The scheme of CrPC does not contemplate any embargo on the direction for registration of an FIR or the conduct of investigation at the pre-cognizance stage. To hold otherwise would amount to introducing a restriction not envisaged by the legislature. The process of criminal law is sequential: information of a cognizable offence must first be received; an FIR must then be registered; investigation must follow; a report under Section 173 of CrPC must thereafter be submitted; and it is only at that stage that the question of taking cognizance arises. {Para 126}
127. The requirement of sanction is, therefore, a condition precedent only for taking cognizance and not for the registration of an FIR or for the conduct of investigation. Any interpretation that makes the registration of an FIR contingent upon prior sanction would invert this statutory scheme and render the provisions relating to investigation unworkable.
129. The bar under Sections 196 and 197 of CrPC would operate
only in respect of the latter course. It could not have been invoked to deny the former. The Trial Court, therefore, fell in error in declining to exercise jurisdiction under Section 156(3) of CrPC on the ground of absence of prior sanction, and the High Court, in affirming such view, has adopted an interpretation which cannot be sustained in law.” [Emphasis supplied]
28. Thus, it is clear that the impugned order, insofar as it extends the benefit of the protective umbrella of sanction to the respondents at the stage of direction for registration of FIR under Section 156(3) CrPC, is per se unsustainable in the eyes of law.
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(Arising out of SLP(Crl.) No(s). 1137 of 2025)
SRI ANUMANDALA RAJESH REDDY Vs STATE OF KARNATAKA AND ANR.
Author: Mehta, J.
Citation: 2026 INSC 1039.
1. Heard.
2. Leave granted.
3. These five appeals arise from the judgment and
final order dated 29th May, 2023 rendered by the High
Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru1 in Criminal
Petition No.9349/2022 and connected matters,
whereby the High Court allowed the petitions filed by
the respondents herein and quashed the proceedings
initiated by the appellant-Anumandala Rajesh
Reddy2 pursuant to PCR No.57 of 2022, including the
order dated 1st August, 2022 passed by I Additional
Civil Judge (Jr.Dn.) and JMFC, Channapatna,
Ramanagara District3 under Section 156(3) of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 19734 and the
consequential FIR bearing Crime No.73 of 2022 dated
12th August, 2022 insofar as the respondents herein,
who were arrayed as Accused No.4 and Accused
Nos.8 to 11, are concerned.
4. Since the facts and questions of law involved in
all the appeals are common, we have analogously
heard the appeals and shall be deciding the same by
this common judgment.
1 Hereinafter referred to as the “High Court”.
2 Hereinafter referred to as the “appellant”.
3 Hereinafter referred to as the “jurisdictional Magistrate.”
4 For short, ‘CrPC’.
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5. Brief outline of the facts relevant for the disposal
of these appeals is as follows.
6. The appellant claims to be an entrepreneur and
the founder of a healthcare analytics company, which
was serving, inter alia, multinational corporations
and the Andhra Pradesh Police Department. During
the period when the appellant was operating a health
management course, he came into contact with Dr.
Parameshwar C.M., who encouraged the appellant to
expand his business to the State of Karnataka. The
appellant thereafter invested Rs.30 lakhs and formed
a new venture with Smt. Anuradha, wife of Dr.
Parameshwar, and another person.
7. In the year 2018, the appellant got associated
with M/s. Smiles International, co-owned by Dr.
Yuvraj Singh and Smt. Anuradha, and was involved
in managing the digital assets of the said enterprise.
In the year 2019, the appellant and Dr. Parameshwar
co-founded another entity, namely, M/s. Smiles
Institute of Gastroenterology (NLP). According to the
appellant, the relations between him and Dr.
Parameshwar subsequently deteriorated. In January
2020, the appellant claims to have received
complaints from members of the hospital staff
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alleging sexual harassment and abuse by Dr.
Parameshwar, following which he confronted him
regarding the same. According to the appellant, Dr.
Parameshwar thereafter withheld his salary and
shares and blocked his access to the company's
financial records.
8. The appellant alleges that, being aggrieved by
the aforesaid acts, he decided to lodge a cyber-crime
complaint against Dr. Parameshwar and one Mr.
Subba Rao. However, while he had gone to purchase
a pen drive to copy the evidence in his possession, he
was apprehended by police officials in civilian dress.
His phone and car keys were allegedly snatched, and
he was pressurised to disclose the whereabouts of his
laptop, which was thereafter seized from his
Advocate, Mr. Durairaj. The appellant was then taken
to Channapatna East Police Station.
9. The appellant further alleges that, at the police
station, the police officials compelled him to unlock
his mobile phone, disabled its security features and
accessed and deleted data contained therein. He was
thereafter informed that he had been arrested in
connection with Crime No.102 of 2020, registered on
4th November, 2020 on the complaint of one Waseem
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Ali Khan, alleging an outstanding payment of Rs.45
lakhs in relation to M/s. Arogya Mark Limited. The
appellant disputes the allegations forming the basis
of the said crime. It is also noteworthy that the said
case was subsequently transferred for investigation
to CID, which submitted a B-Report on 21st
December, 2022, concluding, inter alia, that the
transaction between the complainant and the
appellant was civil in nature and that there was lack
of evidence regarding the commission of the alleged
offences.
10. According to the appellant, although Crime
No.102 of 2020 was registered on 4th November,
2020, the police officials had raided his residential
premises on 3rd November, 2020. For this purpose,
Raja M., then serving as Assistant Sub-Inspector and
Assistant Investigator at Channapatna Rural Circle,
along with the crime staff, namely, Nagaraju K.R.,
Shivarajkumar Kumbavara and Praveen G.N., who
are the respondents in the connected appeals, was
directed to meet the then Superintendent of Police,
Ramanagara District, Girish S., IPS. The appellant
alleges that Dr. Parameshwar was closely associated
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with Girish S., IPS, and that the latter was acting at
the instance of Dr. Parameshwar.
11. Girish S. allegedly directed the team to locate
the appellant in Bengaluru and provided his mobile
number for obtaining his call and location details.
Pursuant thereto, the police team proceeded to
Bengaluru, where Prakash B.K., respondent No.2 in
the lead petition, who was serving as Sub-Inspector
at Channapatna East Police Station, subsequently
joined the team.
12. The appellant further alleges that, during the
intervening night of 4th/5th November, 2020, Dr.
Parameshwar, Smt. Anuradha, Sub Inspector
Prakash B.K. and Dr. Karthik, in collusion with other
police officials, came to the place where he was being
held and compelled him, under threats and coercion,
to execute documents relinquishing his partnership
and shares in M/s. Smiles Institute of
Gastroenterology (NLP), including a resignation.
13. The appellant was ultimately produced before
the Magistrate; remanded to judicial custody and was
released on bail on 10th November, 2020 after
spending nearly 7 days in prison. He alleges that
immediately thereafter he was again arrested in
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connection with Crime No.103 of 2020 with the
intention of harassing and humiliating him.
Nevertheless, in that case, he was subsequently
granted bail at the police station upon intervention
by higher police officials. The appellant further
alleges that Sub Inspector Prakash B.K. threatened
him with further implication in criminal proceedings
if he attempted to complain against the police officials
or Dr. Parameshwar. Crime No.103 of 2020 was
subsequently quashed by the High Court of
Karnataka by order dated 4th April, 2025.
14. The appellant thereafter approached the police
authorities raising grievances against the aforesaid
illegal and highhanded criminal acts. According to
the appellant, the police officials of Ramanagara
District refused to register his complaint on account
of their alleged association with Dr. Parameshwar. He
accordingly forwarded a detailed complaint by e-mail
dated 28th December, 2020 to the DCP and marked
copies thereof to other departments and officials,
including the Human Rights Commission. The
appellant further alleges that, upon obtaining a
forensic report, he came to know that during the
period of his custody, his laptop had been tampered
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with, important data had been deleted and his digital
assets had been transferred in connivance with and
on instructions of Dr. Parameshwar.
15. As no action was forthcoming on the complaints
made by the appellant directly to the police officials
and also through e-mail, the appellant submitted yet
another complaint dated 27th November, 2021 to the
Director General and Inspector General of Police,
against Dr. Parameshwar and the other involved
persons, specifically stating that the complaints filed
by him earlier had not been acted upon by the
jurisdictional police authorities.
16. The appellant thereafter filed a private
complaint under Section 200 CrPC, which came to be
registered as PCR No. 57 of 2022 before the
jurisdictional Magistrate, alleging commission of
offences punishable under Sections 211, 220, 417,
420, 506, 342, 347 and 348 read with Section 34 of
the Indian Penal Code, 18605 and Sections 66B and
66C of the Information Technology Act, 20006.
17. The learned Magistrate, vide order dated 1st
August, 2022, forwarded the same to the
5 For short, ‘IPC’.
6 For short, ‘IT Act, 2000’.
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jurisdictional police station under Section 156(3)
CrPC and directed investigation into the said
complaint. Pursuant thereto, FIR bearing Crime No.
73 of 2022 came to be registered at Channapatna
East Police Station.
18. The respondents herein filed separate petitions
under Section 482 CrPC seeking quashing of the
order dated 1st August, 2022 passed by the learned
Magistrate in PCR No.57 of 2022 under Section
156(3) CrPC and the consequential FIR bearing
Crime No.73/2022. The said petitions came to be
allowed by the learned Single Judge of the High Court
vide judgment and final order dated 29th May, 2023,
which is assailed in these appeals by special leave.
19. The High Court was of the view that, since the
police officials concerned had acted in the discharge
of their official duties, their prosecution was
impermissible in the absence of the sanction
contemplated under Section 197 CrPC. The High
Court further held that there was a clear violation of
the law laid down by this Court in Priyanka
Srivastava v. State of Uttar Pradesh7 as the
7 (2015) 6 SCC 287.
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complainant had directly approached the Magistrate
by way of a private complaint without first
approaching the police authorities in the manner
contemplated therein. On these grounds, the High
Court quashed the proceedings initiated against the
private respondents at the instance of the appellant.
The specific reasons assigned by the High Court for
quashing the FIR and the proceedings are set out
hereinbelow:
“10. Having heard the arguments and on perusal
of the records, which reveals, there was inter se
dispute between the partners of the company i.e.,
respondent No.2, accused Nos.1 to 3 and accused
No.5. Subsequently, accused No.5 said to be filed
complaint to the Channapatna Police as against
respondent No.2-defacto complainant. A case in
Crime No.102/2020 was registered in
Channapatna Police on 04.11.2020. Accused No.4
is the PSI, and accused Nos.8 to 11 who are the
Police Constables under the instruction of the PSI,
they apprehended respondent No.2 at Cunningham
Road and he was taken to the Channapatna, Police
where a investigation was conducted by accused
No.4-PSI in respect of Crime No.102/2020. It is
alleged by the learned counsel for respondent No.2
that during the custody of respondent No.2,
accused Nos.1 to 3 and 5 came to the police station
on 04.11.2020, obtained signature on the blank
papers and other documents and used the said
documents against respondent No.2 and the same
was misused by accused No.5 stating that
respondent No.2 has resigned from the company.
But it was forcefully taken the signature of
respondent No.2 in the Police Station when he was
in custody. of course, the police might have
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obtained the signature of the complainant for the
purpose of helping accused No.5 who is the
complainant in Crime No.102/2020. However, the
investigation was conducted by the PSI-accused
No.4 in respect of Crime No.102/2020.
Subsequently, respondent No.2 got remanded to
the judicial custody and he was released on bail on
10.11.2020. It is submitted by the learned counsel
for respondent No.2 that later the investigation was
handed over to the CID police, 'B' final report has
been filed and it is pending for consideration:
However, the petitioner-accused No.4-PSI and
accused Nos.8 to 11 are Police Constables have
committed the offence during the discharge of their
official duty while investigation in Crime
No.102/2020. Therefore, the sanction under
Section 197 of Cr.P.C. is required to proceed
against them for the purpose of any investigation.
In this regard, the learned counsel for the petitioner
has relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in the case of D.Devaraja stated
supra, wherein, the Hon'ble Supreme Court
considering the - similar situation has held at
paragraph. Nos.74, 75, 76, 77 which are as under:
“74. It is well settled that an application under
Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code is
maintainable to quash proceedings which are
ex facie bad for want of sanction, frivolous or
in abuse of process of court. If, on the face of
the complaint, the act alleged appears to have
a reasonable relationship with official duty,
where the criminal proceeding is apparently
prompted by mala fides and instituted with
ulterior motive, power under Section 482 of
the Criminal Procedure Code would have to be
exercised to quash the proceedings, to prevent
abuse of process of court.
75. There is also no reason to suppose that
sanction will be withheld in case of
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prosecution, where there is substance in a
complaint and in any case if, in süch a case,
sanction is refused, the aggrieved complainant
can take recourse to law. At the cost of
repetition, it is reiterated that the records of
the instant case clearly reveal that the
complainant alleged of police excesses while
the respondent was in custody, in the course
of investigation in connection with Crime No.
12/2012. Patently, the complaint pertains to
an act. under colour of duty.
76. Significantly, the High Court has by its
judgment [H. Siddappa v. Owais Sabeer
Hussain, 2018 SCC OnLine Kar 3805] and
order observed: (H. Siddappa case [H.
Siddappa v. Owais Sabeer Hussain, 2018 SCC
OnLine Kar 3805], SCC OnLine Kar para 5)
“5. it is well-recognised principle of law
that sanction is a legal requirement
which empowers the court to take
cognizance so far as the public servant
is concerned. If at all the sanction is
absolute requirement, if takes
cognizance it. becomes illegal,
therefore, an order to overcome any
illegality the duty of the Magistrate is
that even at any subsequent stages if
the sanction is raised it is the duty of
the Magistrate to consider.”
77. In our considered opinion, the High Court
clearly erred in law in refusing to exercise its
jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Criminal
Procedure Code to set aside the order of the
Magistrate impugned taking cognizance of the
complaint, after having held that it was a
recognised principle of law that sanction was
a legal requirement which empowers the court
to take cognizance. The Court ought to have
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exercised its power to quash the complaint
instead of remitting the appellant to an
application under Section 245 of the Criminal
Procedure Code to seek discharge.”
11. Though the learned counsel for respondent
No.2 has contended and relied upon the judgments
of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Prem
Chand (Paniwala) vs. Union of India (UOI) and
Others reported in (1981) 1 SCC 639 and in the
cases of Chandan Kumar Basu and Rajib Ranjan
both stated supra, where the alleged offences in the
said case were 468, 420, 120B and those offences
were not connected with discharging the official
duty. Therefore, those judgments are not applicable
to the case on hand.
12. As regards another contention raised by the
learned counsel for the petitioner is that there is no
compliance of guidelines issued in Priyanka
Srivastava's case, where respondent No.2 has not
approached the Police and directly has filed the
private complaint. In this regard, respondent
counsel produced the copy of the complaint filed
before the DG and IGP on 27.11.2021 and
contended that he took the complainant to the
Police Station, but they refused to lodge the
complaint, therefore, he has filed complaint to the
Higher officers of the Police Station who is the DGP
of the State. Therefore, he has complied the
guidelines issued in Priyanka Srivastava's case. Of
course, the complainant-respondent No.2 not
produced any copy of the complaint filed against
the Channapatna Police at Channapatna Police
Station: But it is pertinent to note that the
complaint is against accused No.4 who is the PSI of
Channapatna Police Station and definitely he might
have refused. Of course, the complainant could
have filed the complaint before the Superintendent
of Police as per Section 154(3) of Cr.P.C., but the
complaint came to be filed before the DG and IGP.
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It is brought to the notice of this Court and as per
the 'B' final report and enquiry made by the CID
Police, the PSI registered the case on the complaint
filed by accused No.5 at the instance of the
Superintendent of Police one Girish, at that time,
he was S.P. of Ramanagar District. Such being the
case, definitely the complaint was filed before the
PSI as well as S.P. either under Sections 154(1) or
154(3) of Cr.P.C., they might have refused.
Therefore, the complaint came to be filed before the
DGP. However, the complainant might have sent
the complaint to the Police Station through RPAD
either to the Police Station or to the Superintendent
of Police, but respondent No.2 has not chosen to
send the complaint to the Police as per Section
154(1) or to the Superintendent of Police under
Section 154(3) of Cr.P.C., but filed complaint
directly to the Magistrate under Section 200 of
Cr.P.C and got it referred to the Police under
Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C. by filing a complaint to
Inspector General and Deputy General of Police.
Therefore, there is a clear violation of the guidelines
issued by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Priyanka
Srivastava's case. Therefore, on this court, the FIR
registered by the Police on the complaint referred
by the Magistrate is not sustainable under the law.
13. As regards to the delay in lodging the
complaint, of course, he was released on bail on
10.11.2020, but the complaint came to be filed
before the Magistrate on 30.03.2022 i.e., more than
12 years. However, in view of the findings above, for
non compliance of the guidelines issued in the
Priyanka Srivastava's case and not obtained any
sanction under Section 197 of Cr.P.C., it is not
necessary to consider the delay in lodging the
complaint, and also this Court is not required to go
into the ingredients of the provisions of the section
mentioned in the complaint. Therefore, I am of the
view that, in view of the non-compliance of
Priyanka Srivastava's case, without sanction, the
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Police cannot investigate the matter and even the
Magistrate cannot refer the complaint under
Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C. for requirement of
sanction. Therefore, the complaint as well as FIR
required to be quashed as it is an abuse of process
of law.”
Submissions on behalf of the appellants: -
20. Learned senior counsel, Shri Nikhil Goel
appearing for the appellants, assailed the impugned
judgment primarily on the ground that the High
Court had erred in its understanding and application
of the principles laid down by this Court in Priyanka
Srivastava (supra). It was submitted that, although
the appellant may not have followed the course
contemplated under Section 154 CrPC in the precise
manner contemplated therein, he had, in substance,
approached the police authorities on several
occasions and had made repeated efforts to have his
complaint registered and acted upon. It was further
submitted that upon being frustrated by the inaction,
the appellant had approached higher police
authorities, including the Director General and
Inspector General of Police, and had also placed on
record an affidavit setting out the repeated attempts
made by him before the police authorities to get the
FIR registered. It was contended that in a case where
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the allegations themselves were directed against
police officials and other persons exercising
authority, the appellant could not have been expected
to mechanically pursue the same course before the
very authorities against whom the grievance was
raised. According to learned senior counsel, the High
Court clearly erred in holding that the appellant had
approached the Magistrate without first making any
attempt to invoke the police machinery.
21. Learned senior counsel further submitted that
the High Court fell in error in treating the lack of
sanction under Section 197 CrPC as a bar even at the
stage when the Magistrate had simply directed
investigation under Section 156(3) CrPC. It was
argued that an order passed under Section 156(3)
CrPC is a pre-cognizance step, whereby the
Magistrate simply directs the police to register a case
and investigate into the allegations. He urged that
such an order does not amount to taking cognizance
of the offence by any stretch of imagination.
Therefore, the requirement of previous sanction
under Section 197 CrPC cannot operate as a
condition precedent to the registration of an FIR or to
the commencement of investigation pursuant to an
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order under Section 156(3) CrPC. According to
learned senior counsel, the question of sanction, if at
all attracted, would arise at the stage when the Court
would contemplate taking cognizance on the police
report submitted under Section 173(2) CrPC
(corresponding to Section 193(3) of the Bharatiya
Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 20238) and not at the precognizance
stage of registration of FIR. Consequently,
the absence of sanction could not have furnished a
ground for quashing the complaint or the FIR at the
threshold.
22. Learned senior counsel lastly submitted that
the High Court had prematurely brought the
proceedings to an end without permitting a proper
investigation into the grave and serious allegations
made in the complaint filed by the appellant. It was
contended that the complaint disclosed allegations of
cognizable criminal conduct, including coercion,
illegal detention, tampering with digital evidence and
misuse of police machinery, which warranted
investigation by the competent agency. Reliance was
placed upon the judgment of this Court in
8 For short, ‘BNSS’.
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Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. State of
Maharashtra & Ors9. to urge that the power to
quash criminal proceedings at the threshold is to be
exercised with due circumspection and that, where
the allegations prima facie disclose cognizable
offences, the investigation should ordinarily be
permitted to proceed in accordance with law.
Submissions on behalf of the respondents: -
23. Learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of
the respondents, Shri Gaurav Agarwal, fairly
conceded that the requirement of obtaining previous
sanction under Section 197 CrPC would arise at the
stage of cognizance. However, he supported the
impugned judgment of the High Court on the other
grounds. Shri Agarwal submitted that the safeguards
and guidelines laid down by this Court in Priyanka
Srivastava (supra) were required to be given due
regard while invoking the jurisdiction of the
Magistrate under Section 156(3) CrPC. It was
contended that, in the facts of the present case, the
appellant had not followed the procedure
contemplated therein in its proper form and that the
9 (2021) 19 SCC 401
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High Court was, therefore, justified in taking such
non-compliance into consideration and treating it to
be fatal while examining the validity of the
proceedings initiated pursuant to the complaint.
Discussion and Analysis
24. It may be stated at the outset that, before the
High Court, the petitions were opposed by the State
Government through the learned Government
Pleader, who submitted that the investigation had
remained at a nascent stage since the proceedings
were stayed within a month of the registration of the
FIR and, consequently, the police had been unable to
ascertain the truth in the matter. The State,
accordingly, opposed the prayer for quashing of the
FIR and submitted that the police ought to be
permitted to proceed with the investigation. The
stand taken by the State Government before this
Court is at variance with its position before the High
Court. Here, the State Government has supported the
impugned judgment and sought dismissal of the
appeals, relying, inter alia, upon the B-Final Report
submitted in the underlying proceedings and
contending that the complainant’s remedy would be
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to pursue the matter by filing a protest petition before
the jurisdictional Magistrate.
25. Be that as it may, we have given our thoughtful
consideration to the reasoning assigned by the High
Court in the impugned judgment and the material
available on record. We have also gone through the
judgment rendered by this Court in Priyanka
Srivastava (supra) and appreciated the submissions
advanced by the learned counsel appearing for the
parties.
26. We are of the firm opinion that the finding of the
High Court that the investigation into the FIR could
not continue for want of sanction under Section 197
CrPC [corresponding to Section 218 BNSS] is per se
erroneous. Section 197(1) CrPC is quoted
hereinbelow for sake of ready reference: -
“197. Prosecution of Judges and public
servants:–
(1) When any person who is or was a Judge or
Magistrate or a public servant not removable from
his office save by or with the sanction of the
Government is accused of any offence alleged to
have been committed by him while acting or
purporting to act in the discharge of his official
duty, no Court shall take cognizance of such
offence except with the previous sanction [save as
otherwise provided in the Lokpal and Lokayuktas
Act, 2013] –
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(a) in the case of a person who is employed
or, as the case may be, was at the time of
commission of the alleged offence employed,
in connection with the affairs of the Union,
of the Central Government;
(b) in the case of a person who is employed
or, as the case may be, was at the time of
commission of the alleged offence employed,
in connection with the affairs of a State, of
the State Government.
[Provided that where the alleged offence was
committed by a person referred to in clause (b)
during the period while a Proclamation issued
under clause (1) of Article 356 of the Constitution
was in force in a State, clause (b) will apply as if for
the expression “State Government” occurring
therein, the expression “Central Government” were
substituted.]
[Explanation — For the removal of doubts it is
hereby declared that no sanction shall be required
in case of a public servant accused of any offence
alleged to have been committed under Section 166-
A, Section 166-B, Section 354, Section 354-A,
Section 354-B, Section 354-C, Section 354-D,
Section 370, Section 375, Section 376, [Section
376-A, Section 376-AB, Section 376-C, Section
376-D, Section 376-DA, Section 376-DB] or Section
509 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860).]”
[Emphasis supplied]
27. A bare perusal of the aforesaid provision, which
confers a protective umbrella upon public servants
who are alleged to have committed an offence during
the discharge of their official duties, makes it clear
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that the requirement of sanction comes into
operation only when the Court is to proceed to take
cognizance of the offence. The concept of obtaining
sanction under Section 197 CrPC at the stage of
registration of an FIR is alien to the scheme of CrPC
or BNSS. An order under Section 156(3) CrPC
directing registration of an FIR and investigation is a
pre-cognizance step and does not amount to taking
cognizance of the offence. Consequently, where the
Magistrate has, by exercising powers under Section
156(3) CrPC, directed registration of an FIR and to
conduct investigation, the absence or otherwise of
previous sanction under Section 197 CrPC cannot
operate as a bar to such registration and
investigation. This aspect was considered by this
Court in the case of Ashwini Kumar Upadhyay v.
Union of India10, relevant paragraphs of which are
extracted hereinbelow: -
“120. In the present case, the High Court has
declined to direct registration of an FIR on the
ground that prior sanction under
Sections 196 and 197 of CrPC had not been
obtained. The High Court has further proceeded on
the premise that while exercising jurisdiction under
Section 156(3) of CrPC, the Magistrate is deemed to
have taken cognizance, and therefore, the
10 2026 SCC OnLine SC 741.
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requirement of prior sanction becomes a condition
precedent.
121. A coordinate Bench of this Court in State of
Karnataka v. Pastor P. Raju35, had occasion to
consider the stage at which
prior sanction becomes necessary under CrPC.
The Court categorically held that there is no
embargo on the registration of a criminal case,
the conduct of investigation by the police, or
the submission of a report under
Section 173 of CrPC in the absence of
prior sanction.
122. The requirement of sanction, this Court
clarified, operates at the stage of taking cognizance
by the Court and not at the anterior stage of
investigation. In this context, after surveying the
earlier precedents on the subject, this Court
observed as follows: —
“12. In Narayandas Bhagwandas
Madhavdas v. State of W.B. [1959 SCC
OnLine SC 39 : (1960) 1 SCR 93 : AIR
1959 SC 1118 : 1959 Cri LJ 1368] it was
held that before it can be said that any
Magistrate has taken cognizance of
any offence under Section 190(1)(a) of
the Criminal Procedure Code, he must
not only have applied his mind to the
contents of the petition but must have
done so for the purpose of proceeding
in a particular way as indicated in the
subsequent provisions of the
Chapter—proceeding under Section
200 and thereafter sending it for
inquiry and report under Section 202.
It was observed that there is no special
charm or any magical formula in the
expression “taking cognizance” which
merely means judicial application of
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the mind of the Magistrate to the facts
mentioned in the complaint with a
view to taking further action. It was
also observed that what Section 190
contemplates is that the Magistrate
takes cognizance once he makes
himself fully conscious and aware of
the allegations made in the complaint
and decides to examine or test the
validity of the said allegations. The
Court then referred to the three
situations enumerated in sub-section (1)
of Section 190 upon which a Magistrate
could take cognizance. Similar view was
expressed in Kishun Singh v. State of
Bihar [(1993) 2 SCC 16 : 1993 SCC (Cri)
470] that when the Magistrate takes
notice of the accusations and applies his
mind to the allegations made in the
complaint or police report or information
and on being satisfied that the
allegations, if proved, would constitute an
offence, decides to initiate judicial
proceedings against the alleged offender,
he is said to have taken cognizance of the
offence. …”
Thus, defining attribute of “taking cognizance” of
an offence lies in the application of judicial mind by
the Magistrate to the contents of the complaint or
police report with a view to proceed in accordance
with law, including under Sections 200
or 204 of CrPC. Until such stage is reached, any
action undertaken by the Magistrate cannot be
construed as taking cognizance of the offence.
123. In Pastor P. Raju (supra), the FIR therein had
been registered under Section 153B of IPC, and the
respondent was arrested and produced before the
Magistrate. At the stage of remand under
Section 167 of CrPC, the respondent sought
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quashing of the proceedings on the ground of
absence of prior sanction under Section 196(1-
A) of CrPC. While delineating the distinction
between “taking cognizance” and subsequent
procedural stages, including issuance of process,
this Court held as follows: —
“13. It is necessary to mention here that
taking cognizance of an offence is not the
same thing as issuance of
process. Cognizance is taken at the initial
stage when the Magistrate applies his
judicial mind to the facts mentioned in a
complaint or to a police report or upon
information received from any other person
that an offence has been committed. The
issuance of process is at a subsequent stage
when after considering the material placed
before it the court decides to proceed
against the offenders against whom a prima
facie case is made out.
14. In the present case neither any
complaint had been filed nor any police
report had been submitted nor any
information had been given by any person
other than the police officer before the
Magistrate competent to take cognizance of
the offence. After the FIR had been lodged
and a case had been registered under
Section 153-B IPC, the respondent was
arrested by the police and thereafter he had
been produced before the Magistrate. The
Magistrate had merely passed an order
remanding him to judicial custody.
Section 167 CrPC finds place in Chapter XII
which deals with information to the police
and their powers to investigate. This section
gives the procedure which has to be
followed when investigation cannot be
completed within twenty-four hours and
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requires that whenever any person is
arrested and detained in custody and it
appears that the investigation cannot be
completed within the period of twenty-four
hours fixed by Section 57 and there are
grounds for believing that the accusation or
information is well founded, he shall be
forthwith transmitted to the
nearest Judicial Magistrate along with a
copy of the entries in the diary. Sub-section
(2) of Section 167 will show that even a
Magistrate who has no jurisdiction to try the
case can authorise the detention of the
accused. A limited role has to be performed
by the Judicial Magistrate to whom the
accused has been forwarded viz. to
authorise his detention. This is anterior to
Section 190 CrPC which confers power
upon a Magistrate to take cognizance of an
offence. Therefore, an order remanding an
accused to judicial custody does not
amount to taking cognizance of an offence.
In such circumstances Section 196(1-
A) CrPC can have no application at all and
the High Court clearly erred in quashing the
proceedings on the ground that
previous sanction of the Central
Government or of the State Government or
of the District Magistrate had not been
obtained. It is important to note that on the
view taken by the High Court, no person
accused of an offence, which is of the nature
which requires previous sanction of a
specified authority before taking of
cognizance by the court, can ever be
arrested nor such an offence can be
investigated by the police. The specified
authority empowered to
grant sanction does so after applying his
mind to the material collected during the
course of investigation. There is no occasion
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for grant of sanction soon after the FIR is
lodged nor such a power can be exercised
before completion of investigation and
collection of evidence. Therefore, the whole
premise on the basis of which the
proceedings have been quashed by the High
Court is wholly erroneous in law and is
liable to be set aside.”
124. A cumulative reading of the principles laid
down in Pastor P. Raju (supra) and Sakiri
Vasu (supra) makes the legal position abundantly
clear that an order passed by a Magistrate under
Section 156(3) of CrPC does not amount to “taking
cognizance” of an offence within the meaning of
Section 190 of CrPC.
125. In the present case, the appellants, being
aggrieved by the inaction of the police authorities
in registering an FIR, approached the Magistrate by
way of an application under
Section 156(3) of CrPC. The bar contained in
Sections 196 and 197 of CrPC operates only at the
stage of taking cognizance. In other words, it
restrains the Magistrate from proceeding under
Section 190 and thereafter invoking the procedure
under Sections 200 or 204 of CrPC in the absence
of prior sanction.
126. The scheme of CrPC does not contemplate
any embargo on the direction for registration of
an FIR or the conduct of investigation at the
pre-cognizance stage. To hold otherwise would
amount to introducing a restriction not
envisaged by the legislature. The process of
criminal law is sequential: information of a
cognizable offence must first be received; an
FIR must then be registered; investigation must
follow; a report under Section 173 of CrPC must
thereafter be submitted; and it is only at that
stage that the question of taking cognizance
arises.
127. The requirement of sanction is, therefore,
a condition precedent only for taking
cognizance and not for the registration of an
FIR or for the conduct of investigation. Any
interpretation that makes the registration of an
FIR contingent upon prior sanction would
invert this statutory scheme and render the
provisions relating to investigation unworkable.
128. In the facts of the present case, the prayer
before the Trial Court was limited to seeking a
direction to the Station House Officer, Parliament
Street Police Station, to register an FIR on the basis
of the complaint dated 29th January, 2020. In law,
the Magistrate had two options: either to direct
investigation under Section 156(3), or to take
cognizance under Section 190(1)(a) and proceed in
accordance with Chapter XV.
129. The bar under
Sections 196 and 197 of CrPC would operate
only in respect of the latter course. It could not
have been invoked to deny the former. The Trial
Court, therefore, fell in error in declining to
exercise jurisdiction under
Section 156(3) of CrPC on the ground of
absence of prior sanction, and the High Court,
in affirming such view, has adopted an
interpretation which cannot be sustained in
law.”
[Emphasis supplied]
28. Thus, it is clear that the impugned order,
insofar as it extends the benefit of the protective
umbrella of sanction to the respondents at the stage
of direction for registration of FIR under Section
156(3) CrPC, is per se unsustainable in the eyes of
law.
29. The second ground on which the High Court
proceeded to quash the proceedings was the alleged
non-adherence to the guidelines laid down by this
Court in Priyanka Srivastava (supra), and, in this
regard, the High Court relied upon the following
principles laid down in the said judgment to quash
the FIR at the outset: -
“28. Issuing a direction stating “as per the
application” to lodge an FIR creates a very
unhealthy situation in society and also reflects the
erroneous approach of the learned Magistrate. It
also encourages unscrupulous and unprincipled
litigants, like Respondent 3, namely, Prakash
Kumar Bajaj, to take adventurous steps with
courts to bring the financial institutions on their
knees. As the factual exposition would reveal,
Respondent 3 had prosecuted the earlier
authorities and after the matter is dealt with by the
High Court in a writ petition recording a settlement,
he does not withdraw the criminal case and waits
for some kind of situation where he can take
vengeance as if he is the emperor of all he surveys.
It is interesting to note that during the tenure of
Appellant 1, who is presently occupying the
position of Vice-President, neither was the loan
taken, nor was the default made, nor was any
action under the Sarfaesi Act taken. However, the
action under the Sarfaesi Act was taken on the
second time at the instance of the present
Appellant 1. We are only stating about the devilish
design of Respondent 3 to harass the appellants
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with the sole intent to avoid the payment of loan.
When a citizen avails a loan from a financial
institution, it is his obligation to pay back and not
play truant or for that matter play possum. As we
have noticed, he has been able to do such
adventurous acts as he has the embedded
conviction that he will not be taken to task because
an application under Section 156(3) CrPC is a
simple application to the court for issue of a
direction to the investigating agency. We have been
apprised that a carbon copy of a document is filed
to show the compliance with Section 154(3),
indicating it has been sent to the Superintendent
of Police concerned.
29. At this stage it is seemly to state that power
under Section 156(3) warrants application of
judicial mind. A court of law is involved. It is not
the police taking steps at the stage of Section 154
of the Code. A litigant at his own whim cannot
invoke the authority of the Magistrate. A principled
and really grieved citizen with clean hands must
have free access to invoke the said power. It
protects the citizens but when pervert litigations
takes this route to harass their fellow citizens,
efforts are to be made to scuttle and curb the same.
30. In our considered opinion, a stage has come
in this country where Section 156(3) CrPC
applications are to be supported by an affidavit
duly sworn by the applicant who seeks the
invocation of the jurisdiction of the Magistrate.
That apart, in an appropriate case, the learned
Magistrate would be well advised to verify the
truth and also can verify the veracity of the
allegations. This affidavit can make the
applicant more responsible. We are compelled
to say so as such kind of applications are being
filed in a routine manner without taking any
responsibility whatsoever only to harass certain
persons. That apart, it becomes more disturbing
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and alarming when one tries to pick up people who
are passing orders under a statutory provision
which can be challenged under the framework of
the said Act or under Article 226 of the Constitution
of India. But it cannot be done to take undue
advantage in a criminal court as if somebody is
determined to settle the scores.
31. We have already indicated that there has to
be prior applications under Sections 154(1) and
154(3) while filing a petition under Section
156(3). Both the aspects should be clearly spelt
out in the application and necessary documents
to that effect shall be filed. The warrant for
giving a direction that an application under
Section 156(3) be supported by an affidavit is so
that the person making the application should
be conscious and also endeavour to see that no
false affidavit is made. It is because once an
affidavit is found to be false, he will be liable for
prosecution in accordance with law. This will
deter him to casually invoke the authority of
the Magistrate under Section 156(3). That
apart, we have already stated that the veracity
of the same can also be verified by the learned
Magistrate, regard being had to the nature of
allegations of the case. We are compelled to say
so as a number of cases pertaining to fiscal
sphere, matrimonial dispute/family disputes,
commercial offences, medical negligence cases,
corruption cases and the cases where there is
abnormal delay/laches in initiating criminal
prosecution, as are illustrated in Lalita
Kumari [(2014) 2 SCC 1: (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 524]
are being filed. That apart, the learned
Magistrate would also be aware of the delay in
lodging of the FIR.”
[Emphasis supplied]
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30. Suffice it to say that the facts as obtaining in the
present case clearly reflect that, before approaching
the jurisdictional Magistrate by way of the application
under Section 156(3) CrPC, the appellant had
repeatedly approached the police authorities with a
request to register his complaint. When no action was
forthcoming despite his concerted efforts, the
appellant addressed a detailed complaint by e-mail
dated 28th December, 2020 to the DCP, marking
copies thereof to other departments and officials.
Even thereafter, when no effective action was
forthcoming, the appellant submitted another
complaint dated 27th November, 2021 to the Director
General and Inspector General of Police. Thus,
clearly, the High Court erred in holding that the
appellant had approached the jurisdictional
Magistrate at the first instance without recourse to
the remedies available before the police authorities.
Rather, the record discloses that the appellant had
approached the police authorities at different levels
and, only upon his efforts failing to reap any result,
he was compelled to approach the jurisdictional
Magistrate, who, upon consideration of the
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complaint, proceeded to refer the same to the police
for investigation under Section 156(3) CrPC.
31. The safeguards enunciated in Priyanka
Srivastava (supra) cannot be divorced from the
object sought to be achieved by the said decision. The
directions therein were intended to ensure that the
jurisdiction under Section 156(3) CrPC is not invoked
in a routine or mechanical manner and that a
complainant does not directly approach the
Magistrate without first availing the remedies
available before the police authorities. The
requirement of prior recourse to the police authorities
was thus intended to ensure that the sequence of
procedure provided under the Code is adhered to
before an aggrieved person can invoke the
jurisdiction of the Magistrate under Section 156(3)
CrPC. Such safeguards, being intended to prevent
abuse of the process of law, cannot be applied as a
mere matter of procedural formality divorced from the
peculiar circumstances of the case.
32. In the facts and circumstances of the present
case, it is evident that the appellant had not
straightaway invoked the jurisdiction of the
Magistrate. The allegations of the appellant were also
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against police officials but inspite thereof, he had first
approached the jurisdictional police authorities and,
upon experiencing stoic silence, thereafter pursued
his grievances before higher police authorities,
including the DCP and subsequently the Director
General and Inspector General of Police. The mere
fact that the subsequent representation was
addressed to the Director General and Inspector
General of Police, rather than specifically to the
Superintendent of Police under Section 154(3) CrPC,
cannot, in the circumstances of the present case, be
treated as affecting the bonafides of the appellant’s
actions. The grievance of the appellant was directed
against police officials of the local police
establishment, and the record discloses that he had
repeatedly approached the district-level police
authorities with his complaint but failed to meet the
desired result, i.e., registration of the FIR. To insist,
in such circumstances, upon a further
representation to an officer in the rank of
Superintendent of Police merely as a matter of form,
despite the appellant having already pursued the
matter before superior police authorities, would be to
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elevate the form of the safeguard above its underlying
purpose.
33. The ratio of Priyanka Srivastava (supra) has
to be understood in the light of the mischief which
the said decision sought to curb. The law is governed
by reason, and a judicial direction intended to
prevent abuse of a statutory remedy cannot be
applied in a manner which defeats the very purpose
for which the safeguard was evolved. Where the
complainant has, in substance, approached the
police authorities and thereafter pursued the matter
before superior police authorities, the inference of a
direct and casual invocation of Section 156(3) CrPC,
without first giving the police an opportunity to act,
would not arise. In the facts and circumstances of the
present case, therefore, the object underlying the
directions issued by this Court in Priyanka
Srivastava (supra), namely, to ensure that the
extraordinary remedy under Section 156(3) CrPC is
not invoked without first approaching the police
authorities, stood substantially fulfilled.
34. Hence, the view taken by the High Court that
the impugned FIR was liable to be quashed for want
of sanction under Section 197 CrPC and on the
ground that the principles enunciated by this Court
in Priyanka Srivastava (supra) had not been
followed is, per se, unsustainable both in facts and in
law.
35. The impugned order does not stand to scrutiny
and is hereby set aside. Pursuant to the impugned
order passed by the High Court, the Investigating
Agency had submitted the Final Report on 20th
September, 2023, wherein the proceedings against
accused No.4 and accused Nos.8 to 11, i.e., the
respondents herein, were recorded closed purely as a
consequence to quashing of the proceedings by the
High Court. Insofar as the other accused are
concerned, the Final Report records that the dispute
between the parties was essentially civil in nature
and that no evidence was found to substantiate the
allegations.
36. As a sequitur to the impugned judgment being
set aside, the Final Report shall be reopened and the
investigation shall be resumed from the stage at
which the Final Report was submitted, in accordance
with law.
37. Needless to say, the desirability of seeking
sanction shall be kept in mind by the Investigating
Officer in case the offences are found proved, and it
is concluded that the acts alleged against the official
respondents were done in the discharge of their
official duties.
38. The appeals are allowed in these terms.
39. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand
disposed of.
….……………………J.
(VIKRAM NATH)
...…………………….J.
(SANDEEP MEHTA)
NEW DELHI;
AUGUST 24, 2026.
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