Wednesday, 3 March 2021

Whether accused can make Charge Of False Accusation U/S 211 IPC Against Investigating Officer?

 The essentials to be satisfied in  order to attract an offence under Section 211, I.P.C. was elucidated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Santokh Singh &Ors. v. IzharHussan&Anr. (cited supra). The relevant paragraph is

 extracted hereinunder:

“10. […] This section as its marginal note

indicates renders punishable false charge of offence

with intent to injure. The essential ingredient of an

offence under Section 211 IPC is to institute or cause

to be instituted any criminal proceeding against a

person with intent to cause him injury or with similar

intent to falsely charge any person with having

committed an offence, knowing that there is no just or

lawful ground for such proceeding or charge.

Instituting or causing to institute false criminal

proceedings assume false charge but false charge may

be preferred even when no criminal proceedings

result. It is frankly conceded by Shri Kohli that the

appellant cannot be said to have instituted any

criminal proceeding against any person. So that part

of Section 211 IPC is eliminated. Now, the expression

“falsely charges” in this section, in our opinion,

cannot mean giving false evidence as a prosecution

witness against an accused person during the course

of a criminal trial. To “falsely charge” must refer to

the original or initial accusation putting or seeking to

put in motion the machinery of criminal investigation

and not when speaking to prove  the false charge by

making deposition in support of the charge framed in

that trial. The words “falsely charges” have to be read

along with the expression “institution of criminal

proceeding”. Both these expressions, being susceptible

of analogous meaning should be understood to have

been used in their cognate sense. They get as it were

their colour and content from each other. They seem to

have been used in a technical sense as commonly

understood in our criminal law. The false charge must,

therefore, be made initially to a person in authority or

to someone who is in a position to get the offender

punished by appropriate proceedings. In other words,

it must be embodied either in a complaint or in a

report of a cognizable offence to the police officer or

an officer having authority over the person against

whom the allegations are made. The statement in

order to constitute the “charge” should be made with

the intention and object of setting criminal law in motion.{Para 16}

20.This Court had an occasion to consider the judgement of

the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Perumal v. Janaki (cited supra) in the

judgement in S. MukanchandBothra v. Rajiv Gandhi Memorial

Educational Charitable Trust &Ors (cited supra). The relevant

paragraph is extracted hereinunder:

“7. It is our duty to point out that the alleged offence

of the Sub-Inspector informing in the charge sheet the

pregnancy of the girl concerned despite her medical

certificate informing otherwise, would not and cannot

fall within the definition of Section 211 IPC. It also is

to be seen that Perumal had faced prosecution

pursuant to a Magistrate taking cognizance.

Fortunately, offence of making a false charge does not

stand attracted as otherwise, it would be unfair to

prosecute the Sub-Inspector who filed the charge

sheet, while not doing so, the Judicial Magistrate who

took cognizance thereon. As explained by the Supreme

Court in Santokh Singh v. Izhar Hussain [(1973) 2

SCC 406], ‘the essential ingredient of an offence

under section 211 IPC is to institute or cause, to be

instituted any criminal proceeding against a person

with intent to cause him injury or with similar intent to

falsely charge any person with having committed an

offence, knowing that there is no just  or lawful ground

for such proceeding or charge. Instituting or causing

to institute false criminal proceedings assume false

charge but false charge may be preferred even when

no criminal proceedings result. Now, the expression

“falsely charges” in this section, in our opinion,

cannot mean giving false evidence as a prosecution

witness against an accused person during the course

of a criminal trial. “To falsely charge” must refer to

the original or initial accusation putting or seeking to

put in motion the machinery of criminal investigation

and not when seeking to prove the false charge by

making deposition in support of the charge framed in

that trial. The words “falsely charges” have to be,

read along with the expression “institution of criminal

proceeding”. Both these expressions, being susceptible

of analogous meaning should be understood to have

been. used in their cognate sense. They get as it were

their colour and content from each other. They seem to

have been used in a technical sense as commonly

understood in our criminal law. The false charge must,

therefore, be made initially to a person in authority or

to someone who is in a position to get the offender

punished by appropriate proceedings. In other words,

it must be’ embodied either in a complaint or in a

report of a cognizable offence to the police officer or

to an officer having authority over the person against

whom the allegations are made. The statement in 

order to constitute the “charges” should be made with

the intention and object of setting criminal law in

motion.”

22. In the present case, based on the complaint given by

one Mr. Rajamani, the FIR was registered by the F-2 Police Station,

Egmore and the arrest was also carried out by the said police. The

Petitioner came into the scene only at a later point of time when the

case was transferred to the file of the CBCID. The language used under

Section 211, I.P.C. regarding false charge can only relate to the original

or initial accusation through which the criminal law was set in motion. 

Admittedly, it was not the Petitioner who had set the criminal law in

motion. That apart, as held in Iqbal Singh Marwah’sCase (cited

supra) the offences referred to under Section 195(1)(b), Cr.P.C. will get

attracted only with respect to a document after it has been produced or

given in evidence in a proceeding in any court i.e. during the time when

the document was in custodia legis.

23. In the present case, the main grievance of the

Respondent seems to be that he was unnecessarily made to undergo

the agony of a malicious prosecution. Since this prosecution was

investigated by the Petitioner, the Respondent wants to rope in the

Petitioner as if the said officer prosecuted a false charge. If investigating

officers are going to be exposed to such proceedings in all cases where

the accused persons are acquitted from all charges, it will directly

interfere with the independence of the authority in conducting an

investigation. This is the reason why the Hon’ble Supreme Court in

Santokh Singh’s Case (cited supra) held that the words “false

charges” must be read along with the expression “institution of criminal

proceedings”, which relates back to the initiation of criminal proceedings

and it can never be related to an alleged false charge  framed after the

filing of the final report.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS

CORAM

 JUSTICE MR.N.ANAND VENKATESH

Crl.O.P No.2514 of 2020 and Crl.MP.No.1536 of 2020

A.Radhika  Vs Wilson Sundararaj .

Dated:26.02.2021


This Criminal Original Petition has been filed challenging the

summons issued by the Court below directing the Petitioner to attend an

enquiry initiated by the court below based on the complaint given by

the Respondent under Section 340 of The Code of Criminal Procedure,

1973 (hereinafter referred to as “Cr.P.C.”).

2. The Respondent who was arrayed as A3 in S.C. No. 123 of

2005 before the Additional District and Sessions Court, FTC III, Chennai,

faced trial along with 3 other accused persons for an offence under

Sections 120B, 307, 450, 451, 384, 506-Part II of the Indian Penal Code,

1860 (hereinafter referred to as “I.P.C”) read with Section 109, I.P.C.

The FIR in this case was registered in Crime No. 473 of 2002 by the F-2

Police Station, Egmore and later on the investigation was transferred to

the file of the CBCID. The Petitioner who was then the Deputy

Superintendent of Police, CBCID was assigned the task of investigating

the case. It was based on the final report filed by the Petitioner, the

accused persons faced the trial before the concerned court.

3. The trial court on appreciation https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis/ of the oral and documentary evidence and after considering the facts and

circumstances of the case was pleased to acquit all the accused persons

from all the charges through a judgement dt. 23.02.2006.

4. This judgement was taken on appeal by the CBCID before

this Court in Crl. Appeal No. 52 of 2010. This Court by a judgement dt.

22.06.2017, dismissed the appeal and confirmed the judgment passed

by the trial court.

5. The Petitioner thereafter, filed a complaint before the

court below in the year 2019 under Section 340, Cr.P.C. against the

defacto complainant and the Petitioner herein, on the ground that they

have committed an offence under Section 211, I.P.C., and the entire

case was a malicious prosecution against the Respondent.

6. The court below on receipt of the complaint proceeded to

issue summons to the Petitioner to conduct an enquiry before acting

upon the complaint. Aggrieved by the summons issued by the court

below, the present petition has been filed before this Court.

7. Mr. V. Lakshminarayanan, learned counsel appearing on


behalf of the Petitioner submitted that the Petitioner had only

investigated the FIR after it was transferred to CBCID and the mere fact

that the Respondent was acquitted by the court will not attract an

offence under Section 211, I.P.C. The learned counsel further submitted

that if the offence under Section 211, I.P.C. cannot be made applicable

against the Petitioner, there was no occasion for the court below to even

conduct a preliminary enquiry by issuing summons to the Petitioner. It

was submitted that the sum and substance of the complaint given by

the Respondent is that there was a malicious prosecution against the

Respondent and if the claim made by the Respondent is taken to be

true, the Respondent can only file a suit claiming for damages for

malicious prosecution before the competent court, and it cannot be a

ground to file a complaint under Section 340, Cr.P.C.

8. The learned counsel in order to substantiate his

submissions relied upon the following judgements of the Hon’ble

Supreme Court:

a.Singh Marwah v. Meenakshi Marwah, reported in

(2005) 4 SCC 370;

b. Santokh Singh &Ors. v. IzharHussan&Anr. reported in

(1973) 2 SCC 406; 

c. Sasikala Pushpa v. State of T.N, reported in (2019) 6

SCC 477; and

d. S. MukanchandBothra v. Rajiv Gandhi Memorial

Educational Charitable Trust &Ors. reported in 2015

SCC OnLine Mad 11421.

9. Per contra, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the

Respondent submitted that the findings given by the trial court and this

Hon’ble Court in the criminal appeal clearly show that the entire case is

false and the Respondent has been intentionally roped in as an accused

for having filed a Habeas Corpus Petition questioning an illegal arrest

made by the police. The learned counsel further submitted that the

court below has only called the Petitioner for a preliminary enquiry and

whatever grounds are raised by the Petitioner in the present petition,

can be raised before the court below and the court below will take a

decision in accordance with law. Therefore, the Petitioner cannot be

allowed to rush to this Court even without giving an explanation to the

court below by attending the enquiry. The learned counsel in order to

substantiate his submissions relied upon the judgement of the Hon’ble

Supreme Court in Perumal v. Janaki reported in (2014) 5 SCC 377.

10. This Court has carefully considered the submissions


made on either side and the materials available on record.

11. It is true that the court below has issued a summon to

the Petitioner to attend an enquiry in order to enable the Court to take a

decision on the complaint given by the Respondent. The complaint is

given on the basis that the Petitioner has committed an offence under

Section 211, I.P.C. If the allegations made in the complaint, even if

taken as it is, do not make out an offence under Section 211, I.P.C.,

there is no requirement for the Petitioner to go through the ordeal of an enquiry before the court below.

12. In view of the above, this Court will test the complaint

given by the Respondent to satisfy itself as to whether an offence under Section 211, I.P.C. has been made out against the Petitioner. This is the only limited scope that is involved in the present petition.

13. For proper appreciation, Section 211, I.P.C. is extracted

hereinunder:

211. False charge of offence made with intent

to injure.—Whoever, with intent to cause 

person, institutes or causes to be instituted any

criminal proceeding against that person, or falsely

charges any person with having committed an offence,

knowing that there is no just or lawful ground for such

proceeding or charge against that person, shall be

punished with imprisonment of either description for a

term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or

with both; and if such criminal proceeding be

instituted on a false charge of an offence punishable

with death, [imprisonment for life], or imprisonment

for seven years or upwards, shall be punishable with

imprisonment of either description for a term which

may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to

fine.

14. The essential ingredients for invoking Section 211, I.P.C.

are that the complaint must have falsely charged a person with having

committed an offence. The complainant, at the time of giving the

complaint must have known that there is no just or lawful ground for

making a charge against the person. This complaint must have been

given with an intention to cause injury to a person.

15. The Hon’ble Supreme Court on various occasions has

dealt with the scope of Section 211, I.P.C. and the same can be taken

note of before coming to a conclusion in this case.

16. The essentials to be satisfied in  order to attract an offence under Section 211, I.P.C. was elucidated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Santokh Singh &Ors. v. IzharHussan&Anr. (cited supra). The relevant paragraph is

 extracted hereinunder:

“10. […] This section as its marginal note

indicates renders punishable false charge of offence

with intent to injure. The essential ingredient of an

offence under Section 211 IPC is to institute or cause

to be instituted any criminal proceeding against a

person with intent to cause him injury or with similar

intent to falsely charge any person with having

committed an offence, knowing that there is no just or

lawful ground for such proceeding or charge.

Instituting or causing to institute false criminal

proceedings assume false charge but false charge may

be preferred even when no criminal proceedings

result. It is frankly conceded by Shri Kohli that the

appellant cannot be said to have instituted any

criminal proceeding against any person. So that part

of Section 211 IPC is eliminated. Now, the expression

“falsely charges” in this section, in our opinion,

cannot mean giving false evidence as a prosecution

witness against an accused person during the course

of a criminal trial. To “falsely charge” must refer to

the original or initial accusation putting or seeking to

put in motion the machinery of criminal investigation

and not when speaking to prove  the false charge by

making deposition in support of the charge framed in

that trial. The words “falsely charges” have to be read

along with the expression “institution of criminal

proceeding”. Both these expressions, being susceptible

of analogous meaning should be understood to have

been used in their cognate sense. They get as it were

their colour and content from each other. They seem to

have been used in a technical sense as commonly

understood in our criminal law. The false charge must,

therefore, be made initially to a person in authority or

to someone who is in a position to get the offender

punished by appropriate proceedings. In other words,

it must be embodied either in a complaint or in a

report of a cognizable offence to the police officer or

an officer having authority over the person against

whom the allegations are made. The statement in

order to constitute the “charge” should be made with

the intention and object of setting criminal law in motion.

[…]”.

17. The learned counsel for the Respondent placed heavy

reliance upon the judgement of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Perumal v. Janaki(cited supra). The relevant portions of the judgement is

extracted hereinunder:

“5.The case of the appellant herein in his

complaint is that though Nagal alleged an offence of

cheating against the appellant which led to the

pregnancy of Nagal, such an offence was not proved

against him. Upon the registration of Crime No. 18 of

2008, Nagal was subjected to medical examination.

She was not found to be pregnant. Dr Geetha, who

examined Nagal, categorically opined that Nagal was

not found to be pregnant on the date of examination

which took place six days after the registration of the

FIR. In spite of the definite medical opinion that Nagal

was not pregnant, the respondent chose to file a

charge-sheet with an allegation that Nagal became

pregnant. Therefore, according to the appellant, the

charge-sheet was filed with a deliberate false

statement by the respondent herein.

6.The appellant, therefore, prayed in his

complaint as follows:

“It is, therefore, prayed that this Hon'ble Court may be

pleased to take this complaint on file, try the accused

under Section 193 IPC for deliberately giving false

evidence in the court as against the complainant, and

punish the accused and pass such further or other

orders as this Hon'ble Court deems fit and proper.”

The learned Magistrate dismissed the complaint on the

ground that Section 195 CrPC bars criminal courts to

take cognizance of an offence under Section 193 IPC

except on the complaint in writing of that court or an

officer of that court in relation to any proceeding in 

the court where the offence under Section 193 is said

to have been committed and a private complaint such

as the one on hand is not maintainable.

9.The facts relevant for the issue on hand are

that:

9.1.The appellant was prosecuted for the

offences under Sections 417 and 506 Part I IPC. (The

factual allegations forming the basis of such a

prosecution are already noted earlier.)

9.2.The respondent filed a charge-sheet with an

assertion that the appellant was responsible for

pregnancy of Nagal.

9.3.Even before the filing of the charge-sheet, a

definite medical opinion was available to the

respondent (secured during the course of the

investigation of the offence alleged against the

appellant) to the effect that Nagal was not pregnant.

9.4. Still the respondent chose to assert in the

charge-sheet that Nagal was pregnant.

9.5. The prosecution against the appellant

ended in acquittal.

9.6. The abovementioned indisputable facts, in

our opinion, prima facie may not constitute an offence

under Section 193 IPC but may constitute an offence

under Section 211 IPC. We say prima facie only for the

reason that this aspect has not been examined at any

stage in the case nor any submission is made before us

on either side but we cannot help taking notice of the 

basic facts and the legal position.”

18. In the present case, it must be borne in mind that the

allegations in the complaint is to the effect that an offence has been

committed as referred to in Section 195(1)(b), Cr.P.C. and therefore, it

becomes important to understand the scope of this provision since it

forms the basis for proceeding further with the complaint under Section

340, Cr.P.C. It is as this juncture, this Court wants to place reliance upon

the judgement of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Iqbal Singh Marwah

v. Meenakshi Marwah (cited supra) and the relevant paragraphs are

extracted hereinunder:

“23. In view of the language used in Section 340

CrPC the court is not bound to make a complaint

regarding commission of an offence referred to in

Section 195(1)(b), as the section is conditioned by the

words “court is of opinion that it is expedient in the

interests of justice”. This shows that such a course

will be adopted only if the interest of justice requires

and not in every case. Before filing of the complaint,

the court may hold a preliminary enquiry and record a

finding to the effect that it is expedient in the interests

of justice that enquiry should be made into any of the

offences referred to in Section  195(1)(b). This

expediency will normally be judged by the court by

weighing not the magnitude of injury suffered by the

person affected by such forgery or forged document,

but having regard to the effect or impact, such

commission of offence has upon administration of

justice. It is possible that such forged document or

forgery may cause a very serious or substantial injury

to a person in the sense that it may deprive him of a

very valuable property or status or the like, but such

document may be just a piece of evidence produced or

given in evidence in court, where voluminous evidence

may have been adduced and the effect of such piece of

evidence on the broad concept of administration of

justice may be minimal. In such circumstances, the

court may not consider it expedient in the interest of

justice to make a complaint.”

“33. In view of the discussion made above, we

are of the opinion that SachidaNand Singh [(1998) 2

SCC 493 : 1998 SCC (Cri) 660] has been correctly

decided and the view taken therein is the correct view.

Section 195(1)(b)(ii) CrPC would be attracted only

when the offences enumerated in the said provision

have been committed with respect to a document after

it has been produced or given in evidence in a

proceeding in any court i.e. during the time when the

document was in custodia legis.”

19.The principle behind holding a preliminary 

Section 340, Cr.P.C. was summarized by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in

Sasikala Pushpa v. State of T.N, (cited supra) by placing reliance on

Iqbal Singh Marwahv. Meenakshi Marwah(cited supra) and the

relevant paragraphs are extracted hereinunder:

“10. It is fairly well settled that before lodging of the

complaint, it is necessary that the court must be satisfied

that it was expedient in the interest of justice to lodge the

complaint. It is not necessary that the court must use the

actual words of Section 340 CrPC; but the court should

record a finding indicating its satisfaction that it is

expedient in the interest of justice that an enquiry should be

made. Observing that under Section 340 CrPC, the

prosecution is to be launched only if it is expedient in the

interest of justice and not on mere allegations or to

vindicate personal vendetta. In Iqbal Singh Marwah v.

Meenakshi Marwah [Iqbal Singh Marwah v. Meenakshi

Marwah, (2005) 4 SCC 370 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 1101] , this

Court held as under: (SCC pp. 386-87, para 23) […]

11. Before proceeding to make a complaint regarding

commission of an offence referred to in Section 195(1)(b)

CrPC, the court must satisfy itself that “it is expedient in

the interest of justice”. The language in Section 340 CrPC

shows that such a course will be adopted only if the interest

of justice requires and not in every case. It has to be seen in

the facts and circumstances of the present case whether any

prima facie case is made out for forgery or making a forged

document warranting issuance of directions for lodging the 

complaint under Sections 193, 467, 468 and 471 IPC.”

20.This Court had an occasion to consider the judgement of

the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Perumal v. Janaki (cited supra) in the

judgement in S. MukanchandBothra v. Rajiv Gandhi Memorial

Educational Charitable Trust &Ors (cited supra). The relevant

paragraph is extracted hereinunder:

“7. It is our duty to point out that the alleged offence

of the Sub-Inspector informing in the charge sheet the

pregnancy of the girl concerned despite her medical

certificate informing otherwise, would not and cannot

fall within the definition of Section 211 IPC. It also is

to be seen that Perumal had faced prosecution

pursuant to a Magistrate taking cognizance.

Fortunately, offence of making a false charge does not

stand attracted as otherwise, it would be unfair to

prosecute the Sub-Inspector who filed the charge

sheet, while not doing so, the Judicial Magistrate who

took cognizance thereon. As explained by the Supreme

Court in Santokh Singh v. Izhar Hussain [(1973) 2

SCC 406], ‘the essential ingredient of an offence

under section 211 IPC is to institute or cause, to be

instituted any criminal proceeding against a person

with intent to cause him injury or with similar intent to

falsely charge any person with having committed an

offence, knowing that there is no just  or lawful ground

for such proceeding or charge. Instituting or causing

to institute false criminal proceedings assume false

charge but false charge may be preferred even when

no criminal proceedings result. Now, the expression

“falsely charges” in this section, in our opinion,

cannot mean giving false evidence as a prosecution

witness against an accused person during the course

of a criminal trial. “To falsely charge” must refer to

the original or initial accusation putting or seeking to

put in motion the machinery of criminal investigation

and not when seeking to prove the false charge by

making deposition in support of the charge framed in

that trial. The words “falsely charges” have to be,

read along with the expression “institution of criminal

proceeding”. Both these expressions, being susceptible

of analogous meaning should be understood to have

been. used in their cognate sense. They get as it were

their colour and content from each other. They seem to

have been used in a technical sense as commonly

understood in our criminal law. The false charge must,

therefore, be made initially to a person in authority or

to someone who is in a position to get the offender

punished by appropriate proceedings. In other words,

it must be’ embodied either in a complaint or in a

report of a cognizable offence to the police officer or

to an officer having authority over the person against

whom the allegations are made. The statement in 

order to constitute the “charges” should be made with

the intention and object of setting criminal law in

motion.”

21. The above judgements set out the procedure while

dealing with an application under Section 340, Cr.P.C. Firstly, in order to

initiate proceedings under Section 340,Cr.P.C., an application has to be

made to the Court upon which the Court can initiate an inquiry into any

offence referred to in Section 195(1)(b), in respect of a document

produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in that Court. Secondly,

offences as set out in the complaint have to be made out. In the

present case, the complainant alleges that an offence under Section

211, I.P.C. has been made out.

22. In the present case, based on the complaint given by

one Mr. Rajamani, the FIR was registered by the F-2 Police Station,

Egmore and the arrest was also carried out by the said police. The

Petitioner came into the scene only at a later point of time when the

case was transferred to the file of the CBCID. The language used under

Section 211, I.P.C. regarding false charge can only relate to the original

or initial accusation through which the criminal law was set in motion. 

Admittedly, it was not the Petitioner who had set the criminal law in

motion. That apart, as held in Iqbal Singh Marwah’sCase (cited

supra) the offences referred to under Section 195(1)(b), Cr.P.C. will get

attracted only with respect to a document after it has been produced or

given in evidence in a proceeding in any court i.e. during the time when

the document was in custodia legis.

23. In the present case, the main grievance of the

Respondent seems to be that he was unnecessarily made to undergo

the agony of a malicious prosecution. Since this prosecution was

investigated by the Petitioner, the Respondent wants to rope in the

Petitioner as if the said officer prosecuted a false charge. If investigating

officers are going to be exposed to such proceedings in all cases where

the accused persons are acquitted from all charges, it will directly

interfere with the independence of the authority in conducting an

investigation. This is the reason why the Hon’ble Supreme Court in

Santokh Singh’s Case (cited supra) held that the words “false

charges” must be read along with the expression “institution of criminal

proceedings”, which relates back to the initiation of criminal proceedings

and it can never be related to an alleged false charge  framed after the

filing of the final report.

24. This Court after considering the judgement of the

Hon’ble Supreme Court in Perumal v. Janaki (cited supra) has come

up with this fine distinction in the case of S.

MukanchandBothra(citedsupra). That apart, the facts of the present

case is clearly distinguishable from the facts of the case dealt with by

the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Perumal v. Janaki.

25. In view of the above discussion, this Court holds that the

offence under Section 211, I.P.C. has not been made out against the

Petitioner. The Respondent cannot pick and choose certain observations

made by the trial court and this Court, and make it a basis for filing an

application under Section 340, Cr.P.C. to punish the Petitioner under

Section 211, I.P.C.

26. A careful reading of the petition filed by the Respondent

at the best makes out a case for malicious prosecution. In a case of

malicious prosecution, which gives rise to a tortious liability, only a suit

for damages can be filed by establishing the  ingredients to maintain


such a suit. The grounds for maintaining a suit for malicious prosecution

cannot form the basis for filing a petition under Section 340, Cr.P.C.

since it has to independently satisfy the requirements of Section

195(1)(b), Cr.P.C.

27. In view of the above finding rendered by this Court, the

Petitioner need not undergo the ordeal of facing an enquiry before the

court below. Consequently, the impugned summons issued to the

Petitioner in Crl M.P. No 23751 of 2019 is hereby quashed and this

Criminal Original Petition is accordingly allowed. Consequently, the

connected miscellaneous petitoin is closed.

26.02.2021


Print Page

No comments:

Post a comment