Showing posts with label S 201 of IPC. Show all posts
Showing posts with label S 201 of IPC. Show all posts

Saturday, 30 May 2026

Supreme Court: Under which circumstances, the appellate court can set aside conviction of accused in offence under S 201 of IPC without appeal of accused?

 However, we are of the view that the High Court clearly fell into error in affirming the conviction of the accused-respondent for the offence punishable under Section 201 of the IPC.

35. It is not in dispute that the accused-respondent has not preferred any appeal challenging his conviction for the said offence. However, the absence of an appeal by the accused-respondent does not, by itself, denude this Court of its appellate jurisdiction. In exercise of powers under Section 386 of the CrPC

[corresponding to Section 427 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023], the appellate Court is vested with the power to examine the correctness of the findings and sentence recorded by the Court below and to reverse, alter or affirm the

same, as the interests of justice may require.

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026

(Arising out of SLP(Crl.) No(s). 8846 of 2025)

THE STATE OF ASSAM  Vs  MOINUL HAQUE @ MONU 

Mehta, J.

Dated: APRIL 16, 2026.

Read full judgment here: Click here.

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Supreme Court explains the distinction between evidence of accomplice and statements contained in the confession made by co-accused

Insofar as the submission advanced by Shri

Sharma, learned AAG appearing for the State of

Assam, that the co-accused, Salim Uddin @ Salim,

has implicated the accused-respondent in his

testimony/confession is concerned, we are least

persuaded by the said submission, having regard to

the limited evidentiary value of such a statement in

law. In this regard, we may gainfully refer to

constitution bench judgment in Haricharan Kurmi

v. State of Bihar AIR 1964 SC 1184, wherein the Court

 observed as follows:-

“15. The statements contained in the

confessions of the co-accused persons

stand on a different footing. In cases where

such confessions are relied upon by the

prosecution against and accused person,

the court cannot begin with the

examination of the said statements. The

stage to consider the said confessional

statements arrives only after the other

evidence is considered and found to be

satisfactory. The difference in the approach

which the court has to adopt in dealing with

these two types of evidence is thus clear,

well understood and well-established. It,

however, appears that in Ram Prakash case

some observations have been made which

do not seem to recognise the distinction

between the evidence of an accomplice and

the statements contained in the confession

made by an accused person. “An

examination of the reported decisions of the

various High Courts in India,” said Imam,

J., who spoke for the Court in that case,

“indicates that the preponderance of

opinion is in favour of the view that the

retracted confession of an accused person

may be taken into consideration against a

co-accused by virtue of the provisions of

Section 30 of the Act, its value was

extremely weak and there could be no

conviction without the fullest and strongest

corroboration on material particulars”. The

last portion of this observation has been

interpreted by the High Court in the present

case as supporting the view that like the

evidence of an accomplice, a confessional

statement of a co-accused person can be

acted upon if it is corroborated in material

particulars. In our opinion, the context in

which the said observation was made by

this Court shows that this Court did not

intend to lay down any such proposition. In

fact, the other evidence against the

appellant Ram Prakash was of such a

strong character that this Court agreed

with the conclusion of the High Court and

held that the said evidence was satisfactory

and in that connection, the confessional

statement of the co-accused person was

considered. We are, therefore, satisfied that

the High Court was in error in this case in

taking the view that the decision in Ram

Prakash was intended to strike a discordent

note from the well-established principles in

regard to the admissibility and the effect of

confessional statements made by coaccused

persons.” {Para 33}

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026

(Arising out of SLP(Crl.) No(s). 8846 of 2025)

THE STATE OF ASSAM  Vs  MOINUL HAQUE @ MONU 

Author: Mehta, J.

Dated: APRIL 16, 2026.

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Thursday, 6 August 2020

Whether court can convict accused of an offence U/S 201 of IPC if he was acquitted for an offence U/S 302 of IPC?

To bring home an offence under Section 201 of IPC, the ingredients to be established are: (i) committal of an offence; (ii) person charged with the offence under Section 201 must have the knowledge or reason to believe that an offence has been committed; (iii) person charged with the said offence should have caused disappearance of evidence and (iv) the act should have been done with the intention of screening the offender from legal punishment or with that intention he should have given information respecting the offence, which he knew or believed to be false. It is plain that the intent to screen the offender committing an offence must be the primary and sole aim of the accused. It hardly needs any emphasis that in order to bring home an offence under Section 201 IPC, a mere suspicion is not sufficient. There must be on record cogent evidence to prove that the accused knew or had information sufficient to lead him to believe that the offence had been committed and that the accused has caused the evidence to disappear in order to screen the offender, known or unknown.


19. The sole reason given by the High Court for holding appellant A-2 guilty of offence under Section 201 of IPC is the circumstance flowing from the evidence of PW-12, wherein she had stated that: 'Accused No. 1 and the deceased Meerabai were sleeping in one room and we were sleeping in the other room'. Undoubtedly, the mainstay of the prosecution case was the testimony of PW-12. There is absolutely no other evidence or circumstance attributing to A-2, the knowledge of the commission of offence in respect of his daughter-in-law, Meerabai. Merely because he happened to be father of appellant A-1, it cannot be presumed as a matter of legal proof that he must be deemed to have the knowledge of the offence committed by his son. Even if the evidence of PW-12 is taken at its face value, though the witness was declared hostile and had been cross examined by the prosecution counsel, mere presence of the appellant, A-2 in the house, in our opinion, is not sufficient to draw a presumption that he had the knowledge of commission of offence by his son, appellant, A-1. There is no other established circumstance to complete the chain to bring home the offence under Section 201 IPC. We are of the view that the prosecution has failed to establish that the conduct of appellant A-2, both at the time of the occurrence and immediately thereafter, is consistent with the hypothesis of his guilt. We have therefore, no hesitation in holding that the learned Judges of the High Court were in error in convicting appellant A-2 for having committed offences punishable under Sections 302 and 201 IPC.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 1203 of 2006

Decided On: 17.08.2007

Sukhram  Vs.  State of Maharashtra

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
C.K. Thakker and D.K. Jain, JJ.

Citation: MANU/SC/3346/2007,(2007)7 SCC 502,
AIR 2007 SC 3050
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Sunday, 6 October 2019

Whether it is mandatory to report all unnatural deaths whether it amounts to offence or not?

 Section 176 of Indian Penal Code is on subject of
omission to give notice or information to public servant by
person legally bound to give it. This Section makes such
omission an offence punishable with simple imprisonment for
a term which may extend to one month or with fine of
Rs.500/- or with both. If such information pertained to an
offence, the simple imprisonment may extend to 6 months or
fine may be Rs. 1000/.
60. Section 43 does not stipulate what is legal. It points
out act or omission which is illegal and obligation to report
flowing from “legally bound to do” needs to be construed in
that light. So an incident like accident leading to death of a
minor girl which may also sustain a civil cause, being viewed
as illegal, therefore, must be reported to police or concerned
competent authority. Omission to report it is illegal. 

Machinery mandated under S. 174 Cr.P.C. can not be allowed
to be rendered nugatory. All unnatural deaths are covered
under provisions of IPC. Whether it is an offence or not, is for
the Investigating Officer to decide. Otherwise it will provide an
escape route for the offender and he may clean or destroy all
evidence under a specious plea that the un-natural death was
not an offence but an unfortunate accident for which he is not
liable. Such a loophole is not envisaged by the Legislature. If
the arguments on these lines are accepted, S. 304A IPC will be
rendered nugatory. S.176 IPC therefore employs the word “on
any subject”.

Provisions looked into by us particularly Section 43 of Indian
Penal Code shows that even when the consequences furnish a
ground for civil action, the person in knowledge is legally
bound to give information thereof to the competent authority
which may include the police Section 176 of the Code makes
omission to give information “on any subject” to any public
servant, an offence. In this backdrop, Section 201 of IPC gets

attracted and causing disappearance of evidence of offence
under Section 176 becomes punishable thereunder. Section
43, Section 176 and Section 201 of Indian Penal Code clearly
obliged first accused No. 1 Nazir before us to report the
incident to police and not to wipe it out altogether.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
APPELLATE SIDE CRIMINAL JURISDICTION
CONFIRMATION CASE NO.01 OF 2016

The State of Maharashtra  Vs  Nazir Javed Khan 

CORAM :B. P. DHARMADHIKARI & PRAKASH D. NAIK, JJ.

PRONOUNCED ON :03rd June, 2019
JUDGMENT: (Per B. P. Dharmadhikari, J.)
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