Insofar as the submission advanced by Shri
Sharma, learned AAG appearing for the State of
Assam, that the co-accused, Salim Uddin @ Salim,
has implicated the accused-respondent in his
testimony/confession is concerned, we are least
persuaded by the said submission, having regard to
the limited evidentiary value of such a statement in
law. In this regard, we may gainfully refer to
constitution bench judgment in Haricharan Kurmi
v. State of Bihar AIR 1964 SC 1184, wherein the Court
observed as follows:-
“15. The statements contained in the
confessions of the co-accused persons
stand on a different footing. In cases where
such confessions are relied upon by the
prosecution against and accused person,
the court cannot begin with the
examination of the said statements. The
stage to consider the said confessional
statements arrives only after the other
evidence is considered and found to be
satisfactory. The difference in the approach
which the court has to adopt in dealing with
these two types of evidence is thus clear,
well understood and well-established. It,
however, appears that in Ram Prakash case
some observations have been made which
do not seem to recognise the distinction
between the evidence of an accomplice and
the statements contained in the confession
made by an accused person. “An
examination of the reported decisions of the
various High Courts in India,” said Imam,
J., who spoke for the Court in that case,
“indicates that the preponderance of
opinion is in favour of the view that the
retracted confession of an accused person
may be taken into consideration against a
co-accused by virtue of the provisions of
Section 30 of the Act, its value was
extremely weak and there could be no
conviction without the fullest and strongest
corroboration on material particulars”. The
last portion of this observation has been
interpreted by the High Court in the present
case as supporting the view that like the
evidence of an accomplice, a confessional
statement of a co-accused person can be
acted upon if it is corroborated in material
particulars. In our opinion, the context in
which the said observation was made by
this Court shows that this Court did not
intend to lay down any such proposition. In
fact, the other evidence against the
appellant Ram Prakash was of such a
strong character that this Court agreed
with the conclusion of the High Court and
held that the said evidence was satisfactory
and in that connection, the confessional
statement of the co-accused person was
considered. We are, therefore, satisfied that
the High Court was in error in this case in
taking the view that the decision in Ram
Prakash was intended to strike a discordent
note from the well-established principles in
regard to the admissibility and the effect of
confessional statements made by coaccused
persons.” {Para 33}
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(Arising out of SLP(Crl.) No(s). 8846 of 2025)
THE STATE OF ASSAM Vs MOINUL HAQUE @ MONU
Author: Mehta, J.
Dated: APRIL 16, 2026.
Citation: 2026 INSC 386
1. Heard.
2. Leave granted.
3. The State of Assam is in appeal before us by
special leave for assailing the judgment and final
order dated 22nd December, 2022 passed by the
Division Bench of the Gauhati High Court1 in
Criminal Appeal (J) No. 72 of 2018, whereby the High
Court partly allowed the appeal filed by the accusedrespondent.
1 Hereinafter, referred to as “High Court”.
4. By the impugned judgment, the High Court set
aside the conviction and sentence of death imposed
by the learned Additional District and Sessions
Judge, Fast Track Court, Hojai2, vide judgment dated
24th July, 2018 and order on sentence dated 1st
August, 2018, upon the respondent, Moinul Haque3,
for the offences punishable under Sections 302 and
376A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. While affirming
the conviction of the accused-respondent under
Section 201 of the IPC, the High Court reduced the
sentence for the said offence from rigorous
imprisonment for seven years, as awarded by the trial
Court, to rigorous imprisonment for three years,
along with a fine of Rs. 20,000/-.
BRIEF FACTS
5. Succinctly stated, the facts relevant and
essential for disposal of this appeal are noted
hereinbelow.
6. The dead body of Smt. Arnomai Bora4,
concealed in a bag, was found lying on the banks of
the Kopili River on 31st May, 2017. The deceased was
2 Hereinafter, referred to as “trial Court”.
3 Hereinafter, referred to as “accused-respondent”.
4 Hereinafter, referred to as “deceased”.
serving as the Headmistress of Changjurai Elachi
Deuri L.P. School in the Jamunamukh area, located
on the north bank of the said river. Information
regarding the discovery of the dead body was lodged
by the husband of the deceased, Shri Bimal Bora, at
the Police Station Jamunamukh vide G.D. Entry
no.493 dated 31st May, 2017. Based thereupon, an
FIR, being Crime No. 52 of 2017, came to be
registered for offences punishable under Sections
302 and 201 of the IPC. During the course of
investigation, the Investigating Officer proceeded to
apprehend the accused-respondent and the coaccused,
Salim Uddin @ Salim, who were
chargesheeted for the offences punishable under
Sections 302, 201 and 376A read with Section 34 of
the IPC, upon conclusion of investigation.
7. Since the offences punishable under Sections
302 and 376A of the IPC were exclusively triable by
the Court of Sessions, the case was committed and
made over to the trial Court, where Sessions Case
No.70(N) of 2017 came to be registered against the
two accused named above. The trial Court framed
charges against both the accused who pleaded not
guilty and claimed trial. To establish its case, the
prosecution examined nineteen witnesses (PW-1 to
PW-19) and exhibited twenty-eight documents (Ex. 1
to Ex. 28), alongside various material articles.
8. Upon a comprehensive appreciation of the
evidence on record, the trial Court convicted and
sentenced both the accused as below:-
a. The accused-respondent Moinul Haque @
Monu was convicted and sentenced to death
for offences punishable under Sections 302
and 376A of the IPC. He was also sentenced
to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a
period of seven years, along with a fine of Rs.
20,000/-, under Section 201 of the IPC.
b. The co-accused, Salim Uddin @ Salim, was
sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment
for life, along with a fine of Rs. 20,000/-, for
the offence punishable under Section 302 of
the IPC, and further to undergo rigorous
imprisonment for a period of five years, along
with a fine of Rs. 10,000/-, for the offence
punishable under Section 201 of the IPC.
9. Since the accused-respondent was awarded
death penalty by the trial Court, a reference was
made to the High Court under Section 366 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 19735 for confirmation.
Concurrently, both the accused persons preferred
appeals against their conviction. It is further
noteworthy that the husband of the deceased, Shri
Bimal Bora, also preferred an appeal seeking
enhancement of the sentence of life imprisonment
awarded to the co-accused, Salim Uddin @ Salim, to
death penalty.
10. The High Court, by judgment and order dated
22nd December, 2022, upheld the conviction of the
co-accused Salimuddin @ Salim for the offences
punishable under Sections 302 and 201 of the IPC,
while reducing the sentence imposed for the offence
punishable under Section 201 of the IPC.
11. The conviction of the accused-respondent for
the offence punishable under Section 201 of the IPC
was affirmed and the sentence imposed thereunder
was reduced to rigorous imprisonment for a period of
three years with fine and default stipulation.
However, his conviction for the offences punishable
5 Hereinafter, referred to as “CrPC”.
under Sections 302 and 376A of the IPC was set aside
and he was acquitted of these charges.
12. Being aggrieved, the State of Assam is before us
by way of this appeal with special leave.
13. Since the accused-respondent did not appear
despite service of notice, this Court was initially
compelled to issue bailable warrants against him on
13th October, 2025 and 11th November, 2025, and
thereafter a warrant of arrest on 30th January, 2026.
Pursuant thereto, the accused-respondent was
arrested and presented before this Court on 26th
February, 2026, whereupon he was remanded to
judicial custody.
14. Considering the fact that the accusedrespondent
was not represented by any counsel, this
Court requested Shri P.V. Dinesh, learned senior
counsel, to assist the Court in the matter.
SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT
15. Shri Chinmoy Pradip Sharma, learned senior
AAG appearing for the State of Assam, submitted that
the High Court while rendering the impugned
judgment has fallen into grave error in its
appreciation of the circumstantial evidence on
record. It was contended that the prosecution had
duly established a complete and coherent chain of
circumstances which, when considered cumulatively,
unequivocally point towards the guilt of the accusedrespondent
and effectively excludes every reasonable
hypothesis consistent with his innocence.
16. Shri Sharma submitted that the recovery of the
deceased’s umbrella at the instance of the accusedrespondent
constitutes a significant incriminating
circumstance, relevant under Section 27 of the
Indian Evidence Act, 18726. It was contended that the
said recovery, having been effected pursuant to the
disclosure made by the accused-respondent under
Section 27 of the Evidence Act, is demonstrative of
special knowledge within the meaning of the said
provision. It was further urged that the incriminating
recovery made from a place within the exclusive
knowledge of the accused-respondent lends credence
to the prosecution’s case and establishes a proximate
nexus between the accused-respondent and the
crime.
17. Shri Sharma further submitted that the coaccused,
Salim Uddin @ Salim, had implicated the
6 Hereinafter, referred to as “Evidence Act”.
accused-respondent in his testimony. It was
contended that, though such a statement requires
cautious scrutiny, it nevertheless lends support to
the prosecution’s case to the extent that it discloses
the involvement of the accused-respondent in the
commission of the offence. The implication of the
accused-respondent by the co-accused, when
considered in conjunction with the other
incriminating circumstances on record, serves to
reinforce the prosecution case and cannot be lightly
disregarded.
18. On these grounds, learned AAG, sought reversal
of the impugned judgment insofar as it records the
acquittal of the accused-respondent and prayed that
the appeal be allowed.
SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT
19. Per contra, Shri P.V. Dinesh, learned senior
counsel representing the accused-respondent,
submitted that there is no substantive or legally
admissible evidence available on record against the
accused-respondent, save and except the alleged
discovery of umbrella purportedly made under
Section 27 of the Evidence Act. It was contended that
the prosecution’s case rests solely on such disclosure
and discovery, which, by its very nature, is limited in
scope and admissibility.
20. Shri Dinesh further urged that even the alleged
discovery does not, in any manner, establish a direct
or proximate nexus between the accused-respondent
and the commission of the alleged offence. In the
absence of any independent, corroborative, or
incriminating material, the reliance placed by the
Courts below on such discovery is wholly insufficient
to sustain the charges against the accusedrespondent.
21. Shri Dinesh thus submitted that the
prosecution has failed to discharge its burden of
establishing the case against the accused-respondent
in accordance with law and beyond all manner of
doubt. The material placed on record, at best, gives
rise to mere suspicion, which cannot substitute the
standard of proof required to bring home the charges
in a criminal trial. In the absence of cogent and
reliable evidence connecting the accused-respondent
with the alleged offence, his conviction even for the
offence punishable under Section 201 of IPC is wholly
unsustainable in law.
22. Shri Dinesh also submitted that, as against the
sentence of three years’ rigorous imprisonment
awarded by the High Court under Section 201 of the
IPC, the accused-respondent has already undergone
incarceration for a period of approximately five years.
It was contended that the period of custody
undergone by the accused-respondent thus exceeds
the sentence awarded by the High Court post
reduction from that awarded by the trial Court and
hence, he is entitled to be released forthwith.
ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION
23. We have heard and considered the submissions
advanced by Shri Chinmoy Pradip Sharma, learned
senior AAG appearing for the State of Assam and Shri
P.V. Dinesh representing the accused-respondent
and have gone through the impugned judgment and
the material placed on record.
24. Shri P.V. Dinesh has placed on record a
convenience compilation incorporating therein the
copies of the relevant documents and the statements
of the witnesses.
25. On a perusal of the judgment of the High Court,
it becomes apparent that the case of the prosecution
was based purely on circumstantial evidence. In this
context, the law laid down by this Court in Sharad
Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra (1984) 4 SCC 116,
assumes significance, wherein it was held as follows:-
“153. A close analysis of this decision
would show that the following conditions
must be fulfilled before a case against an
accused can be said to be fully established:
(1) the circumstances from which the
conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should
be fully established.
It may be noted here that this Court
indicated that the circumstances concerned
“must or should” and not “may be”
established. There is not only a
grammatical but a legal distinction between
“may be proved” and “must be or should be
proved” as was held by this Court in Shivaji
Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra
[(1973) 2 SCC 793] where the observations
were made: [SCC para 19, p. 807]
“Certainly, it is a primary
principle that the accused must be
and not merely may be guilty
before a court can convict and the
mental distance between ‘may be’
and ‘must be’ is long and divides
vague conjectures from sure
conclusions.”
(2) the facts so established should be
consistent only with the hypothesis of
the guilt of the accused, that is to say,
they should not be explainable on any
other hypothesis except that the
accused is guilty,
(3) the circumstances should be of a
conclusive nature and tendency,
(4) they should exclude every possible
hypothesis except the one to be proved,
and
(5) there must be a chain of evidence so
complete as not to leave any reasonable
ground for the conclusion consistent
with the innocence of the accused and
must show that in all human probability
the act must have been done by the
accused.”
(Emphasis Supplied)
26. It is an admitted case as evident from record
that the solitary circumstance relied upon by the
prosecution to connect the accused-respondent with
the crime was the recovery of the umbrella made in
furtherance of his disclosure statement recorded by
the Investigating Officer under Section 27 of the
Evidence Act. The High Court held that the said
umbrella was concealed by the accused-respondent
in an attempt to destroy evidence of the crime, and
accordingly, affirmed his conviction for the offence
punishable under Section 201 of the IPC. However,
the sentence awarded by the trial Court for the said
offence was reduced from rigorous imprisonment for
seven years to rigorous imprisonment for three years,
along with fine and default stipulation.
27. The factum of recovery of the umbrella, recorded
vide seizure memo (Ex. 1), was sought to be proved
through the evidence of the Investigating Officer,
Abhishek Bodo (PW-19) Hereinafter, referred
to as “Investigating Officer”. Upon a perusal of the
testimony of the said witness (PW-19), we find that
the very arrest of the accused-respondent in the
present case is shrouded in a cloud of doubt.
28. Insofar as the recovery of the umbrella is
concerned, the Investigating Officer proved the
disclosure statement of the accused-respondent as
Ex. 19. Pursuant to the said disclosure statement, a
black-coloured umbrella was purportedly recovered
by the Investigating Officer on 14th June, 2017, upon
being pointed out by the accused-respondent. Thus,
there is a significant gap of approximately 14 days
between the date of the incident and the recovery of
the umbrella.
29. It also emerges from the evidence that the
Investigating Officer deposed that he summoned the
family members of the deceased to the police station
and got the umbrella identified by them. It is further
apparent from the evidence on record that the
umbrella did not bear any specific or distinctive
features so as to be conclusively linked to the
deceased.
30. The identification procedure conducted by the
Investigating Officer, i.e., by simply calling the family
members of the deceased to the police station and
asking them to identify the umbrella as belonging to
the deceased, is in clear contravention of the
established procedure for identification of articles.
Ordinarily, the recovered article ought to have been
sealed, and the test identification proceedings should
have been conducted in the presence of a Magistrate
so as to make the procedure of identification
unimpeachable.
31. The Investigating Officer’s evidence referred to
supra does not specify compliance with either of the
aforesaid requirements, both of which are absolutely
necessary to hold that the seizure of an umbrella was
proved by cogent and reliable evidence.
32. Thus, we are of the firm opinion that neither
was the recovery of the umbrella proved as per law
nor does the identification thereof inspire confidence
so as to link the same either to the accusedrespondent
or to the crime. Furthermore, the
significant gap of 14 days in effecting the recovery
creates a doubt on the sanctity of the procedure of
recovery.
33. Insofar as the submission advanced by Shri
Sharma, learned AAG appearing for the State of
Assam, that the co-accused, Salim Uddin @ Salim,
has implicated the accused-respondent in his
testimony/confession is concerned, we are least
persuaded by the said submission, having regard to
the limited evidentiary value of such a statement in
law. In this regard, we may gainfully refer to
constitution bench judgment in Haricharan Kurmi
v. State of Bihar AIR 1964 SC 1184, wherein the Court
observed as follows:-
“15. The statements contained in the
confessions of the co-accused persons
stand on a different footing. In cases where
such confessions are relied upon by the
prosecution against and accused person,
the court cannot begin with the
examination of the said statements. The
stage to consider the said confessional
statements arrives only after the other
evidence is considered and found to be
satisfactory. The difference in the approach
which the court has to adopt in dealing with
these two types of evidence is thus clear,
well understood and well-established. It,
however, appears that in Ram Prakash case
some observations have been made which
do not seem to recognise the distinction
between the evidence of an accomplice and
the statements contained in the confession
made by an accused person. “An
examination of the reported decisions of the
various High Courts in India,” said Imam,
J., who spoke for the Court in that case,
“indicates that the preponderance of
opinion is in favour of the view that the
retracted confession of an accused person
may be taken into consideration against a
co-accused by virtue of the provisions of
Section 30 of the Act, its value was
extremely weak and there could be no
conviction without the fullest and strongest
corroboration on material particulars”. The
last portion of this observation has been
interpreted by the High Court in the present
case as supporting the view that like the
evidence of an accomplice, a confessional
statement of a co-accused person can be
acted upon if it is corroborated in material
particulars. In our opinion, the context in
which the said observation was made by
this Court shows that this Court did not
intend to lay down any such proposition. In
fact, the other evidence against the
appellant Ram Prakash was of such a
strong character that this Court agreed
with the conclusion of the High Court and
held that the said evidence was satisfactory
and in that connection, the confessional
statement of the co-accused person was
considered. We are, therefore, satisfied that
the High Court was in error in this case in
taking the view that the decision in Ram
Prakash was intended to strike a discordent
note from the well-established principles in
regard to the admissibility and the effect of
confessional statements made by coaccused
persons.”
34. The findings recorded by the High Court
acquitting the accused-respondent of the charges
under Section 302 and 376A of the IPC are based on
sound and cogent reasoning arrived at after proper
appreciation of evidence on record and do not
warrant any interference in this appeal against
acquittal at the instance of the State. However, we are
of the view that the High Court clearly fell into error
in affirming the conviction of the accused-respondent
for the offence punishable under Section 201 of the
IPC.
35. It is not in dispute that the accused-respondent
has not preferred any appeal challenging his
conviction for the said offence. However, the absence
of an appeal by the accused-respondent does not, by
itself, denude this Court of its appellate jurisdiction.
In exercise of powers under Section 386 of the CrPC
[corresponding to Section 427 of the Bharatiya
Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023], the appellate
Court is vested with the power to examine the
correctness of the findings and sentence recorded by
the Court below and to reverse, alter or affirm the
same, as the interests of justice may require.
36. Accordingly, having regard to the entirety of the
matter, and in exercise of the aforesaid appellate
powers, we deem it appropriate to interfere with the
conviction and sentence of the accused-respondent
under Section 201 of the IPC as indicated above.
CONCLUSION
37. As an upshot of the above discussion, we are of
the firm view that the finding recorded in the
impugned judgment dated 22nd December, 2022, to
the extent it affirms the conviction of the accusedrespondent
for the offence punishable under Section
201 of the IPC and the sentence awarded thereunder,
is unsustainable in facts and in law and is
accordingly set aside. The impugned judgment shall,
however, remain undisturbed in all other aspects.
38. The accused-respondent is acquitted of the
charge for the offence punishable under Section 201
of the IPC. He is in custody and shall be released from
prison forthwith, if not wanted in any other case.
39. The appeal preferred by the State of Assam is
dismissed.
40. The Registry is directed to forthwith forward a
copy of this order to the trial Court concerned for
taking necessary action in accordance with law.
41. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand
disposed of.
….……………………J.
(VIKRAM NATH)
...…………………….J.
(SANDEEP MEHTA)
NEW DELHI;
APRIL 16, 2026.
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