Madras HC: Under which circumstances the court can direct forwarding of complaint to police under S 151 of CPC?

 In the case on hand, since, as I have already pointed out, the offence of forgery of Exs. A2 and A3 was committed outside the Court, even before they were produced before the Court, there can be no impediment for the police to register a case. When it was pointed out by this Court to the learned counsel on either side that this Court has power to issue a direction to the Tahsildar, Tambaram to forward a complaint to the police in respect of the above offence of forgery, for registration of a criminal case so as to investigate the same thoroughly to find out the real culprits, the learned counsel for the appellant submitted that such power is not available for this Court in a civil proceedings. Of course, it is true that there is no express provision in the Civil Procedure Code specifically empowering a Civil Court to issue a direction either to a party or to a witness to make a complaint to the police. But at the same time, it needs to be noted that there is no prohibition, either express or implied, thereby prohibiting a Civil Court from issuing any direction to a party or a witness to forward a complaint to the police when a serious offence of forgery is alleged. {Para 59}

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADRAS

Second Appeal No. 479 of 2012 and M.P. Nos. 1 and 2 of 2012

Decided On: 30.03.2015

N. Natarajan Vs. The Executive Officer

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

S. Nagamuthu, J.

Citation: MANU/TN/0811/2015

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Fraud at the Courthouse Door: When Can Civil Courts Use Section 151 CPC to Set the Criminal Law in Motion?

 Why this question matters

Civil judges increasingly encounter forged documents, fabricated seals, and engineered “fraud on the court” designed to siphon public money or manipulate rights. The immediate civil response is clear: refuse or recall relief obtained by fraud. But a connected and difficult question is: can the civil court itself trigger criminal prosecution, and if so, when and how, under Section 151 CPC?

Supreme Court and High Court jurisprudence now fairly clearly recognises that inherent powers under Section 151 can be used to protect the integrity of judicial proceedings—including by undoing orders obtained by fraud and, in appropriate cases, by directing that serious independent forgeries be reported to the police. This operates alongside, and not in derogation of, the special mechanism for “offences against public justice” under Section 195/340 CrPC, now Section 215/379 BNSS.

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Bombay HC: Under which circumstances registration of two independent proceedings for one and the same offence is permissible

The petitioners raised one more objection that impugned directions would result into registration of two independent proceedings for one and the same offence, as directions are given to Collector to lodge FIR/police report and further directions are given to Assistant Superintendent of Court to file separate complaints with Judicial Magistrate. This Court finds that aforesaid objection is fallacious. On the basis of evidence led during course of trial, Reference Court noticed that manipulated reference letter and documents were used on record of Court for presentation, registration of prosecution of land acquisition references and offences of preparation of false or manipulated documents are committed before presentation of references in connivance with many other persons, who are not parties to petition or directly involved in prosecution of references. In that backdrop, for offence covered under Section 215(1)(b) of BNSS, 2023, directions are given to Assistant Superintendent of Court to file separate complaints with Magistrate and for offences which are committed outside Court prior to presentation of references, directions are given to Collector to lodge FIR/police report. In this backdrop, in light of law laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Iqbal Singh Marwah (supra), Reference Court formed opinion regarding commission of offence referred under Section 195(1)(b) of Cr.P.C. (Section 215(1)(b) of BNSS, 2023) and followed further procedure and left Collector to lodge FIR in respect of offences which are not committed on record of Court. This Court finds no fault in course adopted by Reference Court while issuing two different directions. {Para 20}

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (AURANGABAD BENCH)

Writ Petition No. 1676 of 2026

Decided On: 06.05.2026

Raghunath and Ors. Vs. The State of Maharashtra and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

S.G. Chapalgaonkar, J.

Citation: 2026:BHC-AUG:21519,MANU/MH/4472/2026

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Bombay HC: A preliminary inquiry and opportunity of hearing are not mandatory before a court directs filing a complaint U/S 379 of BNSS

Criminal Procedure - Forgery - Complaint against advocate - Section 379 of Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) - Present petition filed by advocate challenging directions of Reference Court to lodge FIR and file complaints against him and claimants for offences related to forged documents used in land acquisition reference proceedings - Whether the Reference Court's directions to lodge an FIR and file complaints against the petitioner and claimants are valid, and whether a preliminary inquiry and opportunity of hearing are mandatory before making such directions - Held, the Reference Court, based on evidence presented during the land acquisition reference proceedings, formed an opinion that the petitioner and claimants had knowledge of the forgery of documents and used them to mislead the court - Section 379 of BNSS (formerly Section 340 Cr.P.C.) does not mandate a complaint in every case, but only if it is "expedient in the interest of justice," and allows for a preliminary inquiry to determine this - A preliminary inquiry and opportunity of hearing are not mandatory before a court directs filing a complaint, as the inquiry is not to determine guilt or innocence - The person against whom a complaint is made has a legal right to be heard by the Magistrate during subsequent proceedings - Principles of natural justice are generally not applicable at the stage of reporting a criminal offence, as this would frustrate proceedings - The Reference Court's opinion was based on an in-depth inquiry during the trial, and is not a finding of guilt against the petitioner - The directions to the Assistant Superintendent of Court to file complaints for offences committed on court record and the directions to the Collector to lodge FIR/police reports for offences committed outside the court are distinct and valid - Petition dismissed.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (AURANGABAD BENCH)

Writ Petition No. 1660 of 2026

Decided On: 06.05.2026

Kishor Vs. The State of Maharashtra and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

S.G. Chapalgaonkar, J.

 Citation: 2026:BHC-AUG:21520,MANU/MH/4470/2026

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Delhi HC: Invoking perjury jurisdiction at the interlocutory stage, with trial already underway and issues framed, would risk interfering with and prejudicing the main civil proceedings

 In my opinion, an application under section 340 of the cr.pc ought to be normally considered at the time of final decision of the case only and not at the interim stage as the defendants/applicant have pressed in the present case. It is the settled legal position that the said provision cannot be resorted to, to satisfy a private grudge of the litigant. In fact the very genesis of this provision is to prevent complaints being filed of offences having being committed in relation to the court proceedings; it was felt that if such complaints are permitted to be filed, the same may be used to force the other party into giving up its claim/defence or to dissuade witnesses from appearing before the courts under threat of criminal prosecution. It was held as far back as in Rewashankar Moolchand v. Emperor MANU/NA/0017/1939 : AIR 1940 Nagpur 72 that proceedings under Section 340Cr.PC should not be resorted to when the criminal case is calculated to hamper fair trial of issue in the civil court before which the matter would probably go on for longer. This court also in Jindal Polyster Ltd. v. Rahul Jaura MANU/DE/2772/2005 : 124 (2005) DLT 613 and in Kuldeep Kapoor v. Susanta Sengupta MANU/DE/2870/2005 : 126 (2006) DLT 149 has held that applications under section 340 of the Cr.pc should be dealt with at the final stage only and not at the interim stage. I also find a consistency of view in this regard in the other High Courts. The law is that a prosecution for perjury should not be ordered by the court before the close of the proceedings in the case in which false evidence is given. It is highly wrong for a court to take action under the said provision against a witness or a party for giving false evidence when trial is underway. {Para 18}

21. Formation of prima facie opinion that a person charged has intentionally given false evidence is a condition precedent for directing lodging of a complaint. The existence of mens rea or criminal intention behind act complained of will have to be looked into and considered before any action under section 340 of the cr.pc is recommended. Before setting the criminal law into motion, the court should exercise great care and caution and it must be satisfied that there is reasonable foundation for the charge in respect of which prosecution is directed. No prosecution ought to be ordered unless reasonable probability of conviction is found. Considering the nature of the documents and evidence in relation whereto offences are alleged to have been committed.

"6. The mere fact that a person has made a contradictory statement in a judicial proceeding is not by itself always sufficient to justify a prosecution under Sections 199 and 200 of the Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860) (hereinafter referred to as "IPC"); but it must be shown that the defendant has intentionally given a false statement at any stage of the judicial proceedings or fabricated false evidence for the purpose of using the same at any stage of the judicial proceedings. Even after the above position has emerged also, still the court has to form an opinion that it is expedient in the interests of justice to initiate an inquiry into the offences of false evidence and offences against public justice and more specifically referred to in Section 340(1)CrPC, having regard to the overall factual matrix as well as the probable consequences of such a prosecution. 

17. The law governing the initiation of criminal proceedings under Section 379 read with Section 215 of the BNSS, for offences under Sections 227, 229, 236, 237, and 246 of the BNS, provides that for a statement to constitute 'false evidence' under Section 227 BNS, the falsity must be clear, deliberate, and established through unimpeachable evidence. Mere inconsistencies in versions or bare denials do not meet this threshold. The Written Statement reflects Defendant No. 2's explanation that he had purchased the alleged pirated version of ISP under a bona fide belief of its genuineness, a contention the veracity of which can only be determined upon leading of evidence.

23. Before filing of the complaint under Section 379 read with Section 215 of the BNSS, the Court along with a clear and deliberate falsehood supported by an unimpeachable evidence has to record a finding to the effect that it is expedient in the interests of justice having regard to the effect or impact, such commission of offence has upon administration of justice. 

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI

CS (COMM) 914/2023

Decided On: 24.11.2025

Koninklijke Philips N.V. and Ors. Vs. Karma Mindtech and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Tejas Karia, J.

Citation: 2025 DHC 10345, MANU/DE/9185/2025.

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Whether it is necessary to hear accused in preliminary inquiry U/S 340 of CRPC?

 We have little doubt that there is no

question of opportunity of hearing in a scenario of

this nature and we say nothing else but that a law

as enunciated by the Constitution Bench in Iqbal

Singh Marwah’s case (supra) is in line with what was

observed in Pritish’case (supra).

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 335/2020

THE STATE OF PUNJAB Vs  JASBIR SINGH 

Dated: SEPTEMBER 15, 2022.

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Whether the charge framed against accused U/S 340 of CRPC is liable to be quashed if Magistrate follows the procedure of the complaint case?

  We are thus of the firm opinion that a Trial Magistrate, on receipt of a complaint under Section 340 and/or Section 341 of the Code, if there is a preliminary inquiry and adequate materials in support of the considerations impelling action under the above provisions are available, would be required to treat such complaint to constitute a case, as if instituted on police report and proceed in accordance with law. However, in absence of any preliminary inquiry or adequate materials, it would be open for the Trial Magistrate, if he genuinely feels it necessary, in the interest of justice and to avoid unmerited prosecution to embark on a summary inquiry to collect further materials and then decide the future course of action as per law. In both the eventualities, the Trial Magistrate has to be cautious, circumspect, rational, objective and further informed with the overwhelming caveat that the offence alleged is one affecting the administration of justice, requiring a responsible, uncompromising and committed approach to the issue referred to him for inquiry and trial, as the case may be. In no case, however, in the teeth of Section 343(1), the procedure prescribed for cases instituted otherwise than on police report would either be relevant or applicable qua the complaints under Section 340 and/or 341 of the Cr.P.C. {Para 58}

59. Reverting to the case in hand, the complaint was filed by the Trial Court stating that the respondent had committed an offence under Section 193 IPC, he having resorted to falsehood on oath at the trial in order to screen the accused from the crime and to enable him to escape punishment. The offence alleged is one included in Section 195(1)(b) of the Code and is otherwise, having regard to the punishment prescribed, to which, warrant procedure would be applicable. In course of the arguments, it had transpired that the Trial Magistrate had examined the complainant and some other witnesses before framing charge against the respondent under the above provision of law. The High Court by the order impugned however, to reiterate, had sustained the plea of the respondent that as the complaint ought to have been construed to be a case otherwise than on police report to which warrant procedure was applicable, charge could not have been framed as the prosecution had not adduced all its evidence at that stage, as required under Section 244 of the Cr.P.C. Significantly, no challenge has been made to the legality and/or the validity of the order under Section 340 or the complaint on any ground. It has also not been asserted in the course of arguments that the evidence already recorded is not sufficient to frame a charge, as had been done by the Trial Magistrate.

60. In view of the determination as above, the approach of the High Court is wholly indefensible, as in the face of Section 343(1) of the Cr.P.C., the procedure prescribed for cases instituted otherwise than on police report is not attracted qua a complaint under Section 340 and/or Section 341 of the Code. Even assuming that the Trial Magistrate had examined few witnesses in support of the complaint, it was in the form of a summary inquiry, to be satisfied as to whether the materials on record would justify the framing of charge against the respondent or not and nothing further. Any other view would fly in the face of the ordainment of Section 343(1) of the Cr.P.C. and thus cannot receive judicial imprimatur. The impugned judgment of the High Court in quashing the charge framed by the Trial Magistrate and remanding the case to him to follow the procedure outlined for cases, instituted otherwise than on police report, under Chapter XIX-B is on the face of it unsustainable in law and on facts. It is thus set aside. 

SUPREME COURT

ARUN MISHRA AND AMITAVA ROY, JJ.

State of Goa Vs. Jose Maria Albert Vales @ Robert Vales

Criminal Appeal Nos. 1427-1428 of 2017

18th August, 2017.

Citation: 2017 ALL SCR (Cri) 1590

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Under which circumstances court can hear the accused in an inquiry under S 340 of CRPC?

 In para 12 of the Judgment in Pritish's case, their Lordships stated as under:-

"12. thus, the person against whom the complaint is made has a legal right to be heard whether he should be tried for the offence or not, but such a legal right is envisaged only when the magistrate calls the accused to appear before him. The person concerned has then the right to participate in the pre-trial inquiry envisaged in Section 239 of the Code. It is open to him to satisfy the magistrate that the allegations against him are groundless and that he is entitled to be discharged."

Their Lordships, therefore, held that there is no statutory requirement to give an opportunity of

hearing to the persons against whom that court might file a complaint before the magistrate for

initiating prosecution proceedings.

5. In the instant case as the party complained against was available before the court and the said party made an application that he should be heard before any inquiry is undertaken under Section 340 of Cr.P.C., the learned Judge has exercised his discretion of granting an opportunity to the

defendant for being heard in the inquiry and this by itself cannot be termed as perverse or patently illegal order and in any case the anxiety of the petitioner-plaintiff should be to get the inquiry

expedited rather than keeping this petition pending before this court.

6. Hence, the petition is rejected summarily and it is directed that the inquiry under Section 340 of

Cr.P.C. be completed as expeditiously as possible and preferably within a period of three months.

BOMBAY HIGH COURT

VARSHA RUBIN T. ZAVERI  Vs. PANNALAL KHIMJI CHHEDA 

( Before : Marlepalle B.H., J. )

Criminal Writ Petition No. 578 Of 2007

Decided on : 02-07-2007

(2007) 2 BomCR(Cri) 613

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Whether accused can make Charge Of False Accusation U/S 211 IPC Against Investigating Officer?

 The essentials to be satisfied in  order to attract an offence under Section 211, I.P.C. was elucidated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Santokh Singh &Ors. v. IzharHussan&Anr. (cited supra). The relevant paragraph is

 extracted hereinunder:

“10. […] This section as its marginal note

indicates renders punishable false charge of offence

with intent to injure. The essential ingredient of an

offence under Section 211 IPC is to institute or cause

to be instituted any criminal proceeding against a

person with intent to cause him injury or with similar

intent to falsely charge any person with having

committed an offence, knowing that there is no just or

lawful ground for such proceeding or charge.

Instituting or causing to institute false criminal

proceedings assume false charge but false charge may

be preferred even when no criminal proceedings

result. It is frankly conceded by Shri Kohli that the

appellant cannot be said to have instituted any

criminal proceeding against any person. So that part

of Section 211 IPC is eliminated. Now, the expression

“falsely charges” in this section, in our opinion,

cannot mean giving false evidence as a prosecution

witness against an accused person during the course

of a criminal trial. To “falsely charge” must refer to

the original or initial accusation putting or seeking to

put in motion the machinery of criminal investigation

and not when speaking to prove  the false charge by

making deposition in support of the charge framed in

that trial. The words “falsely charges” have to be read

along with the expression “institution of criminal

proceeding”. Both these expressions, being susceptible

of analogous meaning should be understood to have

been used in their cognate sense. They get as it were

their colour and content from each other. They seem to

have been used in a technical sense as commonly

understood in our criminal law. The false charge must,

therefore, be made initially to a person in authority or

to someone who is in a position to get the offender

punished by appropriate proceedings. In other words,

it must be embodied either in a complaint or in a

report of a cognizable offence to the police officer or

an officer having authority over the person against

whom the allegations are made. The statement in

order to constitute the “charge” should be made with

the intention and object of setting criminal law in motion.{Para 16}

20.This Court had an occasion to consider the judgement of

the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Perumal v. Janaki (cited supra) in the

judgement in S. MukanchandBothra v. Rajiv Gandhi Memorial

Educational Charitable Trust &Ors (cited supra). The relevant

paragraph is extracted hereinunder:

“7. It is our duty to point out that the alleged offence

of the Sub-Inspector informing in the charge sheet the

pregnancy of the girl concerned despite her medical

certificate informing otherwise, would not and cannot

fall within the definition of Section 211 IPC. It also is

to be seen that Perumal had faced prosecution

pursuant to a Magistrate taking cognizance.

Fortunately, offence of making a false charge does not

stand attracted as otherwise, it would be unfair to

prosecute the Sub-Inspector who filed the charge

sheet, while not doing so, the Judicial Magistrate who

took cognizance thereon. As explained by the Supreme

Court in Santokh Singh v. Izhar Hussain [(1973) 2

SCC 406], ‘the essential ingredient of an offence

under section 211 IPC is to institute or cause, to be

instituted any criminal proceeding against a person

with intent to cause him injury or with similar intent to

falsely charge any person with having committed an

offence, knowing that there is no just  or lawful ground

for such proceeding or charge. Instituting or causing

to institute false criminal proceedings assume false

charge but false charge may be preferred even when

no criminal proceedings result. Now, the expression

“falsely charges” in this section, in our opinion,

cannot mean giving false evidence as a prosecution

witness against an accused person during the course

of a criminal trial. “To falsely charge” must refer to

the original or initial accusation putting or seeking to

put in motion the machinery of criminal investigation

and not when seeking to prove the false charge by

making deposition in support of the charge framed in

that trial. The words “falsely charges” have to be,

read along with the expression “institution of criminal

proceeding”. Both these expressions, being susceptible

of analogous meaning should be understood to have

been. used in their cognate sense. They get as it were

their colour and content from each other. They seem to

have been used in a technical sense as commonly

understood in our criminal law. The false charge must,

therefore, be made initially to a person in authority or

to someone who is in a position to get the offender

punished by appropriate proceedings. In other words,

it must be’ embodied either in a complaint or in a

report of a cognizable offence to the police officer or

to an officer having authority over the person against

whom the allegations are made. The statement in 

order to constitute the “charges” should be made with

the intention and object of setting criminal law in

motion.”

22. In the present case, based on the complaint given by

one Mr. Rajamani, the FIR was registered by the F-2 Police Station,

Egmore and the arrest was also carried out by the said police. The

Petitioner came into the scene only at a later point of time when the

case was transferred to the file of the CBCID. The language used under

Section 211, I.P.C. regarding false charge can only relate to the original

or initial accusation through which the criminal law was set in motion. 

Admittedly, it was not the Petitioner who had set the criminal law in

motion. That apart, as held in Iqbal Singh Marwah’sCase (cited

supra) the offences referred to under Section 195(1)(b), Cr.P.C. will get

attracted only with respect to a document after it has been produced or

given in evidence in a proceeding in any court i.e. during the time when

the document was in custodia legis.

23. In the present case, the main grievance of the

Respondent seems to be that he was unnecessarily made to undergo

the agony of a malicious prosecution. Since this prosecution was

investigated by the Petitioner, the Respondent wants to rope in the

Petitioner as if the said officer prosecuted a false charge. If investigating

officers are going to be exposed to such proceedings in all cases where

the accused persons are acquitted from all charges, it will directly

interfere with the independence of the authority in conducting an

investigation. This is the reason why the Hon’ble Supreme Court in

Santokh Singh’s Case (cited supra) held that the words “false

charges” must be read along with the expression “institution of criminal

proceedings”, which relates back to the initiation of criminal proceedings

and it can never be related to an alleged false charge  framed after the

filing of the final report.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS

CORAM

 JUSTICE MR.N.ANAND VENKATESH

Crl.O.P No.2514 of 2020 and Crl.MP.No.1536 of 2020

A.Radhika  Vs Wilson Sundararaj .

Dated:26.02.2021

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Whether court can prosecute parties for making false pleading as per S 209 of IPC U/S 340 of CRPC?

15. Conclusions

15.1 Section 209 of the Indian Penal Code, is a salutary provision enacted to preserve the sanctity of the Courts and to safeguard the administration of law by deterring the litigants from making the false claims. However, this provision has been seldom invoked by the Courts. The disastrous result of not invoking Section 209 is that the litigants indulge in false claims because of the confidence that no action will be taken.

15.2 Making a false averment in the pleading pollutes the stream of justice. It is an attempt at inviting the Court into passing a wrong judgment and that is why it has been be treated as an offence.

15.3 False evidence in the vast majority of cases springs out of false pleading, and would entirely banish from the Courts if false pleading could be prevented.

15.4 Unless the judicial system protects itself from such wrongdoing by taking cognizance, directing prosecution, and punishing those found guilty, it will be failing in its duty to render justice to the citizens.

15.5 The justice delivery system has to be pure and should be such that the persons who are approaching the Courts must be afraid of making false claims.

15.6 To enable the Courts to ward off unjustified interference in their working, those who indulge in immoral acts like false claims have to be appropriately dealt with, without which it would not be possible for any Court to administer justice in the true sense and to the satisfaction of those who approach it in the hope that truth would ultimately prevail.

15.7 Whenever a false claim is made before a Court, it would be appropriate, in the first instance, to issue a show cause notice to the litigant to show cause as to why a complaint be not made under Section 340 Cr.P.C. for having made a false claim under Section 209 of the Indian Penal Code and a reasonable opportunity be afforded to the litigant to reply to the same. The Court may record the evidence, if considered it necessary.

15.8 If the facts are sufficient to return a finding that an offence appears to have been committed and it is expedient in the interests of justice to proceed to make a complaint under Section 340 Cr.P.C., the Court need not order a preliminary inquiry. But if they are not and there is suspicion, albeit a strong one, the Court may order a preliminary inquiry. For that purpose, it can direct the State agency to investigate and file a report along with such other evidence that they are able to gather.

15.9 Before making a complaint under Section 340 Cr.P.C., the Court shall consider whether it is expedient in the interest of justice to make a complaint.

15.10 Once it prima facie appears that an offence under Section 209 IPC has been made out and it is expedient in the interest of justice, the Court should not hesitate to make a complaint under Section 340 Cr.P.C.

16. This Court hopes that the Courts below shall invoke Section 209 of the Indian Penal Code in appropriate cases to prevent the abuse of process of law, secure the ends of justice, keep the path of justice clear of obstructions and give effect to the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in T. Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal (supra), S.P. Chengalvaraya Naida v. Jagannath (supra), Dalip Singh v. State of U.P.(supra), Ramrameshwari Devi v. Nirmala Devi (supra), Maria Margarida Sequeria Fernandes v. Erasmo Jack de Sequeria (supra), Kishore Samrite v. State of Uttar Pradesh (supra) and Subrata Roy Sahara v. Union of India (supra).

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI

RFA 784/2010

Decided On: 22.01.2016

H.S. Bedi Vs.  National Highway Authority of India

Hon'ble Judges/Coram: J.R. Midha, J.

Citation: MANU/DE/0154/2016

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Whether private complaint is barred as per S 195 of CRPC if a party has filed the forged documents in the court proceeding?

 In view of the discussion made above, we are of the opinion that Sachida Nand Singh has been correctly decided and the view taken therein is the correct view. Section 195(1)(b)(ii) Cr.P.C. would be attracted only when the offences enumerated in the said provision have been committed with respect to a document after it has been produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in any Court i.e. during the time when the document was in custodia legis.

26. In the present case, the will has been produced in the Court subsequently. It is nobody's case that any offence as enumerated in Section 195(b)(ii) was committed in respect to the said will after it had been produced or filed in the Court of District Judge. Therefore, the bar created by Section 195(1)(b)(ii) Cr.P.C. would not come into play and there is no embargo on the power of the Court to take cognizance of the offence on the basis of the complaint filed by the respondents. The view taken by the learned Additional Sessions Judge and the High Court is perfectly correct and calls for no interference.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 402 of 2005 

Decided On: 11.03.2005

Iqbal Singh Marwah  Vs Meenakshi Marwah 

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Supreme Court: Procedure to be followed by the court if there is a bar for cognizance of offence as per S 195 of CRPC in respect of crime investigated by police

The question whether Sections 195 and 340 of the Criminal Procedure Code affect the power of the police to investigate into a cognizable offence has already been considered by this Court in the case of State of Punjab v. Raj SinghMANU/SC/0038/1998 : 1998CriLJ1104 . In this case it has been that as follows:

"2. We are unable to sustain the impugned order of the High Court quashing the FIR lodged against the respondents alleging commission of offences under Sections 419, 420, 467, and 468 IPC by them in course of the proceeding of a civil suit, on the ground that Section 195(1)(b)(ii) CrPC prohibited entertainment of and investigation into the same by the police. From a plain reading of Section 195 CrPC it is manifest that it comes into operation at the stage when the court intends to take cognizance of an offence under Section 190(1) CrPC; and it has nothing to do with the statutory power of the police to investigate into an FIR which discloses a cognizable offence, in accordance with Chapter XII of the Code even if the offence is alleged to have been committed to, or in relation to, any proceedings in court. In other words, the statutory power of the police to investigate under the Code is not in any way controlled or circumscribed by Section 195 CrPC. It is or course true that upon the charge-sheet (challan), if any, filed on completion of the investigation into such an offence the court would not be competent to take cognizance thereof in view of the embargo of Section 195(1)(b) CrPC, but nothing therein deters the court from filling a complaint for the offence on the basis of the FIR (filed by the aggrieved private party) and the materials collected during investigation, provided it forms the requisite opinion and follows the procedure laid down in Section 340 CrPC.

 Not only are we bound by this judgment but we are also in complete agreement with the same. Sections 195 and 340 do not control or circumscribe the power of the police to investigate under the Criminal Procedure Code. Once investigation is completed then the embargo in Section 195 would come into play and the Court would not be competent to take cognizance. However that Court could then file a complaint for the offence on the basis of the FIR and the material collected during investigation provided the procedure laid down in Section 340 Criminal Procedure Code is followed. Thus no right of the Respondents, much less the right to file an appeal under Section 341, is affected.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 1197 of 2003

Decided On: 19.09.2003

M. Narayandas  Vs. State of Karnataka and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

S.N. Variava and H.K. Sema, JJ.

Citation: (2003) 11 SCC 251

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Whether court can give hearing to accused against whom court might file complaint U/S 340 of CRPC?

When I was going through the reliefs sought by the Applicant, I noted that the Applicant has in prayer clause (iv) prayed that this Court be pleased to: “commit the Respondent Nos. 1 to 3 to custody in view of Section 340(1)(d) of the Cr.PC as the Respondents have produced fabricated death certificate and false nomination, false share transfer form, false resolution and false intimation letter and misguided the Court by further making misleading averments in the petition which are false and frivolous as the offences are non-bailable one”. I therefore enquired from Mr. Nilesh Ojha, Advocate for the Plaintiff, whether notice has been issued to the Respondents. Mr. Ojha submitted that the Respondents cannot be heard at this stage as held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Pritish v. State of Maharashtra (supra) and by the Single Judge of this Court in the case of Union of India v. Haresh Milani (supra). Though I subsequently was of the view, that the Respondents are not required to be heard in the matter, I would like to clarify that what is held in the above decisions is that there is no statutory requirement/mandate to afford an opportunity of hearing to the persons against whom the court might file a complaint, and therefore the Respondents in a case of Section 340 are not required to be heard as a matter of right. However, it cannot be disputed that if the Court feels the need to hear the Respondent in an Application under Section 340 Cr.P.C., the Court is not precluded from doing so, and therefore the submission of Mr. Ojha, that the Respondent cannot be heard at this stage is not accepted.

In the High Court of Bombay

Civil Appellate Jurisdiction

(Before S.J. Kathawalla, J.)

Satyanarayan Nandkishore Pande v. Vinay Jagdishchandra Pande, 

Civil Application No. 482 of 2018

In

Writ Petition No. 721 of 2016

Decided on December 22, 2018,

Citation: 2018 SCC OnLine Bom 7271 : (2019) 1 AIR Bom R 722,2019(4) MHLJ 405

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Whether court can take cognizance of offence of giving false evidence punishable under S 193 of IPC on basis of private complaint?

 This Court in M.S. Ahlawat (supra) has clearly held that private complaints are absolutely barred in relation to an offence said to have been committed Under Section 193 Indian Penal Code and that the procedure prescribed Under Section 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure are mandatory. It was held that:

5. Chapter XI Indian Penal Code deals with "false evidence and offences against public justice" and Section 193 occurring therein provides for punishment for giving or fabricating false evidence in a judicial proceeding. Section 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) provides that where an act amounts to an offence of contempt of the lawful authority of public servants or to an offence against public justice such as giving false evidence Under Section 193 Indian Penal Code etc. or to an offence relating to documents actually used in a court, private prosecutions are barred absolutely and only the court in relation to which the offence was committed may initiate proceedings. Provisions of Section 195 Code of Criminal Procedure are mandatory and no court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of any of the offences mentioned therein unless there is a complaint in writing as required under that section. It is settled law that every incorrect or false statement does not make it incumbent upon the court to order prosecution, but (sic) to exercise judicial discretion to order prosecution only in the larger interest of the administration of justice.

23. The case in hand squarely falls within the category of cases falling Under Section 195(1)(b)(i) of the Code of Criminal Procedure as the offence is punishable Under Section 193 of the Indian Penal Code. Therefore, the Magistrate has erred in taking cognizance of the offence on the basis of a private complaint. The High Court, in our view, has rightly set aside the order of the Magistrate.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 211 of 2019

Decided On: 04.02.2019

Narendra Kumar Srivastava Vs.  The State of Bihar and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

A.K. Sikri and S. Abdul Nazeer, JJ.

Citation:(2019) 3 SCC 318

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Whether court should initiate prosecution for perjury if false allegation is made in anticipatory bail application?

Thus, from the above, it is evident that the inquiry/contempt proceedings should be initiated by the court in exceptional circumstances where the court is of the opinion that perjury has been committed by a party deliberately to have some beneficial order from the court. There must be grounds of a nature higher than mere surmise or suspicion for initiating such proceedings. There must be distinct evidence of the commission of an offence by such a person as mere suspicion cannot bring home the charge of perjury. More so, the court has also to determine as on facts, whether it is expedient in the interest of justice to inquire into the offence which appears to have been committed.

10. It is clear therefore from a reading of these judgments that there should be something deliberate-a statement should be made deliberately and consciously which is found to be false as a result of comparing it with unimpeachable evidence, documentary or otherwise. In the facts of the present case, it is clear that the statement made in the anticipatory bail application cannot be tested against unimpeachable evidence as evidence has not yet been led. Moreover, the report dated 12.11.2011 being a report, which is in the nature of a preliminary investigation report by the investigating officer filed only two days after the F.I.R. is lodged, can in no circumstances be regarded as unimpeachable evidence contrary to the statements that have been made in the anticipatory bail application. Further, as has been correctly pointed out by learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the Appellant, that though the submission recorded by the High Court in para 3 of the order dated 30.11.2017 is from the aforesaid paragraph in the anticipatory bail application, yet, the High court made it clear that it was granting anticipatory bail principally because the F.I.R. annexed to the bail application does not show that there was sexual intercourse of the applicant with his wife during the course of their separation as a result of which it was not possible to assess whether the averment regarding the offence punishable Under Section 377 of the Indian Penal Code is or is not substantiated. The High Court also recorded that considering that the husband and wife had resided together after marriage only for a very brief period, and that the husband was granted interim anticipatory bail, decided to grant final anticipatory bail on these grounds. It is clear, therefore, that both the grounds stated by the High Court would not suffice to initiate prosecution Under Section 340 read with Section 195(1)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 387 of 2019 (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 2632/2018)

Decided On: 26.02.2019

 Aarish Asgar Qureshi Vs. Fareed Ahmed Qureshi and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Rohinton Fali Nariman and Vineet Saran, JJ.

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Leading Supreme Court judgment on prosecution for offence of perjury U/S 340 of CRPC

In view of the language used in Section 340 Cr.P.C. the Court is not bound to make a complaint regarding commission of an offence referred to in Section 195(1)(b), as the Section is conditioned by the words "Court is of opinion that it is expedient in the interest of justice." This shows that such a course will be adopted only if the interest of justice requires and not in every case. Before filing of the complaint, the Court may hold a preliminary enquiry and record a finding to the effect that it is expedient in the interests of justice that enquiry should be made into any of the offences referred to in Section 195(i)(b). This expediency will normally be judged by the Court by weighing not the magnitude of injury suffered by the person affected by such forgery or forged document, but having regard to the effect or impact, such commission of offence has upon administration of justice.

It is possible that such forged document or forgery may cause a very serious or substantial injury to a person in the sense that it may deprive him of a very valuable property or status or the like, but such document may be just a piece of evidence produced or given in evidence in Court, where voluminous evidence may have been adduced and the effect of such piece of evidence on the broad concept of administration of justice may be minimal. In such circumstances, the Court may not consider it expedient in the interest of justice to make a complaint.

The broad view of clause (b)(ii), as canvassed by learned counsel for the appellants, would render the victim of such forgery or forged document remedyless. Any interpretation which leads to a situation where a victim of a crime is rendered remedyless, has to be discarded.

19. There is another consideration which has to be kept in mind. Sub- section (1) of Section 340 Cr.P.C. contemplates holding of a preliminary enquiry. Normally, a direction for filing of a complaint is not made during the pendency of the proceeding before the Court and this is done at the stage when the proceeding is concluded and the final judgment is rendered. 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 402 of 2005

Decided On: 11.03.2005

Iqbal Singh Marwah Vs. Meenakshi Marwah and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

R.C. Lahoti, C.J., B.N. Agrawal, H.K. Sema, G.P. Mathur and P.K. Balasubramanyan, JJ.

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Basic principles to be followed by court prior to initiating prosecution for perjury U/S 340 of CRPC

 The Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in the case of Iqbal
Singh Marwah (supra) interpreted section 340. Paragraphs 23 and 24 of the
said decision reads thus :“
23. In view of the language used in Section 340 CrPC the court
is not bound to make a complaint regarding commission of
an offence referred to in Section 195 (1)(b), as the section
is conditioned by the words “court is of opinion that it is
expedient in the interests of justice”. This shows that such a
course will be adopted only if the interest of justice
requires and not in every case. Before filing of the complaint,
the court may hold a preliminary enquiry and record a finding
to the effect that it is expedient in the interests of justice that
enquiry should be made into any of the offences referred to in
Section 195(1)(b). This expediency will normally be judged
by the court by weighing not the magnitude of injury
suffered by the person affected by such forgery or forged
document, but having regard to the effect or impact, such
commission of offence has upon administration of justice. It
is possible that such forged document or forgery may cause
a very serious or substantial injury to a person in the sense
that it may deprive him of a very valuable property or
status or the like, but such document may be just a piece of
evidence produced or given in evidence in court, where
voluminous evidence may have been adduced and the effect
of such piece of evidence on the broad concept of

administration of justice may be minimal. In such
circumstances, the court may not consider it expedient in
the interest of justice to make a complaint. The broad view
of clause (b)(ii), as canvassed by learned counsel for the
appellants, would render the victim of such forgery or forged
document remediless. Any interpretation which leads to a
situation where a victim of a crime is rendered remediless, has
to be discarded.
24. There is another consideration which has to be kept in mind.
Subsection
(1) of Section 340 CrPC contemplates holding of a
preliminary enquiry. Normally, a direction for filing of a
complaint is not made during the pendency of the
proceeding before the court and this is done at the stage
when the proceeding is concluded and the final judgment is
rendered. 

As held
by the Constitution Bench in the case of Iqbal Singh, while deciding
expediency of taking action, the Court cannot weigh magnitude of injury
suffered by the person affected, but the Court is more concerned with the
effect or impact of such commission of offence on the administration of
justice. In view of the facts which are stated above, we are of the view that
at this stage it cannot be stated that the alleged false or misleading
allegations made by the first respondent have any serious impact upon
administration of justice and therefore, at this stage, the prayer made by the
applicant cannot be entertained. We are of the view that as the allegations
and counter allegations will have to be gone into at the time of final hearing
of the Family Court Appeal, at this stage, it is not expedient in the interests
of justice to take action. When we say so, the conduct of the Applicant as
reflected from the record is also taken into consideration. The Applicant has
to come clean by making disclosure of his true income, sources of income,
his assets, etc during the relevant period supported by documents. If a case
is made out, at appropriate stage, this Court can direct recording of
evidence by the Family Court on the case made out by the parties regarding
the income of the husband and the case made out by the wife. We make it
clear that when the appeal is heard on merits, the issues raised by the

applicant in this application as well as prayers will have to be considered by
the Court.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPLICATION NO.72 OF 2017
IN
FAMILY COURT APPEAL NO.113 OF 2014

Dr. Santosh Chandrashekar Shetty Vs Mrs. Ameeta Santosh Shetty

CORAM : A.S. OKA &
ANUJA PRABHUDESSAI, JJ.

DATED : 25.01.2019
JUDGMENT (PER A.S. OKA, J.):
Citation: 2019(3) MHLJ 189

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Whether prosecution for perjury should be initiated if inaccurate statement is made?

The prosecution for perjury should be sanctioned by courts only in those cases where the perjury appears to be deliberate and conscious and the conviction is reasonably probable or likely. No doubt giving of false evidence and filing false affidavits is an evil which must be effectively curbed with a strong hand but to start prosecution for perjury too readily and too frequently without due care and caution and on inconclusive and doubtful material defeats its very purpose. Prosecution should be ordered when it is considered expedient in the interests of justice to punish the delinquent and not merely because there is some inaccuracy in the statement which may be innocent or immaterial. There must be prima facie case of deliberate falsehood on a matter of substance and the court should be satisfied that there is reasonable foundation for the charge. In the present case we do not think the material brought to our notice was sufficiently adequate to justify the conclusion that it is expedient in the interests of justice to file a complaint. The approach of the High Court seems somewhat mechanical and superficial: it does not reflect the requisite judicial deliberation....

12. Having given our anxious consideration to the entirety of the matter, in our view, the guiding principle is the one as laid down in Chajoo Ram (supra). The law is clear, "prosecution should be ordered when it is considered expedient in the interest of justice to punish the delinquent.... and there must be prima facie case of deliberate falsehood on the matter of substance and the Court should be satisfied that there is reasonable foundation for the charge". The assessment made by the High Court, as extracted in the paragraph hereinabove, in our considered view, does not satisfy the parameters and requirements as laid down by this Court.

13. Recently, this Court in Amarsang Nathaji v. Hardik Harshadbhai Patel and Ors. MANU/SC/1516/2016 : (2017) 1 SCC 113 summed up the legal position as under:

6. The mere fact that a person has made a contradictory statement in a judicial proceeding is not by itself always sufficient to justify a prosecution Under Sections 199 and 200 of the Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860) (hereinafter referred to as "IPC"); but it must be shown that the Defendant has intentionally given a false statement at any stage of the judicial proceedings or fabricated false evidence for the purpose of using the same at any stage of the judicial proceedings. Even after the above position has emerged also, still the court has to form an opinion that it is expedient in the interests of justice to initiate an inquiry into the offences of false evidence and offences against public justice and more specifically referred to in Section 340(1) Code of Criminal Procedure., having regard to the overall factual matrix as well as the probable consequences of such a prosecution. (See K.T.M.S. Mohd. v. Union of India). The court must be satisfied that such an inquiry is required in the interests of justice and appropriate in the facts of the case.

14. We are of the considered view that initiation of proceedings in the present case was not consistent with the parameters laid down by this Court. The election petition itself has been dismissed and considering the entirety of the matter, it would not be expedient to initiate proceedings Under Section 340 Code of Criminal Procedure read with Section 195(1)(b)(i) of Code of Criminal Procedure We, therefore, accept the appeal and close the proceedings.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 649 of 2018 (Arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) No. 545 of 2016)

Decided On: 27.04.2018

 Chintamani Malviya Vs. High Court of Madhya Pradesh

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Arun Mishra and U.U. Lalit, JJ.

Citation:(2018) 6 SCC 151

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Procedure to be followed by magistrate in complaint sent by session court for offence U/S 340 of CRPC

 Section 343(1) of the Code now enjoins the Trial Magistrate to deal with the complaint Under Section 340 or Section 341 by treating it to be a case, as if instituted on a police report. There is indeed a deeming element ingrained in the provision.

 We are thus of the firm opinion that a Trial Magistrate, on receipt of a complaint Under Section 340 and/or Section 341 of the Code, if there is a preliminary inquiry and adequate materials in support of the considerations impelling action under the above provisions are available, would be required to treat such complaint to constitute a case, as if instituted on police report and proceed in accordance with law. However, in absence of any preliminary inquiry or adequate materials, it would be open for the Trial Magistrate, if he genuinely feels it necessary, in the interest of justice and to avoid unmerited prosecution to embark on a summary inquiry to collect further materials and then decide the future course of action as per law. In both the eventualities, the Trial Magistrate has to be cautious, circumspect, rational, objective and further informed with the overwhelming caveat that the offence alleged is one affecting the administration of justice, requiring a responsible, uncompromising and committed approach to the issue referred to him for inquiry and trial, as the case may be. In no case, however, in the teeth of Section 343(1), the procedure prescribed for cases instituted otherwise than on police report would either be relevant or applicable qua the complaints Under Section 340 and/or 341 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

59. Reverting to the case in hand, the complaint was filed by the Trial Court stating that the Respondent had committed an offence Under Section 193 Indian Penal Code, he having resorted to falsehood on oath at the trial in order to screen the Accused from the crime and to enable him to escape punishment. The offence alleged is one included in Section 195(1)(b) of the Code and is otherwise, having regard to the punishment prescribed, to which, warrant procedure would be applicable. In course of the arguments, it had transpired that the Trial Magistrate had examined the complainant and some other witnesses before framing charge against the Respondent under the above provision of law. The High Court by the order impugned however, to reiterate, had sustained the plea of the Respondent that as the complaint ought to have been construed to be a case otherwise than on police report to which warrant procedure was applicable, charge could not have been framed as the prosecution had not adduced all its evidence at that stage, as required Under Section 244 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Significantly, no challenge has been made to the legality and/or the validity of the order Under Section 340 or the complaint on any ground. It has also not been asserted in the course of arguments that the evidence already recorded is not sufficient to frame a charge, as had been done by the Trial Magistrate.

60. In view of the determination as above, the approach of the High Court is wholly indefensible, as in the face of Section 343(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the procedure prescribed for cases instituted otherwise than on police report is not attracted qua a complaint Under Section 340 and/or Section 341 of the Code. Even assuming that the Trial Magistrate had examined few witnesses in support of the complaint, it was in the form of a summary inquiry, to be satisfied as to whether the materials on record would justify the framing of charge against the Respondent or not and nothing further. Any other view would fly in the face of the ordainment of Section 343(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure and thus cannot receive judicial imprimatur. 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal Nos. 1427-1428 of 2017 (Arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) Nos. 122-123 of 2016)

Decided On: 18.08.2017

 State of Goa Vs.  Jose Maria Albert Vales

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Arun Mishra and Amitava Roy, JJ.

Citation:( 2018) 11 SCC 659

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