Whether the court should interfere in notice issued by Municipal Corporation for demolition of dilapidated structure?

This Court has examined the notice dated 18.11.2020, issued by respondent Nos. 3 and 4. It prima facie does not appear to be issued in a mechanical manner. There is reference made to the area of two storied structure, the condition of the structure as being bad and at various places even the walls having cracks in the said structure. It is then stated that demolition of the structure is necessary for larger good and to avoid any danger to human life. A structural audit report dated 27.10.2020 is on the record on the file of respondent Nos. 3 and 4 and having applied the same, the said notice has been issued. {Para 20}

21. In this backdrop, there is substance in the reliance placed by the learned counsel appearing for respondent Nos. 3 and 4 on judgement in the case of M/s. Sai Auto Parts and others Vs. State of Maharashtra and Ors. (supra), wherein the Division Bench of this Court has observed that the Court cannot sit in appeal over the satisfaction of the respondent-Corporation in such matters. There is also substance in reliance placed by learned counsel for respondent Nos. 3 and 4 on judgment in the case of Dattatray Ambo Mhatre & Ors. Vs. The State of Maharashtra & Ors.(supra), wherein the Division Bench of this Court observed that the Municipal Corporation is the only authority empowered to make such structural audits and to arrive at a decision to issue such a notice under Section 264 of the said Act, upon being satisfied, that it is necessary in the facts and circumstances of the individual case. Reliance placed on observations made by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of High Court on its own motion (in the matter of Jilani Building at Bhiwandi) Vs. Bhiwandi Nizampur Municipal Corporation & Ors.(supra) is also apposite for the reason that in the said judgment, it has been laid down as to why Courts ought not to interfere in such matters where safety of human lives is involved. It has been emphasized that a life lost is lost forever and the alternative is unimaginable. The learned counsel is also justified in relying upon the observations made by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai Vs. State of Maharashtra(supra), wherein, inter alia, it is indicated that tenancy rights and dispute between the landlords and tenants would have nothing to do with a situation covered under Section 264 of the said Act, because what is important in such cases, is the material indicating satisfaction of the concerned authority, while issuing notice.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (NAGPUR BENCH)

Writ Petition No. 1871/2022

Decided On: 22.06.2022

Mahadeo  Vs. Vimalbai and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Manish Pitale, J.

Citation:  MANU/MH/4921/2022

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When the court should not grant stay to the order of municipal commissioner for demolition of dangerous building?

Once we find that the satisfaction recorded by the Municipal Commissioner is in accordance with the due procedure prescribed by law and is not vitiated by any perversity or any illegality, there exists no ground to interfere with the impugned notices. Merely because the Appellants are senior citizens, does not impel us to take any lenient view in the matter in larger public interest particularly when the private interests of the Appellants have been amply safeguarded. {Para 22}

23. Judicial notice can be taken of various media reports reporting collapse of many old structures in Mumbai causing serious loss of human lives and limbs. By making interference of any sort in the matter at the behest of the Appellants, in the existing facts and circumstances, we would not only be putting the life of the Appellants and other residents of the building in jeopardy, but also hazarding the life and limb of the general public as well.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 5825 of 2022.

Ratilal S. Pujara (since deceased) thr. his L.Rs. and Ors. Vs.

Municipal Commissioner, Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

N.V. Ramana, C.J.I., Krishna Murari and Hima Kohli, JJ.

Author: Krishna Murari, J.

Decided On: 25.08.2022

Citation: MANU/SC/1068/2022

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Whether application before corporation court is maintainable if landlord has remedy before rent court?

   The next contention urged on behalf of the petitioners is that the learned Chief Judge had no jurisdiction to entertain the applications under Section 507 as the owners had a special remedy under the special statute, viz., the Bombay Rents. Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act. 1947 for recovering possession of the premises in the possession of the tenants if the Court under that Act is satisfied under Section 13(1)(hhh) that the premises are required for the immediate purpose of demolition ordered by any local authority or other competent authority. Apart from authority, in our opinion, the contention must be rejected, because it is only in respect of suits or proceedings between landlords and tenants relating to recovery of rent or possession of any premises to which Bombay Rent Act applied and in respect of applications made under that Act or any claim or question arising out of the Act or any of its provisions that the jurisdiction of other Courts is excluded under Section 28 of the Bombay Rent Act. The application made by the owners under Section 507 of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act does not fall under any of the categories of suits or proceedings referred to in Section 28(1) of the Bombay Rent Act. It cannot be said that an application under Section 507 relates to the recovery of possession of the premises because Section 507 empowers the Chief Judge to make a written order “requiring the occupier of the building or land to afford all reasonable facilities to the owner for complying with the notice”. Section 507 is not concerned with the termination of the tenancy or recovery of the possession of the premises but only with providing reasonable facilities to the owner to comply with a notice issued to him under the provisions of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act. Such a question cannot be said to be a claim or question arising out of the Bombay Rent Act or any of its provisions. The tenancy is not terminated before or by making an application under Section 507. Section 507 enables the owner to get an order from the Chief Judge directing the occupants to give reasonable facilities and merely states that if the occupiers fail to afford the facilities after 8 days from the date of the order the owner shall be discharged, during the continuance of such refusal, from any liability which he would otherwise incur by reason of his failure to comply with the said provision or requisition. It is true that the consequence of the refusal is that the occupants made themselves liable to be prosecuted under Section 471, as stated above. But this is not a question or claim arising out of any provisions of the Bombay Rent Act and we find nothing conflicting between Section 13(1)(hhh) and Section 28 of the Bombay Rent Act and Section 507 of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act from which we could infer an implied repeal of Section 354 of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act. On the contrary, having regard to the nature and purpose of these provisions, it is clear that these sections can exist together and the applications made by the owners under Section 507 were maintainable notwithstanding Section 28 of the Bombay Rent Act. {Para 29}

 Bombay High Court

(Before K.K. Desai and Vaidya, JJ.)

Diwanchand Gupta  Vs N.M. Shah 

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Whether the court should interfere if municipal corporation issues notice for demolition of the dangerous building?

   Moreover, it is not for the Court to satisfy itself whether the building was in a dangerous condition when the notice was issued. The fact that part of the building has been already pulled down and the majority of the occupants have no grievance against the pulling down itself further shows that the allegations of mala fides made against the Assistant Engineer is baseless. The criterion of the building being in a ruinous condition or dangerous to the occupants and to the passers-by, as required by Section 354, has been applied by the Assistant Engineer in the notice which mentions that the building “is in a ruinous condition, likely to fall and dangerous to any Person occupying, resorting to or passing by the same”. As Lord Halsbury stated in Westminster Corporation v. London and North Western Railway, 1905 AC 426,

“Where the legislature has confided the power to a particular body, With a discretion how it is to be used, it is beyond the power of any Court to contest that discretion”. {Para 27}

28. In the absence of anything to show abuse of the discretion or mala fide or capricious exercise of the discretion, it must, therefore be held that the contention of the petitioners that there was an unfair discrimination against them as citizens in violation of their right under Article 14 of the Constitution of India is without any foundation.

 Bombay High Court

(Before K.K. Desai and Vaidya, JJ.)

Diwanchand Gupta  Vs N.M. Shah 

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Whether Deputy commissioner of Municipal corporation can delegate his powers to assistant engineer?

 It was next contended that the authority, who issued the notice was delegated the power to issue the notice under Section 354 by the Deputy Commissioner who was himself a deputy of the Municipal Commissioner and this violated the principle contained in the maxim delegatus non potest delegare. The law on this point is succinctly stated in Allen on Law and Orders, 2nd edition at page 204 as follows:—

“With regard to executive functions, it is clear, on the one hand, that any administrator, whether of Ministeral degree or below it must be allowed a reasonable amount of delegation in ordinary routine duties; but, on the other hand if certain specific executive functions are committed to him, he cannot, without authority, entrust them to a deputy of his own choice”.{Para 18}

19. Wade on Administrative Law, 2nd edition. 1967, at page 59 has stated the law as follows:—

“Although, therefore, the Courts are strict in requiring that statutory power shall be exercised by the, persons on whom it is conferred, and by no one else, they make liberal allowance for the working of the official hierarchy, at least so far as it operates within the sphere of responsibility of ministers of the Crown. Powers, conferred upon special statutory bodies are more jealously watched, as we have noticed. Yet the maxim delegatus non potest delegare, like so many of the other rules of administrative law, turns out to be no more than a qualified rule for the interpretation of Parliament's intentions”.

20. It is, therefore, necessary for BS to consider whether in enacting the relevant provisions of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, the legislature had intended that the Deputy Commissioner, to whom powers of the Commissioner were delegated, had no power to delegate the powers to the Assistant Engineer, who, in the present case, issued the notice.

21. The learned Chief Judge considered the proceedings of the Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay at Ex. L relating to the Corporation resolution No. 820 dated October 28, 1958 and the Corporation resolution No. 331 dated May 16, 1960. which refers to the information given by the Commissioner under Section 56(2)(b) and proviso to Section 56-B (1) of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, stating that the Commissioner had deputed inter alia to the Deputy Municipal Commissioner Mr. S.M.Y. Shastri the powers under Section 354. He also considered Ex. H. which records the deputation of the powers to the Deputy Commissioner as well as Ex. G under which powers were delegated on September 26, 1960 to the Assistant Engineer Mr. Countinho (who issued the impugned notice) including the powers to issue notice under Section 354, and held that in view of the provisions of Section 56(3) of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, the Deputy Commissioner Mr. Shastri could validly delegate his powers under Section. 68 to Mr. Countinho, the Assistant Engineer. In effect, he held that as under Section 56(3) all acts and things performed and done by a Deputy Commissioner during the tenure of his office and in virtue thereof shall for all purposes be deemed to have been performed and done by the Commr., the Deputy Commissioner Mr. Shastri had a statutory authority or permission to delegate the powers of the Commissioner under Section 354 to Mr. Coutinho the Assistant Engineer. We find no reason to disagree with the view taken by the learned Chief Judge.

 Bombay High Court

(Before K.K. Desai and Vaidya, JJ.)

Diwanchand Gupta  Vs N.M. Shah 

Special Civil Appln. No. 259 of 1970, 

Decided on July 1, 1971

Citation: 1971 SCC OnLine Bom 30 : AIR 1972 Bom 316

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Whether legal heirs of a government servant can avoid their eviction from official residence saying that said accommodation is not dilapidated?

Moreover, petitioners claim their

occupation over the tenements from the Government,

pursuant to they or their predecessors to be in

Government service. The tenement was a facility

provided to them in service for accommodation. The

petitioners or their predecessors are claiming

their occupation over the tenements from the

Government. They do not have any right to deny the

title of the Government from whom they were

inducted in possession nor any other entity or a

persons is claiming a better title than the

Government. It is futile to enter into the debate

in this regard. The person who is inducted in

possession cannot deny the title of a person who

has inducted him in occupation, unless the person

inducted in occupation claims a better title. It

is also to be noted that, as far as the issue of

ownership of the Government is concerned the same

has been set to rest in the earlier judgments.

There is no reason to again enter into the

rigmarole of the ownership right. Nonetheless,

petitioners are not claiming ownership rights nor

they can claim ownership over the tenement in their

occupation. In light of the above, it is not open

for the petitioners to deny the ownership right of

the Government.

24. The petitioners have also emphasised much

upon the legality of public notice under Section

264 and 265-A of the Act, 1949. The Division Bench

of this Court in case of Municipal Corporation of

Greater Mumbai Vs. State of Maharashtra (supra) and

another judgment in case of Mr. Jaswant Shivlal

Chandarana and Anr. Vs. State of Maharashtra

(supra) has laid down the guidelines of the manner

in which the structural audit has to be based. In

the present case, petitioners do not have any right

to retain the occupation of the tenements. The

person who does not get a right to occupy and

remain in possession of a tenement does not have

locus to assail the impugned notices on the ground

that the procedure and the test required as per the

guidelines of the Division Bench of this Court in

case of Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai Vs.

State of Maharashtra (supra) are not performed. The

Government and Corporation have also placed on

record reports issued by the Department of the

Applied Mechanics, Government Engineering College,

Aurangabad. We may not enter into the said

aspects, as in our opinion petitioners would not

have any legal right to agitate against the same.

The petitioners do not have legal right to continue

occupying tenements having suffered earlier

adjudication.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

BENCH AT AURANGABAD

WRIT PETITION NO.12527 OF 2021

 Dinker s/o Bhaburao Lokhande Vs The State of Maharashtra

CORAM : S. V. GANGAPURWALA &

R. N. LADDHA, JJ.

Dated : 20.01.2022.

 (Per S. V. Gangapurwala, J.) :-

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Whether court should grant status quo in the case of Dilapidated buildings?

  This Court in the case of Mahendra Bhalchandra Shah & Ors. Vs. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay & Ors. in Writ Petition (L) No. 1755 of 2019 has set out at length the governing principles, in relation to subject issue;

“(a) It is never for a Court in exercise of its limited writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to decide whether a particular structure is or is not actually in a ruinous or dilapidated condition;
(b) The rights of tenants/occupants are not harmed by demolition ordered and carried out. These rights are adequately safeguarded by Section 354(5) of the MMC Act and by the provisions of the governing Maharashtra Rent Control Act 1999 which fully occupies the field regarding tenancies of built premises in Maharashtra.
(c) A Writ Court exercising jurisdiction will not substitute its own view for that of technically qualified experts. Equally, the Writ Court will not prefer the view of one expert over another.
(d) In order to succeed a Petitioner before the Court must be able to show that the impugned action suffers from Wednesbury unreasonableness, (Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation, (1948) 1 KB 223 : 1947 (2) All ER 680.) i.e. it is so unreasonable that no rational person could, having regard to the fact of the case, ever have reached it. There is no scope in such cases for any larger judicial review or invoking the doctrine of proportionality. (State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors v Hazarilal, (2008) 3 SCC 273; Coimbatore District Central Cooperative Bank v Coimbatore District Cooperative Bank Employees Association & Anr, (2007) 4 SCC 669.) In other words the decision must be shown to be utterly perverse, or in excess of authority or manifestly illegal.
(e) It is never sufficient merely to allege mala fides without particulars. While direct evidence may not always be available as proof of mala fides, they must nonetheless be established. In the words of the Supreme Court, allegations of mala fides are more easily made than proved, and the very seriousness of such allegations demands proof of high order of credibility. (Union of India v Ashok Kumar, (2005) 8 SCC 760; Government of Andhra Pradesh & Ors v P Chandra Mouli & Anr, (2009) 13 SCC 272.) Courts are slow to draw dubious inferences from incomplete facts, especially when the imputations are grave and they are made against one who holds an office of responsibility in the administration.(EP Royappa v State of Tamil Nadu, (1974) 4 SCC 3; Indian Railway Construction Co Ltd v Ajay Kumar, (2003) 4 SCC 579.) Mala fides are the last refuge of a losing litigant. (Gulam Mustafa v State of Maharashtra, (1976) 1 SCC 800.) Hence, whenever mala fides are alleged, we will demand proof. In case after case we are told that the provisions of the MCGM Act are being abused by rapacious landlords in connivance with venal officers of the MCGM to order the demolition of the buildings that are otherwise structurally sound. We have yet to come across any such case. The argument is in generalities. Though it is an argument of mala fides, it is always made without any particulars whatsoever and we are asked simply to conjecture that this must be so. The law in regard to allegations of mala fides is well settled and we will draw no such general conclusion.
(f) Further, it is no answer at all, as we have held in Mahendra Bhalchandra Shah, to seek an order of status quo. We have discussed this aspect quite elaborately and have held that no such order can be passed by any Court without specific reference to the actual state of affairs at that moment. There can be no order of status quo against natural elements. It is one in one thing to direct the parties to a contract to maintain the status quo. This may be an order against one person seeking another's eviction. This has no application whatsoever to a situation where the complaint is about the deterioration day by day of the physical condition of a built structure exposed to the elements.
(g) We have also demonstrated in Mahendra Bhalchandra Shah that the entire trend in this Court in the recent past of obtaining undertakings from occupants allowing them to continue in occupation at their own risk is without any basis in law. The MCGM cannot contract out of a statute. An undertaking by a Petitioner to a Court does not absolve the MCGM from its statutory responsibilities or liabilities under that statute. If the undertaking is intended to function as some sort of an indemnity then we have expressed the gravest doubts about any such undertaking ever being enforceable, let alone when the person who gives the undertaking himself or herself suffers an unfortunate mishap.” {Para 14}

15. The structural audit report of the tenants, landlords and inspection report of the TAC were material considerations, on which the Committee concluded that structure is in ruinous condition and required to be pulled down. This Court in the case of Mahendra Shah (Supra), while dealing with the identical arguments has held that it is not open to the Court, to sit in judgment over that satisfaction of the Technical Advisory Committee i.e. to substitute that opinion with its own.

16. Thus, taking into consideration the material before us, we do not see any reason to reject the conclusion reached by the Technical Advisory Committee. The argument that the notices have been issued at the instance of the landlord in collusion with Municipal Official is without any foundation and no particulars of alleged collusion were furnished to this Court in the pleadings or otherwise. In the circumstances, we do not think that we should afford any challenge to this notice, on this ground.

17. In the case of Makarand Dattatreya Sugavkar Vs. Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai and Others : (2013) 9 Supreme Court Cases 136 it is held in paragraph no. 20 that,

“The primary object underlying Section 354 is to safeguard the public from the danger of being forced to live in a structure, which includes any building, wall or other structure and which is in a ruinous condition or is likely to fall or is in any way dangerous to any person occupying the same. This section is also intended to protect those who may pass by such structure. A reading of the plain language of Section 489 gives an impression that it is only an enabling provision but if the same is read keeping in view the purpose of its enactment and the setting in which it is placed, it becomes clear that the Commissioner is duty-bound to ensure that the written notice given to the owner or occupier under Section 354(1) is implemented in its letter and spirit. The duty cast upon the Commissioner is in the nature of a public law obligation and in appropriate case, the court can issue direction for its enforcement.”

18. Thus, once it is found that building is in ruinous condition, Corporation owes its duty to take appropriate steps, to ensure and safeguard the public from likely danger. It is to be noted that when there are conflicting opinions of experts opining that the building structure should be pulled down or removed, such opinion cannot be discarded because the primary object of Section 354 is to protect the public at large and the passerby, of a building, which is in ruinous state.

Bombay High Court

JUSTICE SANDEEP K. SHINDE JUSTICE S. C. DHARMADHIKARI

Richard Gasper Mathias & Ors. Vs. The Municipal Commissioner & Ors.

WRIT PETITION NO. 2108 OF 2018

1st August 2019

Author: Sandeep K. Shinde, J.

Citation: 2019(5) ALL MR 377

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Whether court should accept undertaking given by tenants that they are residing in dilapidated building at their own risk?

 First, there is the matter of occupants offering to give an
‘undertaking’. We are conscious that this approach has gained much
currency, especially in the last few years. It is now more or less
routine for lawyers to blithely offer on behalf of their clients an
‘undertaking to continue in occupation at their own risk’. Mr
Damani says so too. We find this unacceptable on facts. These
tenants/occupants, paying paltry or no rent, have so far paid next to
nothing towards maintenance of the structure that they occupy. We
must notice Section 14 of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999:
14. Landlords’ duty to keep premises in good repair.
(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for
the time being in force and in the absence of an agreement
to the contrary by the tenant, every landlord shall be bound
to keep the premises in good and tenantable repair.


(2) If the landlord neglects to make any repairs,
which he is bound to make under sub-section (1), within
a reasonable time after a notice of fifteen days is served
upon him by post or in any other manner by a tenant or
jointly by tenants interested in such repairs, such tenant
or tenants may themselves make the same and deduct
the expenses of such repairs from the rent or otherwise
recover them from the landlord:
Provided that, where the repairs are jointly made by
the tenants the amount to be deducted or recovered with
interest by each tenant shall bear the same proportion as the
rent payable by him in respect of his premises bears to the
total amount of the expenses incurred for such repairs
together with simple interest at fifteen per cent per annum
on such amount:
Provided further that, the amount so deducted or
recoverable in any year shall not exceed one-fourth of the
rent payable by the tenant for that year.
(3) For the purposes of calculating the expenses of the
repairs made under sub-section (2), the accounts together
with the vouchers maintained by the tenants shall be
conclusive evidence of such expenditure and shall be
binding on the landlord.
(Emphasis added)
There is absolutely nothing presented to us to indicate that the
Petitioners ever resorted to Section 14(2). It is not as if the building
suddenly became so ruinous overnight. The process had to be
gradual, spanning decades. In all that time, not one of these
occupants or tenants have once cared to take any steps to maintain

the structure. Section 14 of the Rent Act casts a duty on a property
owner to maintain the premises in tenantable repair. But it also gives
tenants the right to force those repairs should the landlord be
recalcitrant. These tenants have done nothing. Their own report
shows that extensive repairs are, even according to them, necessary.
They only say that there is no need to tear down the building. They
do not say the building is in such mint condition that it needs no
repairs at all. Indeed, our experience is that when tenants are asked
to contribute essential repairs, these are resisted and it is only when
the building is so completely dilapidated that there is no option but
to have it evacuated, pull down and reconstructed that such offers of volunteering to pay for repairs come to be made.
29. We do not accept that there is any warrant or support for this
‘undertaking jurisprudence’. After all, what is the nature of such an
undertaking? What is its value? Typically, the undertaking is worded
to say the occupants will continue in occupation at their own risk;
that they will not hold anyone liable if there is a calamity; and that
they agree to be liable for any losses to life or property of third
parties including passers-by. We fail to see the value of such an
undertaking. If it is meant or conceived to be in form of some sort of
generalized, non-specific indemnity, then it is utterly useless.
Should there be a mishap to the person giving the undertaking,
perhaps even a loss of life, then that undertaking, no matter what its
verbiage and legalese, serves no purpose at all. In that situation, it
can never be enforced. To put it pithily, when the ‘undertaker’
meets his maker, he is beyond the reach of the law. Therefore, in our
view, the practice of permitting persons to continue in occupation
on the basis of such undertakings has no warrant in law. In fact, it is

contrary to the specific mandate of the law. These “undertakings”,
in the form noted earlier, may hold none responsible, but does that
absolve the public body from the loss caused to a third party (an
innocent passer-by or one residing in the neighbourhood), or give
the public body complete and total immunity from all legal
proceedings or the consequences of any verdict rendered therein?
The answer is obviously no. It is extremely doubtful whether it can
be urged that an undertaking of this nature described above, even if
filed in and accepted by the Court, releases the MMC from the
statutory obligation and duty it owes to the public at large.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION (L) NO. 1755 OF 2019

 Mahendra Bhalchandra Shah Vs  Municipal Corporation of
Grater bombay

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Whether court should grant status quo order to demolition notice issued by municipal corporation?

The second aspect is the trend of making an order directing
parties to ‘maintain the status quo’. This is effectively what is sought
even in this writ petition when the petitioners seek from us a writ
commanding the restoration of power and water supply and a
restraint against the forced demolition of the structure. In the case

of a building subjected to a Section 354 notice we do not even
pretend to understand what, if anything, an order of ‘status quo’
(whatever the wording) is supposed to mean. Is it that the building
should continue to degrade and become more ruinous? Or is that
that occupants should continue to be a hazard to themselves or
others or both, contrary to the public law mandate of the statute? Or
is it supposed to be some final determination that the building is not,
in fact, so structurally damaged as to warrant its being pulled down?
If so, then that is a final determination — and one that weight of
precedent says is clearly impermissible — and cannot constitute an
interim or ad interim order.

 We do not suggest that in no case can an order of status quo
ever be made. But it is our considered view that an order of status
quo can be passed only in circumstances that are so sufficiently
precise that both sides and the Court encounter no ambiguity about
the state of affairs that are ordered to be retained as-is.8 The
expression ‘status quo’ means ‘the existing state of affairs’; ‘the
situation that currently exists’;9 or to keep things as they presently
are. It is the nominative form of the prepositional Latin phrase, in
statu quo, literally ‘in the state in which’. In the case of a dilapidated
building, a generalized order of status quo without reference to a
specific or know state of affairs only means that the building should
be allowed to continue to deteriorate further, and that persons are
allowed to continue to occupy the building that has been found to be
8 In Kishore Kumar Khaitan & Anr v Praveen Kumar Singh, (2006) 3 SCC
312, the Supreme Court said it was not proper to order a status quo (there, in
respect of premises) without indicating what the status quo was.
9 Black’s Law Dictionary, 7th Edition.

dangerous not only to themselves but to the general public. Such an
order of status quo itself poses and carries a risk not only to the
occupants themselves but also to others who are not connected with
the present litigation at hand. That stripe of generalized, nonspecific
status quo order in Section 354 cases is contrary to law, to
statute, to precedent, and even logic: there can be no status quo
preventing the monsoon, for instance, or any other force of nature,
nor will it operate to prevent continuing structural degradation over
time. Such a non-specific order of status quo is therefore entirely
impermissible. If necessary, a court will decide the case finally there
and then at the stage of admission (as we have this one).

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION (L) NO. 1755 OF 2019

 Mahendra Bhalchandra Shah Vs  Municipal Corporation of
Grater bombay


CORAM : S. C. Dharmadhikari & G.S.Patel, JJ.

DATED : 24TH JUNE 2019

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Whether occupier of dilapidated building are necessary party to suit challenging notice issued by Municipal corporation for demolition?

A perusal of section 354 however indicates that the said provision can be pressed in service when the structure occupied by the occupier or the owner of the building is in a dilapidated or ruinous condition. In this case, the notice was issued in respect of the entire building and not any particular tenement. Some of the other occupants who were not impleaded as a party defendants to the suit, therefore rightly applied for their impleadment before the learned trial judge on the ground that if any order is passed by the City Civil Court in the said suit impugning the notice issued by the Municipal Corporation under section 354 of the Act, they would be seriously affected. 

12. In my view, the other occupants who are also issued similar notices under section 354 of the Mumbai Municipal Corporation Act may be seriously affected if any order is passed by the City Civil Court in respect of such notice under section 354 which was admittedly issued in respect of the entire building and not a particular structure occupied by the plaintiffs alone. Any order that may be passed by the City Civil Court thus would obviously affect all the occupants and not the plaintiffs alone. In my view the presence of all the occupants thus would be absolutely necessary for the purpose for determining the controversy involved in the said suit.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Writ Petition Nos. 5699, 6582, 6583 and 6584 of 2018

Decided On: 22.10.2018

 Mahesh D. Jobanputra  Vs.  Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

R.D. Dhanuka, J.

Citation: 2019(2) MHLJ 458

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Whether government is liable to provide transit accommodation in case of demolition of dilapidated building?

We cannot sidetrack the difficulties of such old legal tenants of such old chawls/buildings owned by poor landlord/owner who are unable to commercially exploit the land property but, as stated to be under obligation to provide temporary alternate accommodation till the construction/development of the dilapidated, dangerous buildings on the land. Such statutory or otherwise legal tenants/occupants cannot be treated on lower footing than the unauthorised or authorised slum dwellers/occupants on Government or local body's land or property, specially when the urgent situation of compulsory razing of such dilapidated old buildings crops up. The State or local authorities are willing to provide such occupants, dwellers/tenants temporary and/or permanent alternate accommodation as recorded in earlier orders (supra). They have permitted various settlements for the same.

17. All human beings problems/difficulties just cannot be overlooked when it comes to vacation or eviction of compulsory leaving of home/premises, even for want of development of the property by the developer/owner or the society itself. The cooperation and settlement is the solution. The State or local bodies having once decided to provide temporary or permanent shelter with all facilities, as recorded above, the similar policy and/or housing policies, should be, on certain conditions and taking note of the circumstances for such poor tenants/occupants, required to be framed. Therefore, this Guideline No. 3 for reconsideration of the issues so mentioned.

18. It will be open to the Petitioners to apply to the State Government for temporary alternate transit accommodation till redevelopment of the building in question which shall be considered sympathetically. It will also be open to the developer, if so appointed, to provide the temporary alternate accommodation till the redevelopment of the new building, if any.

            

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Writ Petition (Lodging) No. 2371 of 2014

Decided On: 08.10.2014

Zubair Malik Vs. Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Anoop V. Mohta and A.S. Gadkari, JJ.

Citation: 2015 (1) ALL MR 543

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When court should permit demolition of dilapidated building?

We have seen the photographs of the subject structure. We find that the subject structure seems to be very old and in bad condition. But, merely by seeing photographs, condition of the structure cannot be decided. Therefore, structural audit reports, view of the experts are to be looked into. In such cases, Corporation authorities too are duty bound to resort to appropriate steps if it is found that a building/structure is in a dilapidated condition or dangerous for the occupants to live. It is obligation on the authorities to take appropriate steps in accordance with law. In case portion of the building/structure collapses, then it is very likely that people residing in such building would suffer loss of life, property or may suffer severe injuries. The Corporation is duty bound to avoid any loss of life and property to by-passers, third parties and persons residing in the immediate neighbourhood of such building. From all these angles such issues brought before the court are required to be looked into.

 In the facts we are not convinced to call for another report from IIT as suggested by the petitioners. From the record placed before us and looking to the condition of the building, we find that it is a very old dilapidated structure, it is dangerous for human habitation. In case of collapse of the structure, it is very likely that there could be loss of life and property. In the process, third parties, neighbourers, passers-by are also likely to get injured and suffer loss of life and property. Taking into consideration not only the structural audit reports but overall condition of the building, the decision was taken and thereafter the impugned notice was issued by the Corporation.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Writ Petition Lodging Nos. 3002, 3011 and 2934 of 2016

Decided On: 10.03.2017

 Jayant Sunderdas Karia and Ors. Vs. The Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

N.H. Patil and M.S. Karnik, JJ.

Citation: 2017(6) MHLJ 657

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