Supreme Court: Mere Marking Of Document As Exhibit Is Not Proof Of Contents

 It is also settled law that mere marking of a document as an exhibit, is not a proof of the contents thereof. A Division Bench of this Court in LIC v. Ram Pal Singh Bisen2 had observed:{Para 11}

“25. We are of the firm opinion that mere admission of a document in evidence does not amount to its proof. In other words, mere marking of exhibit on a document does not dispense with its proof, which is requiredto be done in accordance with law.

31. Under the law of evidence also, it is necessary that contents of documents are required to be proved either by primary or by secondary evidence. At the most, admission of documents may amount to admission of contents but not its truth. Documents having not been produced and marked as required under the Evidence Act cannot be relied upon by the court. Contents of the document cannot be proved by merely filing in a court.”

NON-REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. OF 2026

S. SANGEETHA & ORS Vs  TMT. P. PONNI 

Author: SANJAY KAROL, J.

Dated: August 07, 2026

Citation: 2026 INSC 813

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Supreme Court: Sale Deed Does Not Require Proof Of Attestation As Per Section 68 of Evidence Act

There is no gainsaying that Section 68 of Evidence Act opens with the words,

“if a document is required by law to be attested…”. Since the

proviso cannot be construed independently of the main

provision that it attaches to, it is as clear as a noon day that

the proviso to Section 68 cannot create an independent rule

as regards “specific denial” for all attested documents. In

other words, the proviso to Section 68 carves out an

exception only in respect of documents that are required to

be mandatorily attested by law. A sale deed does not fall in

the category of such documents, therefore, the proviso to

Section 68 would not be applicable in the present matter.{Para 46}

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6526 OF 2024

R. VERONICA & ANR. Vs RUDRAYANI DEVAKI(D) THROUGH LRS. S. SATHA KUMAR & ORS.

Citation: 2026 INSC 703

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Supreme Court: Registered Sale Deed Presumed Valid; Minor Discrepancy In Attestation Witness Details Won't Invalidate Execution

 In our considered opinion, the aforesaid discrepancy was wholly inconsequential and incapable of dislodging the presumption attaching to a registered conveyance executed nearly four decades earlier. The sale deed in question was executed on 04.06.1957, whereas the testimony of the attesting witness came to be recorded after approximately 38 years on 07.09.1995. In such circumstances, minor variations in the description of residence or village particulars could hardly be treated as material contradictions striking at the root of the transaction itself, particularly when both villages are admittedly proximate to each other. {Para 55}

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8705 OF 2026

SARAFAT ALI (DECEASED) Vs DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF

CONSOLIDATION HARIDWAR AND OTHERS

Author: PRASHANT KUMAR MISHRA, J.

Citation: 2026 INSC 652

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Supreme Court Extends S.498A IPC To Live-In Relationships Which Are 'Relationships In The Nature Of Marriage'

CONCLUSION

23. (i) Section 498A is held to be applicable to “live-in

relationships” that qualify as “relationships in the nature of

marriage” with the intent to marry being established as an

intrinsic part thereof;

(ii) The “live-in relationships” protected by Section 498A, it

is stated for ample clarity, are those that are between two

consenting adult individuals;

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL No (s). OF 2026

DR. LOKESH B.H. & ORS. Vs  STATE OF KARNATAKA & ANR. 

Author: SANJAY KAROL, J.

Citation: 2026 INSC 784

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Supreme Court: Under which circumstances, Magistrate is not required to record reasons for passing the order of issue process?

 In Kanti Bhadra Shah and Anr. v. State of West Bengal   MANU/SC/0004/2000 : (2000) 1 SCC 722, the following passage will be apposite in this context:

12. If there is no legal requirement that the trial Court should write an order showing the reasons for framing a charge, why should the already burdened trial Courts be further burdened with such an extra work. The time has reached to adopt all possible measures to expedite the Court procedures and to chalk out measures to avert all roadblocks causing avoidable delays. If a Magistrate is to write detailed orders at different stages merely because the counsel would address arguments at all stages, the snail- paced progress of proceedings in trial Courts would further be slowed down. We are coming across interlocutory orders of Magistrates and Sessions Judges running into several pages. We can appreciate if such a detailed order has been passed for culminating the proceedings before them. But it is quite unnecessary to write detailed orders at other stages, such as issuing process, remanding the accused to custody, framing of charges, passing over to next stages in the trial.... {Para 12}

(Emphasis supplied)

13. In Smt. Nagawwa v. Veeranna Shivalingappa Konjalgi and Ors.   MANU/SC/0173/1976 : (1976) 3 SCC 736, this Court held that it is not the province of the Magistrate to enter into a detailed discussion on the merits or demerits of the case. It was further held that in deciding whether a process should be issued, the Magistrate can take into consideration improbabilities appearing on the face of the complaint or in the evidence led by the complainant in support of the allegations. The Magistrate has been given an undoubted discretion in the matter and the discretion has to be judicially exercised by him. It was further held that once the Magistrate has exercised his discretion, it is not for the High Court, or even this Court, to substitute its own discretion for that of the Magistrate or to examine the case on merits with a view to find out whether or not the allegations in the complaint, if proved, would ultimately end in conviction of the accused.

14. In Dy. Chief Controller of Imports and Exports v. Roshanlal Agarwal and Ors.   MANU/SC/0182/2003 : (2003) 4 SCC 139, this Court, in para 9, held as under:

9. In determining the question whether any process is to be issued or not, what the Magistrate has to be satisfied is whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding and not whether there is sufficient ground for conviction. Whether the evidence is adequate for supporting the conviction, can be determined only at the trial and not at the stage of inquiry. At the stage of issuing the process to the accused, the Magistrate is not required to record reasons.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 612 of 2012 

Decided On: 04.04.2012

Bhushan Kumar and Ors. Vs. State (NCT of Delhi) and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

P. Sathasivam and Jasti Chelameswar, JJ.

Author: P. Sathasivam, J.

Citation: 2012 INSC 164, MANU/SC/0297/2012

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Supreme Court: Precaution to be taken by the court while passing order of issue process against in- laws of wife for prosecution U/S 498A of IPC

Recently, in K. Subba Rao v. The State of Telangana   MANU/SC/0880/2018 : (2018) 14 SCC 452, it was also observed that:

6. The Courts should be careful in proceeding against the distant relatives in crimes pertaining to matrimonial disputes and dowry deaths. The relatives of the husband should not be roped in on the basis of omnibus allegations unless specific instances of their involvement in the crime are made out. {Para 17}

18. The above-mentioned decisions clearly demonstrate that this Court has at numerous instances expressed concern over the misuse of Section 498A Indian Penal Code and the increased tendency of implicating relatives of the husband in matrimonial disputes, without analysing the long term ramifications of a trial on the complainant as well as the Accused. It is further manifest from the said judgments that false implication by way of general omnibus allegations made in the course of matrimonial dispute, if left unchecked would result in misuse of the process of law. Therefore, this Court by way of its judgments has warned the courts from proceeding against the relatives and in-laws of the husband when no prima facie case is made out against them.

19. Coming to the facts of this case, upon a perusal of the contents of the FIR dated 01.04.19, it is revealed that general allegations are levelled against the Appellants. The complainant alleged that 'all Accused harassed her mentally and threatened her of terminating her pregnancy'. Furthermore, no specific and distinct allegations have been made against either of the Appellants herein, i.e., none of the Appellants have been attributed any specific role in furtherance of the general allegations made against them. This simply leads to a situation wherein one fails to ascertain the role played by each Accused in furtherance of the offence. The allegations are therefore general and omnibus and can at best be said to have been made out on account of small skirmishes.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 195 of 2022

Decided On: 08.02.2022

Kahkashan Kausar and Ors. Vs. State of Bihar and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

S. Abdul Nazeer and Krishna Murari, JJ.

Author: Krishna Murari, J.

Citation: 2022 INSC 163, MANU/SC/0163/2022,(2022) 6 SCC 599

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Supreme Court: No FIR U/S 498A of IPC is complete without Sections 506(2) and 323 of the Indian Penal Code.

In all cases, where wife complains of harassment or ill-treatment, Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code cannot be applied mechanically. No FIR is complete without Sections 506(2) and 323 of the Indian Penal Code. Every matrimonial conduct, which may cause annoyance to the other, may not amount to cruelty. Mere trivial irritations, quarrels between spouses, which happen in day-to-day married life, may also not amount to cruelty.

Ratio: If a person is made to face a criminal trial on some general and sweeping allegations without bringing on record any specific instances of criminal conduct, it is nothing but abuse of the process of the court.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 2379 of 2024 

Decided On: 03.05.2024

Achin Gupta Vs. State of Haryana and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

J.B. Pardiwala and Manoj Misra, JJ.

J.B. Pardiwala, J.

Author: Citation: 2024 INSC 369, MANU/SC/0377/2024

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Supreme Court Highlights Growing Trend Of Dowry Victims Arraigning Relatives Of Husband residing at distant place away from victim

 Insofar as Appellant Nos. 2 to 6 are concerned, we find that they have no connection to the matter at hand and have been dragged into the web of crime without any rhyme or reason. A perusal of the FIR would indicate that no substantial and specific allegations have been made against Appellant Nos. 2 to 6 other than stating that they used to instigate Appellant No. 1 for demanding more dowry. It is also an admitted fact that they never resided with the couple namely Appellant No. 1 and Respondent No. 2 and their children. Appellant Nos. 2 and 3 resided together at Guntakal, Andhra Pradesh. Appellant Nos. 4 to 6 live in Nellore, Bengaluru and Guntur respectively. {Para 24}

25. A mere reference to the names of family members in a criminal case arising out of a matrimonial dispute, without specific allegations indicating their active involvement should be nipped in the bud. It is a well- recognised fact, borne out of judicial experience, that there is often a tendency to implicate all the members of the husband's family when domestic disputes arise out of a matrimonial discord. Such generalised and sweeping accusations unsupported by concrete evidence or particularised allegations cannot form the basis for criminal prosecution. Courts must exercise caution in such cases to prevent misuse of legal provisions and the legal process and avoid unnecessary harassment of innocent family members. In the present case, Appellant Nos. 2 to 6, who are the members of the family of Appellant No. 1 have been living in different cities and have not resided in the matrimonial house of Appellant No. 1 and Respondent No. 2 herein. Hence, they cannot be dragged into criminal prosecution and the same would be an abuse of the process of the law in the absence of specific allegations made against each of them.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 2137 of 2025 

Decided On: 23.04.2025

Muppidi Lakshmi Narayana Reddy and Ors. Vs. The State of Andhra Pradesh and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Ahsanuddin Amanullah and Prashant Kumar Mishra, JJ.

Author: Prashant Kumar Mishra, J.

Citation: 2025 INSC 562: MANU/SC/0546/2025

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Supreme Court direct that in a subsequent maintenance proceeding, the applicant shall disclose the previous maintenance proceeding, and the orders passed therein

 Directions on overlapping jurisdictions

It is well settled that a wife can make a claim for maintenance under different statutes. For instance, there is no bar to seek maintenance both under the D.V. Act and Section 125 of the Cr.P.C., or under H.M.A. It would, however, be inequitable to direct the husband to pay maintenance under each of the proceedings, independent of the relief granted in a previous proceeding. If maintenance is awarded to the wife in a previously instituted proceeding, she is under a legal obligation to disclose the same in a subsequent proceeding for maintenance, which may be filed under another enactment. While deciding the quantum of maintenance in the subsequent proceeding, the civil court/family court shall take into account the maintenance awarded in any previously instituted proceeding, and determine the maintenance payable to the claimant.

To overcome the issue of overlapping jurisdiction, and avoid conflicting orders being passed in different proceedings, we direct that in a subsequent maintenance proceeding, the applicant shall disclose the previous maintenance proceeding, and the orders passed therein, so that the Court would take into consideration the maintenance already awarded in the previous proceeding, and grant an adjustment or set-off of the said amount. If the order passed in the previous proceeding requires any modification or variation, the party would be required to move the concerned court in the previous proceeding.

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 730 OF 2020

RAJNESH  Vs  NEHA & Anr

Dated: November 4, 2020.

Citation: MANU/SC/0833/2020 : (2021) 2 SCC 324

Read full judgment here: Click here.

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Supreme Court: Section 195 of CRPC Bar Cannot Be Evaded by Splitting Offences

In this regard, the Court laid down the following principles to be followed while dealing with a category of offences that fall within the protective sphere of Section 195 CrPC.

(i) Section 195(1)(a)(i) of the Cr.P.C. bars the court from taking cognizance of any offence punishable under Sections 172 to 188 respectively of the I.P.C., unless there is a written complaint by the public servant concerned or his administrative superior, for voluntarily obstructing the public servant from discharge of his public functions. Without a complaint from the said persons, the court would lack competence to take cognizance in certain types of offences enumerated therein.

(ii) If in truth and substance, an offence falls in the category of Section 195(1)(a)(i), it is not open to the court to undertake the exercise of splitting them up and proceeding further against the accused for the other distinct offences disclosed in the same set of facts. However, it also cannot be laid down as a straitjacket formula that the Court, under all circumstances, cannot undertake the exercise of splitting up. It would depend upon the facts of each case, the nature of allegations and the materials on record.

(iii) Severance of distinct offences is not permissible when it would effectively circumvent the protection afforded by Section 195(1)(a)(i) of the Cr.P.C., which requires a complaint by a public servant for certain offences against public justice. This means that if the core of the offence falls under the purview of Section 195(1)(a)(i), it cannot be prosecuted by simply filing a general complaint for a different, but related, offence. The focus should be on whether the facts, in substance, constitute an offence requiring a public servant's complaint.

(iv) In the aforesaid context, the courts must apply twin tests. First, the courts must ascertain having regard to the nature of the allegations made in the complaint/FIR and other materials on record whether the other distinct offences not covered by Section 195(1)(a)(i) have been invoked only with a view to evade the mandatory bar of Section 195 of the I.P.C. and secondly, whether the facts primarily and essentially disclose an offence for which a complaint of the court or a public servant is required.

(v) Where an accused is alleged to have committed some offences which are separate and distinct from those contained in Section 195, Section 195 will affect only the offences mentioned therein. However, the courts should ascertain whether such offences form an integral part and are so intrinsically connected so as to amount to offences committed as a part of the same transaction, in which case the other offences also would fall within the ambit of Section 195 of the Cr.P.C. This would all depend on the facts of each case.

(vi) Sections 195(1)(b)(i)(ii) & (iii) and 340 of the Cr.P.C. respectively do not control or circumscribe the power of the police to investigate, under the Criminal Procedure Code. Once investigation is completed then the embargo in Section 195 would come into play and the Court would not be competent to take cognizance. However, that Court could then file a complaint for the offence on the basis of the FIR and the material collected during investigation, provided the procedure laid down in Section 340 of the Cr.P.C. is followed.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No. 12373 of 2025 

Decided On: 20.08.2025

Devendra Kumar Vs. The State (NCT of Delhi) and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan, JJ.

Author: J.B. Pardiwala, J.

 Citation: 2025 INSC 1009, MANU/SC/1133/2025.

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How Juvenile Justice Boards Should Conduct Preliminary Assessment Under S.15 of JJ Act ? Supreme Court Issues Guidelines

 In this regard, the observations of Gujarat High Court in Child in Conflict with Law v. State of Gujarat, reported in MANU/GJ/1115/2023, remain noteworthy. The relevant observations read thus: {Para 73}

"71. The preliminary assessment as explained under proviso to section 15(1) of the J.J. Act, clarifies that preliminary assessment is not a trial, but it is conducted to assess the capacity of such child to commit and understand the consequences of, the alleged offence. Thus, while making a preliminary assessment, the J.J. Board/Children's Court has to specifically deal with all four criteria by assigning reasons to explain the capacity of such child to commit offence. Such assessment of capacity is in terms of physical capacity of the child to commit alleged offence and mental capacity of child to commit alleged offence. The facts of the case has to be dealt with to understand the circumstances in which the child allegedly committed the offence. The circumstances to be referred are not merely the immediate circumstances of the offence itself, but also to other circumstances cumulative in nature to have led to the immediate circumstances related to a long period occurring in the child's life, and finally the ability to understand the consequence of the offence."

 81. In Child in Conflict with Law (supra) the Gujarat High Court listed factors, other than those written in the SBR or SIR, to be considered during the course of preliminary assessment. The overarching idea flowing across the factors remain that an overall assessment, more particularly, the past conduct, of the child should be undertaken. The Court further noted that while dealing with an appeal, the Appellate Court may call for assistance by expert and are not bound by the report of the expert placed before the JJ Board. The relevant observations read thus:

"99. The children are treated as an adult offenders because of offence category. Thus, the provisions of the section invoked, would also require consideration during the course of preliminary assessment alongwith, the record and previous history of the child in the present jurisdiction or other jurisdiction including:

(i) the number and nature of the previous cases of the child with the Board;

(ii) The number and nature of prior period of probation;

(iii) the number and nature of prior commitments to child correctional centers;

(iv) the number and nature of previous residential and community - based treatments;

(v) whether previous adjudications and commitments were for delinquent acts that involved the infliction of serious bodily injury, and;

(vi) whether the alleged offense is part of a repetitive pattern of similar adjudicated offenses;

(vii) Whether the juvenile has previously absconded from the legal custody of a juvenile correctional entity in this or any other jurisdiction;

(viii) The degree of intellectual disability or mental illness;

(ix) The juvenile's school record and education;

(x) The juvenile's mental and emotional maturity; and

(xi) The juvenile's physical condition and physical maturity.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 3299 of 2026 

Decided On: 21.07.2026

X Vs. State of Bihar and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

J.B. Pardiwala and Ujjal Bhuyan, JJ.

Author: J.B. Pardiwala, J.

Citation: 2026 INSC 728,MANU/SC/0728/2026.

Read full judgment here: Click here.

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Supreme Court: Murder Is 'Heinous Offence' under JJ Act, Not 'Serious Offence'; S 302 IPC Implies Minimum Life Sentence

i. The offence punishable Under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, which prescribes punishment of "death or imprisonment for life", carries life imprisonment as its minimum punishment. It would therefore be categorized as a "heinous offence".

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 3299 of 2026 

Decided On: 21.07.2026

X Vs. State of Bihar and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

J.B. Pardiwala and Ujjal Bhuyan, JJ.

Author: J.B. Pardiwala, J.

Citation: 2026 INSC 728,MANU/SC/0728/2026

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Supreme Court: Consider Increasing Retirement Age Of District Judges To 61

Having regard to the fact that this issue is likely to arise

in all the States, let notice be issued to all the High Courts,

States, Union Territories and the Union of India.

S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A

RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

Writ Petition(s)(Civil) No(s). 1022/1989

ALL INDIA JUDGES ASSOCIATION & ORS. Vs  UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 

[ONLY IA No. 178214/2026 AND IA No. 178357/2026 ARE LISTED UNDER THIS ITEM]

Date : 13-07-2026 This matter was called on for hearing today.

CORAM : HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE JOYMALYA BAGCHI

HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE V. MOHANA

1. Issue notice.

2. List along with W.P. (Civil) No. 986/2025 on 22.07.2026.

3. Meanwhile, the applicant(s) shall be allowed to continue in

service till the age of 61 years, provided they have not already

been released from the service.

4. Having regard to the fact that this issue is likely to arise

in all the States, let notice be issued to all the High Courts,

States, Union Territories and the Union of India.

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Supreme Court: Offence Under Section 66 of Information Technology Act Is Bailable

 In our considered view, the High Court did not

take into consideration Section 77B of the IT Act,

which has to be read to ascertain the nature of

offence provided under Section 66 of the IT Act.

In such view of the matter, the view expressed

by High Court that Section 66 of the IT Act has not

been defined as a bailable offence under the IT Act,

stands set aside.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. /2026

[@ SLP [CRL.] NO.6547/2026]

MAHARAJ SARAN  Vs  STATE OF PUNJAB & ORS. 

Dated: JULY 16, 2026.

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Supreme Court: No Motor Accident Compensation For Murder Inside Vehicle

 We are of the view that even on this lighter standard, there

is no causal link that has been established. A perusal of the

judgments of the Courts below in a sense assume that the injuries

suffered by the deceased took place while Dilip and Anand were

in the car. How such a conclusion came about, is best known to

them. The evidence-on-record does not point to any forensic

proof having been recovered from the car for example - blood,

skin cells, hair etc. Neither it is anybody’s case that Dilip’s car is

involved in any collision. All that has been said is that the injuries sustained by Anand were by hard and blunt objects. Now true it is that the claimants need not establish the particular manner in which injuries have been sustained by the injured or the deceased but that does not mean that simply because there was a car somehow involved in a chain of circumstances that led to his death, the provisions of MVA would apply. Some link whatsoever between the car, and the death has to be established.

{Para 13}

14. Pursuant to the aforesaid discussion, there is an alleged

accidental murder and there is a motor vehicle, but the

relationship between the two specifically involving a motor

vehicle has not been established. There cannot be, consequently,

any liability under the MVA. Judgments of the Courts below are

set aside. The appeals are allowed. 

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NOS. OF 2026

(Arising out of SLP(C) Nos.9002-03 of 2026)

DILIP AGARWAL Vs RAJSHRI AGARWAL & ORS.

SANJAY KAROL, J.

Dated: July 22, 2026.

Citation: 2026 INSC 736.

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Supreme Court: Whether Insurance Company is liable to pay compensation if motor accident is done by driver who is minor child?

Section 4 of the Motor Vehicles Act prohibits driving of a vehicle by any person under the age of eighteen years in any public place. Section 5 of the Act imposes a statutory responsibility upon the owners of the motor vehicles not to cause or permit any person who does not satisfy the provisions of Sections 3 or 4 to drive the vehicle. {Para 15}

16. The vehicle in question admittedly was being driven by Karan Arora who was aged about fifteen years. The Tribunal, as noticed hereinbefore, in our opinion, rightly held that Karan Arora did not hold any valid licence on the date of accident, namely 5.2.1997.

17. The learned single Judge as also the Division Bench of the High Court did not put unto themselves a correct question of law. They proceeded on a wrong premise that it was for the Insurance Company to prove breach of conditions of the contract of insurance.

18. The High Court did not advert to itself the provisions of Sections 4 and 5 of the Motor Vehicles Act and thus misdirected itself in law.

19. This aspect of the matter has been considered by this Court in Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Prithvi Raj   MANU/SC/0685/2008 : AIR2008SC1408 wherein upon taking into consideration a large number of decisions, it was held that the Insurance Company was not liable.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 5876 of 2008 

Decided On: 24.09.2008

United India Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Rakesh Kumar Arora and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

S.B. Sinha and Cyriac Joseph, JJ.

Citation: 2008 INSC 1087,MANU/SC/8090/2008,2009 AIR SC 24.

Read full judgment here: Click here.

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Supreme Court: Minor and inconsequential deviations with regard to licensing conditions not constitute sufficient ground to deny benefit of coverage of insurance to third parties

In National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Swaran Singh and Ors.   MANU/SC/0021/2004 : AIR2004SC1531 this Court held:

88. Section 10 of the Act provides for forms and contents of licences to drive. The licence has to be granted in the prescribed form. Thus, a licence to drive a light motor vehicle would entitle the holder there to drive the vehicle falling within that class or description.

89. Section 3 of the Act casts an obligation on a driver to hold an effective driving licence for the type of vehicle which he intends to drive. Section 10 of the Act enables the Central Government to prescribe forms of driving licences for various categories of vehicles mentioned in Sub-section (2) of the said section. {Para 21}

22. It was furthermore observed:

90. We have construed and determined the scope of Sub-clause (ii) of Sub-section (2) of Section 149 of the Act, Minor breaches of licence conditions, such as want of medical fitness certificate, requirement about age of the driver and the like not found to have been the direct cause of the accident, would be treated as minor breaches of inconsequential deviation in the matter of use of vehicles. Such minor and inconsequential deviations with regard to licensing conditions would not constitute sufficient ground to deny the benefit of coverage of insurance to the third parties.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 5876 of 2008 

Decided On: 24.09.2008

United India Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Rakesh Kumar Arora and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

S.B. Sinha and Cyriac Joseph, JJ.

Citation: 2008 INSC 1087,MANU/SC/8090/2008,2009 AIR SC 24.

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Supreme Court: What is the duty of insured if Insurance company requires him to have the licence duly verified from the licensing authority?

In a claim for compensation, it is certainly open to the insurer Under Section 149(2)(a)(ii) to take a defence that the driver of the vehicle involved in the accident was not duly licensed. Once such a defence is taken, the onus is on the insurer. But even after it is proved that the licence possessed by the driver was a fake one, whether there is liability on the insurer is the moot question. As far as the owner of the vehicle is concerned, when he hires a driver, he has to check whether the driver has a valid driving licence. Thereafter he has to satisfy himself as to the competence of the driver. If satisfied in that regard also, it can be said that the owner had taken reasonable care in employing a person who is qualified and competent to drive the vehicle. The owner cannot be expected to go beyond that, to the extent of verifying the genuineness of the driving licence with the licensing authority before hiring the services of the driver. However, the situation would be different if at the time of insurance of the vehicle or thereafter the insurance company requires the owner of the vehicle to have the licence duly verified from the licensing authority or if the attention of the owner of the vehicle is otherwise invited to the allegation that the licence issued to the driver employed by him is a fake one and yet the owner does not take appropriate action for verification of the matter regarding the genuineness of the licence from the licensing authority. That is what is explained in Swaran Singh's case (supra). If despite such information with the owner that the licence possessed by his driver is fake, no action is taken by the insured for appropriate verification, then the insured will be at fault and, in such circumstances, the insurance company is not liable for the compensation.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal Nos. 1999-2000 of 2020

Decided On: 04.03.2020

Nirmala Kothari Vs. United India Insurance Co. Ltd.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Navin Sinha and Krishna Murari, JJ.

Author: Krishna Murari, J.

Citation: 2020 INSC 263,MANU/SC/0267/2020,AIR 2020 SC 1193,AIR Online 2020 SC 285.

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Supreme Court: The court can cancel the bail if the bail has been obtained by placing wrong facts before the court

 The learned counsel appearing for the State

would vehemently submit that Babu Chatterjee

obtained bail by making false statement before the

Court that almost 25 witnesses are to be examined

whereas only 13 witnesses are to be examined. {Para 4}

5. If it is the case of the State that Babu

Chatterjee, the co-accused obtained bail by

suppressing the true facts before the High Court,

then the High Court should have considered the

application preferred by the State for

cancellation of bail of Babu Chatterjee.

6. We fail to understand why the High Court says

that a coordinate Bench cannot cancel the bail

granted to an co-accused. If the bail has been

obtained by placing wrong facts before the High

Court, the Court can always look into the matter

and pass an appropriate order.

S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A

RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.)

No(s).9148-9149/2026

SURAJ MAHANANDA  Vs  STATE OF WEST BENGAL 

CORAM :

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE J.B. PARDIWALA

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE K.V. VISWANATHAN

Date : 27-05-2026 

UPON hearing the counsel the Court made

the following O R D E R

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Supreme Court: Whether accused can file bail application before Session court after withdrawing it from High court?

Having carefully scrutinized the material available on record,

we are of the considered view that the High Court has passed the

impugned order, without application of its mind, by revoking the

bail granted to the appellant by the Additional Sessions Judge-3,

Nagpur in Misc. Criminal Application No. 1847 of 2017, on the

ground that the application was not maintainable before the Trial Court as the appellant previously approached the High Court for bail and subsequently withdrew the bail application. It may be mentioned in this connection that there is no provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 or law laid down by this Court that once an accused has withdrawn his bail application before the High Court, he cannot file a subsequent bail application before the Sessions Court and that his subsequent bail application would lie before the High Court only. Thus, the impugned order of the High Court is not sustainable in the eyes of law and deserves to be set aside.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1221/2019

SHARAD Vs THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ANR. 

Dated: 8TH AUGUST, 2019.

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