent is, therefore,

entitled to meet the reasoning, controvert the

conclusions reached by the enquiry officer or is entitled

to explain the effect of the evidence recorded. Unless

the copy of the report is supplied to him, he would be in

dark to know the findings, the reasons in support

thereof or nature of the recommendation on penalty. He

would point out all the factual or legal errors committed

by the enquiry officer. He may also persuade the

disciplinary authority that the finding is based on no

evidence or the relevant material evidence was not

considered or overlooked by the enquiry officer in

coming to the conclusions, with a view to persuade the

disciplinary authority to disagree with the enquiry

officer and to consider his innocence of the charge, or

even that the guilt as to the misconduct has not been

established on the evidence on records or disabuse the

initial impression formed in the minds of the

disciplinary authority on consideration of the enquiry

report. Even if the disciplinary authority comes to the

conclusion that charge or charges is/are proved, the case

may not warrant imposition of any, penalty. He may

plead mitigating or extenuating circumstances to impose

no punishment or a lesser punishment. For this purpose

the delinquent needs reasonable opportunity or fair play

in action. The supply of the copy of the report is neither

an empty formality, nor a ritual, but aims to digress the

direction of the disciplinary authority from his

derivative conclusions from the report to the palliative

path of fair consideration. The denial of the supply of

the copy, therefore, causes to the delinquent a grave

prejudice and avoidable injustice which cannot be cured

or mitigated in appeal or at a challenge under Art. 226

of the Constitution or S.19 of the Tribunal Act or other

relevant provisions. Ex post facto opportunity does not

efface the past impression formed by the disciplinary

authority against the delinquent, however, professedly

to be fair to the delinquent. The lurking suspicion

always lingers in the mind of the delinquent that the

disciplinary authority was not objective and he was

treated unfairly. To alleviate such an impression and to

prevent injustice or miscarriage of justice at the

threshold, the disciplinary authority should supply the

copy of the report, consider objectively the records, the

evidence, the report and the explanation offered by the

delinquent and make up his mind on proof of the charge

or the nature of the penalty. The supply of the copy of

the report is thus, a sine qua non for a valid, fair, just

and proper procedure to defend the delinquent himself

effectively and efficaciously. The denial thereof is

offending not only Art.311(2) but also violates Arts. 14

and 21 of the Constitution. {Para 7}

8. The argument on the side of the Government before the

Tribunal that there is no specific rule in the Kerala Police

Departmental Inquiries, Punishment and Appeal Rules to give enquiry report at the stage of drawing up of the same to the delinquent cannot be accepted at all. The right to receive the report is considered as the essential part of reasonable opportunity to be extended to the person affected by the report and a refusal to furnish the report amounts to denial of the right to defend himself and to prove his innocence in the disciplinary proceedings. Even if such right is not explicitly stated in the regulations or statute, that right being a fundamental and essential part of the natural justice, must be read into every regulation or rules. There is nothing in the rules aforesaid

which excludes the operation of the principle of natural justice

entitling the delinquent to be served with a copy of the enquiry

report before accepting the report or proposing a punishment. It is trite that the principles of natural justice must be read into the

unoccupied interstices of the statute/rules or regulations unless there is a clear mandate to the contrary.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

OP (KAT) No. 130 of 2022

JAYACHANDRAN V  Vs STATE OF KERALA

PRESENT

 MR. JUSTICE A.K.JAYASANKARAN NAMBIAR

&

MR.JUSTICE MOHAMMED NIAS C.P.

Author: Mohammed Nias.C.P., J.

Dated: 16th day of June, 2022

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Whether departmental enquiry will be vitiated if President Of Disciplinary Enquiry Committee Was Replaced Due To Ill Health?

 In any case, the High Court, in the impugned order, failed to take the note of doctrine of necessity. Once it is admitted, (i) that the disciplinary proceedings commenced with an Inquiry Committee of which the President was a member; and (ii) that subsequently he was replaced by someone due to ill health, the doctrine of necessity would come into play. Hence the impugned orders of the High Court and the School Tribunal are liable to be reversed.  {Para 23}

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 7937 of 2011

Jai Bhavani Shikshan Prasarak Mandal Vs.  Ramesh and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Hemant Gupta and V. Ramasubramanian, JJ.

Author: V. Ramasubramanian, J.

Decided On: 29.03.2022

Citation: MANU/SC/0376/2022

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Whether Departmental enquiry is vitiated if there is a delay in conducting it?

The Tribunal purportedly did so on the basis that prejudice had been caused to the first respondent by the denial of an opportunity for deputation or for promotion as a result of the pendency of the proceedings. The line of reasoning which weighed with the Tribunal is plainly erroneous. The Tribunal would have been justified in directing the expeditious conclusion of the enquiry, but instead, it proceeded to quash the enquiry in its entirety. This, in our view, was clearly impermissible. Every delay in conducting a disciplinary enquiry does not, ipso facto, lead to the enquiry being vitiated. Whether prejudice is caused to the officer who is being enquired into is a matter which has to be decided on the basis of the circumstances of each case. Prejudice must be demonstrated to have been caused and cannot be a matter of surmise. Apart from submitting that the first respondent was unable to proceed on deputation or to seek promotion, there is no basis on which it could be concluded that his right to defend himself stands prejudicially affected by a delay of two years in concluding the enquiry. The High Court, therefore, in our view, has clearly failed to properly exercise the jurisdiction vested in it by simply affirming the judgment of the Tribunal. The judgment of the Tribunal suffered from basic errors which go to the root of the matter and which have been ignored both by the Tribunal as well as by the High Court.

Supreme Court

JUSTICE Dr. Dhananjaya Y. Chandrachud JUSTICE Vikram Nath JUSTICE Hima Kohli

State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr. Vs. Akhilesh Jha & Anr.

Civil Appeal No. 5153 of 2021

6th September 2021

Author: Dr. Dhananjaya Y. Chandrachud, J.

Citation:  2021 ALL SCR 2092

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Whether sexual harassment complaint can be dropped if an aggrieved woman desire not to prosecute it?

Had the student been really aggrieved with the action of the petitioner then she ought to have taken steps in proper time to protest the same. On the contrary, it appears that there was no intention of the lady ever, to fight for her rights. Law provides enough scope and facility to an aggrieved woman to file a complaint either personally or through persons authorised by her. She sat tight over the matter for nearly two years and thereafter the alleged incident was brought to the forefront by

third parties, who neither had personal knowledge of the incident nor were witnesses to the incident. Reliance was placed on audio clippings, veracity of which have not been tested. It may be that the lady was threatened or intimidated not to proceed further in the matter. It is possible that the student was not advised and guided properly. But where the lady herself puts forth in writing that neither she nor her parents intend to proceed with the matter, then the desire of the lady has to be respected.

The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Dr. Vijayakumaran (supra) held that upon receipt of complaints from girl student of the University about sexual harassment in University campus, it was obligatory on the administration to refer such complaints to the ICC within the stipulated time period as pre-predicated in

Section 9 of the said Act. The same implies that the compliant of the lady and the time limit for filing such complaint both are equally important. The allegations against the petitioner have criminal connotations. No complaint was ever lodged before the police by any person alleging the incident. Without being convinced and satisfied with the documents, the University ought

not to have initiated any proceeding against the petitioner.

The submission of the University that the charge-sheet ought not to fail

automatically in the event the recommendation of ICC fails, cannot be accepted by

the Court. If the initial action of ICC cannot be supported, then obviously the

subsequent actions by the University are bound to fail. It is only on the basis of

the recommendation of ICC that the University initiated disciplinary proceeding.

In fact, the University has relied upon the UGC Guidelines which mention

that the Higher Educational Institution must mandatorily extend full support to

see that the recommendations of ICC are implemented in a timely manner. The

support which is to be extended in terms of the aforesaid provision of the UGC

guideline is with regard to the institutional resources given for functioning of ICC

and the office and building infrastructure as well as sufficient allocation of

financial resources. The recommendation as indicated therein does not mean the

recommendation for initiating disciplinary proceeding against a person even

though the very basis for initiating such proceeding does not exist.

 IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA

Constitutional Writ Jurisdiction

Appellate Side

Present :- Hon’ble Justice Amrita Sinha

W.P.A. No. 8018 of 2020

With

W.P.A. No. 11995 of 2021

Angshuman Kar  Vs. The State of West Bengal & Ors.

Judgment on :- 07.09.2021

Author: Amrita Sinha, J.

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Whether School tribunal has jurisdiction to decide a dispute relating to a private school teacher's resignation?

  In view of the aforesaid judgment of the Supreme Court

in the case of Shashi Gaur (supra), in my opinion, there can

be no doubt that once a teacher/employee of a school takes

up a case that she has been illegally removed, this aspect

very much falls within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. The

mere fact that in determining this issue the Tribunal has

also to consider that whether or not the teacher or employee

has resigned or not cannot mean that Tribunal will have no

jurisdiction because it is only on arriving at a conclusion

that there is no valid resignation, would thereafter the

Tribunal arrive at a decision of illegal removal of a

teacher/employee of a school. Surely, a teacher/employee

who is illegally removed, will naturally approach the

Tribunal as per the ratio of the Supreme Court in the case

of Shashi Gaur (supra), and surely the defence which is laid

out by the school to justify the action of the school would

not mean that the issue will not remain that of removal of

the teacher/employee from the school. In fact, it is reiterated

that it is because of the assertion of the respondent no. 1

that she has been illegally removed from the school, and

which case has been accepted by the Tribunal, that the

impugned judgment has been passed in favour of

respondent no. 1 and against the petitioner.”{Para 4}

22. In fact in the case of Daya Nand (supra) the Court was confronted

with the question of maintainability of an appeal before the Tribunal

where the Petitioner had resigned and even in that context the Court held

that since resignation was one of the modes of cessation of service, it

would be within the purview of the Tribunal under Section 8(3) of the

Act to adjudicate the issue. In a recent judgment in GD Goenka Public School and Ors. vs. Vinod Handa and Ors. 262 (2019) DLT 154, a Coordinate Bench of this Court has taken a similar view and relegated the Petitioner to the remedy of an appeal before the Tribunal, as the challenge was to an order of resignation.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

 W.P.(C) 6975/2020 and CM Nos.23831/2020 and 23832/2020

SANDHYA BINDAL  Vs  STATE OF NCT OF DELHI 

CORAM:

HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE JYOTI SINGH

Pronounced on: 24.11.2020

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Is the employer liable to pay interest to the employee if he withholds his leave encashment without specific order?

  We, accordingly, allow the petition partially by directing

the respondent to pay the petitioner his leave encashment dues

along with interest at the rate of 8% per annum from the date

the same became due, till payment.”{Para 11}

15. Another Division Bench of this Court in Prem Nath (supra)

dealing with a similar issue in the context of Rule 39 (3) of the CCS (Leave) Rules, 1972 held as under:-

“7. It is undisputed that the respondent retired from service on

31.08.2010 on attaining the age of superannuation and that at

the time of his retirement, or immediately thereafter, leave

encashment was not released to him. There is also no dispute

on the proposition that leave encashment can be withheld under

Rule 39 (3) of CCS (Leave) Rules, 1972, if at the time of

retirement, an employee is under suspension or disciplinary or

criminal proceedings are pending against him. However, a

reading of the said provision clearly shows that in order to

withhold the leave encashment in whole or in part, the authority

competent to grant leave has to pass an order specifically

withholding the encashment, if in its view there is a possibility

of some money becoming recoverable from the employee on

conclusion of the proceedings against him. 

8. Learned counsel for the respondent vehemently submitted

that no such order was passed by the competent authority and

the learned counsel for the petitioners was not able to rebut the

said fact. Consequently, the petitioners herein could not have

withheld the leave encashment and the money ought to have

been released to the respondent soon after his retirement. We

also do not agree with the submissions of the learned counsel

for the petitioners that only because there is no Rule for grant

of interest of leave encashment, the respondent would not be

entitled to the same. Learned counsel has not been able to point

out any rule to the contrary, which creates a bar for grant of

interest in case due amount is released after a considerable

delay. It has been clearly held by the Apex Court in several

judgments including S.K.Dua vs. State of Haryana & Anr.,

(2008) 3 SCC 44 that if there are Statutory Rules or

Administrative Instructions occupying the field, an employee

could claim payment of interest relying on such rule, but even

in the absence of any Statutory Rules or Administrative

Instructions or Guidelines, an employee can claim interest

under Part-III of the Constitution relying on Articles 14, 19 and

21 of the Constitution of India. In this regard, we also rely on a

decision passed by the Division Bench of this Court in Writ

Petition (C) No.1186/2012, titled as ‘Government of NCT of

Delhi vs. S.K.Srivastava’. This judgment also supports our view

that if no order is passed under Rule 39(3) of Leave Rules, the

leave encashment cannot be withheld. The fact of the matter is

that the petitioners are retaining the money of the respondent

from the year 2010 to 2015 and the respondent is, thus, clearly

entitled to interest on the delayed payment. Interest is awarded

to compensate the recipient for the falling value of money due

to inflation. In so far as, the plea of the petitioners that serious

cases were pending against the respondent and, therefore, the

leave encashment was not released is concerned, the same has

no merit either. Although neither the petitioners nor the

respondent have been able to throw any light on the status of

the criminal and disciplinary proceedings as of today, however,

if this was the reason for withholding the leave encashment

then the same status continues perhaps even today. The reason

given for releasing the leave encashment in 2015 is an order

passed by the Public Grievances Commission. We fail to

understand that if the petitioners were withholding the leave

encashment due to pending proceedings then they had the

remedy of not implementing the order of the Public Grievances

Commission. However, having complied with that order and

released the leave encashment, the petitioners cannot be heard

to say that the leave encashment was withheld due to pending

proceedings. Learned tribunal has, thus, rightly come to

conclusion that the respondent deserves interest at the GPF

rate for the delayed payment of leave encashment.”

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

W.P.(C) 3114/2020 & CM 10817/2020

SH. S.B. SINGH Vs NATIONAL TEXTILE CORPORATION 

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Whether the employer can refuse to pay the amount of provident fund and leave encashment to the employee if he had issued the charge sheet of departmental enquiry to him after retirement?

  With respect the Provident Fund reliance is placed on the

judgement of the Supreme Court in Gorakhpur University & Ors. vs. Dr. Shitla Prasad Nagendra & Ors., (2006) 6 SCC 591, wherein the Court held that terminal benefits including Provident Fund cannot be withheld and the same are immune from attachment, deduction or adjustment even against any of the dues from the employee. To the same effect is the

decision of the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in Ramdas Govind Bakhle vs. Maharashtra State Financial Corporation (2000)SCC OnLine Bom 9, wherein the Court relying on Bhagirathijena vs. Board of Directors, Orissa State Financial Corporation & Ors., (1993) 3 SCC 666, held that no amount from the Provident Fund of an employee can be deducted in the absence of service Regulations providing so and

the Court directed the Respondent therein to release the Provident Fund of the Petitioner.{Para 7}

13. A perusal of the provisions of Rule 7.7 makes it evident that before the Competent Authority can withhold the Leave Encashment of an employee, wholly or partly, a conscious decision must be taken to withhold the Leave Encashment due to the employee on account of there being a possibility of some money becoming recoverable from him, once the Disciplinary Proceedings conclude.

14. While interpreting the said Rule, the Division Bench held as

follows:-

“10. The aforesaid Rule would show that the competent

authority may wholly or partly, withhold leave encashment in

respect of a Government servant who retires on attaining the

age of superannuation, while under suspension or while

undergoing disciplinary or criminal proceedings, provided the

competent authority is of the view that there is a possibility of

some money becoming recoverable from him on the conclusion

of proceedings against him. In the present case, the respondents

have not produced any order to show that a conscious decision

has been taken by the Government to withhold the leave

encashment due to the petitioner upon his retirement, on

account of there being a possibility of some money becoming

recoverable from him on the conclusion of proceedings against

him. The nature of the charge levied against the petitioner also

does not support the withholding of the leave encashment. We

cannot agree with the submissions of learned counsel for the

respondents that if the charge against the petitioner is proved,

it could also have the effect of nullifying the examination

process in which the petitioner is alleged to have manipulated

the marks of some of the candidates. Pertinently, the said

examination took place in the year 2010. It is not the

respondent’s case that any of the successful candidates have

been put to notice in this regard. It is not claimed that the said

examination process has been assailed by any unsuccessful

candidate on account of the alleged misconduct of the

petitioner, or that the same has been set aside, or the challenge

is still pending. We are, therefore, of the view that withholding

of leave encashment of the petitioner is not justified.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

W.P.(C) 3114/2020 & CM 10817/2020

SH. S.B. SINGH Vs NATIONAL TEXTILE CORPORATION 

CORAM: HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE JYOTI SINGH

Pronounced on: 17.11.2020

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Whether investigating officer is liable for departmental enquiry if he fails to investigate the offence properly to shield the accused?

 The first glaring lapse in the investigation, left by Mr. Khatane, is that he did not prepare a seizure panchanama of the said car. It cannot be ignored that the  said car belonged to the accused – Police Sub-Inspector at Aurangabad, who was believed to be on duty and was believed to  be driving the said vehicle when the accident occurred.

9. From the above, it is obvious that the then I.O. Mr.

Khatane has seriously failed in properly investigating into the crime, as has been noted by the Commissioner of Police in paragraph No.5 reproduced above. The learned Government Pleader has strenuously tried to convince us that the I.O. may not have intentionally left such loopholes or deficiencies in the investigation. However, he fairly states that he is not defending an erring I.O. He is canvasing that the element of intentionally leaving loopholes in the investigation, may not be the case as is being tried to be made out by the petitioner.

10. We have no hesitation in observing that an investigating

officer is supposed to investigate the crime in accordance with the Code of Criminal Procedure / the procedure applicable and to the best of his ability. He is not supposed to indulge in any such act during investigation, which would have a semblance or a flavour of the I.O. deliberately leaving loopholes in the investigation, so as to tacitly create an advantage in favour of the accused. The learned public prosecutor submits that such mistakes may have occurred inadvertently. We cannot accept such contention for the reason that an experienced I.O. would never commit such acts inadvertently. There is a clear averment by the petitioner that the I.O. was trying to protect the accused, who was an in-service Sub- Inspector of Police posted in the same Police Station in which the crime has been registered, and within whose jurisdiction the offence had occurred. 

15. We are, therefore, directing the Commissioner of Police,

Aurangabad to issue an appropriate charge-sheet-cum-show-cause

notice and follow the procedure as is laid down in law and the

service conditions applicable, for conducting a Departmental

Enquiry against the I.O. Needless to state, if he is found guilty, we

would expect maximum punishment to be awarded to him, since

this is the only way that the faith and trust of the common man and

the public at large would be reposed in the police machinery, which

otherwise is facing a flak for it’s role in such cases

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

BENCH AT AURANGABAD

CRIMINAL WRIT PETITION NO.1121 OF 2020

MOHAMMED ZAHEER S/O. MOHAMMED AZAM Vs THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND OTHERS

CORAM : RAVINDRA V. GHUGE AND

B. U. DEBADWAR, JJ.

DATE : 19TH MARCH, 2021

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Whether the employer can hold an employee guilty for sexual harassment in departmental enquiry despite the pendency of criminal prosecution?

What emerges from the record is:

(a) There were two FIRs filed pursuant to reporting that Respondent No.1

was guilty of objectionable behavior with adolescent girl students in the

school. In both these FIRs the investigation was undertaken and chargesheets

stand filed. Thus, prima facie, the allegations made in the FIR were

found sustainable in police investigation and Respondent No.1 is presently

accused of having committed said offences.

(b) Pursuant to FIR bearing CR No.24 of 2014 Respondent No.1 was

arrested and remained in custody for about seven days.

(c) During the present inquiry 12 witnesses were examined out of whom five witnesses were girls studying in the school.

It was thus not just two girl students, pursuant to whose complaint the

crime was registered against Respondent No.1, but there were other students

as well. Some parents had also gone to the extent of levelling allegations

against Respondent No.1. The conclusion by the Convener in the report that

the charges were sensitive and that the case called for strict action, was

absolutely correct. On the other hand, the reports of the Nominee of

Respondent No.1 and the State Awardee Teacher not only show complete lack

of sensitivity but they also got bogged down unnecessarily by a question

whether any action on their part would amount to contempt of court or not. It

is well settled that a departmental proceeding and proceedings in a criminal

court are completely different. The purpose is different, the standard of proof

is different and the approach is also different. The initiation of the process in

a departmental proceeding, specially on charges with which we are concerned

in the present matter can never be said to be amounting to contempt of court

even if the criminal proceedings were pending. The allegations made against

Respondent No.1 were of such level and dimension that an immediate action

on the departmental front was required to be undertaken and such action by its

very nature had to be completely independent. Whether any criminal trial

was pending or not would not be having any bearing on the pending issue

before the Inquiry Committee. We have, therefore, no hesitation in observing

that the approach of the Nominee of Respondent No.1 and of the State Awardee Teacher was completely wrong and unsustainable.

Reportable

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3456 OF 2019

THE SECRETARY, LUCY SEQUEIRA TRUST Vs  KAILASH RAMESH TANDEL AND ORS.

Author: Uday Umesh Lalit, J.

Dated: April 08, 2019.

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In the Digital Era Employees Working In Different States can Be Treated as working in One Work Place under Sexual Harassment law.

In the present digital world, work place for employees

working in the Bank and who have earlier worked in the same

Branch and later on shifted to different branches which may be

situated in different States has to be treated completely as one

work place on a digital platform. Thus, if a person may be posted

in Jaipur and acts on a digital platform harassing another lady who may be posted in a different State, it would come within the ambit of being harassed in a common work place. The contention of the counsel for the petitioner, thus on the aforesaid count is rejected.

 HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN

BENCH AT JAIPUR

S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.150/2021

Sanjeev Mishra Vs  The Disciplinary Authority And General Manager, Zonal Head, Bank Of Baroda, 

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJEEV PRAKASH SHARMA

Order: 11/01/2021

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Whether the court should permit the inquiry officer's change in departmental inquiry if delinquent alleges that inquiry officer is biased?

As far as the main challenge of the petitioner is concerned, it is regarding the change of the Enquiry Officer. We are of the considered view that it would not be proper for this Court to change the Enquiry Officer at this stage of the inquiry. We also say this because there are already observations of the Division Bench of this Court about the change of Enquiry Officer in Writ Petition (S/B) No. 442 of 2019, where the earlier petition of the petitioner (which was primarily for seeking a writ of certiorari to quash the order passed by the Enquiry Officer dated 23.08.2019), was dismissed on 25.09.2019. The observations of the Division Bench of this Court, however, in para 28 of the judgment dated 25.09.2019 passed in Writ Petition (S/B) No. 442 of 2019 reads as under:—

“28. Since the claim of the petitioner that he has suffered prejudice on the failure of the Enquiry Officer to defer cross-examination of PW2 is required to be examined by the Disciplinary Authority in the first instance after completion of the inquiry, and as this Court would ordinarily not interfere with the inquiry proceedings at an interlocutory stage, we see no reason to entertain this Writ Petition. While declaring the law in this regard on whether or not prejudice is suffered on the failure of the Enquiry Officer to defer cross-examination of a witness, suffice it to make it clear that it is open to the petitioner on completion of the inquiry, and on his being afforded an opportunity to put forth his objections to the inquiry report, to also raise this contention of having suffered prejudice, on the failure of the Enquiry Officer to defer cross-examination of PW2. We have no reason to doubt that, on any such objection being raised, the Disciplinary Authority would consider such contentions uninfluenced by any observations made in this order.”

 In the High Court of Uttarakhand at Nainital

(Before Sudhanshu Dhulia and Alok Kumar Verma, JJ.)

Kanwar Amninder Singh 

Versus

Hon'ble High Court of Uttarakhand at Nainital … 

Writ Petition (S/B) No. 282 of 2020

Decided on October 31, 2020

Citation: 2020 SCC OnLine Utt 722

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What are the powers of the high court in the challenge of disciplinary action against an employee?

 In Union of India v. P. Gunasekaran8, this Court held as follows : (SCC pp. 616-17, paras 12-13)

“12. Despite the well-settled position, it is painfully disturbing to note that the High Court has acted as an appellate authority in the disciplinary proceedings, reappreciating even the evidence before the enquiry officer. The finding on Charge I was accepted by the disciplinary authority and was also endorsed by the Central Administrative Tribunal. In disciplinary proceedings, the High Court is not and cannot act as a second court of first appeal. The High Court, in exercise of its powers under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, shall not venture into reappreciation of the evidence. The High Court can only see whether:

(a) the enquiry is held by a competent authority;

(b) the enquiry is held according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf;

(c) there is violation of the principles of natural justice in conducting the proceedings;

(d) the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair conclusion by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case;

(e) the authorities have allowed themselves to be influenced by irrelevant or extraneous considerations;

(f) the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at such conclusion;

(g) the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed to admit the admissible and material evidence;

(h) the disciplinary authority had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which influenced the finding;

(i) the finding of fact is based on no evidence.

13. Under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court shall not:

(i) reappreciate the evidence;

(ii) interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in case the same has been conducted in accordance with law;

(iii) go into the adequacy of the evidence;

(iv) go into the reliability of the evidence;

(v) interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings can be based.

(vi) correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be;

(vii) go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience.”

 In the High Court of Jharkhand at Ranchi

(Before Deepak Roshan, J.)

W.P.(S) No. 4120 of 2014

Balwant Singh V   Union of India 

Citation: 2020 SCC OnLine Jhar 889

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