Needless to say, knowledge of a fact is a necessary
pre-requisite for its non-disclosure. The very concept of
suppression presupposes an awareness of that which is
suppressed; one cannot be said to have withheld or
concealed something of which one had no knowledge in
the first place. It would be both illogical and unjust to
hold a candidate liable for suppression of information
that was never within his knowledge to begin with.
Therefore, where the very existence of a criminal
antecedent is not shown to have been within the
candidate's knowledge at the relevant time, he cannot be
held to have suppressed or furnished false information
in that regard, there being no suppression of a fact that
was, to him, non-existent. {Para 31}
32. We hasten to add that such lack of awareness of
the existence of a criminal antecedent is itself a fact that
must be established by the candidate, the onus being
upon him to substantiate the claim before the employer.
A bare plea of ignorance, without cogent and reliable
material to assert such claim, will not suffice to escape
liability. Were it otherwise, the requirement of disclosure
in verification forms would be rendered illusory, open to
circumvention by simply pleading ignorance. In the
present case, as discussed above, we find that the
appellant's consistent claim of bona fide ignorance of the
NCR stands duly established by documentary evidence
on record.
33. The second prong of the enquiry to be undertaken
is whether the criminal antecedent, and the
suppression, if any, is of such nature that merits
termination of employment. In the present case, we
observe that although sufficient opportunity was
granted to the appellant to put forth his case, the
authorities have not undertaken such enquiry. They
have not considered the specific facts and circumstances
and have proceeded under the presumption that
existence of the criminal antecedent would
automatically render the appellant ineligible for the post.
There have been no specific findings regarding the
specific nature of the offence and its impact on the
nature of the post held by the appellant, and the
subsequent discharge of the appellant has not been
given due consideration.
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.________OF 2026
[ @ SLP(CIVIL) NO. 7197 OF 2026 ]
SHATRUGHN YADAV Vs THE FERTILIZERS AND CHEMICALS TRAVANCORE LTD. (F.A.C.T.) AND OTHERS
Author: AUGUSTINE GEORGE MASIH, J.
Citation: 2026 INSC 829
Dated: AUGUST 11, 2026.
1. Leave granted.
2. The present appeal arises from the judgment and
order dated 04.07.2025 of the High Court of Kerala at
Ernakulam in Writ Appeal No.414 of 2025 whereby the
High Court upheld the judgment and order of the Single
Judge and dismissed the appellant’s challenge to the
termination order.
3. The brief factual matrix is that the appellant was
appointed to the post of Technician(Process) by the
Fertilizers and Chemicals Travancore Ltd. on
05.05.2021 on consolidated pay for an initial tenure of
two years. At the time of joining, he submitted an
attestation form declaring that there was no criminal
case pending against him.
4. Six months later, a letter was forwarded by the
respondent to the District Magistrate for verification of
the appellant’s criminal antecedents. In response, vide
letter dated 22.03.2022, the District Magistrate
disclosed that a Non-Cognizable Report (hereinafter,
‘NCR’) dated 03.04.2019 had been registered against the
appellant under Sections 323 and 504 of the IPC.
Consequently, a show cause notice was issued to the
appellant on 30.04.2022, directing him to furnish
reasons as to why his services should not be terminated
on the ground of furnishing false information.
5. The appellant submitted his reply to the aforesaid
notice stating that he had acted in a bona fide manner
and had not suppressed or given false information as he
was not aware of the registration of the NCR. He had not
received any summons, nor was he arrested with respect
to the said report, and therefore, he had no means to
know that the said case was registered against him. To
support his case, he enclosed with his reply a photocopy
of a certificate dated 09.07.2020 issued by the
Superintendent of Police, District Maharajganj which
stated that there was no entry against the candidate as
per the information received from the concerned police
station, local intelligence unit and the District Crime
Records Bureau.
6. A further representation dated 06.06.2023 was
submitted by the appellant enclosing the final report
which recorded that the police had found no evidence
against him and therefore his name had been deleted
from the array of the accused persons. This, he pleaded,
fortified his stand of not being aware of the registration
of the report.
7. However, the respondents were dissatisfied with
the reply. After granting a few more opportunities to
substantiate his claim, a termination letter was issued
to the appellant on 05.08.2023 cancelling his
appointment.
Page 4 of 18
8. Aggrieved, the appellant approached the High
Court by filing Writ Petition No.37484 of 2023
challenging the order of termination. The learned Single
Judge declined to interfere, holding that the appellant's
claim of being unaware of the NCR involved a disputed
question of fact requiring proof. By the impugned order,
the Division Bench concurred with the Single Judge and
dismissed the appeal. The appellant is therefore now
before this Court by way of the present appeal.
9. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that
the High Court has erred in not appreciating the facts
and circumstances of the case. He places reliance on the
judgments in Ravindra Kumar v State of UP1 and Avtar
Singh v Union of India2 to contend that the question to
be examined is not whether there is non-disclosure
simplicitor, but whether there was deliberate
suppression or supply of false information on the part of
the candidate. Each case has to be examined on its own
merits and termination cannot be an automatic
consequence of existence of criminal antecedents.
10. It is submitted that such an exercise has not been
undertaken in the appellant’s case. The appellant’s
1 (2024) INSC 131
2 (2016) 8 SCC 471
Page 5 of 18
consistent stand has been that he had no knowledge of
the existence of the NCR, therefore his declaration was
bona fide.
11. It is contended that this stand is further
strengthened by the character certificate issued by the
Police on 09.07.2020, and the subsequent certificate
stating that the appellant’s name was deleted from the
array of accused persons as no evidence was found
against him. Since he was never called to the police
station or associated in the investigation, nor was he
arrested, he had no knowledge of the proceedings and
answered the question on the form truthfully, to the best
of his knowledge.
12. It is further submitted that the High Court also
erred in holding that it lacked the jurisdiction to examine
the appellant's case on the ground that it involved
disputed questions of fact, since the real issue was the
legality of the termination of the appellant's
appointment.
13. Learned counsel for the respondents, on the other
hand, supports the impugned judgment and submits
that the suppression of information regarding the NCR
rendered the appellant unfit for employment. The offer
Page 6 of 18
of appointment had been issued to the appellant
contingent upon clearance of antecedents. The
appellant, despite being aware of the NCR, did not reveal
its pendency to the respondents.
14. It is also submitted that the discharge of the
appellant from the NCR has no bearing on the falsity of
the declaration given in the attestation form. Moreover,
it is unlikely that he had no knowledge of the NCR since
his parents were also charged.
15. On the question of jurisdiction, it is submitted
that the appellant ought to have exhausted the remedy
available under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The
matter, being one involving disputed questions of fact,
ought not to have been entertained in writ jurisdiction.
16. Lastly, it is urged that since the appellant was on
probation when his services were terminated, in the
event this Court is of the opinion that the appellant
ought to be reinstated, his reinstatement ought to be
made in the capacity of a consolidated pay period
appointee.
17. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties
and have perused the material on record.
Page 7 of 18
18. Before proceeding, we must first address the
objection raised on behalf of the respondents as to the
maintainability of the writ petition, it being contended
that the appellant ought to have availed of the remedy
under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and that the
matter, involving disputed questions of fact, was not
amenable to writ jurisdiction. We are unable to accept
this submission. It is settled law that the existence of an
alternative remedy does not operate as an absolute bar
to the exercise of writ jurisdiction, particularly where the
challenge is to the legality of the order of termination
itself.
19. Now coming to the merits of the case, the issue to
be considered by us is whether the action of the
respondents in terminating the employment of the
appellant, in the given facts and circumstances, was
permissible in law.
20. The legal position on the issue of suppression of
information in verification forms with regard to criminal
antecedents has been settled and summarised in a
three-Judge Bench decision of this Court in Avtar Singh
(supra). The relevant paragraphs are reproduced
hereinbelow:
Page 8 of 18
“38. We have noticed various decisions and
tried to explain and reconcile them as far as
possible. In view of the aforesaid discussion,
we summarise our conclusion thus:
38.1. Information given to the employer by a
candidate as to conviction, acquittal or arrest,
or pendency of a criminal case, whether before
or after entering into service must be true and
there should be no suppression or false
mention of required information.
38.2. While passing order of termination of
services or cancellation of candidature for
giving false information, the employer may take
notice of special circumstances of the case, if
any, while giving such information.
38.3. The employer shall take into
consideration the government
orders/instructions/rules, applicable to the
employee, at the time of taking the decision.
38.4. In case there is suppression or false
information of involvement in a criminal case
where conviction or acquittal had already been
recorded before filling of the
application/verification form and such fact
later comes to knowledge of employer, any of
the following recourses appropriate to the case
may be adopted:
38.4.1. In a case trivial in nature in which
conviction had been recorded, such as shouting
slogans at young age or for a petty offence
which if disclosed would not have rendered an
incumbent unfit for post in question, the
employer may, in its discretion, ignore such
suppression of fact or false information by
condoning the lapse.
Page 9 of 18
38.4.2. Where conviction has been recorded in
case which is not trivial in nature, employer
may cancel candidature or terminate services
of the employee.
38.5. In a case where the employee has made
declaration truthfully of a concluded criminal
case, the employer still has the right to consider
antecedents, and cannot be compelled to
appoint the candidate.
38.6. In case when fact has been truthfully
declared in character verification form
regarding pendency of a criminal case of trivial
nature, employer, in facts and circumstances of
the case, in its discretion, may appoint the
candidate subject to decision of such case.
38.4.3. If acquittal had already been recorded
in a case involving moral turpitude or offence of
heinous/serious nature, on technical ground
and it is not a case of clean acquittal, or benefit
of reasonable doubt has been given, the
employer may consider all relevant facts
available as to antecedents, and may take
appropriate decision as to the continuance of
the employee.
38.7. In a case of deliberate suppression of fact
with respect to multiple pending cases such
false information by itself will assume
significance and an employer may pass
appropriate order cancelling candidature or
terminating services as appointment of a
person against whom multiple criminal cases
were pending may not be proper.
38.8. If criminal case was pending but not
known to the candidate at the time of filling the
form, still it may have adverse impact and the
Page 10 of 18
appointing authority would take decision after
considering the seriousness of the crime.
38.9. In case the employee is confirmed in
service, holding departmental enquiry would
be necessary before passing order of
termination/removal or dismissal on the
ground of suppression or submitting false
information in verification form.
38.10. For determining suppression or false
information attestation/verification form has to
be specific, not vague. Only such information
which was required to be specifically
mentioned has to be disclosed. If information
not asked for but is relevant comes to
knowledge of the employer the same can be
considered in an objective manner while
addressing the question of fitness. However, in
such cases action cannot be taken on basis of
suppression or submitting false information as
to a fact which was not even asked for.
38.11. Before a person is held guilty of
suppressio veri or suggestio falsi, knowledge of
the fact must be attributable to him.”
21. What emerges from the above is that the relevant
facts and circumstances must be considered in each
case. The order of termination must not be mechanical
but must have regard to the form of suppression, the
outcome of the criminal case, the nature of the
employment and of the offence, and any special
circumstances. Termination is therefore not an
automatic consequence of the disclosure of criminal
Page 11 of 18
antecedents; rather, the specific case of the employee
must be considered, and the employer must apply its
mind before arriving at a decision.
22. In a recent decision of this Court in Ravindra
Kumar(supra) involving non-disclosure of a criminal case
in the verification form, this Court granted relief to the
appellant therein, having regard to the fact that on the
date of the application, no criminal case was pending as
he had been acquitted. Due regard was also given to the
character certificate by the SHO certifying that the
candidate was excellent, and that the appellant’s general
reputation was good. This Court also noted that the
selection had been mechanically treated as irregular
merely because the affidavit contained incorrect facts,
instead of considering the appellant's suitability for
appointment, which was an impermissible approach.
23. Similarly, in Umesh Chandra Yadav v Inspector
General and Chief Security Commissioner, Railway
Protection Force, Northern Railway, New Delhi and
others3, where the appellant had failed to furnish
information regarding a criminal case wherein he had
been discharged as a juvenile, this Court, while granting
relief, noted that in the facts and circumstances, such
3 (2022) 14 SCC 244
action could not be considered suppression of material
information. It was reiterated that termination must not
be done arbitrarily and the yardstick to be applied
depends on the nature of the post, the impact of
suppression and suitability. The relevant paragraph is
reproduced hereinbelow:
“14. This cannot be disputed that the
candidate who intend to participate in the
selection process is required to furnish correct
information relating to his character and
antecedents in the verification/attestation form
before or after his induction into service. At the
same time, it is also true that the person who
has suppressed the material information,
cannot claim unfettered right of seeking
appointment or continuity in service but, at the
same time, he has a right not to be dealt with
arbitrarily and power has to be exercised in
reasonable manner with objectivity having due
regard to the facts of the case on hand. The
yardstick which has to be applied always
depends upon the nature of post, nature of
duties, impact of suppression on suitability has
to be considered by the competent authority
considering post/nature of duties/services and
power has to be exercised on due diligence of
various aspects at the given time and no hardand-
fast rule of thumb can be laid down in this
regard.”
24. To summarise, the enquiry to be undertaken by
the employer, before proceeding to terminate the
services of an employee on the ground of suppression of
information regarding criminal antecedents, is
essentially two-pronged. The first is one of fact: whether
there has, in truth, been any suppression or furnishing
of false information by the candidate, having regard to
the extent of his knowledge at the relevant time and the
circumstances in which the declaration came to be
made. The second prong of enquiry requires the
authorities to apply their mind to the specific facts and
circumstances of the case including the type of the
suppression, the nature of allegations, role and gravity
of the offence, the nature of the post and the duties
attached to it and wherever relevant the effect thereof,
and the eventual outcome of the criminal proceedings, if
concluded, in order to arrive at a considered conclusion
as to whether the continuation of the employee in service
would not be feasible and the only option available is
termination from service. It is only where both these
stages of enquiries are undertaken and not otherwise,
that an order of termination on this ground can be said
to be sustainable in law.
25. Having elaborated upon the settled law on the
issue before us, we now proceed to apply the same to the
facts and circumstances at hand.
26. Looking at the first prong, whether there has been
any suppression or supply of false information on the
part of the appellant, we observe that the consistent
Page 14 of 18
stand of the appellant is that he had no knowledge of the
NCR involving him. Therefore, to the best of his
knowledge and in a bona fide manner, he stated in his
verification form that there was no criminal case pending
against him.
27. The appellant has also relied upon a character
certificate dated 09.07.2020 by the Senior
Superintendent of Police, Maharajganj, that stated that
there were no adverse entries against the appellant in
the police records. Pertinently, this certificate was given
subsequent to the date of the lodging of the NCR i.e.
03.04.2019.
28. The appellant has also brought on record a
subsequent certificate dated 09.08.2023 issued by the
Sub-Inspector of Police, Nichlaul, Maharajganj, Uttar
Pradesh, disclosing that although the appellant was
initially arrayed in the NCR, his name was later removed
after investigation as no evidence was found against
him. It was also certified that he was neither called to
the police station nor was he arrested during the
relevant period.
29. From the above, the claim of the appellant stands
substantiated that, in the absence of any summons, and
Page 15 of 18
having never been called to the police station, arrested,
or questioned, the appellant had no means of knowing
about the NCR.
30. We are also not persuaded by the submission of
the respondents that the appellant could not have been
unaware of the NCR since his parents were also named
therein. No material has been placed on record to show
that the appellant was in fact informed by his parents of
the registration of the NCR, or that he was otherwise put
to notice of the same. In the absence of any such
evidence, the respondents' submission remains a matter
of surmise and cannot displace the documentary
material relied upon and placed on record by the
appellant, particularly the certificate dated 09.07.2020
and the subsequent confirmation of deletion of his name
from the array of accused.
31. Needless to say, knowledge of a fact is a necessary
pre-requisite for its non-disclosure. The very concept of
suppression presupposes an awareness of that which is
suppressed; one cannot be said to have withheld or
concealed something of which one had no knowledge in
the first place. It would be both illogical and unjust to
hold a candidate liable for suppression of information
that was never within his knowledge to begin with.
Therefore, where the very existence of a criminal
antecedent is not shown to have been within the
candidate's knowledge at the relevant time, he cannot be
held to have suppressed or furnished false information
in that regard, there being no suppression of a fact that
was, to him, non-existent.
32. We hasten to add that such lack of awareness of
the existence of a criminal antecedent is itself a fact that
must be established by the candidate, the onus being
upon him to substantiate the claim before the employer.
A bare plea of ignorance, without cogent and reliable
material to assert such claim, will not suffice to escape
liability. Were it otherwise, the requirement of disclosure
in verification forms would be rendered illusory, open to
circumvention by simply pleading ignorance. In the
present case, as discussed above, we find that the
appellant's consistent claim of bona fide ignorance of the
NCR stands duly established by documentary evidence
on record.
33. The second prong of the enquiry to be undertaken
is whether the criminal antecedent, and the
suppression, if any, is of such nature that merits
termination of employment. In the present case, we
observe that although sufficient opportunity was
granted to the appellant to put forth his case, the
authorities have not undertaken such enquiry. They
have not considered the specific facts and circumstances
and have proceeded under the presumption that
existence of the criminal antecedent would
automatically render the appellant ineligible for the post.
There have been no specific findings regarding the
specific nature of the offence and its impact on the
nature of the post held by the appellant, and the
subsequent discharge of the appellant has not been
given due consideration.
34. In light of the above, we answer the issue framed
by us in the negative, and hold that the termination of
the appellant was not permissible in law, as it fails on
both the prongs, the order being illegal as well as without
application of mind.
35. In the facts and circumstances, since there is
nothing on record to indicate that the appellant was
otherwise unfit for the post in terms of qualifications,
and nothing has been brought on record regarding his
work being unsatisfactory, we set aside the order of
termination of the appellant and direct reinstatement in
service forthwith with all consequential benefits, except
for backwages which will be restricted to 50% to be paid
within a period of eight weeks from today failing which
interest @6% per annum will be payable from the date
the amount became due till disbursal.
36. The appeal is allowed in the aforesaid terms.
37. Pending applications, if any, stand disposed of.
.……..………..……………………..J.
[ SANJAY KAROL ]
……..………..……………………..J.
[ AUGUSTINE GEORGE MASIH ]
NEW DELHI;
AUGUST 11, 2026.
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