What is distinction between proceeding U/S 12 and U/S 31 of Domestic violence Act?

19.9. Section 31 of the Act provides for punishment only if a person commits breach of protection order passed under Section 18 or an order of interim protection passed under Section 23 of the Act. Thus, commission of acts of domestic violence by themselves do not constitute any offence punishable under the Act and it is only the breach of the order passed by the Magistrate either under Section 18 or under Section 23 of the Act which has been made punishable under Section 31 of the Act. No criminal liability is thus incurred by a person under this Act merely on account of his indulging into acts of domestic violence or depriving a woman from use of the shared household. It is only the reach of the orders passed under Sections 18 and 23 of the Act, which has been made punishable.

19.10. The Court dealing with an application under Section 12 of D.V. Act cannot take cognizance of any offence under IPC because the proceedings under Section 12 of the D.V. Act are civil in nature triable by a Civil Court, Criminal Court or Family Court. However, in the event of breach of a protection order, a fresh criminal case has to be instituted against the accused (either by an FIR or by a criminal complaint before the Court) and in that criminal case, at the stage of framing the charge, the Court is empowered to frame a charge under IPC or any other law if the facts disclose the commission of such offence. This fresh case under Section 31 would be a criminal case as the respondent would be accused of an offence under Section 31 of the DV Act and it would be tried by the Magistrate. This is clear from the reading of Section 31(2) and (3) of D.V. Act.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI

LPA 736/2013 & CM 15769/2013

Decided On: 26.05.2014

Nidhi Kaushik Vs. Union of India and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

P.K. Bhasin and J.R. Midha, JJ.

Author: J.R. Midha, J.

Citation:  MANU/DE/1306/2014.

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Whether wife is barred from lodging FIR U/S 498A of IPC against her husband on the ground that she has filed application U/S 12 of Domestic violence Act?

  The contention of the petitioner that respondent No. 3 is debarred from lodging FIR as she has already filed an application under Section 12 of the DV Act is also without any merit. The scope of proceedings under Section 12 of the DV Act and the scope of criminal proceedings initiated pursuant to the lodging of FIR are entirely different from each other. While in proceedings under Section 12 of the DV Act, the victim of domestic violence can be awarded monetary compensation and she can also be given certain protective orders in her favour, but the criminal proceedings are intended to punish the perpetrator of a crime, may be a matrimonial crime. So, the provisions of DV Act and IPC act in different fields. Therefore, merely because respondent No. 3 has filed an application under DV Act, she cannot be debarred from lodging FIR against the petitioner for investigating the acts of cruelty alleged to have been perpetrated by him against her. {Para 7}

HIGH COURT OF JAMMU & KASHMIR AND LADAKH

AT JAMMU

CRM(M) No. 141/2023

CrlM No. 249/2023

Danish Chauhan Vs Director General J&K Police and others

Coram:

HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY DHAR, JUDGE

Dated: 20.02.2023.

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Whether the court can entertain an application U/S 12 of Domestic violence Act after delay of ten years?

 The provisions of the Act contemplate filing of an application

under Section 12 to initiate the proceedings before the concerned Magistrate. After hearing both sides and after taking into account the material on record, the Magistrate may pass an appropriate order under Section 12 of the Act. It is only the breach of such order which constitutes an offence as is clear from

Section 31 of the Act. Thus, if there be any offence committed in terms of the provisions of the Act, the limitation prescribed under Section 468 of the Code will apply from the date of commission of such offence. By the time an application is preferred under Section 12 of the Act, there is no offence committed in terms of the provisions of the Act and as such there would never be a starting point for limitation from the date of application under Section 12 of the Act. Such a starting point for limitation would arise only and only after there is a breach of an order passed under Section 12 of the Act.

19. The special features with regard to an application under Section 12 of the Act were noticed by a Single Judge of the High Court in Dr. P. Padmanathan & Ors.2 as under:

“19. In the first instance, it is, therefore, necessary to examine the

areas where the D.V. Act or the D.V. Rules have specifically set out the procedure thereby excluding the operation of Cr.P.C. as

contemplated under Section 28(1) of the Act. This takes us to the

D.V. Rules. At the outset, it may be noticed that a “complaint” as

contemplated under the D.V. Act and the D.V. Rules is not the same as a “complaint” under Cr.P.C. A complaint under Rule 2(b) of the D.V. Rules is defined as an allegation made orally or in writing by any person to a Protection Officer. On the other hand, a complaint, under Section 2(d) of the Cr.P.C. is any allegation made orally or in writing to a Magistrate, with a view to his taking action under the Code, that some person, whether known or unknown has committed an offence. However, the Magistrate dealing with an application under Section 12 of the Act is not called upon to take action for the commission of an offence. Hence, what is contemplated is not a complaint but an application to a Magistrate as set out in Rule 6(1) of the D.V. Rules. A complaint under the D.V. Rules is made only to a Protection Officer as contemplated under Rule 4(1) of the D.V. Rules.

20. Rule 6(1) sets out that an application under Section 12 of the

Act shall be as per Form II appended to the Act. Thus, an

application under Section 12 not being a complaint as defined

under Section 2(d) of the Cr.P.C, the procedure for cognizance set out under Section 190(1)(a) of the Code followed by the procedure set out in Chapter XV of the Code for taking cognizance will have no application to a proceeding under the D.V. Act. To reiterate, Section 190(1)(a) of the Code and the procedure set out in the subsequent Chapter XV of the Code will apply only in cases of complaints, under Section 2(d) of Cr.P.C, given to a Magistrate and not to an application under Section 12 of the Act.”

20. It is thus clear that the High Court wrongly equated filing of an application under Section 12 of the Act to lodging of a complaint or initiation of prosecution. In our considered view, the High Court was in error in observing that the application under Section 12 of the Act ought to have been filed within a period of one year of the alleged acts of domestic violence.

21. It is, however, true that as noted by the Protection Officer in his Domestic Inspection Report dated 2.08.2018, there appears to be a period of almost 10 years after 16.09.2008, when nothing was alleged by the appellant against the husband. But that is a matter which will certainly be considered by the Magistrate after response is received from the husband and the rival contentions are considered. That is an exercise which has to be undertaken

by the Magistrate after considering all the factual aspects presented before him, including whether the allegations constitute a continuing wrong.

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.627 OF 2022

KAMATCHI Vs LAKSHMI NARAYANAN

Author: Uday Umesh Lalit, J.

Dated: April 13, 2022.

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Whether legal heirs of a woman can claim monetary relief under the Domestic violence Act after her death?

Herein, the petitioners do not claim

themselves to be “aggrieved person” but would assert

their right to present an application under Section 12 of

the D.V. Act on behalf of the deceased, who according to

them, was an “aggrieved person”. Therefore, in essence,

petitioners were seeking enforcement of personal rights

of deceased, Suchita, which she had not sought in her

lifetime. In the backdrop of facts aforestated, the rights

sought to be enforced by the petitioner, by presenting an

application under Section 12 of the D.V. Act, was clearly

not maintainable for the following reasons :

(i)the right to claim monetary reliefs,

protection order and compensation under the

D.V. Act, are personal-statutory and inalienable

rights of the “aggrieved person”. These rights

extinguish on the death of “aggrieved person”.

For that reason, such rights were not

enforceable by legal representatives of

“aggrieved person”.

(ii) expression “aggrieved person” has to be

understood and given restrictive meaning, in

view of the Statement and Object and Reasons

of the Act. Defined expression “aggrieved

person” is not inclusive and thus by process of

interpretative explanation, its scope cannot be

expanded like suggested by the petitioners, as

it would counter the Scheme and Object of the

Act and would defeat the intention of

legislation.

(iii) although “any other person” can present

an application under Section 12 of the D.V. Act,

on behalf of “aggrieved person”, nevertheless,

such “other person” cannot maintain an

application independently of an “aggrieved

person”. Infact, Section 12 of the D.V. Act,

simply enables, the “aggrieved person” to

present an application under the Act through

“any other person”. That being the Scheme of

the Act, “aggrieved person” must be living

(alive), while presenting the application.

. Therefore, petitioners attempt to claim rights

through deceased, Suchita, not being acknowledged by

the provisions of the D.V. Act, application has been

rightly rejected by the trial Court and Appellate Court.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

WRIT PETITION NO. 2790 OF 2021

1. Ms. Kanaka Kedar Sapre }

(Through Grandmother) }

2. Mrs. Sudha Mukund Shukla }

(Mother) } 

V/S.

 Mr. Kedar Narhar Sapre 

CORAM : SANDEEP K. SHINDE, J.

Dated: January 4th 2022.

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Can Magistrate entertain an application under S. 12 DV Act from woman coming to his jurisdiction for casual visit?

  Thus, averments in application suggest, that Applicant is well educated person; she is financially sound; her parents are in business. In consideration of her background it is difficult to accept her contention or that she could not seek protection order at Hyderabad. In other words, application in no way suggest or implies that she was forced to leave the Hyderabad and or she was intending to reside in Mumbai. On the contrary the chronology of the events do suggest, that the Applicant engineered the cause of action with an intention to file case and confer jurisdiction upon the Magistrate. In the case of, Advocate Ramesh Mohanlal Bhutada Vs. State of Mahrashtra & Ors.,2011 CRI. L.J. 4074, the learned Judge of this Court has made distinction between temporary residence and casual visit. In Paragraph No. 5 it was held that;

“5. In support of the petition, it is submitted on behalf of the petitioners that there is distinction between temporary residence and casual visit. The expression “reside” implied something more than “stay” and implied some intention to remain at a place and not merely to pay it a casual visit. The question of residence is required to be decided as to whether the party claiming residence, permanent or temporary, has an intention to stay at a particular place then alone it could be said that the party is residing at that particular place, either permanently or even temporarily. The question as to whether aggrieved person has made a particular place an abode, permanent or temporary, is a question to be decided with reference to facts of each case. It is apprehended that if liberal construction is placed upon the provisions made under Section 27 of the Act to allow even casual visit of the place to claim that the place is his or her temporary residence within the meaning of Section 27 of the Act 2005, then it may lead to abuse of the legal process as the aggrieved person may choose to harass the other party by choosing any place where he or she may be a casual visitor.

Yet in the case of Prashant s/o Manmohanjhi Laddha Vs. Sau Madhuri w/o Prashant Laddha; 2018 ALL MR (Cri) 2971. It was held that; “Temporary residence requires residence at a place on continuing basis in pursuit of some activity or want or need which may be economic, educational, financial, cultural, social and the like which comes to an end when the goal or purpose is achieved. The period or such residence would vary depending upon the purpose for which it is taken. But, such residence cannot be a residence created just to confer territorial jurisdiction upon a Magistrate of a place or otherwise, it would be easy for a woman well equipped with resources to go to a far away place, set up a temporary residence there just to file a case and file a case to get the pleasure of seeing husband or person in domestic relationship being put to travails of long travels and high expenses. So, to my mind, in the context of Section 27 of the D.V. Act, temporary residence means a residence set up or acquired in the ordinary course of human affairs and is not a residence set up with an intention to file a case and confer jurisdiction upon the magistrate. This is the meaning, plainly and naturally, conveyed by combined reading of key words used in Section 27 of the D.V. Act, which are “resides or carries on business or is employed.” {Para 14}

15. Thus, in consideration of the facts of the case, I hold that the Applicant was not “temporarily” residing within the jurisdiction of the Court of learned Magistrate and no cause of action arose in Mumbai. The facts pleaded in the application and the documents produced in support of her case only belief, leads to indicate that Applicants’ visit to Mumbai was ‘casual visit’ and does not imply definite intention to stay at a particular place. Therefore, order passed by the Magistrate cannot be faulted with, either for wrong or non-exercise of jurisdiction. In fact if liberal construction is placed upon the provision, made under Section 27 of the Act, as sought by the Applicants, it may lead to abuse of legal process of law, as aggrieved person may choose, any place, where she may be a casual visitor.

16. In the result, the impugned order declining to entertain, Petitioner’s application under Section 12 for want of jurisdiction cannot be faulted with. There is no error committed by the learned Magistrate in exercise of her jurisdiction. Petition therefore fails, it is dismissed.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

Writ Petition No. 4184 / 2021

Mrs. Afia Rasheed Khan  Vs Mr. Dr. Mazharuddin Ali Khan

CORAM : SANDEEP K. SHINDE J.

PRONOUNCED ON : 03rd DECEMBER, 2021.

Citation: 2022 ALLMR (Cri) 3125

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Whether court can permit filing of affidavit of examination in chief in proceeding U/S 12 of Domestic violence Act?

A short question raised in this petition is whether in an application filed under Section 12 of the Protection of Women from the Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (hereinafter referred to as 'DV Act'), the Applicant can be permitted to file affidavit in evidence.

Similarly, in Manish Kumar Soni (supra) it has been held as under:-

"27. Hence, though the provision under Section 28(1) of the Act stipulates that the proceeding under Section 12 of the Act shall be governed by the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, but the same is directory in nature and any departure from the provisions of Code of Criminal Procedure will not vitiate the proceeding initiated under Section 12 of the Act."

29. Thus, keeping in mind the aim and object of the Act and scope of Section 28(2), in my considered view the Court can deviate from procedure prescribed under Sub-section (1) of Section 28 r/w. Rule 6(5) and devise its own procedure, which would include permitting evidence by way of an affidavit. In other words, the court in its discretion can allow evidence on affidavit and permit cross examination to test veracity of the evidence.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Writ Petition No. 2938 of 2017

Decided On: 22.03.2018

Aniket Subhash Tupe  Vs.  Piyusha Aniket Tupe and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Anuja Prabhudessai, J.

Citation: 2018 CriLJ 3316,MANU/MH/0537/2018

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Calcutta HC: Mother is entitled to claim relief under domestic violence Act against son

In the present case, the petitioner and the opposite party are related

with each other i.e. the relationship of son and mother. They have been in a

relationship with each other where both the parties lived together in a

residence.

The Learned Courts below after considering the evidence adduced by the

parties and the materials placed on record came to the concurrent findings

that the present opposite party was entitled to get a protection order under

Section 18 of the Act of 2005, monetary relief including medical expenses @

rate of Rs.8,000/- per month from the date of the order and also entitled to get

Rs.50,000/- as damages for mental torture and emotional distress.

Both the Learned Courts elaborately analyzed the evidence on record,

the relationship between the parties, their economic condition and the income

of the other two sons of the present opposite party/mother. Thereafter came to

the conclusion that the aggrieved party/mother was entitled to get the reliefs

under the Act of 2005. The conclusion drawn by the Learned Courts below is

based on facts and law.

It is a settled principle of law that in exercise of its power under Section

482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the High Court should not, in the

absence of perversity, upset concurrent factual findings of the Trial Court and

Appellate Court. Moreso, the High Court in exercise of its inherent power

should not reanalyze and re-assess the materials particularly the evidence on

record.

On perusal of the entire materials on record, it cannot be held that the

Learned Courts below committed an error in holding that the present opposite

party/mother is entitled to get the reliefs under the Protection of Women from

Domestic Violence Act.

IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA

Criminal Revisional Jurisdiction

C.R.R. 2126 of 2015

Goutam Chanda Vs  Gouri Rani Chandan 

Judgment on : 02.12.2019

Present:

The Hon’ble Justice Madhumati Mitra

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Whether wife can execute order passed in her favour under S 12 of Domestic violence Act after her divorce?

Moreover, our law recognises the right of a divorced wife to get maintenance till her remarriage. This Act of 2005 provides additional rights and remedies to the aggrieved person. If the contention of the petitioner is accepted then the wife will be forced to approach before the Magistrate to get maintenance under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. What is needed is that the existence of domestic relationship as defined in the Act is necessary to bring an action and to get relief under the Act of 2005. Existence of domestic relationship is not needed to execute the order granted under Section 12 of the Act of 2005 and the divorced wife who got an order of maintenance and other relief under the Act of 2005 prior to the decree of divorce is entitled to execute the same if she is unable to maintain herself and she has not remarried and for other reasons.

In the High Court of Calcutta

(Before Madhumati Mitra, J.)

Krishnendu Das Thakur v. State of West of Bengal and Another

C.R.R 3566 of 2018 and CRAN 1348 of 2019

Decided on June 28, 2019

Citation: 2019 SCC OnLine Cal 969

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Whether magistrate can consider legality of divorce decree in application U/S 12 of DV Act?

Respondent No. 2, who did not change her stand in the second motion and obtained a sham decree of divorce as alleged by her asked the criminal court to sit in appeal against the judgment and decree of the competent Civil Court. The complaint was filed before the Magistrate, Jalandhar while the decree of divorce had been granted by the District Judge, Ludhiana i.e. of another district. Therefore, it is beyond our imagination as under what circumstances a subordinate criminal court can sit in appeal against the judgment and order of the superior Civil Court, having a different territorial jurisdiction.

22. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the submission made on behalf of Respondent No. 2 that the judgment and decree of a Civil Court granting divorce is null and void and they continued to be the husband and wife, cannot be taken note of at this stage unless the suit filed by the Respondent No. 2 to declare the said judgment and decree dated 20.3.2008 is decided in her favour. In view thereof, the evidence adduced by her particularly the record of the telephone calls, photographs attending a wedding together and her signatures in school diary of the child cannot be taken into consideration so long as the judgment and decree of the Civil Court subsists. On the similar footing, the contention advanced by her counsel that even after the decree of divorce, they continued to live together as husband and wife and therefore the complaint under the Act 2005 is maintainable, is not worth acceptance at this stage.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 1635 of 2011 

Decided On: 23.08.2011

 Inderjit Singh Grewal Vs.  State of Punjab and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

P. Sathasivam and B.S. Chauhan, JJ.

Citation: (2011) 12 SCC 58

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Whether Court can direct brother in law of a widow to pay maintenance to her under Domestic Violence Act?

The submission which has been urged on behalf of the

appellant is that there was no basis under the provisions of

the Act to fasten liability on the appellant, who is the

brother of the deceased spouse of the first respondent.

Learned counsel submitted that the sole basis on which

liability has been fastened is that the appellant and his

deceased brother carried on a joint business. It was urged that

this cannot furnish any lawful basis to direct the appellant to

meet the award of maintenance.

The expression “respondent” is defined in Section 2(q) as

follows:-

2(q) “respondent” means any adult male person

who is, or has been, in a domestic relationship

with the aggrieved person and against whom the

aggrieved person has sought any relief under

this Act:

Provided that an aggrieved wife or female living

in a relationship in the nature of a marriage

may also file a complaint against a relative of

the husband or the male partner;

13. That it is worthwhile to mention here

that after the marriage of Complainant No. 1,

both brother Sh. Vijay Kumar Jindal and Ajay

Kumar Jindal were running their joint

business of M/s. Ajay Kumar Vijay Kumar

Kiryana Store, at Jatal Road, Sanjay Chowk

Panipat, very smoothly and both brothers were

taking / deciding Rs. 30,000/- P.M. each, out

of the income of the said business, for the

maintenance of their respective families.

However after the death of Sh. Vijay Kumar,

the Respondent No. 2 has been running the

said business and the Complainants are

equally entitled to the amount which the

respondent No. 2 has been deducting from the

said joint business or at least Rs. 30,000/-

P.M. which the Complainant No. 1 has been

receiving during the life time of Sh. Vijay

Kumar Jindal.”

At the present stage, there are sufficient averments in

the complaint to sustain the order for the award of interim

maintenance. Paragraph 10 of the complaint prima facie

indicates that the case of the complainants is that the house

where the first respondent and her spouse resided, belong to a

joint family. The appellant and his brother (who was the

spouse of the first respondent and father of the second

respondent) carried on a joint business. The appellant resided

in the same household. Ultimately, whether the requirements of

Section 2(f); Section 2(q); and Section 2(s) are fulfilled is a

matter of evidence which will be adjudicated upon at the trial.

At this stage, for the purpose of an interim order for

maintenance, there was material which justifies the issuance of

a direction in regard to the payment of maintenance.

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO(S). 617 OF 2019

AJAY KUMAR  Vs  LATA @ SHARUTI 

Dated:APRIL 8, 2019.

Citation: (2019) 15 SCC 352.

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Whether wife can claim right of residence in property in the name of her father in law?

Against the above backdrop, the contentions raised by the
petitioner that she has a right to continue to live in a portion of the
above-mentioned property cannot survive. The claim of her husband
through whom she claims the right of residence in his property has
already been repelled by the civil court twice, once in the partition suit
and second time in the suit for partition brought by the first respondent
himself. The claim brought through her son has already been rejected,
the suit for partition having already been dismissed.
12. It is clear from the averments of the petitioner herself, she has
been permitted to use a portion of the property by the second
respondent. This averment may be assumed to be correct. But, then it
is clear from the averment itself that what was allowed was only a
permissive user. The petitioner cannot force herself on the owner of

the property, particularly when she has no vested or legal right to claim residence in his property.
13. The judgments reported as Navneet Arora vs. Surender Kaur & Ors. in FAO (OS 196/2014, decided by a division bench of this Court on 10.09.2014, and Smt. Preeti Satija vs. Smt. Raj Kumari & Anr. in RFA (OS) 24/2012, decided by another division bench of this Court on 15.01.2014, do not assist the petitioner in the present case in view of the ruling of the Supreme Court in S.R. Batra vs. Taruna Batra (2007) 3 SCC 169, particularly, the observations in para 29 of which read as under:-
“As regards Sec. 17 (1) of the Act, in our opinion the wife is only entitled to claim a right to residence in a shared household, and a shared household’ would only mean the house belonging to or taken on rent by the husband, or the house which belongs to the joint family of which the husband is a member. The property in question in the present case neither belongs to Amit Batra nor was it taken on rent by him nor is it a joint family property of which the husband Amit Batra is a member. It is the exclusive property of appellant no.2, mother of Amit Batra. Hence it cannot be called a ‘shared household’.”
IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Decided on: 30th August, 2018
 Crl.M.C. 2082/2016 & Crl.M.A. 8823-24/2016

MANJU GUPTA  Vs  PANKAJ GUPTA 

CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE R.K.GAUBA

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Whether wife can claim relief under domestic violence Act on same allegation on basis of husband is acquitted U/S 498A of IPC?

The considerations in the prosecution under Section 498­A
of the Indian Penal Code are different from the considerations while
dealing with an application under Section 12 of the Domestic Violence
Act, 2005.  “Cruelty” as explained/contemplated by Section 498­A of
the Indian Penal Code is different from the “domestic violence” as
defined by Section 3 of the Domestic Violence Act, 2005. 
“Economic abuse” as defined by clause (iv) of Explanation
I of Section 3 of the Domestic Violence Act, 2005 cannot be an offence
under Section 498­A of the Indian Penal Code.  The denial of right of
shared household or denial of alternate accommodation to the wife or
denial of monetary assistance to the wife will not constitute an offence
punishable under Section 498­A of the Indian Penal Code.  Considering
the facts of the case, in my view, the submissions made on behalf of
the applicant relying on the provisions of Section 300 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, are misdirected.   Apart from the fact that the

applicant   is   acquitted   of   the   charge   of   commission   of   offences
punishable under Section 498­A and Section 323 of the Indian Penal
Code because of insufficiency of evidence, in my view, the claim made
by   the   applicant   under   Sections   17,   19   and   20   of   the   Domestic
Violence Act, 2005 is not hit by the principles of res judicata and by the
findings in the judgment given in Regular Criminal Case No.129/2014.
11. There cannot be  any dispute  that the  principles of  res
judicata  are applicable to criminal proceedings and the maxim “resjudicata
provertitate accipitur” will apply to the proceedings under
Section 12 of the Domestic Violence Act, 2005 as the proceedings are
quasi­civil  quasi­ criminal  in  nature.   However, the  point which is
required to be considered is whether the non­applicant can seek reliefs
under Section 17, Section 19 and Section 20 of the Domestic Violence
Act, 2005 on the basis of the same allegations, for which the applicant
was   prosecuted under Section 498­A and Section 323 of the Indian
Penal Code.  
Though,   in   the   application   under   Section   12   of     the
Domestic Violence Act, 2005, the non­applicant has reproduced the
same   allegations   against   the   applicant   which   were   made   in   the
complaint   made   to   the   police   station   on   the   basis   of   which   the

applicant is prosecuted for offences under Section 498­A and Section
323 of the Indian Penal Code, the pleadings/averments for seeking
reliefs under Section 17, Section 19 and Section 20 of  the Domestic
Violence Act, 2005 are different.  The relevant pleadings in support of
the reliefs claimed by the non­applicant are in paragraph No.60 of the
application, as follows :
“60. That the applicant is not having any source of income
and   she   is   not   doing   any   job   and   her   children   are   also
dependent on her.   It is to submit that the respondent is
lecturer earning good salary but not sparing single pai for the
applicant and the children.  That the respondent is leading his
luxurious life and depriving the applicant and her children
from minimum requirements of the life.  It is to submit that
the   respondent   No.1   can   easily   pay   Rs.20,000/­   to   the
applicant   for   the   maintenance   of   the   applicant   and   her
children.  It is therefore prayed that Hon'ble Court may grant
Rs.20,000/­ as maintenance to the applicant.”
12. The entitlement of the non­applicant for the reliefs sought
by her and the liability of the applicant to provide shared household or
to make an alternate arrangement for residence of the non­applicant
and   to   provide   monetary   assistance   for   food,   clothes,   medical,
travelling and miscellaneous items will have to be adjudicated by the
Court considering the application under Section 12 of   the Domestic
Violence Act, 2005.  Learned Magistrate who has decided the Regular

Criminal Case No. 129/2014 could not have dealt with these issues.

  IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY,
NAGPUR BENCH, NAGPUR.
    CRIMINAL APPLICATION (APL) NO.497 OF 2015

Jaiprakash Madhukarrao Sahurkar,  V Sarika  Jaiprakash Sahurkar,

                             CORAM : Z.A. HAQ, J.
                                     DATED  : 29th FEBRUARY, 2016.
Citation: 2016 ALLMR(CRI)5008

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Whether wife will be debarred from claiming maintenance U/S 125 of CRPC if her application U/S 12 of DV Act is dismissed?

I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner and I am of the
opinion that mere dismissal of the application under Section 12 of the Act
will not debar the proceedings under Section 125 Cr.P.C. as Section 26 (2)
of the Act provides that any relief available under the provisions of the Act
may be sought for by an aggrieved person in addition to or alongwith any
other relief that the aggrieved person may seek in any legal proceedings
before the civil or criminal Court. Dismissal of application under Section 12
of the Act will not, in any manner, prejudice the rights of the respondent
wife to seek relief under Section 125 Cr.P.C.
 IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT
CHANDIGARH.
 CRR (F) 327 of 2015 (O&M)
Date of Decision: December 4, 2015

Satpal Vs. Sheela and another


CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE M.M.S. BEDI.
Citation: 2016 ALLMR(CRI)JOURNAL 239:2016 CRLH(NOC) P&H

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Whether issue of limitation provided under S 468 of crpc is applicable to domestic violence proceeding?

So far as issue of limitation provided under section 468 CrPC is concerned, it has no application to section 12 of the Act of 2005 as it is not a complaint and does not provide punishment. Section 12 of the Act of 2005 provides for an application by the aggrieved person or even by the protection  officer. The petitioners have wrongly construed it to be a complaint so as to attract section 468 CrPC. In view of above, even second argument is not legally tenable. 
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN
JAIPUR BENCH, JAIPUR
ORDER 
SB Cr Misc Petition No.4452/2013
Pankaj Sharma & anr versus Smt Priyanka Sharma 
Dated;1.4.2015  
MR. JUSTICE MN BHANDARI

REPORTABLE
Citation; 2015 CRLJ 3924

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