Tuesday, 21 April 2020

Leading Supreme court judgments on parameters for exercise of powers by appellate court under O 41 R 33 of CPC

The learned counsel for the respondent forcefully argued that even in the absence of appeal preferred by the plaintiff or cross objection taken by the plaintiff-respondent the Appellate Court was not powerless to grant the decree which it has done in exercise of the power conferred by Rule 33 of Order 41 of the CPC, Rule 33 of Order 41 as also Rule 4 thereof, which have to be necessarily together, are set out hereunder:

ORDER 41
Appeals from Original Decrees

"33. Power of Court of appeal--The Appellate Court shall have power to pass any decree and make any order which ought to have been passed or made and to pass or make such further or other decree or order as the case may require, and this power may be exercised by the Court notwithstanding that the appeal is as to part only of the decree and may be exercised in favour of all or any of the respondents or parties, although such respondents or parties may not have filed any appeal or objection and may, where there have been decrees in cross-suits or where two or more decree are passed in one suit, be exercised in respect of all or any of the decrees, although an appeal may not have been filed against such decrees.

Provided that the Appellate Court shall not make any order under Section 35A, in pursuance of any objection on which the Court from whose decree the appeal is preferred has omitted or refused to make such order.

Illustration

A claims a sum of money as due to him from X or Y, and in a suit against both obtains a decree against X. X, appeals and A and Y are respondents. The Appellate Court decides in favour of X. It has power to pass a decree against Y.

4. One of several plaintiffs or defendants may obtain reversal of whole decree where it proceeds on ground common to all.--Where there are more plaintiffs or more defendants than one in a suit, and the decree appealed from proceeds on any ground common to all the plaintiffs or to all the defendants, any one of the plaintiffs or of the defendants may appeal from the whole decree, and thereupon the Appellate court may reverse or vary the decree in favour of all the plaintiffs or defendants, as the case may be."

15. (SIC) 4 seeks (SIC) one of the several objects sought to be achieved by Rule 33, that is, avoiding a situation of conflicting decrees coming into existence in the same suit. The abovesaid provisions confer power of widest amplitude on the appellate court so as to do complete justice between the parties and such power is unfettered by consideration of facts like what is the subject matter of appeal, who has filed the appeal and whether the appeal is being dismissed, allowed or disposed of by modifying the judgment appealed against. While dismissing an appeal and though confirming the impugned decree, the appellate court may still direct passing of such decree or making of such order which ought to have been passed or made by the court below in accordance with the findings of fact and law arrived at by the court below and which it would have done had it been conscious of the error committed by it and noticed by the Appellate Court. While allowing the appeal or otherwise interfering with the decree or order appealed against, the appellate court may pass or make such further or other, decree or order, as the case would require being done, consistently with the findings arrived at by the appellate court. The object sought to be achieved by conferment of such power on the appellate court is to avoid inconsistency, inequity, inequality in reliefs granted to similarly placed parties and unworkable decree or order coming into existence. The overriding consideration is achieving the ends of justice. Wider the power, higher the need for caution and care in discretion while exercising the power. Usually the power under Rule 33 is exercised when the portion of the decree appealed against or the portion of the decree held liable to be set aside or interfered by the appellant court is so inseparably connected with the portion not appealed against or left untouched that for the reason of the latter portion being left untouched either injustice would result or inconsistent decrees would follow. The power is subject to at least three limitations: firstly, the power cannot be exercised to the prejudice or disadvantage of a person not a party before the Court: secondly, a claim given up or lost cannot be revived; and thirdly, such part of the decree which essentially ought to have been appealed against or objected to by a party and which that party has permitted to achieve a finality cannot be reversed to the advantage of such party. A case where there are two reliefs prayed for and one is refused while the other one is granted and the former is not inseparably connected with or necessarily depending on the other, in an appeal against the latter, the former relief cannot be granted in favour of the respondent by the appellate court exercising power under Rule 33 of Order 41.

18. In Harihar Prasad Singh and Ors. v. Balmiki Prasad Singh and Ors. , MANU/SC/0008/1974 : [1975]2SCR932 , the following statement of law made by Venkatarama Aiyar, J. (as His Lordship then was) in the Division Bench decision in Krishna Reddy v. Ramireddi, MANU/TN/0366/1954 : AIR1954Mad848 was cited with approval which clearly brings out the wide scope of power contained in Rule 33 and the illustration appended thereto, as also the limitations on such power:

"Though Order 41, Rule 33 confers wide and unlimited jurisdiction on Courts to pass a decree in favour of a party who has not preferred any appeal, there are, however, certain well-defined principles in accordance with which that jurisdiction should be exercised. Normally, a party who is aggrieved by a decree should, if he seeks to escape from its operation, appeal against it within the time allowed after complying with the requirements of law. Where he fails to do so, no relief should ordinarily be given to him under Order 41, Rule 33.

But there are well-recognised exceptions to this rule. One is where as a result of interference in favour of the appellant it becomes necessary to readjust the rights of other parties.
A second class of cases based on the same principle is where the question is one of settling mutual rights and obligations between the same parties.
A third class of cases is when the relief prayed for is single and indivisible but is claimed against a number of defendants. In such cases, if the suit is decree and there is an appeal only by some of the defendants and if the relief is granted only to the appellants there is the possibility that there might come into operation at the same time and with reference to the same subject-matter two decrees which are inconsistent and contradictory.
This, however, is not an exhaustive enumeration of the class of cases in which courts could interfere under Order 41, Rule 33. Such an enumeration would neither be possible nor even desirable."
19. In the words of J.C. Shah, J. speaking for a three-Judge Bench of this Court in Nirmala Bala Ghose and Anr. v. Balai Chand Ghose and Anr. , MANU/SC/0346/1965 : [1965]3SCR550 , the limitation on discretion operating as bounds of the width of power conferred by Rule 33 can be so formulated --

"The rule is undoubtedly expressed in terms which are wide, but it has to be applied with discretion, and to cases where interference in favour of the appellant necessitates interference also with a decree which has by acceptance or acquiescence become final so as to enable the Court to adjust the rights of the parties. Where in an appeal the Court reaches a conclusion which is inconsistent with the opinion of the court appealed from and in adjusting the right claimed by the appellant it is necessary to grant relief to a person who has not appealed, the power conferred by Order 41 Rule 33 may properly be invoked. The rule however does not confer an unrestricted right to re-open decrees which have become final merely because the appellate Court does not agree with the opinion of the Court appealed from." (Para 22)



IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal Nos. 1376-1377 of 2003

Decided On: 17.02.2003

 Banarsi  Vs.  Ram Phal

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
R.C. Lahoti and Brijesh Kumar, JJ.

Citation: AIR 2003 SC 1989.
Read full judgment here:Click here
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