Can the appointing authority dismiss a public servant from service by invoking the doctrine of pleasure or is the authority bound by the rule of law?

The law on “the Doctrine of Pleasure” and the

scope of judicial review, is no longer res integra; it has

been settled by the Apex Court and also by this Court in

various judgments. The “Doctrine of Pleasure” has its

genesis under the common law. A public servant could be

dismissed from service by the Crown at its pleasure.

However, the doctrine lost the said trait when it was

applied in India, which is a republic, wedded to the

rule of law functioning under a written Constitution.

The authoritarian doctrine, though couched in an

unfettered manner, is but subject to the rule of law.

While considering the justiciability on the exercise of

the power of Doctrine of Pleasure, there is no

adjudication of any lis. The contours of judicial review

is confined to, finding out if the exercise of the power

was “arbitrary, capricious or malafide”. There is no

requirement of any notice preceding exercise of the

power, or to assign any cause for exercise of the power.

Though there is no need to assign reasons, the need for

a valid and compelling reason, exists. In exercise of

the doctrine of pleasure, the principles of natural

justice have no application. [See Deepak v. University of

Kerala 2014 (1) KLT 520, Krishna vs. State of Maharashtra and Ors. 2001 (2) SCC 441; B.P. Singhal vs. Union of India (UOI) and Ors. 2010 (6) SCC 331]. {Para 24}

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

WP(C) NO. 33664 OF 2022

DR.K.S.CHANDRASEKAR Vs THE CHANCELLOR UNIVERSITY OF KERALA, 

PRESENT

 MR. JUSTICE SATHISH NINAN

 24TH DAY OF MARCH 2023

Dated: 24th day of March, 2023

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Whether an employee can retain government accommodation if his appeal against dismissal from service is pending?

  Before this Court, petitioner has not been able to show any right or entitlement of the petitioner to retain the premises. It is an admitted position that petitioner stands dismissed from service in exercise of powers under Rule 14 read with Rule 19(i) of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules 1965 and there is no stay of the said order of dismissal.

14. Since petitioner does not remain in the service and has been struck off from the strength of the Air Force, petitioner is not entitled to continue in possession of the accommodation which was allotted to him being in service.

15. Mere fact that an appeal is pending against an order of dismissal does not entitle petitioner to continue in occupation of the quarter meant for service personnel and allotted to the petitioner and consequently to an interim protection.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI 

Judgment delivered on: 07th September, 2021 

CM(M) 446/2021 

SUSHIL DUTT Vs ESTATE OFFICER/ AOC & ANR

HON’BLE MR JUSTICE SANJEEV SACHDEVA

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Disciplinary authority should impose punishment of dismissal from service in exceptional circumstances

While dismissing the appeal, we would like to observe that the

government authorities must be quite sensitive while imposing

the severe punishment of dismissal as a consequence to

disciplinary action. 

ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT

 Chief Justice's Court

Case :- SPECIAL APPEAL DEFECTIVE No. - 898 of 2020

 Board Of Basic Education Vs Arvind Prakash Dwivedi And 2 Others

CORAM:

Hon'ble Govind Mathur,Chief Justice

Hon'ble Siddhartha Varma,J.

Order Date :- 21.10.2020

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Who is competent authority to dismiss judicial officer from service without disciplinary enquiry?

 Learned counsel appearing for Komal Ram and Jitendra Nath

Singh had raised another contention relating to the power of the

High Court to dispense with the inquiry under clause (b) of the

second proviso to Article 311 of the Constitution. The contention is

that this power exclusively vests with the Governor alone who has

to satisfy himself and record in writing the reasons why it is not

reasonably practical to hold an inquiry. Reliance was placed on

the following observations in the Constitutional Bench judgment of

this Court in State of West Bengal v. Nripendra Nath Bagchi,11:

“...within the exercise of the control vested in the High

Court, the High Court can hold enquiries, impose

punishments other than dismissal or removal, subject

however to the conditions of service, to a right of

appeal if granted by the conditions of service, and to

the giving of an opportunity of showing cause as

required by clause (2) of Article 311 unless such

opportunity is dispensed with by the Governor acting

under the provisos (b) and (c) to that clause.”

17. The contention misreads the ratio in Nripendra Nath Bagchi

(supra), which rather holds to the contrary. Interpreting Articles

233 and 235 of the Constitution, and on the aspect of ‘control’ of

the High Court in matters relating to the subordinate judiciary in

Nripendra Nath Bagchi (supra), it was held:

“13. […] the history which lies behind the enactment of

these Articles indicate that “control” was vested in the

11 AIR 1966 SC 447

High Court to effectuate a purpose, namely, the

securing of the independence of the subordinate

judiciary and unless it included disciplinary control as

well the very object would be frustrated. This aid to

construction is admissible because to find out the

meaning of a law, recourse may legitimately be had to

the prior state of the law, the evil sought to be removed

and the process by which the law was evolved. The

word “control”, as we have seen, was used for the first

time in the Constitution and it is accompanied by the

word “vest” which is a strong word. It shows that the

High Court is made the sole custodian of the control

over the judiciary. Control, therefore, is not merely the

power to arrange the day to day working of the court

but contemplates disciplinary jurisdiction over the

presiding Judge. Article 227 gives to the High Court

superintendence over these courts and enables the

High Court to call for returns etc. The word “control” in

Article 235 must have a different content. It includes

something in addition to mere superintendence. It is

control over the conduct and discipline of the judges.

This conclusion is further strengthened by two other

indications pointing clearly in the same direction. The

first is that the order of the High Court is made subject

to an appeal if so provided in the law regulating the

conditions of service and this necessarily indicates an

order passed in disciplinary jurisdiction. Secondly, the

words are that the High Court shall “deal” with the

judge in accordance with his rules of service and the

word “deal” also points to disciplinary and not mere

administrative jurisdiction.

14. Articles 233 and 235 make a mention of two distinct

powers. The first is power of appointments of persons,

their postings and promotion and the other is power of

control. In the case of the District Judges,

appointments of persons to be and posting and

promotion are to be made by the Governor but the

control over the District Judge is of the High Court. We

are not impressed by the argument that the term used

is “District Court” because the rest of the Article clearly

indicates that the word “court” is used compendiously

to denote not only the court proper but also the

presiding Judge. The latter part of Article 235 talks of

the man who holds the office. In the case of the judicial

service subordinate to the District judge the

appointment has to be made by the Governor in

accordance with the rules to be framed after

consultation with the State Public Service Commission

and the High Court but the power of posting, promotion

and grant of leave and the control of the courts are

vested in the High Court. What is vested includes

disciplinary jurisdiction. Control is useless if it is not

accompanied by disciplinary powers. It is not to be

expected that the High Court would run to the

Government or the Governor in every case of

indiscipline however small and which may not even

require the punishment of dismissal or removal. These

Articles go to show that by vesting “control” in the High

Court the independence of the subordinate judiciary

was in view. This was partly achieved in the

Government of India Act, 1935 but it was given effect

to fully by the drafters of the present Constitution. This

construction is also in accord with the Directive

Principles in Article 50 of the Constitution which reads:

“50. The State shall take steps to separate

the judiciary from the executive in the public

services of the State”.

xx xx xx

17. […] That the Governor appoints District Judges and

the Governor alone can dismiss or remove them goes

without saying. That does not impinge upon the control

of the High Court. It only means that the High Court

cannot appoint or dismiss or remove District Judges. In

the same way the High Court cannot use the special

jurisdiction conferred by the two provisos. The High

Court cannot decide that it is not reasonably

practicable to give a District Judge an opportunity of

showing cause or that in the interest of the security of

the State it is not expedient to give such an

opportunity. This the Governor alone can decide. That

certain powers are to be exercised by the Governor

and not by the High Court does not necessarily take

away other powers from the High Courts. The provisos

can be given their full effect without giving rise to other

implications. It is obvious that if a case arose for the

exercise of the special powers under the two provisos,

the High Court must leave the matter to the Governor.

In this connection we may incidentally add that we

have no doubt that in exercising these special powers

in relation to inquiries against District Judges, the

Governor will always have regard to the opinion of the

High Court in the matter. This will be so whoever be

the inquiring authority in the State. But this does not

lead to the further conclusion that the High Court must

not hold the enquiry any more than that the Governor

should personally hold the enquiry.”

18. The expression/words “within the exercise of the control vested in

the High Court, the High Court can hold enquiries, impose

punishments other than dismissal or removal, subject however to

the conditions of service, to a right of appeal if granted by the

conditions of service, and to the giving of an opportunity of

showing cause as required by clause (2) of Article 311 unless

such opportunity is dispensed with by the Governor acting under

the provisos (b) and (c) to that clause” is not to deny the High

Court the authority to decide whether conditions for invoking

clause (b) of the second proviso to Article 311(2) are satisfied, but

recognises that the resolution and recommendation of dismissal,

removal or reduction in rank or for dispensing with the inquiry in

terms of clause (b) [also clause (c)] of the second proviso to

Article 311(2) would require an order of the Governor. The

observations do not hold that the Governor, and not the High

Court, is vested with the jurisdiction and is the competent authority

to decide whether the inquiry should be dispensed with upon

recording of satisfaction in terms of clause (b) of the second

proviso to Article 311(2) of the Constitution. The decision refers to

Article 235 of the Constitution and states that the control vests

with the High Court, albeit order of appointment, dismissal or

removal is passed and made in the name of the Governor who

passes the formal order be it a case of appointment, dismissal or

removal. This is clear from the last portion of paragraph 17 in

Nirpendra Nath Bagchi (supra) which records “that the Governor

will always have regard to the opinion of the High Court in the

matter. This will be the inquiring authority in the State. But this

does not lead to the further conclusion that the High Court must

not hold the enquiry any more than that the Governor should

personally hold the enquiry.”

This legal position with reference to Articles 233 to 236 and

‘control’ of the High Court is beyond doubt as was explained in

Ajit Kumar v. State of Jharkhand12 in the following words:

“15. The next contention raised by the appellant was

that the aforesaid power under Article 311(2)(b) of the

Constitution could not have been invoked by the High

Court. The aforesaid submission also cannot be

accepted in view of the fact that a Subordinate Judge is

also a Judge within the meaning of the provision of

Article 233 of the Constitution of India read with the

provisions of Articles 235 and 236 of the Constitution of

India.

12 (2011) 11 SCC 458

16. Article 233 clearly lays down that appointments and

promotions of District Judges in any State are to be

made by the Governor of the State in consultation with

the High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to such

State. The aforesaid provision, like Articles 234 to 236,

has been incorporated in the Constitution of India inter

alia to secure the independence of the judiciary from

the executive and the same deals with the scope of

separation of power of the three wings of the State.

17. It cannot be disputed that the power under the

aforesaid articles [Articles 233-236] is to be exercised

by the Governor in consultation with the High Court.

Under the scheme of the Indian Constitution the High

Court is vested with the power to take decision for

appointment of the subordinate judiciary under Articles

234 to 236 of the Constitution. The High Court is also

vested with the power to see that the high traditions

and standards of the judiciary are maintained by the

selection of proper persons to run the District Judiciary.

If a person is found not worthy to be a member of the

judicial service or it is found that he has committed a

misconduct he could be removed from the service by

following the procedure laid down. Power could also be

exercised for such dismissal or removal by following

the preconditions as laid down under Article 311(2)(b)

of the Constitution of India. Even for imposing a

punishment of dismissal or removal or reduction in

rank, the High Court can hold disciplinary proceedings

and recommend such punishments. The Governor

alone is competent to impose such punishment upon

persons coming under Articles 233-235 read with

Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India. Similarly,

such a power could be exercised by the High Court to

dispense with an enquiry for a reason to be recorded in

writing and such dispensation of an enquiry for valid

reasons when recommended to the Governor, it is

within the competence of the Governor to issue such

orders in terms of the recommendation of the High

Court in exercise of power under Article 311(2)(b) of

the Constitution of India.” (emphasis supplied)

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3105 OF 2017

HARI NIWAS GUPTA Vs  STATE OF BIHAR 

SANJIV KHANNA, J.

Dated:NOVEMBER 08, 2019.

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Whether dismissal order can be passed against employee without examination of witnesses?

Even if the employee refuses to participate in the enquiry, the employer cannot straightaway dismiss him, but he must hold an ex parte enquiry where evidence must be led vide Imperial Tobacco Co, Ltd. v. its workmen. MANU/SC/0401/1961 : AIR 1962 SC 1348, Uma Shanker v. Registrar. 1992 (651) FLR 674

9. A dismissal order has serious consequences and should be passed only after complying with the rules of natural justice. Since in the present case, no enquiry was held at all and no evidence led in the presence of the petitioner nor was he given opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses against him or lead his own evidence the impugned dismissal order is illegal.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD

C.M.W.P. No. 33291 of 1996

Decided On: 07.09.1999

Subhash Chandra Sharma  Vs.  Managing Director, U.P. Co-op. Spg. Mils Federation Ltd., Kanpur and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Markandey Katju and Dhani Ram Chaudhary, JJ.

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Whether employee can be granted service benefits if he is terminated from service?

Dismissal is punitive in nature while a termination of employment simply brings an employment contract to an end. 'Dismissed' as per Oxford Dictionary is "treat as unworthy of serious consideration and refuse further hearing to (a case)", whereas Black's Law Dictionary defines 'dismissal' as "termination of an action or claim without further hearing".

8. In the present case, a notice was served upon the respondent. A fair hearing was given and therefore, it cannot be said that the petitioner had exercised the powers arbitrarily. Termination of employment as per Black's Law Dictionary is the complete severance of an employer-employee relationship.

9. Many a times dismissal and termination are held to be synonymous, however, they differ in letter and spirit as well as the ascertainment of the rights of the employee would differ. A dismissal on account of grave misconduct, as in the present case, would necessarily entail dismissal. In the present case, the Petitioner Corporation has been fair enough to conduct an enquiry and give an opportunity of hearing to the employee.

10. Thus, the difference between termination and dismissal is that-Dismissal could be on account of misconduct involving dishonesty or criminality and that is not the case in termination. On termination, the employee would be entitled to receive gratuity and other terminal benefits, whereas the same cannot be granted in case of dismissal.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

W.P. No. 1347 of 2004

Decided On: 05.10.2018

 Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation  Vs.  A.B. Patel

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Sadhana S. Jadhav, J.

Citation: 2019(2) MHLJ 207

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Whether Judge can be dismissed on corruption charges from service without giving him opportunity to put his defence?

 It is also an accepted position that after the inquiry report
was submitted by the Inquiry Officer to the Administrative
Committee of the High Court, copy of the inquiry report was not
furnished to the appellant at that stage and no opportunity was
given to him to make his representation against the findings of the
Inquiry Officer. Instead the Administrative Committee accepted the
said report and only thereafter the copy of the inquiry report was

sent to the appellant along with show cause notice whereby the
appellant was asked to show cause as to why penalty of dismissal be
not inflicted upon him. It is clear from the above that the show
cause notice pertained only to the punishment insofar as the
findings recorded by the Inquiry Officer are concerned, the
appellant was not given any opportunity before the said findings
were accepted by the Administrative Committee. Only, after the
submission of the reply to the show cause notice, the disciplinary
authority considered the question of quantum of punishment.
Therefore, insofar as acceptance of findings of the Inquiry Officer
by the Administrative Committee without giving prior opportunity to
show cause against that is concerned, the appellant has been
prejudiced. We make this comment having regard to the
representation which was submitted by the appellant. A perusal of
the said representation reflects that the appellant had
specifically mentioned as to how the complainant had developed
grudge against him inasmuch as in various cases the complainant had
appeared before the appellant. Some of the orders which were passed
by the appellant in those cases were not of the liking of the
complainant and because of this reason the complainant had made the
complaint against the appellant. The appellant had also brought on
record the conduct of the said advocate/complainant who had been
indulging in the practice of making such complaints which have been
deprecated by the High Court also on previous occasions. The
appellant had also submitted that the other witnesses were close
relatives of the complainant and, therefore, they were the
interested witnesses. Obviously, this defense of the appellant was

not looked into by the Administrative Committee as the
Administrative Committee had already decided to accept the findings
without giving opportunity to the appellant to make a
representation against the inquiry report. We, therefore, are of
the firm opinion that non-grant of opportunity in the aforesaid
circumstances has also caused prejudice to the appellant.
In view of the aforesaid, we do not agree with the submissions
of the learned counsel for the respondent that no prejudice was
caused to the appellant and, therefore, reliance upon the judgments
of this Court in “Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad & Ors. vs.
Karunakar & Ors.” (1993)4 SCC 727 and “Haryana Financial
Corporation & Anr. vs. Kailash Chandra Ahuja” (2008)9 SCC 31 is of
no avail to the respondents. On the contrary in these very
judgments it is held that non-grant of opportunity in respect of
the findings of the Inquiry Officer leads to violation of
principles of nature justice. Once this violation is found, coupled
with the fact that it has caused prejudice to the appellant as
well, those very judgments would rather support the case of the
appellant.
In the aforesaid circumstances, this appeal is allowed; the
impugned judgment of the High Court is set aside.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 1749/2019
(@ SLP(C) No. 15741/2018)


R. ALEXANDER Vs  REGISTRAR GENERAL HIGH COURT 

Dated:FEBRUARY 19, 2019.

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Who is competent authority for dismissal, removal, reduction in rank or termination of judicial officers?

This Court in Registrar (Admn.), High Court of Orissa, Cuttack v. Sisir Kanta Satapathy (dead) by L.Rs. and Anr. MANU/SC/0573/1999 : (1999) 7 SCC 725, while considering the scope of Articles 233, 234 and 235 of the Constitution of India has held

that the control vested in the High Court over the subordinate judiciary though absolute and exclusive, has to be exercised without usurping the power vested in the executive under the Constitution.

The High Court retains the power of disciplinary control over the subordinate judiciary, including the power to initiate disciplinary proceedings, suspend them pending enquiry and impose punishment on them. But when it comes to the question of dismissal, removal, reduction in rank or termination of judicial officers on any count whatsoever, the High Court becomes only the recommending authority and cannot itself pass such an order. The High Court has to send its recommendations to the Governor because the Governor is the authority to dismiss, remove, reduce in rank or terminate the appointment.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 10244 of 2017 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 13525/2016)

Decided On: 08.08.2017

 P.D. Goel Vs.  High Court of Himachal Pradesh

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Whether dismissal of judicial officer can be set aside on ground that copy of resolution of full court is not supplied to him?

 Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Kunj Bihari Misra (supra) laid down as under:

“19. The result of the aforesaid discussion would be that the principles of natural justice have to be read into Regulation 7(2). As a result thereof whenever the disciplinary authority disagrees with the inquiry authority on any article of charge then before it records its own findings on such charge, it must record its tentative reasons for such disagreement and give to the delinquent officer an opportunity to represent before it records its findings. The report of the inquiry officer containing its findings will have to be conveyed and the delinquent officer will have an opportunity to persuade the disciplinary authority to accept the favourable conclusion of the inquiry officer. The principles of natural justice, as we have already observed, require the authority, which has to take a final decision and can impose a penalty, to give an opportunity to the officer charged of misconduct to file a representation before the disciplinary authority records its findings on the charges framed against the officer.”

31. It may be noticed here that after the law was laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Kunj Bihari Misra (supra) specific provision in this regard has been inserted in the Rules of 1958 as Rule 16(10A) in the year 2003, as reproduced hereinbefore.

32. In the present case as admittedly the copy of the resolution of the Full Court was not made available to the petitioner, the same apparently was in violation of the resolution itself as well as express provisions of Rule 16(10A) of the Rules, 1958 and results in causing prejudice to the petitioner, who being unaware of the opinion of the Full Court did not make any representation qua the said opinion of the Full Court.

33. The rest of the issues sought to be raised by the petitioner pertaining to the findings of the Inquiry Judge, on account of the fact that the Full Court apparently formed the opinion that the petitioner acted with corrupt motive also, go into oblivion at this stage.

34. In view of the fact that the opinion of the Full Court was not communicated to the petitioner and petitioner could not make any representation qua the said opinion, further the Full Court rejected the representation and the State acting on the opinion of the Full Court has ordered for dismissal of the petitioner, the order of dismissal stands vitiated.

In the High Court of Rajasthan at Jodhpur

(Before Sangeet Lodha and Arun Bhansali, JJ.)

Ghanshyam Giri v. Rajasthan High Court through the Registrar General,

D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 637/2012

Decided on September 20, 2017

Citation: 2017 SCC OnLine Raj 2559

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Whether an employee can be dismissed from service even though principles of natural justice are not followed?

The other aspect of the matter which requires the consideration is the action of dismissing the petitioner from service on the ground that a criminal offence was registered against him under provisions of Sections 294, 506 and 509 of the Indian Penal Code. The criminal proceedings are said to be pending and the petitioner is yet to be convicted for the alleged offences. The resolution dated 25-3-2013 passed by the Gram Panchayat merely refers to the registration of aforesaid offence against the petitioner. Said resolution further indicates that there were deliberations on various other aspects pertaining to the services of the petitioner. As noted above, there was no show cause notice given to the petitioner with regard his unsatisfactory discharge of duties or his indulging in political activities. Therefore, it will have to be examined as to whether the respondent No.3 was justified in dismissing the petitioner from service underSection 61(1) of the said Act in the manner in which the same has been done.

10. It cannot be disputed that under provisions of Section 61(1) of the said Act the Gram Panchayat has the power to dismiss any servant appointed by it. There is no procedure prescribed in Section 61 of the said Act to indicate the manner in which a servant can be dismissed from service.

 The act of dismissing a servant from services results in visiting such servant with civil consequences. As held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Mohindersingh Gill Vs. Chief Election Commissioner (1978) 1 SCC 405 civil consequences would include everything that affects a citizen in his civil life. Reference can also be made to the observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of D.K. Yadav Vs. J.M.A. Industries Ltd. (1993) 3 Supreme Court Cases 259. In para 11 thereof, it was observed thus:

"11. The law must therefore be now taken to be well-settled that procedure prescribed for depriving a person of livelihood must meet the challenge of Article 14 and such law would be liable to be tested on the anvil of Article 14 and the procedure prescribed by a statute or statutory rule or rules or orders affecting the civil rights or result in civil consequences would have to answer the requirement of Article 14. So it must be be right, just and fair and not arbitrary, fanciful or oppressive. There can be no distinction between a quasi-judicial function and an administrative function for the purpose of principles of natural justice. The aim of both administrative inquiry as well as the quasi- judicial inquiry is to arrive at a just decision and if a rule of natural justice is calculated to secure justice or to put it negatively, to prevent miscarriage of justice, it is difficult to see why it should be applicable only to quasi-judicial inquiry and not to administrative inquiry. It must logically apply to both."

Bombay High Court

Ashok Govindrao Sardar (Water ... vs The Chief Executive Officer, Z.P. 

Bench: A.S. Chandurkar

WRIT PETITION NO.2395 OF 2015

Citation:2016(2) ALLMR 413

 DATE ON WHICH JUDGMENT IS PRONOUNCED: 29-01-2016.

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Whether an employee can be dismissed from service on ground that offence is registered against him?

In the present case after a show cause notice was given to the petitioner and his reply was received, the Gram Panchayat passed a resolution resolving to dismiss the petitioner from services. There was no reasonable opportunity granted to the petitioner to justify his defence before dismissing him from service. There was no opportunity to putforth his explanation before said action was taken. Though provisions of Section 61(1) empower the Gram Panchayat to dismiss any servant, said power cannot be exercised in a manner that gives a go bye to the principles of natural justice. There is no power with the Gram Panchayat to dismiss a servant merely on the ground that an offence has been registered against him. Mere registration of an offence in these facts by itself cannot be treated as a reason for dispensing with holding of an enquiry whatsoever especially when the services of a servant were sought to be dismissed. In State of UP and another Vs. Ram Vinayak (2010) 15 SCC 305, an Assistant Engineer in the Irrigation Department was appointed on ad hoc basis and his services were subsequently regularized. Thereafter an offence under Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 was registered against him. The State Government terminated his services on the ground that same were not required. It was held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that the termination of services was sought to be justified on the ground that he was found unsuitable in view of a criminal case being registered against him. It was held that same was not termination simplicitor and in absence of any opportunity of being heard, the order of termination was in violation of principles of natural justice. Said order was accordingly set aside.

Bombay High Court

Ashok Govindrao Sardar (Water ... vs The Chief Executive Officer, Z.P. ... on 29 January, 2016

Bench: A.S. Chandurkar

WRIT PETITION NO.2395 OF 2015

Citation:2016(2) ALLMR 413

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Whether Judge can be dismissed from service without proper departmental enquiry?

In totality of the matter, the disciplinary proceedings as initiated was based upon the anonymous complaint not supported by any evidence. Later on restricted to the two incidents of the Trust that was also based upon no prior written communication. The statements were recorded based upon unwritten complaint by those material witnesses. No other Trustees were examined and or called for any statement at any point of time. No evidence and witnesses were recorded of any other Trust on which the Petitioner was incharge. No official summons issued to call and to record the statement of the District Judge and at least not placed any affidavit and/or evidence of Departmental witnesses, when the statement was recorded. No copy of Summons or service report issued by the District Court Office placed on record. No other team members were examined to support the charges of demand and/or no payment of taxi charges, though it were available. It shows that the whole object was to single out and bring in by all by means the Petitioner for undisclosed reasons. The doctrine of preponderance of probabilities used to punish and/or to impose such major penalty on the basis of false and fabricated evidence and inquiry report which was admittedly initiated on the foundation of general and vague anonymous complaint, without verifying the genuineness and bonafide of all the complainants and 

supporting witnesses, therefore, the existing material were not sufficient to impose such major penalty.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

WRIT PETITION NO. 1930 OF 2007

Rahul  Abhimanyu Ranpise  Vs. State of Maharashtra

CORAM :- D.K. DESHMUKH &

ANOOP V . MOHTA, JJ.

Dated :- 24 JANUARY 2012.

JUDGMENT (Per Anoop V. Mohta, J):-

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