In regard to the decision of Meredith J. in
AIR 1948 Pat 56 (Z33) It would be wholly improper for
me to canvass the correctness of this single Judge's
decision of another High Court which is not binding
upon me except to the extent that it refers to the decision
of Burn J. in 1935 Mad WN Cr 76 (A). The learned
Judge writes :
"I have been referred to the notes in Ratanlal's Penal
Code for a Madras case, 1935 Mad WN Cr 76 (A)
which, according to the learned commentator, laid down
that where the accused was charged with defamation
because his vakil put a defamatory question to the
complainant and the vakil gave evidence that he did so
on the instruction of his client, the accused, the
instructions of the accused to his vakil were inadmissible
under Section 126, Evidence Act and the accused was
not guilty of defamation committed as it were by proxy
through the mouth of his vakil. Unfortunately, the
decision is not obtainable In the library here. but the
reasoning quoted, seems to me sound."
A lawyer is an
advocate -- one who speaks for another. Naturally
beyond what his client tells him the lawyer has no
opportunity to test the truth or falsity of the story put
forward by the client. It would therefore be unrighteous
to make the lawyer the whipping-boy for his client.
It is held that a lawyer is an advocate, one who speaks for another.
Naturally beyond what his client tells him the lawyer has no opportunity
to test the truth or falsity of the story put forward by the client. Therefore
no lawyer could ever be prosecuted for defamation in regard to any
instructions which he might have given to his lawyer, because it is the
lawyer's business to decide whether he could properly act upon the
instructions, and whatever responsibility might ensue from acting upon
those instruction would be his, and no one else's, is opposed to the entire
trend of decisions defining the scope and extent of the privilege
conferred upon the lawyer.
24. In light of above-stated legal analysis, an
advocate, who acted professionally as per instructions of
his/her client, cannot be made criminally liable for the
offence of defamation under Section 500 of the IPC unless
contrary is alleged and established.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
DATED : 30.09.2020
CORAM: MR. JUSTICE G.K.ILANTHIRAIYAN
Crl.O.P.Nos.4669 & 5115 of 2020
M.L.Ganesh Vs. CA V.Venkata Siva Kumar
Dated: 30.09.2020
COMMON ORDER
These criminal original petitions have been filed to
quash the proceedings in CC.No.5095 of 2019 on the file of the XVII
Metropolitan Magistrate, Saidapet, Chennai, having been taken
cognizance for the offences under Sections 500, 192 r/w 34 of IPC.
2. The learned counsel for the petitioners in
Crl.OP.No.5115 of 2020 submitted that the petitioners are arrayed as A1,
A3 to A5 in the complaint lodged by the respondent for the offences
punishable under Sections 500, 192 r/w 34 of IPC. The first petitioner is
the former Managing Director and Chief Executive Officer of Indian
Overseas Bank, the second petitioner is the former Assistant General
Manager of Central Bank of India and the third petitioner is the General
Manager, attached to the Central Office of IOB and the fourth petitioner
is the Assistant General Manager of IOB attached to Zonal Office,
Chennai. He further submitted that the appointment and removal of
Resolution Professional(hereinafter called as RP) is provided under the
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code. In Corporate Insolvency Resolution
Process(hereinafter called as CIRP), the interest of the creditors and the
stakeholders is paramount. Since the Committee of Creditors(hereinafter
called as COC) may compromise of several institutions, to manage the
CIRP the Code provides appointment of RP. However, he cannot act
independently and he has to act upon the guidelines of COC and his
actions are subject to the approval of COC. Therefore, COC unanimously resolved to remove the respondent and appointed another RP. Therefore, the decision taken by the COC which comprises of 5 financial
institutions and as such such removal cannot be termed as defamatory.
2.1 He further submitted that COC comprises of the
financial creditors and they are exercising the statutory powers conferred
under the provisions of Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code(hereinafter
called IBC). Therefore the action taken under the IBC would not amount
to any offence. The COC have statutory powers under IBC to replace
Resolution Professional and they can very well appoint other RP. In fact
the respondent challenged the order passed by the COC before this Court
by way of writ petition and the same was dismissed and aggrieved by the
same, he also filed writ appeal and the said writ appeal was also
dismissed. Thereafter approached the National Company Law Appellate
Tribunal and the same was also dismissed. The respondent completely
suppressed all those details and lodged the present impugned complaint.
The learned Magistrate also without even looking into the allegations
made in the complaint, mechanically had taken cognizance and issued summons to the petitioners. The petitioners are being public servants
and they vested with statutory duty conferred under the IBC and no
sanction of the Government was obtained to prosecute them. Even
according to the respondent, the petitioners did not make any statement,
thereby detaining the respondent herein. In fact, COC had acted in the
interest of the institutions, in which they represented and safeguard the
public funds. Therefore, there is absolutely no iota of material to attract
the offence under Section 500 of IPC. He also relied upon the judgment
in the case of K.Virupaksha and others Vs State of Karnataka and
others reported in (2020) 4 SCC 440.
3. The learned counsel for the petitioner in
Crl.OP.No.4669 of 2020 would submit that the petitioner is arrayed as
A2. He is practicing advocate with more than 28 years of experience
representing various bank and also private financial institutions before
this Court and Debt Recovery Tribunal, National Company Law Tribunal
and also National Company Law Appellate Tribunal and Supreme Court.
On instruction from his client, the petitioner has filed application in
CP.No.563(IB)CB/17 under Section 27 of Insolvency and Bankruptcy
Code before the National Company Law Tribunal, Chennai for
replacement of the respondent herein and proposed another person to be
appointed as Resolution Professional. The said application was filed at
the behest of Indian Overseas Bank, Central Bank of India, State Bank of
India and IDBI Bank having 87.42% of voting shares in the aforesaid
corporate debtor company, such as M/s.Oceanic Edibles International
Ltd. The respondent had published an invitation for expression of
interest (EOI) for resolution plan of the CD company on 23.01.2018 in
two newspapers without getting approval from the COC member banks
which is in violation of amended provision under Section 25(2)(h) of
IBC.
3.1 He further submitted that the respondent had sent
unsigned letter to the Chairman of IOB, CBI and SBI wherein made
scathing and derogatory remarks against the top officials who
represented the COC meeting. Issuance of notice to then IRP without the
knowledge and information of COC member banks and sent letter,
e-mail on 08.02.2018 and 09.02.2018. Without consulting the COC
member banks proposed appointment of forensic auditor to look into the
undervalued preferential transactions. The respondent has not minutised
the serious key issues as raised in the COC meeting by CBI which is
against the code of conduct under regulations 7(2)(g) of IBC. Unwanted
e-mails sent to top executives of the COC member banks containing
baseless, misleading allegations in a threatening manner. Discussion of
the COC meetings posted in the whatsapp group created by the
respondent. Improperly recording the minutes of meeting held on
09.02.2018 wherein included the agenda not discussed in the COC
meeting by the member banks. Sending e-mails on 10.02.2018,
11.02.2018, 12.02.2018, 13.02.2018, 15.02.2018, 16.02.2018 to the top
executives of the bank in a very unethical manner. He further submitted
that on the application based on the records and arguments of both the
sides, the application was allowed and he was removed. In fact during
the enquiry, the respondent has sent e-mail to the petitioner threatening
him that he will take action before the Bar Council of Tamil Nadu for
making statement against him. He also had posted so many messages.
He also threatened the members of COC vide email dated 11.02.2018
that he will file defamation case for damages to the tune of ten crores.
The respondent also challenged the order passed by NCLT before the
High Court, National Company Law Appellate Tribunal, New Delhi but
failed to sustain his vexatious contentions. Without even disclosing those
orders filed the impugned complaint alleging that the petitioner along
with other accused persons have made defamatory statement against the
respondent herein.
3.2 He further submitted that the petitioner is being an
advocate he represented on behalf of his client and as such his
representation and arguments made in the court cannot be construed or
termed as defamatory in nature as alleged by the respondent herein. If it
is treated as defamation, no legal professional will render legal assistance
to any aggrieved person afraiding of vexatious complaint from the other
side. He further submitted that the legal profession always enjoins
immunity while arguing the case for his client in the open court which
cannot be termed as defamation. In support of his contention, he relied
upon the following judgments:
(i) Ayeasha Bi Vs.Peerkhan Sahib
reported in 1954 AIR Mad 741.
(ii) Judgment of High Court of Chhattisgarh in
Crl.MP.No.1984 of 2018 between Arun Takur and
State of Chattisgarh and others.
4. Per contra, the respondent appeared party in person
and filed counter and stated that he was appointed as Resolution
Professional of one Corporate Debtor M/s.Oceanic Edibles Private
Limited undergoing Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process by the
National Company Law Tribunal, Chennai Bench. The respondent was
being neutral Court officer was entrusted with managing the company as
a going concern as per Section 16,17 and 18 of Insolvency and
Bankruptcy Code, 2016. During investigation, he found that about 320
crores worth of stocks of prawns were returned of as damaged stock and
thrown in the sea. Therefore, he moved a Resolution Professional
conducting a domestic audit, which was objected by the COC. Therefore
it was taken up before the first accused. The first accused instead of
cooperating with the resolution process, was already annoyed with the
respondent because of an earlier instance wherein the respondent as the auditor for SWIFT transaction audit involving a fraud of Rs.300 crores
committed by one employee of IOB at Chandigarh Branch in connivance
with the staff at Head Office. During the 4th COC meeting represented by
accused 3 to 5, abused the respondent in spite of that he was being the
Chairman of the meeting and created ruckus resulting in media persons
waiting outside the conference room becoming inquisitive. Therefore,
the first accused directed COC to file petition before the NCLT, Chennai
for removal of the respondent by making defamatory, and false and
baseless allegations as against the respondent. It would impact on the
profession and reputation among the fraternity. The following
defamatory statements were made by the accused persons:
a) Resolution Professional “is not up to the
expected standard” (para 21)
b) “He is only keen on entering into the brawl
with everyone, thus undermining the judicial process, if
he is allowed to continue the interest of COC will be
jeopardized”(para 21)
c) COC had already lost precious 50 days from
the date of his appointment, no effective business has
been conducted to evolve the resolution process in a
forward moving directions (para 22)
d) Resolution professional has misrepresented
to media violating the code of conduct (para 23)
e) seeking amendments in IBC is beyond the
Rps scope(para 18)
f) resolution professional again sent mails to
the top executives wherein he had made statements to the
top executives in a very unethical manner and uncalled
for (para 19)
4.1 He further submitted that the second accused is a
counsel on record and during the first hearing, filed counter and started
abusing respondent making serious unfounded baseless allegations.
When the respondent pointing out such serious baseless allegations are
harming his reputation and advised the second respondent to avoid such
abusive attacks. Therefore it would attract the offence under Section 499
of IPC and as such the learned Magistrate rightly taken cognizance for
the offence under Section 499 of IPC as against the accused persons. In
this regard, the respondent relied upon the following judgments:
(i) Prem Kumar Vs. Nehar Singh reported in
1991 (1) SLJ 668.
(ii) And Krishnan Lal Verma Vs. State of Haryana
reported in AIR 1976 SC 1947
(iii) Bhupen Dutta Bhowmik Vs. State of Tripura
reported in 1993 Crimes 846 at p.848
(iv) Dr.Radhanath Rath Vs. Balakrishna Swain
reported in 1985 Cr.L.J. 735 at p.740, 741(Orissa).
4.2 He further submitted that the points raised by the
petitioners are mixed question of facts and as such it cannot be
considered before this Court under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. It has to be
considered only during the trial before the trial court by let in evidence.
Therefore, he sought for dismissal of the quash petitions.
5. Heard, Mr.S.Arunkumar, learned counsel for the
petitioner in Crl.OP.No.4669 of 2020, Mr.P.B.Benjamin George, learned
counsel for the petitioners in Crl.OP.No.5115 of 2020, and the
respondent, Mr.Venkata Siva Kumar appeared party-in-person.
6. There are totally five accused, in which the
petitioners are arrayed as A1 to A5. The second accused is an advocate
appeared on behalf of other accused persons. A1, A3, A4 and A5 are
members of the Committee of Creditors. Initially, the respondent herein
was appointed as Insolvency Resolution Professional of M/s.Oceanic
Edibles International Ltd. which is undergoing Corporate Insolvency
Resolution Process by the National Company Law Tribunal, Chennai
Bench. Due to various allegations as against the respondent, accused 1,
3, 4 and 5 instructed the second accused to file an application to remove
the respondent and seeking appointment of another Resolution
Professional in CP No.563(IB)CB/2017 under Section 27 of Insolvency
and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 before the National Company Law Tribunal,
Chennai. The said application was allowed and the respondent herein
was removed and another person was appointed as Resolution
Professional. According to the respondent, the following statements
made by the petitioners are defamatory nature and thereby defamed the
respondent's reputation.
a) Resolution Professional “is not up to the
expected standard” (para 21)
b) “He is only keen on entering into the brawl
with everyone, thus undermining the judicial process, if
he is allowed to continue the interest of COC will be
jeopardized”(para 21)
c) COC had already lost precious 50 days from
the date of his appointment, no effective business has
been conducted to evolve the resolution process in a
forward moving directions (para 22)
d) Resolution professional has misrepresented
to media violating the code of conduct (para 23)
e) seeking amendments in IBC is beyond the
Rps scope(para 18)
f) resolution professional again sent mails to
the top executives wherein he had made statements to the
top executives in a very unethical manner and uncalled
for (para 19)
7. The order passed by the National Company Law
Tribunal, Chennai Bench was challenged by the respondent before this
Court by way of writ petition. The writ petition at the stage of SR in
WP.SR23210 of 2018 was dismissed as not maintainable before this
Court. Aggrieved by the same, the respondent also filed writ appeal in
WA.No.1232 of 2018 and the same was also dismissed by granting
liberty to the respondent to avail alternative remedy provided under the
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code. The respondent later challenged the
order passed by the National Company Law Tribunal before the National
Company Law Appellate Tribunal in Appeal (AT)No.668 of 2018. It was
also dismissed as withdrawn. As rightly pointed out by the learned
counsel for the petitioners, the petitioners are members of COC, and they
have vested with statutory powers under the IBC to replace the
Resolution Professional in the manner provided under IBC.
Accordingly, they instructed their counsel, namely the second accused to
file an application before the NCLT. Therefore, it would not attract
offence under Section 499 of IPC. It is relevant to extract provision
under Section 499 of IPC hereunder:
499. Defamation.—Whoever, by words
either spoken or intended to be read, or by signs or by
visible representations, makes or publishes any
imputation concerning any person intending to harm,
or knowing or having reason to believe that such
imputation will harm, the reputation of such person, is
said, except in the cases hereinafter expected, to
defame that person.
8. On perusal of the statement made by the petitioners
in the application are not at all attracted any offence under Section 499 of
IPC. Insofar as A2 is concerned, he is being an advocate for other
accused persons, filed an application on instruction of COC before
National Company Law Tribunal to remove the respondent. In this
regard, the learned counsel for the petitioner in Crl.OP.No.4669 of 2020
relied upon the judgment in the case of Ayeasha Bi Vs.Peerkhan Sahib
reported in 1954 AIR Mad 741, wherein this court has held as follows:
31. In regard to the decision of Meredith J. in
AIR 1948 Pat 56 (Z33) It would be wholly improper for
me to canvass the correctness of this single Judge's
decision of another High Court which is not binding
upon me except to the extent that it refers to the decision
of Burn J. in 1935 Mad WN Cr 76 (A). The learned
Judge writes :
"I have been referred to the notes in Ratanlal's Penal
Code for a Madras case, 1935 Mad WN Cr 76 (A)
which, according to the learned commentator, laid down
that where the accused was charged with defamation
because his vakil put a defamatory question to the
complainant and the vakil gave evidence that he did so
on the instruction of his client, the accused, the
instructions of the accused to his vakil were inadmissible
under Section 126, Evidence Act and the accused was
not guilty of defamation committed as it were by proxy
through the mouth of his vakil. Unfortunately, the
decision is not obtainable In the library here. but the
reasoning quoted, seems to me sound."
It Is quite possible that if Meredith J. had perused the
entire report he might have come to a different
conclusion. In any event, his conclusion that no one
could ever be prosecuted for defamation in regard to any
instructions which he might have given to his lawyer,
because it is the lawyer's business to decide whether he
could properly act upon the instructions, and whatever
responsibility might ensue from acting upon those
instructions would be his and no one else's, is opposed to
the entire trend of decisions defining the scope and
extent of the privilege conferred upon the lawyer and
secondly, it will make a lawyer's position in India
hopelessly impossible if he were to be held vicariously
responsible for all the instructions given by his client
and in fact it would be a case not of the lawyer
representing his client but of a lawyer doubling or
substituting for his client-accused. This would cut at the
root of the 'impersonality' of advocacy which is the basis
of our criminal administration of Justice. A lawyer is an
advocate -- one who speaks for another. Naturally
beyond what his client tells him the lawyer has no
opportunity to test the truth or falsity of the story put
forward by the client. It would therefore be unrighteous
to make the lawyer the whipping-boy for his client.
It is held that a lawyer is an advocate, one who speaks for another.
Naturally beyond what his client tells him the lawyer has no opportunity
to test the truth or falsity of the story put forward by the client. Therefore
no lawyer could ever be prosecuted for defamation in regard to any
instructions which he might have given to his lawyer, because it is the
lawyer's business to decide whether he could properly act upon the
instructions, and whatever responsibility might ensue from acting upon
those instruction would be his, and no one else's, is opposed to the entire
trend of decisions defining the scope and extent of the privilege
conferred upon the lawyer.
9. It is also held in Crl.Misc.Petition No.1984 of 2018
in the case of Arun Thakur Vs. State of Chhattisgarh and others as
follows:
17. The Allahabad High Court in the matter of B
Sumat Prasad Jain v. Sheo Dutt Sharma and another
MANU/UP/0046/1945 : AIR 1946 Allahabad 213 with
regard to the privilege of an advocate acting professionally
in a cause observed as under:-
"So long as the interests of litigants in this
country are entrusted to recognized and
qualified professional men and so long as the
Courts repose their confidence in the Bars
which practise before them, I respectfully agree
with Sir Henry Richards in thinking that it
would be a disaster to the litigating public, both
if the liberty of speech or action of their
advocates were circumscribed by exposure to
civil suits for words spoken or written in the
course of the administration of cause entrusted
to them, and if the Courts were by law
compelled to withdraw their confidence from
them. Such exposure would, I think, be
calculated to limit their freedom and
independence in their clients' interests to a
greater extent than would be the case in
England, if no absolute privilege existed there,
since the risk of vexatious and often ruinous
litigation in India is far greater. Nor do I
perceive for what good reasons, so long as the
same principles of the practice and
administration of justice are maintained, or
aimed at, in this country as in England the
necessity for the maintenance of the absolute
privilege of the Bar should be less. Indeed, there
is the greater need for it in a country in which
the advocate is exposed to larger risks of
spiteful litigation. If it be said that conversely,
the risk of the abuse of an absolute privilege is
also greater, I should still maintain that it were
better in the public interest that the immunity of
the advocate should be sufficiently large to
enable him to perform his duty fearlessly than
that some relatively few cases of abuse should
be made the subject of a just civil liability. If
abuse occurs, as sometimes from inexperience
and sometimes from less excusable causes is
bound to happen, the remedy lies, I think, not in
an alteration of the law relating to the privilege
but in fostering high standards of practice, in
the censure of the public and in the continuous
vigilance of the Courts themselves."
18. Likewise, in the matter of K. Daniel v. T.
Hymavathy Amma MANU/KE/0048/1985 : AIR 1985
Kerala 233 it was observed by the Kerala High Court that
the English Courts have reiterated the view during last four
hundred years that the statements made by Judges, Juries,
counsel, parties and witnesses in the course of judicial
proceedings are not actionable in civil law for defamation
as the occasion is absolutely privileged. It was further held
that the English Common Law relating to absolute
privilege enjoyed by Judges, advocates, attorneys,
witnesses and parties in regard to words spoken or uttered
during the course of a judicial proceeding is applicable in
relation to a civil suit filed for damages for defamation. The
reasons for granting absolute privilege to the statements
made in the course of judicial proceedings are laid down in
paragraph 11 of the judgment which are as follows:-
"11. It is imperative that Judges, counsel,
parties and witnesses participating in a judicial
proceeding must be able to conduct themselves
without any apprehension of being called upon
to answer a claim for damages for defamation.
They must be able to act uninfluenced by any
such fear. Freedom of speech on such occasions
has to be totally safeguarded. Hence it is
necessary to protect the maker of statements on
such occasions. The privilege arises on account
of privilege attached to the occasion and not to
the individual. It is possible that sometimes
counsel or the parties or witnesses may take
advantage of the occasion and indulge in false
or malicious statement which has the effect of
bringing down the reputation of some other
person; that would certainly be mischievous.
But to say that statement would be privileged
only in the absence of malice would put these
persons in considerable strain and apprehension
on such occasions. Basis of privilege is not
absence of malice or the truth of statement or
the intention of the maker but public policy.
Any restriction on privilege during the occasion
would create constraints in the process of
administration of justice."
19. Likewise, in the matter of Chunni Lal v.
Narsingh Das MANU/UP/0325/1917 : AIR 1918
Allahabad 69, the Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court
has held that defamatory words used in connection with the
judicial proceedings are not actionable on the ground of
absolute privilege and as such the suit for damages for
defamation instituted by the plaintiff was dismissed.
20. Recently, in the matter of, Pradip Kumar
Mitra v. Lipi Basu and others MANU/WB/0153/2017, the
Calcutta High Court relying upon the decision of the Full
Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Chunni Lal (supra)
and that of the Kerala High Court in K. Daniel (supra)
while following the view has held that the privilege
extended to the Judges, Juries, counsel, parties and
witnesses are based on the principle of public policy.
21. Likewise, in the matter of Bennett Coleman
& Co. Ltd. and others v. K. Sarat Chandra and others
MANU/AP/1026/2015, the High Court of Judicature at
Hyderabad for the State of Telangana and the State of
Andhra Pradesh held that the privilege of Judges, Counsel,
Jury, Witnesses or Parties to be the absolute privilege and
observed as under:-
"Absolute privilege-a statement is said to have
absolute privilege when no action lies whether
against Judges, Counsel, Jury, Witnesses or
Parties, for words spoken in the ordinary
course of any proceedings before any Court or
Tribunal recognized by law. It is manifest that
the administration of justice would be
paralyzed if those who were engaged in it were
liable to actions of libel or slander upon the
imputation that they had acted maliciously and
not bona fide. The privilege extends not only
to words spoken but also to documents
properly used and regularly prepared for in the
proceedings."
22. The Calcutta High Court in the matter of P.C.
Gupta v. The State MANU/WB/0392/1970 : (1970) ILR 2
Cal 254 has held that the doctrine of absolute privilege is
not applicable to criminal proceeding. It was held as
under:-
"It is abundantly clear, therefore, that even in
the said Single Bench decision of the Bombay
High Court, the doctrine of absolute privilege
enjoyed by a lawyer in regard to words spoken
or uttered during the course- of a judicial
proceeding was applied only to civil suits filed
for damages for libel or slander and it was
noted that there was originally a divergence of
opinion and ultimately the preponderance of
the decisions of the different High Courts is
that the said doctrine of absolute privilege
should not be applied to a criminal proceeding
where the party prosecuted should be required
to bring his case within exception 9 to Section
499 of the Indian Penal Code."
23. The Calcutta High Court further relied upon
the observation by the Master of the Rolls in the case of
Munster v. Lamb (1882) SUR. 11 Q.B.O. 588 which is as
under:-
"If any one needs to be free of all fear in the
performance of his arduous duty, an advocate
is that person and, therefore, unless and until
there is a proof of 'express malice' on the part
of the lawyer, in the discharge of his
professional duties, he does not come within
the bounds of the offence of defamation. In
ancient Rome a class of persons called the
jurisprudence came into existence though
they were not professional lawyers in their
true sense. Notion of law does not include of
necessity the extent of a distinct profession of
lawyers whether as Judges or as Advocates,
but 'there cannot well be a science of law
without such profession'. The lawyers are the
high priests in pursuit of truth at the altar of
justice and there should be no spoke in the
wheels of justice by fettering unreasonably
the freedom of such lawyers. Fiat justitia mat
caelum: Let justice be done, though heavens
may fall."
24. In light of above-stated legal analysis, an
advocate, who acted professionally as per instructions of
his/her client, cannot be made criminally liable for the
offence of defamation under Section 500 of the IPC unless
contrary is alleged and established.
The Hon'ble Supreme Court of India and also various High Courts
repeatedly held that an advocate who acted professionally as per the
instruction of his or her client cannot be made criminally liable for
offence of defamation under Section 500 unless contrary is alleged and established.
10. In the case on hand, allegations made in the
application filed on behalf of the members of COC filed by the second
respondent are not defamatory in nature. In fact, on the application the
respondent was removed and the same was also challenged upto National
Company Appellate Tribunal, Delhi and confirmed.
11. In view of the discussion, the impugned complaint is
clear abuse of process of court and as such it cannot be sustained as
against the petitioners. Accordingly, these criminal original petitions are
allowed, and the entire proceedings in CC.No.5095 of 2019 on the file of XVII Metropolitan Magistrate Court, Chennai is quashed. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petitions are closed.
Dated: 30.09.2020
No comments:
Post a Comment