Sunday 9 January 2022

Whether legal heirs of a woman can claim monetary relief under the Domestic violence Act after her death?

Herein, the petitioners do not claim

themselves to be “aggrieved person” but would assert

their right to present an application under Section 12 of

the D.V. Act on behalf of the deceased, who according to

them, was an “aggrieved person”. Therefore, in essence,

petitioners were seeking enforcement of personal rights

of deceased, Suchita, which she had not sought in her

lifetime. In the backdrop of facts aforestated, the rights

sought to be enforced by the petitioner, by presenting an

application under Section 12 of the D.V. Act, was clearly

not maintainable for the following reasons :

(i)the right to claim monetary reliefs,

protection order and compensation under the

D.V. Act, are personal-statutory and inalienable

rights of the “aggrieved person”. These rights

extinguish on the death of “aggrieved person”.

For that reason, such rights were not

enforceable by legal representatives of

“aggrieved person”.

(ii) expression “aggrieved person” has to be

understood and given restrictive meaning, in

view of the Statement and Object and Reasons

of the Act. Defined expression “aggrieved

person” is not inclusive and thus by process of

interpretative explanation, its scope cannot be

expanded like suggested by the petitioners, as

it would counter the Scheme and Object of the

Act and would defeat the intention of

legislation.

(iii) although “any other person” can present

an application under Section 12 of the D.V. Act,

on behalf of “aggrieved person”, nevertheless,

such “other person” cannot maintain an

application independently of an “aggrieved

person”. Infact, Section 12 of the D.V. Act,

simply enables, the “aggrieved person” to

present an application under the Act through

“any other person”. That being the Scheme of

the Act, “aggrieved person” must be living

(alive), while presenting the application.

. Therefore, petitioners attempt to claim rights

through deceased, Suchita, not being acknowledged by

the provisions of the D.V. Act, application has been

rightly rejected by the trial Court and Appellate Court.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

WRIT PETITION NO. 2790 OF 2021

1. Ms. Kanaka Kedar Sapre }

(Through Grandmother) }

2. Mrs. Sudha Mukund Shukla }

(Mother) } 

V/S.

 Mr. Kedar Narhar Sapre 

CORAM : SANDEEP K. SHINDE, J.

Dated: January 4th 2022.


1. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith. By

consent of parties, taken up for hearing forthwith.


2. Petitioner’s application under Section 12 of

the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act,

2005 (“D.V. Act” for short), was held not maintainable by

the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Pune. As a

result, the application was rejected. In appeal, rejection

of order was confrmed. These orders are challenged in

the instant writ petition under Article 227 of the

Constitution of India.

3. Heard Mr. Sarwate, learned Counsel for the

petitioners and Mr. Thatte, Advocate for the respondents.

BACKGROUND FACTS ARE AS UNDER :

4. Petitioner no.1 is the minor daughter of late,

Suchita Kedar Sapre (“deceased” for short). Respondent

no.1 is father of petitioner no.1; respondents no.2 and 3

are grandfather and grandmother of petitioner no.1;

whereas, petitioner no.2 is mother of deceased, Suchita.

It is petitioner’s case that, Suchita got married to

respondent no.1 on 24th November, 2009 whereafter

petitioner no.1 was born on 7th October, 2012.

Throughout, Suchita was neglected by her husband and


in-laws. She was subjected to physical, verbal and

economic abuses by the respondent, due to which, she

suffered serious sickness and was admitted in the

hospital in April, 2013. Suchita passed away on 27th

October, 2013. Her mother and father were taking her

care. Petitioners alleged, the respondents did not bother

to look after Suchita in her lifetime and even during her

illness. Petitioner no.2 (mother of Suchita) would claim

that, she had spent Rs.60,00,000/- for Suchita’s

treatment and would also claim that, she had gifted gold

ornaments in Suchita’s marriage, which are in custody of

mother-in-law, respondent no.3 herein. On the backdrop

of these facts, petitioners presented an application under

Section 12 of the D.V. Act, seeking following reliefs :

“a. The application may kindly be allowed.

b. That as per the list mentioned herein above in Para 21, the

respondent no.3 may kindly be directed to hand over the same to

applicant no.1 through applicant no.2.

c. That respondent no.1 may kindly be directed to pay the

amount of Rs.60,00,000/- (Rs. Sixty Lacs) to the Applicant no.2

spent towards the medical expenses and Hospitalization

expenses of Late, Mrs. Sucheta.


d. That all the respondents may be directed to pay Rs.50,00,000

as compensation to each Applicant.

e. The cost of the present application Rs.50,000/- may be

awarded from the respondents.

f. That the applicants craves the leave to amend/alter the

application and lead oral as well as documentary evidence if and

when necessary.

g. Any other just and equitable orders may please be passed.”

5. Respondents sought dismissal of the

application, inter-alia, questioning locus of the

petitioners and maintainability of the present application

under Section 12 of the D.V. Act; reason being, reliefs

under the said Act, could not have been sought on behalf

of deceased, Suchita. In consideration of the facts of the

case and objection raised by the respondents as to

maintainability of the application, the objection was

upheld. As a result, petitioner’s application was rejected

vide order dated 11th March, 2019. In appeal, rejection

order was confrmed by the Additional Sessions Judge,

Pune vide order dated 16th March, 2021. These orders

are assailed in this petition.


6. Question is, whether an application presented

by the petitioners under Section 12 of the D.V. Act on

behalf of deceased, Suchita Sapre, seeking (i) monetary

relief under Section 20(b) i.e. reimbursement of medical

expenses incurred by petitioner no.2 for the treatment of

deceased, Suchita; (ii)possession of “Streedhan” of late,

Suchita under Section 19(8) of the D.V. Act; and

(iii)compensation under Section 22 from the

respondents, was maintainable ?”

7. Before answering the question, it may be noted

that; Suchita died in the year 2013; whereas; petitioners

presented an application under Section 12 in April, 2015

ON BEHALF of deceased, Suchita for various reliefs.

8. The Protection of Women from Domestic

Violence Act, 2015 has been enacted to protect the

Woman, from being victim of domestic violence and to

prevent occurrence of domestic violence. It covers those

women who are or have been, in relationship with the

“abuser”; where both the parties have lived together in a


shared household and related by consanguinity, marriage

or through a relationship in the nature of marriage or

adoption. The Act empowers the Magistrate to pass,

Protection Orders under Section 18; Residence Orders

under Section 19; Monetary Reliefs order under Section

20 and Compensation Orders under Section 22 of the D.V.

Act. Section 12 of the Act, enables an “aggrieved person”

or a Protection Offcer or any other person on behalf of

the aggrieved person (emphasis supplied), to present an

application to Magistrate seeking one or more reliefs

under the Act. The expression “aggrieved person” means

any woman, who is, or has been in domestic relationship

with the respondents and who alleges to have been

subjected to any act of domestic violence by the

respondents. The expression “domestic relationship”

means relationship between two persons who live or

have, at any point of time, lived together in a shared

household, when they are related by consanguinity,

marriage or through relationship in the nature of

marriage, adoption or are family members living together

as a joint family. Therefore, either “aggrieved person” or

“a person on behalf of aggrieved person”, may move an


application under Section 12 of the Act, seeking one or

more reliefs under the Act.

9. Herein, the petitioners do not claim

themselves to be “aggrieved person” but would assert

their right to present an application under Section 12 of

the D.V. Act on behalf of the deceased, who according to

them, was an “aggrieved person”. Therefore, in essence,

petitioners were seeking enforcement of personal rights

of deceased, Suchita, which she had not sought in her

lifetime. In the backdrop of facts aforestated, the rights

sought to be enforced by the petitioner, by presenting an

application under Section 12 of the D.V. Act, was clearly

not maintainable for the following reasons :

(i)the right to claim monetary reliefs,

protection order and compensation under the

D.V. Act, are personal-statutory and inalienable

rights of the “aggrieved person”. These rights

extinguish on the death of “aggrieved person”.

For that reason, such rights were not

enforceable by legal representatives of

“aggrieved person”.


(ii) expression “aggrieved person” has to be

understood and given restrictive meaning, in

view of the Statement and Object and Reasons

of the Act. Defined expression “aggrieved

person” is not inclusive and thus by process of

interpretative explanation, its scope cannot be

expanded like suggested by the petitioners, as

it would counter the Scheme and Object of the

Act and would defeat the intention of

legislation.

(iii) although “any other person” can present

an application under Section 12 of the D.V. Act,

on behalf of “aggrieved person”, nevertheless,

such “other person” cannot maintain an

application independently of an “aggrieved

person”. Infact, Section 12 of the D.V. Act,

simply enables, the “aggrieved person” to

present an application under the Act through

“any other person”. That being the Scheme of

the Act, “aggrieved person” must be living

(alive), while presenting the application.

. Therefore, petitioners attempt to claim rights

through deceased, Suchita, not being acknowledged by

the provisions of the D.V. Act, application has been

rightly rejected by the trial Court and Appellate Court.

10. For the foregoing reasons, the petition is

dismissed. Rule is discharged. However, dismissal of the

petition, shall not forbid the petitioners from adopting

such other proceedings against the respondents for

enforcing their rights, if any, in accordance with law.

11. Petition is disposed of.

(SANDEEP K. SHINDE, J.)

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