In departmental enquiry, whose statement will carry more weightage, either the delinquent or the Inquiry officer?

 The main ground on which the respondent attacked the order dated September 16, 1954, was that at the enquiry held by Mr. Byrne, he was not given an opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses, who deposed against him, and that the findings reached at such enquiry could not be accepted. But the question is whether that allegation has been made out. In para. 7 of his petition, the respondent stated :

"Despite repeated verbal requests of the petitioner, the Inquiry Officer did not permit him to cross-examine any witness, who deposed against him." {Para 7}

8. But this was contradicted by Mr. Byrne, who filed a counter-affidavit, in which he stated :

"(4) That it is incorrect that no opportunity was given to the petitioner at the time of the oral enquiry to cross-examine the witnesses who had deposed against the petitioner.

(5) That all witnesses were examined in petitioner's presence and he was asked by me at the end of each examination whether he had any questions to put.

(6) That the petitioner only put questions to one witness Shri P. Govindan Nair, and to others he did not."

9. On this affidavit, Mr. Byrne was examined in Court, and he repeated these allegations and added :

"I have distinct recollection that I asked Shri T.R. Varma to put questions in cross-examination to witnesses."

10. It was elicited in the course of his further examination that he did not make any note that he asked Shri T.R. Varma to put questions in cross-examination to witnesses, and that that might have been due to a slip on his part.

11. We have thus before us two statements, one by Mr. Byrne and the other by the respondent, and they are in flat contradiction of each other. The question is which of them is to be accepted. When there is a dispute as to what happened before a court or tribunal, the statement of the Presiding Officer in regard to it is generally taken to be correct, and there is no reason why the statement of Mr. Byrne should not be accepted as true. He was admittedly an officer holding a high position, and it is not suggested that there was any motive for him to give false evidence. There are moreover, features in the record, which clearly show that the statement of Mr. Byrne must be correct. The examination of witnesses began on April 20, 1953, and four witnesses were examined on that date, among them being Sri C.B. Tawakley. If, as stated by the respondent, he asked for permission to cross-examine witnesses, and that was refused, it is surprising that he should not have put the complaint in writing on the subsequent dates on which the enquiry was continued. To one of the witnesses Sri P. Govindan Nair, he did actually put a question in cross-examination, and it is difficult to reconcile this with his statement that permission had been refused to cross-examine the previous witnesses. A reading of the deposition of the witnesses shows that the Enquiring Officer himself had put searching questions, and elicited all relevant facts. It is not suggested that there was any specific matter in respect of which cross-examination could have been but was not directed. We think it likely that the respondent did not cross-examine the witnesses because there was nothing left for him to cross-examine. The learned Judges gave two reasons for accepting the statement of the respondent in preference to that of Mr. Byrne. One is that there was no record made in the depositions of the witnesses that there was no cross-examination. But what follows from this ? That, in fact, there was no cross-examination, which is a fact; not that the request of the respondent to cross-examine was disallowed. Then again, the learned Judges say that the respondent was present at the hearing of the writ petition before them, that they put questions to him, and formed the opinion that he was sufficiently intelligent, and that it was difficult to believe that he would not have cross-examined the witnesses. We are of opinion that this was a consideration which ought not to have been taken into account in a judicial determination of the question, and that it should have been wholly excluded. On a consideration of the record and of the probabilities, we accept the statement of Mr. Byrne as true, and hold that the respondent was not refused permission to cross-examine the witnesses, and that the charge that the enquiry was defective for this reason cannot be sustained.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 118 of 1957

Decided On: 18.09.1957

Union of India (UOI) Vs. T.R. Varma

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Sudhi Ranjan Das, C.J., B.P. Sinha, J.L. Kapur, A.K. Sarkar and T.L. Venkatarama Aiyyar, JJ.

Author: T.L. Venkatarama Aiyyar, J.

Citation: MANU/SC/0121/1957,1957 AIR 882, 1958 SCR 499

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Whether School tribunal has jurisdiction to decide a dispute relating to a private school teacher's resignation?

  In view of the aforesaid judgment of the Supreme Court

in the case of Shashi Gaur (supra), in my opinion, there can

be no doubt that once a teacher/employee of a school takes

up a case that she has been illegally removed, this aspect

very much falls within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. The

mere fact that in determining this issue the Tribunal has

also to consider that whether or not the teacher or employee

has resigned or not cannot mean that Tribunal will have no

jurisdiction because it is only on arriving at a conclusion

that there is no valid resignation, would thereafter the

Tribunal arrive at a decision of illegal removal of a

teacher/employee of a school. Surely, a teacher/employee

who is illegally removed, will naturally approach the

Tribunal as per the ratio of the Supreme Court in the case

of Shashi Gaur (supra), and surely the defence which is laid

out by the school to justify the action of the school would

not mean that the issue will not remain that of removal of

the teacher/employee from the school. In fact, it is reiterated

that it is because of the assertion of the respondent no. 1

that she has been illegally removed from the school, and

which case has been accepted by the Tribunal, that the

impugned judgment has been passed in favour of

respondent no. 1 and against the petitioner.”{Para 4}

22. In fact in the case of Daya Nand (supra) the Court was confronted

with the question of maintainability of an appeal before the Tribunal

where the Petitioner had resigned and even in that context the Court held

that since resignation was one of the modes of cessation of service, it

would be within the purview of the Tribunal under Section 8(3) of the

Act to adjudicate the issue. In a recent judgment in GD Goenka Public School and Ors. vs. Vinod Handa and Ors. 262 (2019) DLT 154, a Coordinate Bench of this Court has taken a similar view and relegated the Petitioner to the remedy of an appeal before the Tribunal, as the challenge was to an order of resignation.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

 W.P.(C) 6975/2020 and CM Nos.23831/2020 and 23832/2020

SANDHYA BINDAL  Vs  STATE OF NCT OF DELHI 

CORAM:

HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE JYOTI SINGH

Pronounced on: 24.11.2020

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Whether the employer can hold an employee guilty for sexual harassment in departmental enquiry despite the pendency of criminal prosecution?

What emerges from the record is:

(a) There were two FIRs filed pursuant to reporting that Respondent No.1

was guilty of objectionable behavior with adolescent girl students in the

school. In both these FIRs the investigation was undertaken and chargesheets

stand filed. Thus, prima facie, the allegations made in the FIR were

found sustainable in police investigation and Respondent No.1 is presently

accused of having committed said offences.

(b) Pursuant to FIR bearing CR No.24 of 2014 Respondent No.1 was

arrested and remained in custody for about seven days.

(c) During the present inquiry 12 witnesses were examined out of whom five witnesses were girls studying in the school.

It was thus not just two girl students, pursuant to whose complaint the

crime was registered against Respondent No.1, but there were other students

as well. Some parents had also gone to the extent of levelling allegations

against Respondent No.1. The conclusion by the Convener in the report that

the charges were sensitive and that the case called for strict action, was

absolutely correct. On the other hand, the reports of the Nominee of

Respondent No.1 and the State Awardee Teacher not only show complete lack

of sensitivity but they also got bogged down unnecessarily by a question

whether any action on their part would amount to contempt of court or not. It

is well settled that a departmental proceeding and proceedings in a criminal

court are completely different. The purpose is different, the standard of proof

is different and the approach is also different. The initiation of the process in

a departmental proceeding, specially on charges with which we are concerned

in the present matter can never be said to be amounting to contempt of court

even if the criminal proceedings were pending. The allegations made against

Respondent No.1 were of such level and dimension that an immediate action

on the departmental front was required to be undertaken and such action by its

very nature had to be completely independent. Whether any criminal trial

was pending or not would not be having any bearing on the pending issue

before the Inquiry Committee. We have, therefore, no hesitation in observing

that the approach of the Nominee of Respondent No.1 and of the State Awardee Teacher was completely wrong and unsustainable.

Reportable

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3456 OF 2019

THE SECRETARY, LUCY SEQUEIRA TRUST Vs  KAILASH RAMESH TANDEL AND ORS.

Author: Uday Umesh Lalit, J.

Dated: April 08, 2019.

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What are the powers of the high court in the challenge of disciplinary action against an employee?

 In Union of India v. P. Gunasekaran8, this Court held as follows : (SCC pp. 616-17, paras 12-13)

“12. Despite the well-settled position, it is painfully disturbing to note that the High Court has acted as an appellate authority in the disciplinary proceedings, reappreciating even the evidence before the enquiry officer. The finding on Charge I was accepted by the disciplinary authority and was also endorsed by the Central Administrative Tribunal. In disciplinary proceedings, the High Court is not and cannot act as a second court of first appeal. The High Court, in exercise of its powers under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, shall not venture into reappreciation of the evidence. The High Court can only see whether:

(a) the enquiry is held by a competent authority;

(b) the enquiry is held according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf;

(c) there is violation of the principles of natural justice in conducting the proceedings;

(d) the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair conclusion by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case;

(e) the authorities have allowed themselves to be influenced by irrelevant or extraneous considerations;

(f) the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at such conclusion;

(g) the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed to admit the admissible and material evidence;

(h) the disciplinary authority had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which influenced the finding;

(i) the finding of fact is based on no evidence.

13. Under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court shall not:

(i) reappreciate the evidence;

(ii) interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in case the same has been conducted in accordance with law;

(iii) go into the adequacy of the evidence;

(iv) go into the reliability of the evidence;

(v) interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings can be based.

(vi) correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be;

(vii) go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience.”

 In the High Court of Jharkhand at Ranchi

(Before Deepak Roshan, J.)

W.P.(S) No. 4120 of 2014

Balwant Singh V   Union of India 

Citation: 2020 SCC OnLine Jhar 889

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Leading Supreme court Judgment on the obligation of disciplinary authority to furnish enquiry report to delinquent in the departmental enquiry

 This group of matters is at the instance of various parties, viz., Union of India, Public Sector Corporations, Public Sector banks, State Governments and two private parties. By an order dated 5th August, 1991 in Managing Director, Electronic Corporation of India v. B.Karunakar MANU/SC/0474/1992 : (1992)1SCC709 , a three Judge Bench of this Court referred that matter to the Chief Justice for being placed before a Larger Bench, for the Bench found a conflict in the two decisions of this Court, viz., Kailash Chander Asthana etc. etc. v. State of U.P. and Ors. etc. etc. MANU/SC/0221/1988 : (1988)IILLJ219SC , and Union of India and Ors. etc. etc. v. Mohd. Ramzan Khan MANU/SC/0124/1991 : (1991)ILLJ29SC both delivered by the Benches of three learned Judges. Civil Appeal No. 3056 of 1991 arising out of SLP (Civil) No. 12103 of 1991 along with the other matters in which the same question of law is in issue, has therefore, been referred to this Bench.

2. The basis question of law which arises in these matters is whether the report of the Inquiry Officer/authority who/which is appointed by the disciplinary authority to hold an inquiry into the charges against the delinquent employee, is required to be furnished to the employee to enable him to make proper representation to the disciplinary authority before such authority arrives at its own finding with regard to the guilt or otherwise of the employee and the punishment, If any, to be awarded to him. This question in turn gives rise to the following incidental questions:

(i) Whether the report should be furnished to the employee even when the statutory rules laying down the procedure for holding the disciplinary inquiry are silent on the subject or are against it?

(ii) Whether the report of the Inquiry Officer is required to be furnished to the delinquent employee even when the punishment imposed is other than the major punishment of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank?

(iii) Whether the obligation to furnish the report is only when the employee asks for the same or whether it exists even otherwise?

(iv) Whether the law laid down in Mohd. Ramzan Khan's case (Supra) will apply to all establishments - Government and non-Government, public and private sector undertakings,

(v) What is the effect of the non-furnishing of the report on the order of punishment and what relief should be granted to the employee in such cases?

(vi) From what date the law requiring furnishing of the report, should come into operation?

(vii) Since the decision in Ramzan Khan's case (supra) has made the law laid down there prospective in operation, i.e., applicable to the orders of punishment passed after 20th November, 1990 on which day the said decision was delivered, this question in turn also raises another question, viz., what was the law prevailing prior to 20th November, 1990?

Hence the incidental question raised above may be answered as follows:

(i) Since the denial of the report of the Inquiry Officer is a denial of reasonable opportunity and a breach of the principles of natural justice, it follows that the statutory rules if any, which deny the report to the employee are against the principles of natural justice and, therefore, invalid. The delinquent employee will, therefore be entitled to a copy of the report even if the statutory rules do not permit the furnishing of the report or are silent on the subject.

(ii) The relevant portion of Article 311(2) of the Constitution is a follows:

(2) No such person as aforesaid shall be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank except after an enquiry in which he has been informed of the charges against him and given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges.

Thus the Article makes it obligatory to hold an inquiry before the employee is dismissed or removed or reduced in rank. The Article, however, cannot be construed to mean that it prevents or prohibits the inquiry when punishment other than that of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank is awarded. The procedure to be followed in awarding other punishments is laid down in the service rules governing the employee. What is further, Article 311(2) applies only to members of the civil services of the Union or an all-India service or a civil service of a State or to the holders of the civil posts under the Union or a State. In the matter of all punishments both Government servants and others are governed by their service rules. Whenever, therefore, the service rules contemplate an inquiry before a punishment is awarded, and when the Inquiry Officer is not the disciplinary authority the delinquent employee will have the right to receive the Inquiry Officer's report notwithstanding the nature of the punishment.

(iii) Since it is the right of the employee to have the report to defend himself effectively, and he would not known in advance whether the report is in his favour or against him, it will not be proper to construe his failure to ask for the report, as the waiver of his right. Whether, therefore, the employee asks for the report or not, the report has to be furnished to him.

(iv) In the view that we have taken, viz., that the right to make representation to the disciplinary authority against the findings recorded in the inquiry report is an integral part of the opportunity of defence against the charges and is a breach of principles of natural justice to deny the said right, it is only appropriate that the law laid down in Mohd. Ramzan Khan's case (supra) should apply to employees in all establishments whether Government or non-Government, public or private. This will be the case whether there are rules governing the disciplinary proceeding or not and whether they expressly prohibit the furnishing of the copy of the report or are silent on the subject. Whether the nature of punishment, further, whenever the rules require an inquiry to be held, for inflicting the punishment in question, the delinquent employee should have the benefit of the report of the Inquiry Officer before the disciplinary authority records its findings on the charges levelled against him. Hence question (iv) is answered accordingly.

(v) The next question to be answered is what is the effect on the order of punishment when the report of the Inquiry Officer is not furnished to the employee and what relief should be granted to him in such cases. The answer to this question has to be relative to the punishment awarded. When the employee is dismissed or removed from service and the inquiry is set aside because the report is not furnished to him, in some cases the non-furnishing of the report may have prejudiced him gravely while in other cases it may have made no difference to the ultimate punishment awarded to him. Since to direct reinstatement of the employee with back-wages in all cases is to reduce the rules of justice is a mechanical ritual the theory of reasonable opportunity and the principles of natural justice have been evolved to uphold the rule of law and to assist the individual to vindicate his just rights. They are not incantations to be invoked nor rites to be performed on all and sundry occasions. Whether in fact, prejudice has been caused to the employee or not on account of the denial to him of the report, has to be considered on the facts and circumstances of each case. Where, therefore, even after the furnishing of the report, no different consequence would have followed, it would be perversion of justice to permit the employee to resume duty and to get all the consequential benefits. It amounts to rewarding the dishonest and the guilty and thus to stretching the concept of justice to illogical and exasperating limits. It amounts to an "unnatural expansion of natural justice" which in itself is antithetical to justice.

Hence, in all cases where the Inquiry Officer's report is not furnished to the delinquent employee in the disciplinary proceedings, the Courts and Tribunals should cause the copy of the report to be furnished to the aggrieved employee if he has not already secured it before coming to the Court/Tribunal, and give the employee an opportunity to show how his or her case was prejudiced because of the non-supply of the report. If after hearing the parties, The Court/Tribunal comes to the conclusion that the non-supply of the report would have made no difference to the ultimate findings and the punishment given, the Court/Tribunal should not interfere with the order of punishment the Courts/Tribunal should not mechanically set aside the order of punishment on the ground that the report was not furnished as is regrettably being done at present. The courts should avoid resorting to short-cuts. Since it is the Court/Tribunals which will apply their judicial mind to the question and give their reasons for setting aside or not setting aside the order of punishment, (and not any internal appellate of revisional authority), there would be neither a breach of the principles of natural justice nor a denial of the reasonable opportunity.

It is only if the Court/Tribunal finds that the furnishing of the report would have made a difference to the result in the case that it should set aside the order of punishment.

Where after following the above procedure, the Court/Tribunal sets aside the order of punishment, the proper relief that should be granted is to direct reinstatement of the employee with liberty to the authority/management to proceed with the inquiry, by placing the employee under suspension and continuing the inquiry from the stage of furnishing him with the report.

The question whether the employee would be entitled to the back-wages and other benefits from the date of his dismissal to the date of his reinstatement if ultimately ordered, should invariably be left to be decided by the authority concerned according to law, after the culmination of the proceedings and depending on the final outcome. If the employee succeeds in the fresh inquiry and is directed to be reinstated, the authority should be at liberty to decide according to law how it will treat the period from the date of dismissal till the reinstatement and to what benefits, if any and the extent of the benefits, he will be entitled. The reinstatement made as a result of the setting aside of the inquiry for failure to furnish the report, should be treated as a reinstatement for the purpose of holding the fresh inquiry from the stage of furnishing the report and no more, where such fresh inquiry is held. That will also be the correct position in law.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 3056 of 1991

Decided On: 01.10.1993

Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad  Vs.  Karunakar and Ors.

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Supreme Court: Discrepancies In Evidence Against Delinquent Not A Ground To Interfere With Findings Of Disciplinary authority

It is not the case of no evidence or that the findings are

perverse. The finding that the respondent is guilty of misconduct

has been interfered with only on the ground that there are

discrepancies in the evidence of the Department. The

discrepancies in the evidence will not make it a case of no

evidence. The Inquiry Officer has appreciated the evidence and

returned a finding that the respondent is guilty of misconduct.

15. The disciplinary authority agreed with the findings of the enquiry

officer and had passed an order of punishment. An appeal before

the State Government was also dismissed. Once the evidence has

been accepted by the departmental authority, in exercise of power

of judicial review, the Tribunal or the High Court could not interfere

with the findings of facts recorded by reappreciating evidence as if

the Courts are the Appellate Authority. We may notice that the

said judgment has not noticed larger bench judgments in S. Sree

Rama Rao and B.C. Chaturvedi as mentioned above. Therefore,

the orders passed by the Tribunal and the High Court suffer from

patent illegality and thus cannot be sustained in law. Accordingly,

appeal is allowed and orders passed by the Tribunal and the High

Court are set aside and the order of punishment imposed is

restored.

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8071 OF 2014

THE STATE OF KARNATAKA Vs N. GANGARAJ 

HEMANT GUPTA, J.

Dated:FEBRUARY 14, 2020.

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Whether inquiry against medical officer is sustainable on vague charges?

 Learned senior counsel next cites a judgment reported at (2009) 12 SCC 78 [Union

of India and others vs. Gyan Chand Chattar], for the proposition that an enquiry is to

be conducted against any person giving strict adherence to the statutory

provisions and principles of natural justice. The charges should be specific,

definite and giving details of the incident which formed the basis of charges. No

enquiry can be sustained on vague charges. Enquiry has to be conducted fairly,

objectively and not subjectively. Finding should not be perverse or unreasonable,

nor should the same be based on conjectures and surmises. There is a distinction

between proof and suspicion. Every act or omission on the part of the delinquent

cannot be misconduct. The authority must record reasons for arriving at the

finding of fact in the context of the statute defining misconduct.
In the High Court at Calcutta

Constitutional Writ Jurisdiction

Appellate Side

The Hon’ble Justice Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya

W.P. No. 21498(W) of 2019

Dr. Subhash Chandra Tiwari Vs. West Bengal Medical Council and others

Judgment on : 27.11.2019

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Whether it is mandatory to hear delinquent if disciplinary authority disagrees with finding of enquiry officer?

 In J.A. Naikasatam vs. Prothonotary and Senior Master, Bombay High Court Bombay reported in MANU/SC/0894/2004 : 2004 (8) SCC 653, it was held that, when finding of Inquiry Officer was in favour of delinquent and the disciplinary authority takes a contrary view, giving of opportunity of hearing to delinquent is necessary even if the requirement may not have been contemplated by the Rules. However, the opportunity of personal hearing is not essential. Where the delinquents were given a copy of tentative decision of disciplinary authority and they furnished detailed explanation, the principles of natural justice were fully complied with. There was no infraction of rules or infirmity in the said decision.

 As per Rule 9(2) of Discipline & Appeal Rules, if the Disciplinary Authority does not agree with the finding of Inquiry Officer and holds him guilty, it shall record its reasons for such disagreement and as held in J.A. Naikasatam (supra), it should give opportunity of hearing to the delinquent. The order of disciplinary authority does not show the compliance of the above procedure, in tune with the principles of natural justice.

16. In the light of these facts, the impugned order is not sustainable. Hence, the petition is allowed. The impugned order is set aside. 

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (AURANGABAD BENCH)

Writ Petition No. 5094 of 2002

Decided On: 30.01.2019

 Hanumant  Vs.  The Disciplinary Authority and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

S.V. Gangapurwala and A.M. Dhavale, JJ.

Citation: 2019(3) MHLJ 320

A.M. Dhavale, J.

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Whether it is mandatory for disciplinary authority to issue second show cause notice if he disagree with report given by inquiry officer?

 From perusal of the said supplementary counter affidavit
especially para-4, it is quite clear that the respondents have not issued the
second show cause notice to the petitioner, but punished him after
differing with the findings incorporated in inquiry report. This procedure
which the respondents have adopted is in utter violation of the principles
of natural justice. The petitioner ought to have been issued a second show
cause notice indicating the ground of disagreement, before punishing him.
Thus, the punishment order cannot be sustained in the eyes of law as it
violates the principles of natural justice. Since the punishment cannot be
sustained, the appellate order also needs to be set aside.
8. Thus, I hereby set aside the order of punishment dated
29.09.2010, passed by the Disciplinary Authority as well as the appellate
order dated 10.03.2011, passed by the Appellate Authority.
9. The matter is remitted to the Disciplinary Authority. If the
Disciplinary Authority wants to proceed any further in the matter, he will
issue second show cause notice giving reasons as to why he is differing
with the inquiry report and will thereafter pass a reasoned order in
accordance with law.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
W.P. (S) No. 1884 of 2018

Lalit Oraon Vs  State of Jharkhand

Coram:  Mr. Justice Ananda Sen
Dated:13.03.2019

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When charge of misbehaviour with female employees is not proved?

The charges 

levelled   against   the   petitioner   were   that   he   misbehaved   with   the   female 
employees working in the department and the behaviour of the petitioner with 
the female employees was improper. 
After hearing the learned advocates for the respective parties and 
examining the record, particularly, the report submitted by the Enquiry Officer, I 
find that the report submitted by the Enquiry Officer is as vague as it could be 
and it cannot be said that there is any finding recorded by the Enquiry Officer 
which brings home the alleged guilt of the petitioner.  There is no justification on 
the record as to why the complaint about the alleged incidents was made after 

the period of 7 or 8 years.   The Enquiry Officer has found that the statements 
given by some of the witnesses examined during the enquiry are not supported 
by  the   statements   of the   other  witnesses  or  there  are  contradictions.       I  am 
conscious that the charges against the delinquent in the departmental enquiry 
are required to be considered on the basis of the theory of preponderance of 
probabilities and it is not necessary that the parameters applicable in criminal 
trial are required to be applied.   However, the employee cannot be deprived of 
his   legal   right   of   continuing   in   the   employment   on   the   basis   of   motivated 
complaints without examining the truthfulness of the allegations made against 
the employee.  Moreover, the Enquiry Officer is required to give definite finding 
after considering the material on the record that the charges levelled against the 
delinquent are proved.    In the present case, the Enquiry Officer has not been 
able to bring home the alleged guilt for which the petitioner was charged and 
therefore, he has recorded that charges 1 and 2 are partly proved against the 
petitioner.  

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

NAGPUR BENCH AT NAGPUR

Dhanraj s/o Nankuprasad Gupta V  Public Works Department, 

CORAM  :  Z.A. HAQ, J.
DATE  :     12.11.2014
Citation;2015(2) MHLJ 351

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