Supreme Court: Provisions of CRPC does not contemplate either granting of a bail on the basis of an assurance of a compromise or cancellation of a bail for violation of the terms of such compromise

  Mr. Kharat, relied on the case of Biman Chatterjee (supra) to submit that now fulfillment of the terms of compromise cannot be basis of granting or cancelling the bail. He places reliance on the paragraph No. 7 of the said decision. Case in Biman Chatterjee (supra) was a proposed settlement between a couple having matrimonial discord. Bail granted to the Accused in the said crime was cancelled on the ground that the Accused was not adhering to the settlement terms. It is in this context that the Hon'ble Supreme Court in paragraph-7 has made the observations as under:

7. Having heard the learned Counsel for the parties, we are of the opinion that the High Court was not justified in cancelling the bail on the ground that the Appellant had violated the terms of the compromise. Though in the original order granting bail there is a reference to an agreement of the parties to have a talk of compromise through the media of well wishers, there is no submission made to the court that there will be a compromise or that the Appellant would take back his wife. Be that as it may, in our opinion, the courts below could not have cancelled the bail solely on the ground that the Appellant had failed to keep up his promise made to the court. Here we hasten to observe first of all from the material on record, we do not find that there was any compromise arrived at between the parties at all, hence, question of fulfilling the terms of such compromise does not arise. That apart non-fulfilment of the terms of the compromise cannot be the basis of granting or cancelling a bail. The grant of bail under the Code of Criminal Procedure is governed by the provision of Chapter XXXIII of the Code and the provision therein does not contemplate either granting of a bail on the basis of an assurance of a compromise or cancellation of a bail for violation of the terms of such compromise. What the court has to bear in mind while granting bail is what is provided for in Section 437 of the said Code. In our opinion, having granted the bail under the said provision of law, it is not open to the trial court or the High Court to cancel the same on a ground alien to the grounds mentioned for cancellation of bail in the said provision of law. {Para 20}

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 3219/2025

Decided On: 28.07.2025

Gajanan Dattatray Gore Vs. The State of Maharashtra and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan, JJ.

Author: J.B. Pardiwala, J.

Citation:  MANU/SC/1004/2025,2025 INSC 913.

Read full judgment here: Click here.

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Supreme Court: The court must grant bail solely on law and the merits of each case — not on extraneous undertakings, assurances, or financial conditions.

 Be that as it may, now we have made ourselves very clear that there shall not be a single order that the High Courts and the Trial Courts shall pass for grant of regular bail or anticipatory bail on the basis of any Accused or his/her family members giving an undertaking to deposit a particular amount. The plea shall be decided strictly on merits in accordance with law. If the case is made out on merits the court may exercise its discretion and if no case is made out on merits the court shall reject the plea for regular bail or anticipatory bail as the case may be. However, in any circumstances the High Courts or trial courts shall not pass a conditional order of regular bail or anticipatory bail. {Para 24}

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 3219/2025

Decided On: 28.07.2025

Gajanan Dattatray Gore Vs. The State of Maharashtra and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan, JJ.

Author: J.B. Pardiwala, J.

Citation:  MANU/SC/1004/2025,2025 INSC 913.

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Whether court can direct eviction of tenant on basis of statement made by Advocate of tenant?

 It has been held by the Apex Court in Babu Ram Gupta (supra) that even if there was an undertaking given by the counsel on behalf of his client, the undertaking should be carefully construed to find out the extent and nature of the undertaking actually given by the person concerned. It is not open to the Court to assume an implied undertaking when there is none on the record. In the instant case, the Senior Counsel for the bank had not given any undertaking before the Court that the premises shall be vacated within four months or within any specific time.

27. The matter can be looked from another angle also. Jurisdiction cannot be conferred by consent. Statutory provisions cannot be violated by consent. Conferment of jurisdiction is a legislative function. Jurisdiction can neither be conferred with the consent of the parties nor by a superior court. The Court cannot derive jurisdiction apart from the statute. In such eventuality the doctrine of waiver also does not apply (See Jagmittar Sain Bhagat v. Health Services, Haryana : MANU/SC/0703/2013 : AIR 2013 SC 3060). A wrong concession, on a question of law, made by counsel is not binding on his client (See Uptron India Limited v. Shammi Bhan: MANU/SC/0258/1998 : AIR 1998 SC 1681). Neither the client nor the Court is bound by the lawyer's statements or admissions as to matters of law or legal conclusions. A lawyer generally has no implied or apparent authority to make an admission or statement which would directly surrender or conclude the substantial legal rights of the client unless such an admission or statement is clearly a proper step in accomplishing the purpose for which the lawyer was employed (See Himalayan Co-operative Group Housing Society v. Balwan Singh : MANU/SC/0609/2015 : AIR 2015 SC 2867). Therefore, immunity from eviction enjoyed by the bank under the provisions of the Act is not lost on account of the statement made by the counsel for the bank in the Court that the premises would be surrendered immediately on construction of currency chest in another building.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

W.A. No. 2598 of 2017

Decided On: 02.07.2019

 Central Bank of India  Vs.  Beena Thiruvenkitam

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

C.K. Abdul Rehim and R. Narayana Pisharadi, JJ.

Citation: AIR 2019 Kerala 216

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Whether court should accept undertaking given by tenants that they are residing in dilapidated building at their own risk?

 First, there is the matter of occupants offering to give an
‘undertaking’. We are conscious that this approach has gained much
currency, especially in the last few years. It is now more or less
routine for lawyers to blithely offer on behalf of their clients an
‘undertaking to continue in occupation at their own risk’. Mr
Damani says so too. We find this unacceptable on facts. These
tenants/occupants, paying paltry or no rent, have so far paid next to
nothing towards maintenance of the structure that they occupy. We
must notice Section 14 of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999:
14. Landlords’ duty to keep premises in good repair.
(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for
the time being in force and in the absence of an agreement
to the contrary by the tenant, every landlord shall be bound
to keep the premises in good and tenantable repair.


(2) If the landlord neglects to make any repairs,
which he is bound to make under sub-section (1), within
a reasonable time after a notice of fifteen days is served
upon him by post or in any other manner by a tenant or
jointly by tenants interested in such repairs, such tenant
or tenants may themselves make the same and deduct
the expenses of such repairs from the rent or otherwise
recover them from the landlord:
Provided that, where the repairs are jointly made by
the tenants the amount to be deducted or recovered with
interest by each tenant shall bear the same proportion as the
rent payable by him in respect of his premises bears to the
total amount of the expenses incurred for such repairs
together with simple interest at fifteen per cent per annum
on such amount:
Provided further that, the amount so deducted or
recoverable in any year shall not exceed one-fourth of the
rent payable by the tenant for that year.
(3) For the purposes of calculating the expenses of the
repairs made under sub-section (2), the accounts together
with the vouchers maintained by the tenants shall be
conclusive evidence of such expenditure and shall be
binding on the landlord.
(Emphasis added)
There is absolutely nothing presented to us to indicate that the
Petitioners ever resorted to Section 14(2). It is not as if the building
suddenly became so ruinous overnight. The process had to be
gradual, spanning decades. In all that time, not one of these
occupants or tenants have once cared to take any steps to maintain

the structure. Section 14 of the Rent Act casts a duty on a property
owner to maintain the premises in tenantable repair. But it also gives
tenants the right to force those repairs should the landlord be
recalcitrant. These tenants have done nothing. Their own report
shows that extensive repairs are, even according to them, necessary.
They only say that there is no need to tear down the building. They
do not say the building is in such mint condition that it needs no
repairs at all. Indeed, our experience is that when tenants are asked
to contribute essential repairs, these are resisted and it is only when
the building is so completely dilapidated that there is no option but
to have it evacuated, pull down and reconstructed that such offers of volunteering to pay for repairs come to be made.
29. We do not accept that there is any warrant or support for this
‘undertaking jurisprudence’. After all, what is the nature of such an
undertaking? What is its value? Typically, the undertaking is worded
to say the occupants will continue in occupation at their own risk;
that they will not hold anyone liable if there is a calamity; and that
they agree to be liable for any losses to life or property of third
parties including passers-by. We fail to see the value of such an
undertaking. If it is meant or conceived to be in form of some sort of
generalized, non-specific indemnity, then it is utterly useless.
Should there be a mishap to the person giving the undertaking,
perhaps even a loss of life, then that undertaking, no matter what its
verbiage and legalese, serves no purpose at all. In that situation, it
can never be enforced. To put it pithily, when the ‘undertaker’
meets his maker, he is beyond the reach of the law. Therefore, in our
view, the practice of permitting persons to continue in occupation
on the basis of such undertakings has no warrant in law. In fact, it is

contrary to the specific mandate of the law. These “undertakings”,
in the form noted earlier, may hold none responsible, but does that
absolve the public body from the loss caused to a third party (an
innocent passer-by or one residing in the neighbourhood), or give
the public body complete and total immunity from all legal
proceedings or the consequences of any verdict rendered therein?
The answer is obviously no. It is extremely doubtful whether it can
be urged that an undertaking of this nature described above, even if
filed in and accepted by the Court, releases the MMC from the
statutory obligation and duty it owes to the public at large.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION (L) NO. 1755 OF 2019

 Mahendra Bhalchandra Shah Vs  Municipal Corporation of
Grater bombay

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Whether court should grant status quo order to demolition notice issued by municipal corporation?

The second aspect is the trend of making an order directing
parties to ‘maintain the status quo’. This is effectively what is sought
even in this writ petition when the petitioners seek from us a writ
commanding the restoration of power and water supply and a
restraint against the forced demolition of the structure. In the case

of a building subjected to a Section 354 notice we do not even
pretend to understand what, if anything, an order of ‘status quo’
(whatever the wording) is supposed to mean. Is it that the building
should continue to degrade and become more ruinous? Or is that
that occupants should continue to be a hazard to themselves or
others or both, contrary to the public law mandate of the statute? Or
is it supposed to be some final determination that the building is not,
in fact, so structurally damaged as to warrant its being pulled down?
If so, then that is a final determination — and one that weight of
precedent says is clearly impermissible — and cannot constitute an
interim or ad interim order.

 We do not suggest that in no case can an order of status quo
ever be made. But it is our considered view that an order of status
quo can be passed only in circumstances that are so sufficiently
precise that both sides and the Court encounter no ambiguity about
the state of affairs that are ordered to be retained as-is.8 The
expression ‘status quo’ means ‘the existing state of affairs’; ‘the
situation that currently exists’;9 or to keep things as they presently
are. It is the nominative form of the prepositional Latin phrase, in
statu quo, literally ‘in the state in which’. In the case of a dilapidated
building, a generalized order of status quo without reference to a
specific or know state of affairs only means that the building should
be allowed to continue to deteriorate further, and that persons are
allowed to continue to occupy the building that has been found to be
8 In Kishore Kumar Khaitan & Anr v Praveen Kumar Singh, (2006) 3 SCC
312, the Supreme Court said it was not proper to order a status quo (there, in
respect of premises) without indicating what the status quo was.
9 Black’s Law Dictionary, 7th Edition.

dangerous not only to themselves but to the general public. Such an
order of status quo itself poses and carries a risk not only to the
occupants themselves but also to others who are not connected with
the present litigation at hand. That stripe of generalized, nonspecific
status quo order in Section 354 cases is contrary to law, to
statute, to precedent, and even logic: there can be no status quo
preventing the monsoon, for instance, or any other force of nature,
nor will it operate to prevent continuing structural degradation over
time. Such a non-specific order of status quo is therefore entirely
impermissible. If necessary, a court will decide the case finally there
and then at the stage of admission (as we have this one).

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION (L) NO. 1755 OF 2019

 Mahendra Bhalchandra Shah Vs  Municipal Corporation of
Grater bombay


CORAM : S. C. Dharmadhikari & G.S.Patel, JJ.

DATED : 24TH JUNE 2019

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Whether a person can be precluded from challenging the order if he has obtained stay to its execution?

It is now trite that the principle of estoppel has no application when statutory rights and liabilities are involved. It cannot imped right of appeal and particularly the constitutional remedy. The House of Lords has considered the same question in Evans vs. Bartlam (1937 2 All E.R.

646). The House was dealing with an order of the Court of Appeal whereby Scott L.J. approved the contention of a party to put the matter on the rule of election on the premise that the defendant knew or must be presumed to know that he had the right to apply to set the judgment aside and by asking for and obtaining time he irrevocably elected to abide by the judgment. Lord Atkin, reversing the above view, has observed thus:

" My Lords, I do not find myself convinced by these judgments. I find nothing in the facts analogous to cases where a party, having obtained and enjoyed material benefit from a judgment, has been held precluded from attacking it while he still is in enjoyment of the benefit. I cannot bring myself to think that a judgment debtor, who asks for and receives a stay of execution, approbates the judgment, so as to preclude him thereafter from seeking to set it aside, whether by appeal or otherwise. Nor do I find it possible to apply the doctrine of election."

Lord Russell of Killowen while concurring with the aforesaid observations has stated thus:

"My lord, I confess to a feeling of some bewilderment at the theory that a man who, so long as it stands, must perforce acknowledge and bow to a judgment of the court regularly obtained), by seeking and obtaining a temporary suspension of its execution, thereby binds himself never to dispute its validity or its correctness, and never to seek to have it set aside or reversed. If this were right, no defeated litigant could safely ask his adversary for a stay of execution pending an appeal, for the grant of the request would end the right of appeal. The doctrine of election applies only to a man who elects with full knowledge of the facts."

A party to a lis can be asked to give an undertaking to the court if he requires stay of operation of the judgment. It is done on the supposition that the order would remain unchanged. By directing the party to give such an undertaking no court can scuttle or foreclose a statutory remedy of appeal or revision, much less a constitutional remedy. If the order is reversed or modified by the superior court or even the same court on a review the undertaking given by the party will automatically cease to operate. merely because a party has complied with the directions to give an undertaking as a condition for obtaining stay he cannot be presumed to communicate to the other party that he is thereby giving up his statutory remedies to challenge the order. No doubt he is bound to comply with his undertaking so long a s the order remains alive and operative. However, it is open to such superior court to consider whether the operation of the order or judgment challenged before it need be stayed or suspended having regard to the fact that the concerned party has given undertaking in the lower court to abide by the decree or order within the time fixed by that court.

We are, therefore, in agreement with the view of Sahai and Venkatachala, JJ, that the appeal filed under Article 136 of the Constitution by special leave cannot be dismissed as not maintainable on the more ground that appellant has given an undertaking to the High Court on being so directed, in order to keep the High Court's order in abeyance for some time.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

C. A. No. 4587 of 1995

Decided On: 11.08.1998

 P.R. Deshpande Vs.  Maruti Balaram Haibatti

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

M.M. Punchhi, CJI., K.T. Thomas and S.S.M. Quadri, JJ.

Citation: (1998) 6 SCC 507

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What action court can take when there is breach of undertaking on the basis of which suit is disposed off?

 In KANWAR SINGH SAINI v. HIGH COURT OF

DELHI  the Supreme Court discussed categorically about the distinction between Order XXXIX Rule 2A and Order XXI Rule 32 CPC. It is held: "An application under Order XXXIX Rule 2A lies only where disobedience/breach of injunction granted or order complained of was one that is granted by the Court under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 CPC, which is naturally to enure during the pendency of the suit. However, once a suit is decreed, the interim order, if any, merges into the final order and if the case is ultimately dismissed, the interim order stands nullified automatically. On the other hand in case there is a grievance of non-compliance with the terms of the decree passed in the civil suit, the remedy available to the aggrieved person is to approach the execution Court under Order XXI Rule 32 CPC which provides for elaborate proceedings in which the parties can adduce their evidence and can examine and cross-examine the witnesses as opposed to the proceedings in contempt which are summary in nature. An application under Order XXXIX Rule 2-A CPC is not maintainable once the suit is decreed. Law does not permit to skip the remedies available under order XXI Rule 32 CPC and resort to the contempt proceedings for the reason that the Court has to exercise its discretion under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 when an effective and alternative remedy is not available to the person concerned. Thus, when the matter relates to the infringement of a decree or decretal order embodies rights, as between the parties, it is not expedient to invoke and exercise contempt jurisdiction, in essence, as a mode of executing the decree or merely because other remedies may take time or are more circumlocutory in character. Thus, the violation of permanent injunction can be set right in executing the proceedings and not the contempt proceedings. There is a complete fallacy in the argument that the provisions of Order XXXIX Rule 2A CPC would also include the case of violation of breach of permanent injunction granted at the time of passing of the decree. It is also observed that in an undertaking given to the Court during the pendency of the suit on the basis of which the suit itself has been disposed of becomes a part of the decree and breach of such undertaking is to be dealt with in execution proceedings under Order XXI Rule 32 CPC and no by way of contempt proceedings."

Supreme Court of India

Kanwar Singh Saini vs High Court Of Delhi on 23 September, 2011

Bench: P. Sathasivam, B.S. Chauhan

REPORTABLE

 Citation: 2012(1)ACR1035(SC), 2012(2)ALD58(SC), 2012 (90) ALR 24, 2012(2)ALT(Cri)SC71, 2012BomCR(Cri)522, 2011 (4) KLT(SN) 32, 2012-1-LW689, (2012)2MLJ409(SC), 2012(1)PLJR241, 2011(4)RCR(Civil)402, 2011(4)RCR(Criminal)407, 2012 115 RD291, 2011(10)SCALE725, (2012)4SCC307, 2011(6)UJ4202

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Whether Contempt proceeding can be initiated if consent decree is not complied?

 A compromise, as is well known, is an agreement between the parties with the seal of the Court super-added to it. A consent decree, therefore, is not a decree in its true sense. It would not even attract the principles of res judicata. See Baldevdas Shivlal and Anr. v. Filimistan Distributors (India) P.Ltd. & Prs.7), .

18. There exists a distinction between an undertaking given to a party to the lis and an undertaking given to a Court.

19. An undertaking given to a Court attracts the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act, whereas an undertaking given to a party to the lis by way of an agreement of settlement or otherwise would not attract the provisions of the said Act.

 Having considered the matter, this Court is of the opinion that in the instant case no proceeding under the Contempt of Courts Act should be initiated. The undertaking given before this Court is qua the party to the lis and not qua the Court and in that view of the matter, no case for initiation of proceedings under the Contempt of Courts Act having been made out. The same view has been taken by two learned Judges of this Court in Urmila Salwan and Ors. v. Kasturi Lal Bhatia, 1999 IV AD (Delhi) 805 and Indian Overseas Bank's case (Supra)

Delhi High Court

Hindustan Motors Ltd. vs Amritpal Singh Nayar And Anr. on 31 May, 2002

Equivalent citations: 100 (2002) DLT 278, 2002 (64) DRJ 394

Bench: S.B. Sinha, C.J.

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