For decades, filing an FIR under Section 154 of the old Code of
Criminal Procedure was the easy part. What followed was often silence —
sometimes for years — until a final report finally surfaced under Section
173(2) CrPC. The complainant had no enforceable right to interim information.
That era of "administrative silence" has now been legislatively
dismantled.
Under the CrPC regime, the informant's statutory journey
effectively paused the moment the FIR was registered. There was no checkpoint,
no mandated update, and no accountability mechanism until the investigation
concluded — a process that, in practice, was left almost entirely to police
discretion.
This created three recurring problems that plagued ordinary
complainants and corporate victims alike:
· Investigations could stall indefinitely with no obligation on
police to explain the delay.
· Case diaries were sometimes reconstructed or aligned
retrospectively when courts eventually asked for an account of the delay, since
no contemporaneous record of "progress as on date X" existed.
· Victims had no independent trigger point to approach a senior
officer or Magistrate — they simply had to wait for the chargesheet or closure
report.
The 90-Day Mandate Under Section 193(3)(ii)
The BNSS directly addresses this gap. Section 193, which governs
the police report on completion of investigation, now carries an explicit
victim-facing obligation embedded within it. Clause (ii) states that the police
officer shall, within a period of ninety
days, inform the progress of the investigation — by any means, including
electronic communication — to the informant or the victim.
This is a statutory duty, not a discretionary courtesy. Three
features make it significant:
· The 90-day clock creates a fixed, verifiable checkpoint rather
than leaving the timeline open-ended.
· Communication may be delivered through any means, expressly
including electronic and audio-video communication, making compliance easier
for police and traceable for victims.
· The duty exists independently of whether the investigation is
complete — it is a progress update, not a final report, and applies even to
ongoing cases.
The Press Information Bureau's official explainer on the new
criminal laws confirms this reading: Section 193 "mandates that the police
officer must inform the progress of investigation to the informant or victim
within 90 days of the investigation," alongside a related mandate that
further investigation after a chargesheet is filed must also be completed
within 90 days unless the court extends the period.
An Important Caveat: Ambiguity On The Starting
Point
Even law-enforcement training material acknowledges a genuine gap
in the drafting. Standard operating procedure notes issued for police point out
that "the said provision is silent whether the limitation of 90 days
begins from the date of registration of FIR or on filing chargesheet or
report".
Practitioners should flag
this ambiguity rather than assume a settled position — it is likely to be a
live point of interpretation until clarified by rules, circulars, or judicial
pronouncement.
What Recourse Actually Exists If Day 90 Lapses
This is where precision matters, because the correct remedy under
BNSS is often confused with the remedy for a refused FIR, which is a separate track.
Section 173(4) BNSS and Section 175(3) BNSS specifically address a
situation where the police refuse to
register an FIR in the first place: the aggrieved person may write to the
Superintendent of Police, and if the SP fails to act, may then apply to the
Magistrate for a direction to investigate.
Where an FIR is already
registered but the mandatory 90-day progress intimation under Section
193(3)(ii) is not furnished, the more precise recourse for a victim or
informant is to:
· Make a written representation to the Superintendent of Police or
the supervisory officer, citing the specific statutory breach and seeking
compliance.
· Bring the default to the notice of the jurisdictional Magistrate
exercising supervisory oversight over the investigation, who retains the power
to call for the case diary and question the investigating officer on the status
of the probe.
· Rely on the missed 90-day deadline as documented evidence of
investigative default, which becomes especially persuasive if the matter later
reaches a bail hearing, a quashing petition, or a protest petition against a
closure report.
Counsel should draft correspondence carefully — invoking Section
193(3)(ii) as the substantive right breached, while treating Sections
173(4)/175(3) as the appropriate track only where the underlying grievance is
non-registration or refusal to investigate, not merely a missed progress update
on an already-registered case.
Practical Takeaway For Victims And Counsel
Section 193(3)(ii) BNSS converts investigative transparency from a
matter of police goodwill into an enforceable statutory entitlement. For
victims, corporate complainants, and their counsel, the 90-day mark is no
longer just a date to note — it is a lever.
If that date passes
without any communication, physical or electronic, the silence itself becomes
documentable non-compliance. Used correctly, it lets counsel move from a vague
grievance about "delay" to a specific, citable statutory default — which
is a far stronger position before a Superintendent of Police or a Magistrate
than a general complaint ever was.
Know the 90-day right.
Insist on the record. That is how transparency stops being a favour and becomes
law.

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