Bombay HC: How Appellate court should exercise his discretion while deciding misc. civil appeal against the order of temporary injunction??

 The scope of jurisdiction available to this Court at this stage is well known. The temporary injunction is a discretionary relief granted to preserve the subject matter till end of civil suit & to satisfy the decree therein. Prima facie case, balance of convenience & possibility of the irreparable loss are the tests applied by trial court & this Court can interfere only if there is any perversity or jurisdictional error. If the trial court has after proper appreciation of records and contentions reached a plausible finding, this Court can not overrule it merely because some other view is also possible. In the case of Wander Ltd. v. Antox India P. Ltd., MANU/SC/0595/1990 : 1990 (Supp) SCC 727, the Hon. Apex Court has considered the question of grant of interlocutory injunction under Order 39 Rule 1 Code of Civil Procedure in a case under Section 29(2) of the Act and Section 55 of the Copyright Act, 1957 and held as follows :-

Usually, the prayer for grant of an interlocutory injunction is at a stage when the existence of the legal right asserted by the plaintiff and its alleged violation are both contested and uncertain and remain uncertain till they are established at the trial on evidence. The court, at this stage, acts on certain well settled principles of administration of this form of interlocutory remedy which is both temporary and discretionary. The object of the interlocutory injunction, it is stated- "............. is to protect the plaintiff against injury by violation of his rights for which he could not adequately be compensated in damages recoverable in the action if the uncertainty were resolved in his favour at the trial. The need for such protection must be weighed against the corresponding need of the defendant to be protected against injury resulting from his having bee prevented from exercising his own legal rights for which he could not be adequately compensated. The court must weigh one need against another and determine where the 'balance of convenience' lies.

The interlocutory remedy is intended to preserve in status quo, the rights of parties which may appear of a prima facie case. The Court also, in restraining a defendant from exercising what he considers his legal right but what the plaintiff would like to be prevented, puts into the scales, as a relevant consideration whether the defendant has yet to commence his enterprise or whether he has already been doing so in which latter case considerations somewhat different from those that apply to a case where the defendant is yet to commence his enterprise, are attracted. xxx xxx xxx xxx The appeals before the Division Bench were against the exercise of discretion by the Single Judge. In such appeals, the appellate court will not interfere with the exercise of discretion except where the discretion has been shown to have been exercised arbitrarily, or capriciously or perversely or where the court had ignored the settled principles of law regulating grant or refusal of interlocutory injunctions. An appeal against exercise of discretion is said to be an appeal on principle. Appellate court will not reassess the material and seek to reach a conclusion different from the one reached by the court below if the one reached by that court was reasonably possible on the material. The appellate court would normally not be justified in interfering with the exercise of discretion under appeal solely on the ground that if it had considered the matter at the trial stage it would have come to a contrary conclusion. If the discretion has been exercised by the trial court reasonably and in a judicial manner the fact that the appellate court would have taken a different view may not justify interference with the trial court's exercise of discretion. {Para 8}

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Appeal From Order No. 838 of 2011

Decided On: 05.11.2012

Mangalam Group Vs. Nandkumar Bhalchandra Bhondve

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

B.P. Dharmadhikari, J.

Citation: 2013(1) ABR 331,MANU/MH/1819/2012

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Supreme Court: Under which circumstances, the appellate court can set aside conviction of accused in offence under S 201 of IPC without appeal of accused?

 However, we are of the view that the High Court clearly fell into error in affirming the conviction of the accused-respondent for the offence punishable under Section 201 of the IPC.

35. It is not in dispute that the accused-respondent has not preferred any appeal challenging his conviction for the said offence. However, the absence of an appeal by the accused-respondent does not, by itself, denude this Court of its appellate jurisdiction. In exercise of powers under Section 386 of the CrPC

[corresponding to Section 427 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023], the appellate Court is vested with the power to examine the correctness of the findings and sentence recorded by the Court below and to reverse, alter or affirm the

same, as the interests of justice may require.

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026

(Arising out of SLP(Crl.) No(s). 8846 of 2025)

THE STATE OF ASSAM  Vs  MOINUL HAQUE @ MONU 

Mehta, J.

Dated: APRIL 16, 2026.

Read full judgment here: Click here.

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Supreme Court: The Appellate Court can always frame an issue to determine any question of fact based on subsequent event

Yet another factor that impelled the High Court to interfere was the direction of the Appellate Bench in remanding the issue of bonafide requirement and hardship to the Trial Court for recording evidence and returning a finding in that regard. According to the High Court, the Trial Court had neither omitted to frame such issue nor had failed to try the same when it decided the suit. Hence, exercise of power by the Appellate Bench under provisions of Order XLI Rule 25 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 19083 was uncalled for. While it is true that the Trial Court did not omit to frame or try the issue with regard to bonafide requirement of the landlord, the Appellate Court could always exercise power Under Order XLI Rule 25 of the Code and frame an issue so as to "determine any question of fact which appears to the Appellate Court essential to the right decision of the suit upon the merits." Such power can be exercised by the Appellate Court if it appears to it essential to the right decision of the suit on merits. It has to be exercised in the facts and circumstances of the case when found necessary by the Appellate Court for arriving at a right decision in the suit. {Para 18} 

In the facts of the present case, we do not find that the Appellate Bench committed an error when it exercised its jurisdiction Under Order XLI Rule 25 of the Code and referred the issue of bonafide requirement to the Trial Court pursuant to the plaint being amended. Liberty had been granted to the Defendants to amend the written statement and thereafter to both parties to lead evidence. Hence, even on this count the order of the Appellate Bench was not liable to be interfered with.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 6677 of 2026

Decided On: 24.04.2026

Vinay Raghunath Deshmukh Vs. Natwarlal Shamji Gada and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

A.S. Chandurkar, J.

 Citation: 2026 INSC 416,MANU/SC/0405/2026

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Additional Evidence in Appeal: Why the Application Is Decided at Final Hearing?

 Under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC, the application for additional evidence is generally decided at the time of final hearing of the appeal on merits, because the appellate court must first see whether the existing record is sufficient to pronounce judgment. The rule starts with a prohibition: parties have no right to produce fresh evidence in appeal, except in the limited situations mentioned in clauses (a), (aa), and (b).

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Supreme Court: Appellate Courts Must First Examine Pleadings Before Allowing Additional Evidence Under O 41 Rule 27 of CPC

 In our opinion, before undertaking the exercise of

considering whether a party is entitled to lead additional

evidence under Order XLI Rule 27(1) of the Code, it would

be first necessary to examine the pleadings of such party

to gather if the case sought to be set up is pleaded so as

to support the additional evidence that is proposed to be

brought on record. In absence of necessary pleadings in

that regard, permitting a party to lead additional evidence

would result in an unnecessary exercise and such

evidence, if led, would be of no consequence as it may not

be permissible to take such evidence into consideration.

Useful reference in this regard can be made to the

decisions in Bachhaj Nahar Vs. Nilima Mandal and Anr.,

AIR 2009 SC 1103 and Union of India Vs. Ibrahim Uddin

and Anr., (2012) 8 SCC 148. Thus, besides the

requirements prescribed by Order XLI Rule 27(1) of the

Code being fulfilled, it would also be necessary for the

Appellate Court to consider the pleadings of the party

seeking to lead such additional evidence. It is only

thereafter on being satisfied that a case as contemplated

by the provisions of Order XLI Rule 27(1) of the Code has

been made out that such permission can be granted. In

absence of such exercise being undertaken by the High

Court in the present case, we are of the view that it

committed an error in allowing the application moved by

the defendant for leading additional evidence. {Para 8}

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.10458 OF 2010

IQBAL AHMED (DEAD) BY LRS. & ANR. Vs ABDUL SHUKOOR 

Author: ATUL S. CHANDURKAR, J.

Citation: 2025 INSC 1027

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Whether the order of appointment of court commissioner can be challenged in appeal from decree?

  An order appointing a Court Commissioner can generally be challenged in the appeal from the decree, if that interlocutory order affected the decision of the case. The relevant provision is Section 105 CPC, because an order appointing a commissioner is ordinarily not an independently appealable order under Order 43 Rule 1 of CPC.

Relevant provision

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What is part performance of specific contract as per S 12 of the Specific Relief Act?

 Part performance in the Specific Relief Act means specific performance of only a part of the contract, and the general rule is that the court does not order performance of a part alone. Section 12 is the key provision, and it allows exceptions where the unperformed part is small and compensable, or in some cases where the plaintiff is willing to accept partial performance and relinquish the remaining claim and compensation.

30 second answer

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Questions and answers on law (Part 89)

 Q 1:- In a criminal appeal if it is brought to your notice as sessions judge  that all incriminating questions were not asked to the accused by the trial court, what are the options available to you as an appellate court? 

Ans:- Yes. If in a criminal appeal, it is found that all incriminating circumstances were not put to the accused under Section 313 CrPC, the appellate court must first see whether that omission caused material prejudice or failure of justice; the omission does not automatically vitiate the trial.

30-second answer

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Supreme Court: Whether an appellate court can dismiss an appeal solely on the basis of an unrebutted affidavit of the respondent without considering the entire material on record, including the trial court record?

Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and having

perused the documentary material on record, we are of the view

that the writ petition did not warrant dismissal solely on the

ground that the original plaintiffs failed to file any rejoinder to the defendants’ affidavit in reply dated 12th April 2023. In our view, all relevant material that was brought on record by both the parties ought to have been examined while deciding the writ petition. The affidavit in reply dated 12th April 2023 could have been considered as additional material in opposing the claim for eviction on theground of bonafide need. Dismissal of the writ petition solely on the ground of non-traverse has, in our view, vitiated the impugned judgment. {Para 6}.

18. In the case of Gaya Prasad v. Pradeep Srivastava [(2001)

2 SCC 604], this Court held that the landlord should not be

penalised for the slowness of the legal system and the crucial

date for deciding the facts of the requirement of the landlord is

the date of his application for eviction. It is also observed that

the process of litigation cannot be made the basis for denying

the landlord relief unless the litigation at least reaches the final

stages. However, it is further added that subsequent events

may, in some situations, be considered to have overshadowed

the genuineness of the landlords’ needs but only if they are of

such nature and dimension as to completely eclipse such need

and make it lose the significance altogether.”

In the light of above discussion, the High Court failed to consider whether the subsequent event as urged by the defendants had material bearing on the right claimed by the plaintiffs. It has to be borne in mind that the Trial Court had passed a decree for eviction on the basis of the evidence on record which was reversed by the Appellate Court. It was, therefore, necessary for the High Court to have taken into consideration the entire material available on record including the affidavit dated 12th April 2023. Thus, by failing to do so, the High Court failed to exercise jurisdiction vested in it while deciding the challenge to the reversal of the decree for eviction. We, therefore, find that the order passed by the High Court deserves interference.

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. OF 2026

MARIA MARTINS  Vs NOEL ZUZARTE AND OTHERS 

Author: ATUL S. CHANDURKAR, J.

Citation: 2026 INSC 376

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Jharkhand HC :Admissions Made In Pleadings Are Binding U/S 21 of Evidence Act and Cannot Be Retracted At Appellate Stage

11.2 So far as the second plea raised by the Appellant

assailing the impugned Award on the ground that the

claimant injured had sustained no injury by causing the

accident by the offending Truck. This plea of the fact has

been raised on behalf of the Appellant for the first time at

the stage of appeal; While before the learned Tribunal on

behalf of the Appellant Insurance Company in its written

statement has admitted that the claimant Ashim Parveen

@ Nagmi injured had sustained injury in the accident

caused by the contributory negligence of the driver of

Bolero as well as offending Truck. This admission made by

the Appellant-Insurance Company in the pleading of the

written statement is binding upon the Appellant Insurance

Company under Section 21 of Indian Evidence Act and cannot

deviate from the same at the stage of appeal for the first time.

11.7 The Hon’ble Apex Court held in RAMA KT BARMAN (DIED) THR. LRS VERSUS MD. MAHIM ALI & ORS. 2024 LiveLaw SC 637 that it is well settled principle of law that the Court cannot create any new case at the appellate stage for either of parties and Appellate Court is supposed to decide the issue involved in the suit based on pleading of parties.Para 14 reads as under:

14. Apart from the fact that none of the said substantial

questions of law formulated by the High Court were either

raised before the trial court or the appellate court, none of

parties was given any opportunity of leading the evidence on

the said issues. It is well-settled principle of law that the Court

cannot create any new case at the appellate stage for either

of the parties, and the appellate court is supposed to decide

the issues involved in the suit based on the pleadings of the

parties.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI

M.A.No. 101 of 2021

National Insurance Company Limited Vs  Asmin Parveen @ Nagmi, 

CORAM :MR. JUSTICE SUBHASH CHAND

Dated: 19.11.2024

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Supreme Court: Appellate court may not order deposit of 20% of compensation in appeal against conviction in checque dishonour case

We may take the discussion a little forward to emphasize

our point of view. There could arise a case before the Appellate

Court where such court is capable of forming an opinion, even in

course of considering as to what would be the appropriate

quantum of fine or compensation to be kept in deposit, that the

impugned conviction and the consequent sentence

recorded/imposed by the trial court is so wholly incorrect and

erroneous that it is only a matter of time for the same to be set

aside and that ordering a deposit would be unnecessarily

burdensome for the appellant. Such firm opinion could be formed

on a plain reading of the order, such as, the conviction might have

been recorded and sentence imposed without adherence to the

mandatory procedural requirements of the N.I. Act prior to/at the

time lodging of the complaint by the complainant rendering the

proceedings vitiated, or the trial court might have rejected

admissible evidence from being led and/or relied on inadmissible

evidence which was permitted to be led, or the trial court might

have recorded an order of conviction which is its ipse dixit, without

any assessment/analysis of the evidence and/or totally

misappreciating the evidence on record, or the trial court might

have passed an order failing to disclose application of mind and/or

sufficient reasons thereby establishing the link between the

appellant and the offence, alleged and found to be proved, or that

the compensation awarded is so excessive and outrageous that it

fails to meet the proportionality test : all that, which would evince

an order to be in defiance of the applicable law and, thus, liable to

be labelled as perverse. These instances, which are merely

illustrative and not exhaustive, may not arise too frequently but its

possibility cannot be completely ruled out. It would amount to a

travesty of justice if exercise of discretion, which is permitted by

the legislature and could indeed be called for in situations such as

these pointed out above, or in any other appropriate situation, is

not permitted to be exercised by the Appellate Court by a judicial interpretation of ‘may’ being read as ‘shall’ in sub-section (1) of Section 148 and the aggrieved appellant is compelled to make a deposit of minimum 20% of the fine or compensation awarded by the trial court, notwithstanding any opinion that the Appellate Court might have formed at the stage of ordering deposit as regards invalidity of the conviction and sentence under challenge on any valid ground. Reading ‘may’ as ‘may’ leads to the text matching the context and, therefore, it seems to be just and proper not to denude the Appellate Court of a limited discretion conferred by the legislature and that is, exercise of the power of not ordering deposit altogether albeit in a rare, fit and appropriate case which commends to the Appellate Court as exceptional. While there can be no gainsaying that normally the discretion of the Appellate Court should lean towards requiring a deposit to be made with the quantum of such deposit depending upon the factual situation in every individual case, more so because an

order under challenge does not bear the mark of invalidity on its

forehead, retention of the power of such court not to order any

deposit in a given case (which in its view and for the recorded

reasons is exceptional) and calling for exercise of the discretion to

not order deposit, has to be conceded. If indeed the legislative

intent were not to leave any discretion to the Appellate Court,

there is little reason as to why the legislature did not also use

‘shall’ instead of ‘may’ in sub-section (1). Since the self-same

section, read as a whole, reveals that ‘may’ has been used twice

and ‘shall’ thrice, it must be presumed that the legislature was

well and truly aware of the words used which form the skin of the

language. Reading and understanding the words used by the

legislature in the literal sense does not also result in manifest

absurdity and hence tinkering with the same ought to be avoided

at all costs. We would, therefore, read ‘may’ as ‘may’ and ‘shall’ as ‘shall’, wherever they are used in Section 148. This is because, the words mean what they say. {Para 27}

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 5491/2024

MUSKAN ENTERPRISES & ANR. Vs THE STATE OF PUNJAB & ANR. 

DIPANKAR DATTA, J.

Citation: 2024 INSC 1046.

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Supreme Court: 20% deposit of compensation amount in appeal against conviction for offence U/S 138 of NI Act is not an absolute rule and can be relaxed in exceptional cases

What is held by this Court is that a purposive interpretation should be made of Section 148 of the N.I. Act. Hence, normally, Appellate Court will be justified in imposing the condition of deposit as provided in Section 148. However, in a case where the Appellate Court is satisfied that the condition of deposit of 20% will be unjust or imposing such a condition will amount to deprivation of the right of appeal of the Appellant, exception can be made for the reasons specifically recorded. {Para 6}

7. Therefore, when Appellate Court considers the prayer Under Section 389 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of an Accused who has been convicted for offence Under Section 138 of the N.I. Act, it is always open for the Appellate Court to consider whether it is an exceptional case which warrants grant of suspension of sentence without imposing the condition of deposit of 20% of the fine/compensation amount. As stated earlier, if the Appellate Court comes to the conclusion that it is an exceptional case, the reasons for coming to the said conclusion must be recorded.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 2741 of 2023 

Decided On: 04.09.2023

Jamboo Bhandari Vs. M.P. State Industrial Development Corporation Ltd. and Ors

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Abhay Shreeniwas Oka and Pankaj Mithal, JJ.

Author: Abhay Shreeniwas Oka, J.

Citation: 2023 INSC 822, MANU/SC/1005/2023.

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Madhya Pradesh HC: Whether District Judge in Miscellaneous civil appeal can entertain application for amendment of plaint?

The appeal before the learned District Judge was one under Order 43, Rule 1 (r), C. P. C. and not a regular appeal. Jurisdiction of the appellate Court while deciding appeal of such a character extends only to examine the validity of an order enumerated in Clause (r) of Order 43, Rule 1, C. P. C., which runs as under :

"An appeal shall lie from the following orders under the provisions of Section 104, namely :--

(r) an order under Rule 1, Rule 2, (Rule 2-A), Rule 4 or Rule 10 of Order XXXIX."

Accordingly, the scope of such appeal is limited. It extends to adjudication of challenge to an order of grant or refusal of interim injunction as envisaged by Order 43, Rule 1 (r), C. P. C. As such, the learned District Judge has no seisin over the suit as such. He was seized of proceedings for issuance of a temporary injunction in the suit and not of the suit itself. This aspect of the law appears to have been overlooked by the learned District Judge.

As a logical corollary flowing from the aforesaid position of law, it has to be concluded that the learned District Judge had no jurisdiction to entertain the application for amendment of the plaint submitted before him by the plaintiff-applicant herein. If the applicant herein (plaintiff) chose to submit the application in the appeal preferred by the defendants before the learned District Judge, only courses which would have been adopted by the learned District Judge were (a) to direct the plaintiff to submit the amendment application before the trial Court; and (b) to forward it to the trial Court for decision in accordance with law after deciding the appeal on merits. However, he had no jurisdiction to decide the application for amendment of the plaint on its merits.

 In spite of this, the scope of the appeal under Order 43, Rule 1 (r) is restricted as discussed above to examine the propriety and/or legality of order passed under the various rules of Order 39 referred therein. A distinction has to be made between the scope of regular appeal and a miscellaneous appeal under the aforesaid provision. While deciding the appeal of former character the appellate Court has, on the theory that appeal is continuation of suit, power to allow amendment in the pleadings, but in an appeal of the later type the appellate Court has jurisdiction only to adjudicate upon the correctness or otherwise of order refusing or granting an interim injunction. The position of trial Court in such a situation appears to be different, as the trial Court is in seisin of the suit as well as of application for issuance of a temporary injunction made in the suit. The powers exercisable by an appellate Court while hearing appeals preferred under Order 43, Rule 1 (r) cannot be regarded to extend to allowing amendment of the plaint, as he is not in seisin of the suit as such. 

In the present situation, the word 'proceeding' connotes merely an application for issuance of a temporary injunction and/or its reply. Accordingly, where the plaintiff-applicant moves an application for amendment of the application for issuance of temporary injunction, the appellate Court may be regarded to have jurisdiction to decide it.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH (INDORE BENCH)

Civil Revn. No. 272 of 1979

Decided On: 25.02.1981

Dhundasingh Vs. Leeladhar and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

H.G. Mishra, J.

Citation: 1982 AIR MP 14,1981 SCC ONLINE MP, MANU/MP/0005/1982

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Amendment of Memorandum of Appeal in First Appeal: When It May Be Allowed, and Why It Does Not Amend the Trial Court Pleadings

 A first appellate court may permit amendment of the memorandum of appeal, or grant leave to urge an additional ground, where the amendment is necessary for effective adjudication of the real controversy and does not introduce a wholly new case causing irremediable prejudice to the respondent. However, such permission does not by itself amend the plaint, written statement, claim petition, or any other pleading before the trial court; the amendment must ordinarily be carried out in the appellate record itself.

Introduction

In appellate practice, applications are often made for amendment of the memorandum of appeal after filing, and sometimes even at an advanced stage of hearing. The real difficulty for courts is not whether such power exists, but how far that power extends and what exactly changes when the amendment is allowed.

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Supreme Court: New grounds containing new material/facts could not have been introduced for the first time in an appeal when admittedly these grounds were not originally raised in the arbitration petition for setting aside the award

The question then arises, whether in the facts and circumstances of the present case, the High Court committed any error in rejecting the appellant's application for addition of new grounds in the memorandum of arbitration appeal. As noticed above, in the application for setting aside the award, appellant set up only five grounds viz., waiver, acquiescence, delay, laches and res judicata. The grounds sought to be added in the memorandum of arbitration appeal by way of amendment are absolutely new grounds for which there is no foundation in the application for setting aside the award. Obviously, such new grounds containing new material/facts could not have been introduced for the first time in an appeal when admittedly these grounds were not originally raised in the arbitration petition for setting aside the award. {Para 28}

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 2928 of 2010 

Decided On: 01.04.2010

State of Maharashtra Vs. Hindustan Construction Company Ltd.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

R.V. Raveendran and R.M. Lodha, JJ.

Author: R.M. Lodha, J.

Citation: 2010 INSC 191, MANU/SC/0215/2010.

Read full judgment here: Click here.

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Supreme court: Do the principles relating to amendment of pleadings in original proceedings apply to the amendment in the grounds of appeal?

 Do the principles relating to amendment of pleadings in original proceedings apply to the amendment in the grounds of appeal? Order XLI Rule 2 CPC makes a provision that the appellant shall not, except by leave of the Court, urge or be heard in support of any ground of objection not set forth in the memorandum of appeal; but the Appellate Court, in deciding the appeal, shall not be confined to the grounds of objections set forth in the memorandum of appeal or taken by leave of the Court. Order XLI Rule 3 CPC provides that where the memorandum of appeal is not drawn up as prescribed, it may be rejected, or be returned to the appellant for the purpose of being amended. {Para 20}

21. The aforesaid provisions in CPC leave no manner of doubt that the appellate court has power to grant leave to amend the memorandum of appeal. As a matter of fact, in Harcharan v. State of Haryana   MANU/SC/0166/1982 : (1982) 3 SCC 408 this Court observed that the memorandum of appeal has same position like the plaint in the suit. This Court said:

...When an appeal is preferred the memorandum of appeal has the same position like the plaint in a suit because plaintiff is held to the case pleaded in the plaint. In the case of memorandum of appeal same situation obtains in view of Order 41, Rule 3. The appellant is confined to and also would be held to the memorandum of appeal. To overcome any contention that such is not the pleading the appellant sought the amendment....

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 2928 of 2010 

Decided On: 01.04.2010

State of Maharashtra Vs. Hindustan Construction Company Ltd.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

R.V. Raveendran and R.M. Lodha, JJ.

Author: R.M. Lodha, J.

Citation: 2010 INSC 191, MANU/SC/0215/2010

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Supreme Court: When an appeal is preferred the memorandum of appeal has the same position like the plaint in a suit and appellate Court can permit amendment of Memo of appeal

To effectively and finally adjudicate this controversy necessary pleadings ought to be available. To highlight this real controversy it may become necessary to amend the pleadings. When an appeal is preferred the memorandum of appeal has the same position like the plaint in a suit because plaintiff is held to the case pleaded in the plaint. In the case of memorandum of appeal same situation obtains in view of Order XLI, Rule 3. The appellant is confined to and also would be held to the memorandum of appeal. To overcome any contention that such is not the pleading the appellant sought the amendment. It was declined on the sole ground that it was delayed by six years because the High Court does not refer to any other ground for rejecting this application. The High Court has not held the averments in the application about the various decisions rendered by the same High Court as being untrue or otherwise. Therefore, the foundation for the amendment is neither shaken nor knocked out. We are, therefore, left to the only question whether the appellant should be denied an opportunity to agitate what is the market value of the land and what would be justly due to him on the ground of delay in moving the application for amendment of pleadings. 

8. Accordingly, interest of justice demands that we allow the appeal, set aside the order of the High Court rejecting the application and grant the amendment application and remit the matter to the High Court. The High Court will permit the respondent to raise any contention permissible in law and dispose of the appeal on merits.

  IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 3620 of 1982 

Decided On: 16.11.1982

Harcharan Vs. State of Haryana

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

D.A. Desai and R.B. Misra, JJ.

Citation: AIR 1983 SC 43, MANU/SC/0166/1982.

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Can a Court Allow a Time-Barred Amendment of Pleadings? Scope of Trial Court and First Appellate Court Powers Under Order VI Rule 17 CPC

Order VI Rule 17 CPC confers a wide discretionary power on civil courts to permit amendment of pleadings at any stage if the amendment is necessary for determining the real question in controversy between the parties. But this power is not unstructured: the court must weigh necessity, prejudice, limitation, due diligence, and the effect of the proposed amendment on the nature of the case.

A frequent question is whether a court can permit an amendment when the plea or relief sought to be introduced appears to be barred by limitation. The correct answer is: yes, in some cases; no, in others. There is no absolute prohibition against allowing a time-barred amendment, but a court should ordinarily decline such amendment when it introduces a fresh cause of action or a fresh relief that had already become barred on the date of the amendment application, because that would deprive the opposite party of a valuable accrued defence.

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Silent Defendants, Noisy Records: How District Judges Should Handle Undefended Partition Appeals and Additional Evidence

 When a defendant appears but never files a written statement, and yet the trial court dismisses a partition suit with minimal reasoning, the real work shifts to the first appellate court. For District Judges, such appeals are a common—and delicate—test of how far one can go on the existing record, how to treat additional evidence under Order XLI Rule 27 CPC, and how strictly to enforce the “no new case in appeal” rule.

This article distils core principles from the CPC, the Evidence Act and leading Supreme Court decisions, using the typical pattern of a partition suit based on revenue records, an absent written statement, unrebutted plaintiff’s evidence, and an Order XLI Rule 27 application for certified 7/12 extracts or similar public documents.

“First appeals are not a mere formality; the District Court is the final court on facts.”

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Supreme Court: Appellants can not rely upon the additional evidence at the appellate stage in the absence of foundational pleadings in plaint

 11.11. Further, even at the stage of the earlier suit instituted by the predecessors-in-interest of the Appellant-Plaintiffs, their consistent case was one of lawful title to the suit property. No plea of adverse possession was ever raised against the Respondent-Defendants. The Appellants wish to rely upon the additional evidence, namely, the entries in the General Land Register maintained by the Respondent-Defendants to show that the suit property is recorded as private land. Such an endeavour, at the appellate stage and in the absence of foundational pleadings, is wholly impermissible in law. Mere recording of the land in suit as private land in the GLR does not in any manner benefit the Appellants claim of ownership.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal Nos. 5168-5169 of 2011

Decided On: 09.03.2026

Gobind Singh and Ors. Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Vikram Nath and Sandeep Mehta, JJ.

Author: Vikram Nath, J.

Citation: 2026 INSC 211,MANU/SC/0205/2026.

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