As such, for bringing the case under Section 27 of the
Evidence Act, it will be necessary for the prosecution to
establish that, based on the information given by the accused
while in police custody, it had led to the discovery of the fact,
which was distinctly within the knowledge of the maker of the
said statement. It is only so much of the information as
relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered would be
admissible. It has been held that the rationale behind this
provision is that, if a fact is actually discovered in consequence
of the information supplied, it affords some guarantee that the
information is true and it can therefore be safely allowed to be
admitted in evidence as an incriminating factor against the
accused. {Para 13}
14. We will have to therefore examine as to whether the
prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that the
recovery of the dead body was on the basis of the information
given by the accused persons in the statement recorded under
Section 27 of the Evidence Act. The prosecution will have to
establish that, before the information given by the accused
persons on the basis of which the dead body was recovered,
nobody had the knowledge about the existence of the dead
body at the place from where it was recovered.
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 3869 OF 2023
RAVISHANKAR TANDON Vs STATE OF CHHATTISGARH
Author: B.R. GAVAI, J.
1. Leave granted in SLP (Criminal) Nos. 837 and 1174 of
2024.
2. These appeals challenge the judgment and order dated
2nd January, 2023 passed by the Division Bench of the High
Court of Chhattisgarh at Bilaspur in Criminal Appeal Nos.
194, 232 and 277 of 2013 wherein the Division Bench
dismissed the criminal appeals preferred by the appellants,
namely Ravishankar Tandon (accused No.1), Umend Prasad
Dhrutlahre (accused No.2), Dinesh Chandrakar (accused
No.3) and Satyendra Kumar Patre (accused No.4) and upheld
the order of conviction and sentence dated 5th February, 2013
as recorded by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Mungeli
(hereinafter referred to as the ‘trial court’) in Sessions Trial No.
10 of 2012.
3. Shorn of details, the facts leading to the present appeals
are as under:-
3.1 On 2nd December 2011, Ramavtar (PW-1) lodged a
missing person report being Missing Person Serial No. 10/11
at Police Station Kunda after his son Dharmendra Satnami
(deceased) went missing. While an extensive search was being
conducted, on the basis of suspicion, the police interrogated
the appellants. During the interrogation, the appellants
disclosed that they had strangulated the deceased to death on
the Bhatgaon Canal Road and had thereafter thrown his body
into a pond at Village Bhatgaon. Thereafter, on 3rd December
2011, the police recorded the memorandum statements of
accused Nos.1 to 3 at about 10:00 am, 10:30 am and 11:00
am, respectively, whereas the memorandum statement of
accused No.4 came to be recorded on 6th December 2011 at
07:00 pm. On the basis of the aforesaid memorandum
statements, the police recovered the dead body of the deceased
from the pond at Bhatgaon on 3rd December 2011 at about
04:05 pm and the dead body was identified. Thereafter, on the
very same day, a First Information Report (‘FIR’ for short) being
No. 402 of 2011 was registered at Police Station Mungeli,
District Bilaspur wherein it is recorded that the aforesaid
offences were committed between the days of 30th November
2011 and 3rd December 2011. According to the Post-Mortem
Report (Ext. P-22), the cause of death of the deceased was
asphyxia due to strangulation and the nature of death was
homicidal.
3.2 The prosecution case stems from the memorandum
statements of the appellants wherein the appellants had
admitted that Dinesh Chandrakar (accused No.3) had
instructed Ravishankar Tandon (accused No.1) and Satyendra
Kumar Patre (accused No.4) to murder the deceased in
exchange for Rs.90,000/-, which was to be paid upon the
execution of the said murder. Upon receiving the aforesaid
instruction, Ravishankar Tandon (accused No.1) and
Satyendra Kumar Patre (accused No.4) along with Umend
Prasad Dhritalhare (accused No.2) hatched a criminal
conspiracy to kill the deceased and worked out a plan to
execute the same. Accordingly, the aforesaid three accused
persons called the deceased to Mungeli on 30th November 2011
under the ruse of purchasing silver. While Umend Prasad
Dhritalhare (accused No. 2) and Satyendra Kumar Patre
(accused No.4) reached Datgaon which fell within the ambit of
Police Station Mungeli, on a motorcycle belonging to a relative
of Satyendra Kumar Patre (accused No.4), Ravishankar
Tandon (accused No.1) and the deceased reached Datgaon by
a bus. Thereafter, the three accused persons along with the
deceased went to visit the house of the brother-in-law of
Satyendra Kumar Patre (accused No.4), namely, Sunil. On that
same night, after taking the dinner, they left Sunil’s house on
the pretext of returning to their homes. However, when they
reached near Bhatgaon, Ravishankar Tandon (accused No.1),
Umend Prasad Dhritalhare (accused No.2) and Satyendra
Kumar Patre (accused No.4) strangulated the deceased to
death and in order to screen themselves from the said act of
murder, the accused persons tied the dead body of the
deceased with his own clothes and stuffed it into a jute sack
which had been procured from Sunil’s house. Thereafter, the
appellants transported the dead body of the deceased to a
pond at Village Bhatgaon, on the motorcycle of Satyendra
Kumar Patre (accused No.4), and threw the dead body into the
said pond, wherefrom it was subsequently recovered.
3.3 Upon the conclusion of the investigation, a charge-sheet
came to be filed before the Court of the Chief Judicial
Magistrate, Mungeli, Chhattisgarh, wherein accused Nos. 1, 2
and 4 had been charged for the offences punishable under
Sections 302 read with 34, Sections 120B and 201 of the
Indian Penal Code, 1860 (‘IPC’ for short) whereas accused No.3
had been charged for the offences punishable under Sections
302 read with 34 and 120B of the IPC. Since the case was
exclusively triable by the Sessions Court, the same came to be
committed to the Sessions Court.
3.4 Charges came to be framed by the trial court for the
aforesaid offences. The accused/appellants pleaded not guilty
and claimed to be tried.
3.5 The prosecution examined 18 witnesses and exhibited 37
documents to bring home the guilt of the accused/appellants.
The defence, on the other hand, did not examine any witness
or exhibit any document.
3.6 At the conclusion of the trial, the trial Court found that
the prosecution had proved the case against the appellants
beyond reasonable doubt and accordingly convicted accused
Nos. 1, 2 and 3 for the offences punishable under Sections 302
read with 34, Sections 120B and 201 of the IPC and convicted
accused No. 4 for the offences punishable under Sections 302
read with 34 and 120B of the IPC and sentenced all of them to
undergo imprisonment for life along with fine.
3.7 Being aggrieved thereby, the appellants preferred three
Criminal Appeals before the High Court. The High Court vide
the impugned judgment dismissed the Criminal Appeals and
affirmed the order of conviction and sentence awarded by the
trial Court.
4. Being aggrieved thereby, the present appeals.
5. We have heard Shri Manish Kumar Saran, learned
counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant in Criminal
Appeal No. 3869 of 2023, Shri Chandrika Prasad Mishra,
learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants in
Criminal Appeal No. 2740 of 2023, appeals arising out of SLP
(Criminal) Nos. 837 and 1174 of 2024, and Shri Praneet
Pranav, learned Deputy Advocate General (‘Dy. AG’ for short)
appearing on behalf of the respondent-State at length.
6. Shri Saran and Shri Mishra, learned counsel appearing
on behalf of the appellants, submitted that the present case
rests on circumstantial evidence. It is submitted that the
prosecution has failed to prove any of the incriminating
circumstances beyond reasonable doubt. It is submitted that,
in any case, the prosecution has failed to establish the chain
of proven circumstances which leads to no other conclusion
than the guilt of the accused persons. They therefore
submitted that the appeals deserve to be allowed and the
judgments and orders of conviction need to be quashed and
set aside.
7. Shri Pranav, learned Dy. AG appearing on behalf of the
respondent-State, on the contrary, submitted that both the
High Court and the trial court have concurrently held that the
prosecution has proved the case beyond reasonable doubt. He
submitted that the findings of the trial court and the High
Court are based upon cogent appreciation of evidence and as
such, no interference is warranted.
8. Undoubtedly, the prosecution case rests on
circumstantial evidence. The law with regard to conviction on
the basis of circumstantial evidence has very well been
crystalized in the judgment of this Court in the case of Sharad
Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra1, wherein this
Court held thus:
“152. Before discussing the cases relied upon by the
High Court we would like to cite a few decisions on
the nature, character and essential proof required in
a criminal case which rests on circumstantial
evidence alone. The most fundamental and basic
decision of this Court is Hanumant v. State of
Madhya Pradesh [(1952) 2 SCC 71 : AIR 1952 SC 343
: 1952 SCR 1091 : 1953 Cri LJ 129]. This case has
been uniformly followed and applied by this Court in
a large number of later decisions up-to-date, for
instance, the cases of Tufail (Alias) Simmi v. State of
Uttar Pradesh [(1969) 3 SCC 198 : 1970 SCC (Cri) 55]
and Ramgopal v. State of Maharashtra [(1972) 4 SCC
625 : AIR 1972 SC 656]. It may be useful to extract
what Mahajan, J. has laid down in Hanumant case
[(1952) 2 SCC 71 : AIR 1952 SC 343 : 1952 SCR 1091
: 1953 Cri LJ 129] :
“It is well to remember that in cases where
the evidence is of a circumstantial nature,
the circumstances from which the
conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should
in the first instance be fully established,
and all the facts so established should be
consistent only with the hypothesis of the
1 (1984) 4 SCC 116 : 1984 INSC 121
guilt of the accused. Again, the
circumstances should be of a conclusive
nature and tendency and they should be
such as to exclude every hypothesis but
the one proposed to be proved. In other
words, there must be a chain of evidence
so far complete as not to leave any
reasonable ground for a conclusion
consistent with the innocence of the
accused and it must be such as to show
that within all human probability the act
must have been done by the accused.”
153. A close analysis of this decision would show
that the following conditions must be fulfilled before
a case against an accused can be said to be fully
established:
(1) the circumstances from which the
conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should
be fully established.
It may be noted here that this Court indicated that
the circumstances concerned “must or should” and
not “may be” established. There is not only a
grammatical but a legal distinction between “may be
proved” and “must be or should be proved” as was
held by this Court in Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v.
State of Maharashtra [(1973) 2 SCC 793 : 1973 SCC
(Cri) 1033 : 1973 Crl LJ 1783] where the observations
were made: [SCC para 19, p. 807: SCC (Cri) p. 1047]
“Certainly, it is a primary principle that
the accused must be and not merely may
be guilty before a court can convict and
the mental distance between ‘may be’ and
‘must be’ is long and divides vague
conjectures from sure conclusions.”
(2) the facts so established should be
consistent only with the hypothesis of the
guilt of the accused, that is to say, they
should not be explainable on any other
hypothesis except that the accused is
guilty,
(3) the circumstances should be of a
conclusive nature and tendency,
(4) they should exclude every possible
hypothesis except the one to be proved,
and
(5) there must be a chain of evidence so
complete as not to leave any reasonable
ground for the conclusion consistent with
the innocence of the accused and must
show that in all human probability the act
must have been done by the accused.
154. These five golden principles, if we may say so,
constitute the panchsheel of the proof of a case based
on circumstantial evidence.”
9. It can thus clearly be seen that it is necessary for the
prosecution that the circumstances from which the
conclusion of the guilt is to be drawn should be fully
established. The Court held that it is a primary principle that
the accused ‘must be’ and not merely ‘may be’ proved guilty
before a court can convict the accused. It has been held that
there is not only a grammatical but a legal distinction between
‘may be proved’ and ‘must be or should be proved’. It has been
held that the facts so established should be consistent only
with the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not
be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the
accused is guilty. It has further been held that the
circumstances should be such that they exclude every
possible hypothesis except the one to be proved. It has been
held that there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not
to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent
with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all
human probabilities the act must have been done by the
accused.
10. It is settled law that suspicion, however strong it may be,
cannot take the place of proof beyond reasonable doubt. An
accused cannot be convicted on the ground of suspicion, no
matter how strong it is. An accused is presumed to be
innocent unless proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
11. In the light of these guiding principles, we will have to
examine the present case.
12. The prosecution case basically relies on the
circumstance of the memorandum of the accused under
Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (for short
“Evidence Act”) and the subsequent recovery of the dead body
from the pond at Bhatgaon. The learned Judges of the High
Court have relied on the judgment of this Court in the case of
State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu alias Afsan Guru2.
The High Court has relied on the following observations of the
said judgment:
“121. The first requisite condition for utilising
Section 27 in support of the prosecution case is that
the investigating police officer should depose that he
discovered a fact in consequence of the information
received from an accused person in police custody.
Thus, there must be a discovery of fact not within the
knowledge of police officer as a consequence of
information received. Of course, it is axiomatic that
the information or disclosure should be free from any
element of compulsion. The next component of
Section 27 relates to the nature and extent of
information that can be proved. It is only so much of
the information as relates distinctly to the fact
thereby discovered that can be proved and nothing
more. It is explicitly clarified in the section that there
is no taboo against receiving such information in
evidence merely because it amounts to a confession.
At the same time, the last clause makes it clear that
it is not the confessional part that is admissible but
it is only such information or part of it, which relates
distinctly to the fact discovered by means of the
information furnished. Thus, the information
conveyed in the statement to the police ought to be
dissected if necessary so as to admit only the
information of the nature mentioned in the section.
The rationale behind this provision is that, if a fact is
actually discovered in consequence of the
information supplied, it affords some guarantee that
the information is true and can therefore be safely
allowed to be admitted in evidence as an
incriminating factor against the accused. As pointed
out by the Privy Council in Kottaya case [AIR 1947
PC 67 : 48 Cri LJ 533 : 74 IA 65] : (AIR p. 70, para
10)
2 (2005) 11 SCC 600 : 2005 INSC 333
13
“clearly the extent of the information
admissible must depend on the exact
nature of the fact discovered”
and the information must distinctly relate to that
fact.
Elucidating the scope of this section, the Privy
Council speaking through Sir John Beaumont said:
(AIR p. 70, para 10)
“Normally the section is brought into
operation when a person in police custody
produces from some place of concealment
some object, such as a dead body, a
weapon, or ornaments, said to be
connected with the crime of which the
informant is accused.”
(emphasis supplied)
We have emphasised the word “normally” because
the illustrations given by the learned Judge are not
exhaustive. The next point to be noted is that the
Privy Council rejected the argument of the counsel
appearing for the Crown that the fact discovered is
the physical object produced and that any and every
information which relates distinctly to that object can
be proved. Upon this view, the information given by
a person that the weapon produced is the one used
by him in the commission of the murder will be
admissible in its entirety. Such contention of the
Crown's counsel was emphatically rejected with the
following words: (AIR p. 70, para 10)
“If this be the effect of Section 27, little
substance would remain in the ban
imposed by the two preceding sections on
confessions made to the police, or by
persons in police custody. That ban was
presumably inspired by the fear of the
legislature that a person under police
influence might be induced to confess by
the exercise of undue pressure. But if all
that is required to lift the ban be the
inclusion in the confession of information
relating to an object subsequently
produced, it seems reasonable to suppose
that the persuasive powers of the police
will prove equal to the occasion, and that
in practice the ban will lose its effect.”
Then, Their Lordships proceeded to give a lucid
exposition of the expression “fact discovered” in the
following passage, which is quoted time and again by
this Court: (AIR p. 70, para 10)
“In Their Lordships' view it is fallacious to
treat the ‘fact discovered’ within the
section as equivalent to the object
produced; the fact discovered embraces
the place from which the object is
produced and the knowledge of the
accused as to this, and the information
given must relate distinctly to this fact.
Information as to past user, or the past
history, of the object produced is not
related to its discovery in the setting in
which it is discovered. Information
supplied by a person in custody that ‘I will
produce a knife concealed in the roof of my
house’ does not lead to the discovery of a
knife; knives were discovered many years
ago. It leads to the discovery of the fact that
a knife is concealed in the house of the
informant to his knowledge, and if the
knife is proved to have been used in the
commission of the offence, the fact
discovered is very relevant. But if to the
statement the words be added ‘with which
I stabbed A’ these words are inadmissible
since they do not relate to the discovery of
the knife in the house of the informant.”
(emphasis supplied)
128. So also in Udai Bhan v. State of U.P. [1962
Supp (2) SCR 830 : AIR 1962 SC 1116 : (1962) 2 Cri
LJ 251] J.L. Kapur, J. after referring to Kottaya
case [AIR 1947 PC 67 : 48 Cri LJ 533 : 74 IA 65]
stated the legal position as follows: (SCR p. 837)
“A discovery of a fact includes the object
found, the place from which it is produced
and the knowledge of the accused as to its
existence.”
The above statement of law does not run counter to
the contention of Mr. Ram Jethmalani, that the
factum of discovery combines both the physical
object as well as the mental consciousness of the
informant accused in relation thereto. However, what
would be the position if the physical object was not
recovered at the instance of the accused was not
discussed in any of these cases.”
13. As such, for bringing the case under Section 27 of the
Evidence Act, it will be necessary for the prosecution to
establish that, based on the information given by the accused
while in police custody, it had led to the discovery of the fact,
which was distinctly within the knowledge of the maker of the
said statement. It is only so much of the information as
relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered would be
admissible. It has been held that the rationale behind this
provision is that, if a fact is actually discovered in consequence
of the information supplied, it affords some guarantee that the
information is true and it can therefore be safely allowed to be
admitted in evidence as an incriminating factor against the
accused.
14. We will have to therefore examine as to whether the
prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that the
recovery of the dead body was on the basis of the information
given by the accused persons in the statement recorded under
Section 27 of the Evidence Act. The prosecution will have to
establish that, before the information given by the accused
persons on the basis of which the dead body was recovered,
nobody had the knowledge about the existence of the dead
body at the place from where it was recovered.
15. The prosecution, insofar as the memorandum under
Section 27 of the Evidence Act is concerned, has relied on the
depositions of Ramkumar (PW-5) and Ajab Singh (PW-18).
According to the prosecution, the statement of Ravishankar
Tandon (accused No. 1) was recorded on 3rd December 2011 at
10:00 am. On the same day, the statement of Umend Prasad
Dhritalhare (accused No. 2) was recorded at 10:30 am, and
that of Dinesh Chandrakar (accused No. 3) at 11:00 am.
Whereas the statement of Satyendra Kumar Patre (accused No.
4) was recorded on 6th December 2011 at 07:00 pm. It will be
relevant to refer to the relevant part of the evidence of
Ramkumar (PW-5), which reads thus:
“2. In front of me, accused Ravishankar have told to
the police that at the behest of accused Dinesh, they
have killed Dharmender for Rs. 90,000 and made a
plan and Ravishankar called Dharmender called him
to buy silver and killed him in Bhatgaon stuffed his
dead body in a sack and threw it in the pond. On
being shown the memorandum statement of Exhibit
P- l0 have told to be his signature on Part A to A.
3. Umed had also told the police in front of me that
Sattu along with Ravi Shankar had killed
Dharmendra and threw him in Bhatagaon's lake on
the advice of Dinesh. Witness Memo statement is
Exhibit P-11 and accepts his signature on part A to
A.
4. Dinesh had told in front of me that 6 months back
he had made a deal with Ravishankar and sattu to
kill Dharmender for 90 thousand rupees. Dinesh also
told that Shankar had said that the work is done, give
him the money. On being shown Exhibit P-12,
accepted to have his signature on Part A to A.
Witness states that it was seized from the pond in
front of me.
5. Village Kunda is 16 km away from my village. It is
correct that Dharmendra had come to know about
the murder on 3rd. Witness states that it was
informed by the police. On that other morning, at
about 7 -8 o'clock in the morning, it is correct that
on my arrival in village Kunda, my brother-in-law
and nephew Narendra had told me about the murder
which was done by the accused. By that time we did
not reach the spot that's why whether it was
Dharmender's body or not I cannot.”
6. I went from Kunda to Bhatgaon on 2nd with the
police, then he says that at that time it was about two
and a half o'clock in the evening. It is correct that
when I reached Bhatgaon there were many people of
the village. It is correct that because of dead body
there were many people there. It is correct to say that
police have brought the dead body to Mungeli police
station where PM was done.
7. It is correct that accused were brought to Mungeli
police station. It is incorrect that I had taken the
signature of accused at Mungeli police station.
Accused have given the statement at Kunda police
station, in front of me. Apart from the accused we
were 5-6 other family members in the Police station
Kunda. The police took the statement at around 12
o'clock.
…………..
14. We have reached Bhatgaon at 4.30-5. And
reached Mungeli before sunset. It is incorrect to· say
that the police have taken my signature Witness itself
states that I have signed in Bhatgaon. It is incorrect
to say that I did not read the papers before signing
them. Witness says that the I have read the main
part. It is incorrect to say that I am seeing accused
for the first time today. It is incorrect to say that I
know accused by name only, witness states that I
know him by face also. It is incorrect to say that the
name of the accused was revealed by my brotherin-:
law and Narendra it was told by the police.”
16. It is to be noted that Ramkumar (PW-5) is the brother-inlaw
of the deceased. A perusal of his evidence would reveal
that he has admitted that, on his arrival in village Kunda, he
was informed by his brother-in-law and nephew Narendra
Kumar (PW-2) about the murder of the deceased which was
done by the accused persons. He stated that, by that time they
had not reached the spot and that is why they were not aware
as to whether it was the body of Dharmendra or not. He
further admitted that when they reached Bhatgaon, many
people of the village were there. He has also admitted that
because of the dead body, many people were there. He has
further admitted that the accused persons had given their
statements at Kunda police station. He has further admitted
that they had reached Bhatgaon at around 04:30 pm to 05:00
pm and had reached Mungeli before sunset. He has also stated
that he had signed the panchnama at Bhatgaon.
17. It could thus be seen that, according to this witness (PW-
5), though the statement was taken at Kunda, it was signed at
Bhatgaon.
18. Ajab Singh (PW-18) is another witness on the
memorandum recorded under Section 27 of the Evidence Act
and the subsequent recovery of the dead body. He states that
Ravishankar informed the police that Dharmendra had been
killed and thrown into the pond. However, he states in
examination-in-chief that Umend and Dinesh did not tell
anything to the police in front of him. It will be relevant to
refer to his cross-examination, which reads thus:
“4. It is true that I used to work as Kotwari. It is true
that I did not have read the paper. It is true that I
had signed 3-4 papers on the instructions of the
police. It is true that due to being Kotwar had to visit
police station regularly. It is true that I signed on
documents on the instructions of the police. It is
wrong to say that I signed in police station, Kunda.
20
Witnesses say that it was signed in Dandaon.”
19. It could thus be seen that Ajab Singh (PW-18) has clearly
admitted that he did not read the papers before putting his
signature on them. He has admitted that he had signed 3-4
papers on the instructions of the police. He has also stated
that he had signed the statement at Dandaon.
20. Narendra Kumar (PW-2) is the brother of the deceased.
He has stated that, after his brother went missing; on the next
day at around 08:00 o’clock in the morning, the police came
to his place and informed that his brother Dharmendra had
been killed by Ravishankar, Satnami, Umend and Satyendra.
After that, they went to Bhatgaon with the police. The extract
of the evidence of Narendra Kumar (PW-2) is as under:
“3. At around 8 in morning the police came to my
place and informed that my brother Dharmendra was
killed by Ravishankar, Satnami, Umend and
Satyendra. After that we went to Bhatgaon with the
police. Ramkumar, Krishna, Banshee had gone with
me.”
21. A perusal of the evidence of Narendra Kumar (PW-2) read
with that of Ramkumar (PW-5) would clearly reveal that the
police as well as these witnesses knew about the death of
Dharmendra Satnami occurring and the dead body being
21
found at Bhatgaon prior to the statements of the accused
persons being recorded under Section 27 of the Evidence Act.
All the statements are recorded after 10:00 am whereas
Ramkumar (PW-2) stated that at around 08:00 am, police
informed him about the accused persons killing the deceased
and thereafter they going to Bhatgaon. Ramkumar (PW-5) also
admitted that he arrived at village Kunda and on his arrival,
he was informed by his brother-in-law and nephew about the
murder which was done by the accused persons.
22. We therefore find that the prosecution has utterly failed
to prove that the discovery of the dead body of the deceased
from the pond at Bhatgaon was only on the basis of the
disclosure statement made by the accused persons under
Section 27 of the Evidence Act and that nobody knew about
the same before that. It is further to be noted that Ajab Singh
(PW-18) has clearly admitted that he had signed the papers
without reading them and that too on the instructions of the
police.
23. The evidence of Ramkumar (PW-5) would show that
though his statement was taken at Kunda police station, it was
signed at Bhatgaon. As such, the possibility of these
22
documents being created to rope in the accused persons
cannot be ruled out. In any case, insofar as the statement of
Dinesh Chandrakar (accused No. 3) is concerned, even the
statement recorded under Section 27 of the Evidence Act is not
at all related to the discovery of the dead body of the deceased.
As a matter of fact, nothing in his statement recorded under
Section 27 of the Evidence Act has led to discovery of any
incriminating fact.
24. Another aspect that needs to be noted is that, the only
evidence with regard to recording of the memorandum of
accused persons under Section 27 of the Evidence Act is
concerned, is that of B.R. Singh, the then Investigating Officer
(IO) (PW-16). The relevant part thereof reads thus:
“1. ….I wrote the statement of accused Ravi Shankar
as per memorandum Ex. P-10 after taking him into
custody in which my signature is on part B to B. I
wrote the statement of accused· Um end as per his
memorandum Ex. P-11 and accused Dinesh as per
his memorandum Ex. P-12 in which my signature is
on part B to B.”
25. It could thus be seen that the IO (PW-16) has failed to
state as to what information was given by the accused persons
which led to the discovery of the dead body. The evidence is
23
also totally silent as to how the dead body was discovered and
subsequently recovered. We find that therefore, the evidence
of the IO (PW-16) would also not bring the case at hand under
the purview of Section 27 of the Evidence Act. Reliance in this
respect could be placed on the judgments of this Court in the
cases of Asar Mohammad and Others v. State of Uttar
Pradesh3 and Boby v. State of Kerala4.
26. We therefore find that the prosecution has utterly failed
to prove any of the incriminating circumstances against the
appellants herein. In any case, the chain of circumstances
must be so complete that it leads to no other conclusion than
the guilt of the accused persons, which is not so in the present
case.
27. In the result, we pass the following order:
(i) The appeals are allowed;
(ii) The judgment dated 2nd January 2023 passed by the
High Court and the judgment dated 5th February 2013
passed by the trial court are quashed and set aside;
and
3 (2019) 12 SCC 253 : 2018 INSC 985
4 2023 SCC OnLine SC 50 : 2023 INSC 23
24
(iii) The appellants are directed to be acquitted of all the
charges charged with and are directed to be released
forthwith, if not required in any other case.
28. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.
…….........................J.
[B.R. GAVAI]
…….........................J.
[SANDEEP MEHTA]
NEW DELHI;
APRIL 10, 2024.
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