Whether slum dweller dispossessed during slum clearance can claim alternative accommodation as a matter of right?

“Whether under the policy of Slum Clearance, a slum dweller living in his independent premises can be dispossessed without providing any alternative accommodation?”

I am afraid not. The appellant/plaintiff having approached the Court, was required to lay a foundation/basis for his claim. Neither was any such foundation/basis laid in the plaint or other pleadings nor was any document found to have been filed. In the absence of the same, it is not understandable on what premise the suit court found in favour of the appellants/plaintiffs.

21. The appellants/plaintiffs having not pleaded and proved their entitlement under any policy/scheme and having not further proved their eligibility under the scheme, the appellants/plaintiffs were/are not entitled to any relief.

23. The aforesaid questions are decided as under:

(I) Without the appellants/plaintiffs pleading and proving any scheme and their eligibility thereunder, the appellants/plaintiffs cannot be entitled to any alternative accommodation; and

In the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi

(Before Rajiv Sahai Endlaw, J.)

Sharda Gautam v.  Delhi Urban Shelter Improvement Board 

RSA 367/2016

Decided on July 17, 2018

Citation: 2018 SCC OnLine Del 10262

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Whether tenant can seek possession of alternate accommodation from small cause court as per his agreement with landlord?

 Reverting back to the facts of the case in hand and considering the law settled by the above referred decisions, as regards the first point for consideration it is to be held that the agreement in question clearly discloses the same to be between the landlord and tenant and the relief which is asked for under the guise of specific performance of the said agreement in the suit filed by the respondent No. 1 is squarely in terms of the rights and obligations of the tenant and landlord under the Rent Act and therefore such a suit in the Civil Court is clearly hit by Section 28 of the Rent Act.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Appeal No. 484 of 1998 in Suit No. 297 of 1976

Decided On: 10.08.2007

 Tejbai Tejshi Dedhia  Vs.  Central Bank of India and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

R.M.S. Khandeparkar and Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, JJ.

Citations: 2007 (109) Bom L R 1799, 2007 (5) MhLj 869

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Whether landlord can be granted eviction decree for one premises even if he has recovered possession of another premises during pendency of present proceeding?

 As discussed infra, the shop vacated by other tenant-Babulal is for the bona fide requirement of Respondent-landlord's another son Rajesh Kumar Jain. In that view of the matter, the court would not be justified in taking notice of such a subsequent fact sought to be projected by the Appellant to oppose the relief granted by the courts below. In the facts and circumstances of the present case, the subsequent event relied upon by the Appellant-tenant cannot be taken cognizance.

19. Admittedly, Respondent-landlord obtained vacant possession of the adjacent shop from the other tenant-Babulal on 14.11.2006 in pursuance of an order dated 01.09.2005 passed by the High Court in Second Appeal No. 472 of 2002. But the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Respondent-landlord submitted that the decree for eviction of the said tenant-Babulal was on the ground of bona fide requirement of Rajesh Kumar Jain (other son of Respondent-landlord) as envisaged Under Section 12(1)(f) of the Act. It was submitted that Respondent-landlord's another son Rajesh Kumar Jain has occupied the said adjacent shop and doing the business of "Sara". Respondent-landlord has four sons and the other shop vacated by tenant-Babulal is meant for the bona fide requirement of another son Rajesh Kumar Jain. If that shop is not actually occupied by the other son Rajesh Kumar Jain, the other tenant Babulal has a right to initiate the proceedings against the landlord for his re-entry in the said adjacent shop in terms of the provisions contained in Section 17 of the Act. Therefore, it cannot be said that alternative accommodation was available for the Respondent-landlord's son Rajendra Kumar due to vacation of the said adjacent shop by another tenant Babulal.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 3827 of 2014

Decided On: 14.12.2018

 Hukum Chandra  Vs.  Nemi Chand Jain and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

R. Banumathi and Indira Banerjee, JJ.

Citation: AIR 2019 SC 60

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Whether mother in law can be directed to provide alternate accommodation to daughter in law in domestic violence proceeding?

 However, the action of the Mother-in-Law in selling the subject property, though not strictly illegal, has caused loss to the Daughter-in-Law. Accordingly, one would also have balance the corresponding rights of the parties. On the one hand, Mother-in-Law is alleged to have sold the property for her bona fide needs and third party rights in the subject property have arisen and on the other hand, the Daughter-in-Law is deprived of her rights of residence in the subject property.

35. The contention of the Mother-in-Law is that the Daughter-in-Law was residing in only one room of the first floor of the subject property. On the other hand, the contention of the Daughter-in-Law is that the household was common and she was occupying the first floor of the subject property.

36. Documents on record prima facie show that the Daughter-in-Law was in possession of one room on the first floor, but was sharing the kitchen and common areas on the ground floor.

37. Without getting into the controversy, one may examine the rights that are granted by Section 19 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005.

38. Section 19(1)(f) inter alia stipulates that the Magistrate shall secure same level of alternative accommodation for the aggrieved person as enjoyed by her in the shared household or direct payment of rent for the same, if the circumstances so require.

39. In the facts of the present case, since the subject property is now not available, the only order that can be passed in favour of the Daughter-in-Law for securing her residence is to direct the Mother-in-Law to ensure that either a ground floor or a first floor is obtained on rent for the residence of the Daughter-in-Law in the locality ‘Anand Vihar’ in a similar property.

40. Since the action of the Mother-in-Law has also resulted in removal of a property from the control of the Daughter-in-Law, she has to be granted adequate, fair and reasonable compensation/monetary relief for the deprivation of said property.

In the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi

(Before Sanjeev Sachdeva, J.)

Crl.M.C 1868/2016 & Crl.M.A 35881/2018

Shachi Mahajan .v. Santosh Mahajan .

Decided on January 10, 2019,

Citation:  2019 SCC OnLine Del 6418, 

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Whether tenant is entitled to get alternative accommodation if he is evicted for demolition of tenanted building?

 Section 16(1)(i) provided that the decree for eviction may be passed if the premises are reasonably and bona fide required by the landlord for the immediate purpose of demolishing them and such demolition is to be made for the purpose of erecting new building on the premises sought to be demolished. Similarly under Section 16(1)(j), decree can be passed if the premises let out consist of a tenement or tenements on the terrace of a building and such tenement or tenements being is required by the landlord for the purpose of the demolition thereof and erection or raising of a floor or floors on such tenements. In both these cases, building is not required to be demolished because it is in dilapidated condition nor there is any order from the Municipal Corporation to demolish the building. The landlord seeks to demolish the premises or such tenements for the purpose of erection of new building or for erection or raising some additional floors on the existing building. Naturally such work is taken up for his own benefit or for the purpose of optimum utilisation of the land or F.S.I., which may be available to him. When decree of eviction is passed on these two grounds under Section 16(1)(i) and (j), provision is specifically made in Section 16(6)(d)(ii) that after construction of new building or new floor or floors in the existing building, the landlord shall offer the concerned tenant premises in the re-erected building or the floors as the case may be.

14. From this provision, it is clear that wherever legislature wanted to provide protection to the tenants even after passing a decree for eviction, legislature has specifically made provision that he shall be accommodated in the newly constructed building or in new floor or floors in the existing building or in the existing building itself after it is repaired. However, no such provision is made if decree of eviction is passed under Section 16(1)(g) or under Section 16(1)(k). As noted above the learned Appellate Court observed that under Section 16(1) of Bombay Rent Act the tenant has a remedy and can claim possession in newly constructed building or in the proposed building and hence, the right of alternative accommodation which is given by the legislature cannot be taken away. However, the learned Appellate Court also opined that such right given by the legislature cannot be taken away merely because building is demolished by the Municipal Corporation. He further observed that object of Section 16(1)(k) is to save the public and occupant of the building from danger, but it is nowhere stated in the Act that when in such circumstances building is demolished, tenant has no right to claim tenancy. If the observations of the learned Appellate Court are accepted, the Court will have to read something in the statute, which is not there. It is the settled principle of interpretation of statutes that the Court has to give plain meaning to the language used by the legislation and only when the language used by the legislature is ambiguous, the Court may try to interpret the same in such a way that it serves and furthers the purpose and object of the legislation. But when there is no such ambiguity, question of reading something in the statute is not permissible. From different provisions contained in Section 16(1)(h), (i) and (j) read with Section 16(6) and Section 17, it is amply clear that wherever the legislature wanted to give protection to the tenant even after passing a decree for eviction, a specific provision in that respect is made in the Act. When no such provision is made under Section 16(1)(g) and under Section 16(1)(k) it must be held that the legislature did not want to give such protection to the tenant after decree of eviction. If the legislature wanted to provide such protection, it would have specifically provided in the Act, as it is done in case of eviction under Section 16(1)(h),(i) and (j). As no such protection is given to the tenant against whom decree of eviction is passed under Section 16(1)(g) and (k), the Court cannot presume existence of such provision nor it can hold that such provision should be read in the statute. Any such attempt on the part of the Court would amount to modifying provisions of law or amending and adding something t44o the statutes.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Contempt Petition No. 390 of 2006 and Civil Rev. Appln. No. 131 of 2008

Decided On: 13.02.2008

 Sharadchandra Vasant Chitnis Vs. Neela Ashok Korde and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

J.H. Bhatia, J.

Citation: 2010(1) MHLJ1006:2010(5) ALLMR134

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Whether tenant is said to have acquired suitable accommodation if he is occupying quarters allotted by employer?

It appears from the record that the lower appellate Court has also not considered another judgment of the Apex Court in the case of B.R. Mehta v. Smt. Atma Devi and Ors. reported in MANU/SC/0740/1987 : [1987]3SCR1184 , which deals with allotment of government quarters to the wife of the tenant. In para 4 of the judgment, the Apex Court observed that the correct position must be that if the tenant has a legal right, then only can such acquisition or allotment would attract the provision of Section 14(1)(h) of the Delhi Rent Control Act. It is further opined that, if in the real sense the tenant acquired or was allotted another residence, then his need for the old tenanted residence would go and the tenant would lose his right to retain his tenanted premises. If we apply this ratio to the present set of facts, then it is clear that acquisition or allotment as contemplated by Section 13(1)(l) of the Bombay Rent Act necessarily implied "as of right" and mere temporary occupation of quarters for the purpose of employment could not amount to acquisition of suitable accommodation so as to render the tenant liable for eviction from the rental premises. It also appears from the perusal of the judgment of the lower appellate Court that it has merely opined that it did not find any error or illegality in the findings of the Trial Court that defendant No. 1 had acquired suitable residential accommodation. Thereafter the lower appellate Court proceeds on the basis of evidence of suitability of accommodation itself and proceeded to hold that the findings recorded by the Trial Court appear to be legal. While doing so, the appellate Court, in my considered view, did not take into account all the relevant aspects noted above.

13. At this juncture, the judgment of the Gujrat High Court in the case of Francis Dias v. H. Sumatilal reported in MANU/GJ/0108/1985 : AIR1985Guj171 , Justice Ahmadi (as he was then) has interpreted Section 13(1)(l) of the Bombay Rent Act and observed as follows:

Read in the contest of the preceding words, acquisition of possession can never mean permission for temporary use of a suitable residence. The word "acquire" is a well understood legal term and when used with the term "possession" it generally means something more than mere temporary possession, it usually implies a vesting of interest or some substantial right to possess the residence. Even the words "has been allotted" a suitable residence mean more than mere temporary residence, they mean allotment as of right.... What is sought to be conveyed is that he must have acquired right to possess another suitable residence, a right which he can enforce in a Court of law if he is sought to be dispossessed.

Similar view has been taken by this Court in the case of Pramila Madhav Damle & ors. v. Waman R. Koparde reported in MANU/MH/0148/1999 : 1999(2)BomCR371 . Relying on the Supreme Court judgment in the case of B.R. Mehta v. Atma Devi (Supra), this Court has opined that in order to bring the case under the mischief of Section 13(1)(l) of the Bombay Rent Act, the tenant should acquire or must be able to reside in the alternate accommodation as a matter of right, then only Section 13(1)(l) would be attracted.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Writ Petition No. 4949 of 1993

Decided On: 04.05.2006

 Surendra M. Wagh Vs. Manohar Krishna Kale 

Hon'ble Judges/Coram: P.V. Kakade, J.

Citation: 2006(4) ALLMR 19,2006(5) MHLJ 70

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Tenant not taking efforts to search alternative accommodation, whether liable to be evicted?

In the context, the consistent view of the Bombay High Court is that once the landlord proceeds to initiate a suit on the ground of bona fide requirement, the tenant is expected to start looking for alternative premises and to explain as to why he was unsuccessful in securing such accommodation. In case of Suhasini Atmaram Parab and others vs. B. H. Khatu and others, 2003 Bom.R.C. 313 a Single Bench of this Court has reiterated the same view by taking survey of the case law on the point. The tenant did not elaborate his efforts regarding steps taken to search for alternative accommodation. He failed to discharge the burden to prove that comparatively he will be put to greater hardship in case of passing the eviction decree. 

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (AURANGABAD BENCH)

W. P. No. 802 of 1990

Decided On: 07.12.2006

Parashram Tuljaram Belhekar  Vs. Tejmal @ Kankamal Mulchand Jain 

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

V.R. Kingaonkar, J.

Citation: 2007(2) MHLJ 610: 2007(3) ALLMR 657

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Whether eviction decree can be passed against tenant if he fails to take efforts to find alternative accommodation?

The Appellate Court rightly adverted to the fact that there is nothing on record to show that the petitioners have made efforts to find out alternative accommodation for their residence and could not get one. Reliance was placed on paragraph No. 14 of the defendants evidence which reads thus:

"14. It is true that the plaintiff has offered me an alternative accommodation of one room admeasuring 10 x 12 with balcony, with bathroom W.C. combined, in the same suit premises having separate entrance. I am not prepared to accept the offer of the plaintiff regarding the above said alternate accommodation. I tried to find out the alternative accommodation for my residence from June, 1980 near Pratap Talkies, S.T. Workshop, Near Highway at Murphy Company. It is not true to say that I did not search an alternate accommodation for my residence after receiving the notice from the plaintiff."

From the evidence it is obvious that no positive evidence has been adduced by the defendants that getting alternative premises in the same locality or the same city was impossible. If that be so, then applying the principle enunciated by the Apex Court in MANU/SC/0313/1978 : [1979]2SCR1 in the case of Ms. Bega Begum & others v. Abdul Ahad Khan (dead) by L.Rs. and others, the Court will have to answer the issue of comparative hardship against the petitioners-tenants and in favour of the respondent-plaintiff landlady.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Writ Petition No. 4457 of 1991

Decided On: 28.08.2002

 Gaur Chandra Basu and Anr. Vs. Ruchira Ashok Sonde and Anr.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

A.M. Khanwilkar, J.

Citation: 2002(1) ALLMR 312

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Whether government is liable to provide transit accommodation in case of demolition of dilapidated building?

We cannot sidetrack the difficulties of such old legal tenants of such old chawls/buildings owned by poor landlord/owner who are unable to commercially exploit the land property but, as stated to be under obligation to provide temporary alternate accommodation till the construction/development of the dilapidated, dangerous buildings on the land. Such statutory or otherwise legal tenants/occupants cannot be treated on lower footing than the unauthorised or authorised slum dwellers/occupants on Government or local body's land or property, specially when the urgent situation of compulsory razing of such dilapidated old buildings crops up. The State or local authorities are willing to provide such occupants, dwellers/tenants temporary and/or permanent alternate accommodation as recorded in earlier orders (supra). They have permitted various settlements for the same.

17. All human beings problems/difficulties just cannot be overlooked when it comes to vacation or eviction of compulsory leaving of home/premises, even for want of development of the property by the developer/owner or the society itself. The cooperation and settlement is the solution. The State or local bodies having once decided to provide temporary or permanent shelter with all facilities, as recorded above, the similar policy and/or housing policies, should be, on certain conditions and taking note of the circumstances for such poor tenants/occupants, required to be framed. Therefore, this Guideline No. 3 for reconsideration of the issues so mentioned.

18. It will be open to the Petitioners to apply to the State Government for temporary alternate transit accommodation till redevelopment of the building in question which shall be considered sympathetically. It will also be open to the developer, if so appointed, to provide the temporary alternate accommodation till the redevelopment of the new building, if any.

            

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Writ Petition (Lodging) No. 2371 of 2014

Decided On: 08.10.2014

Zubair Malik Vs. Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Anoop V. Mohta and A.S. Gadkari, JJ.

Citation: 2015 (1) ALL MR 543

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Whether civil court can grant declaration that legal heir of tenant is entitled to get permanent alternate accommodation?

In their capacity as heirs and legal representatives of the deceased, the Plaintiffs claim entitlement to the permanent alternate accommodation in the premises redeveloped and reconstructed by MHADA, Defendant No.4. Consequently the suit is for declaration that the Plaintiffs are entitled to permanent alternate accommodation in lieu of the suit premises which was the tenanted premises of their father and for injunction restraining Defendant No. 3, the developer, from handing over possession of the permanent alternate accommodation in the newly constructed building to Defendant Nos. 1 and 2 and to handover possession to the Plaintiffs instead. Consequently as an ancillary relief the plaintiff has prayed for cancellation of the approval granted to Defendant No.1 as tenant/occupant of the suit premises.

5. Upon the admitted facts the Court would have to decide the Plaintiffs' right of inheritance under the Hindu Succession Act. Upon so deciding the Court would either have to pass relief's of declaration of the permanent alternate accommodation to the Plaintiffs and not to Defendant No.1 and the consequential relief of cancellation of the claim of the Defendant No.1 if the Plaintiffs makes out a case on merits in that behalf or to dismiss the suit if the Plaintiffs do not make out a case of their right on succession claimed by them.

6. These relief's have to be granted only by a Civil Court. There is no law which has expressly or impliedly barred the Civil Court from exercising jurisdiction in respect of declaration and injunction sought by the Plaintiffs under the Hindu Law of inheritance.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Appeal From Order No. 1221 of 2012 and Civil Application No. 1660 of 2012

Decided On: 07.08.2013

Sanjay Govind Ganjekar & Ors. Vs. Krishna Kashiram Mistri & Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

R.S. Dalvi, J.

Citation: 2013(5) MHLJ 726

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Whether compensation in lieu of alternate accommodation can be enhanced if redevelopment is not completed within fixed period?

Further, the alleged agreements contemplated the construction being completed and the petitioners members being put in possession of their respective premises in the newly constructed building within 24 months i.e. latest by the year 2010. It is inconceivable that the parties had agreed to accept the amounts allegedly mentioned therein in perpetuity. A view to this effect would entitle respondent No. 4 to delay the construction indefinitely and during this period, pay the petitioners members the amounts allegedly agreed upon in the year 2008. This would be highly inequitable and unfair to the petitioners members who have already suffered substantially by having been kept out of their premises for about five years. If that were the case, we would not have been inclined to exercise our powers in favour of granting respondent No. 4 further time to complete the construction of the building.

17. This brings us to the question of the quantum of increase in the monthly compensation to be granted to the petitioners members.

18. Mr. Shaikh, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners relied upon the agreements entered into between respondent No. 4 and certain other tenants. Mr. Narula stated that those agreements were entered into under compulsion as those tenants had filed proceedings and were refusing to vacate. As Mr. Shaikh rightly pointed out the petitioners members cannot be penalized for having cooperated with respondent No. 4 by vacating the premises without adopting legal proceedings and having had to suffer on account of this inordinate delay. The agreements entered into between respondent No. 4 and the other tenants would be an indication of the fair amount to be paid towards compensation for the temporary accommodation.

19. We will, for the purpose of this writ petition, however, restrict the period for which this additional amount ought to be paid. We will presume that the agreements were entered into between the petitioners members and respondent No. 4 around July, 2008. The lump sum consideration of Rs. 1,80,000/- was paid from July, 2008 to July, 2010. Under the agreements, the tenants were to be put in possession of their premises within 24 months. 24 months from July, 2008, takes us to July, 2010. The agreements provide for enhanced compensation for any delay beyond 24 months. We will presume in favour of the respondent No. 4 that a further extension of 6 months would be reasonable. This would, therefore, take us to the end of the year 2010. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the enhanced rate ought to apply from January, 2011.

20. Mr. Narula contended that an enhancement in the amount of compensation for the extended period would amount to the Court varying an agreement between the parties. The contention is not well founded. We have not varied the terms of the alleged agreement. 

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Writ Petition No. 974 of 2012

Decided On: 26.02.2013

 Kagalwala Building Resident Welfare Association Vs.  Maharashtra Housing and Area Development Authority and Others

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

S.J. Vazifdar and Mridula Bhatkar, JJ.

Citation: 2014(3) ALLMR 615

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Whether tenant can be evicted from tenanted premises if his wife has acquired alternative premises?

In the present case, there is plentiful and overflowing evidence to indicate that the defendant is living in the alternate accommodation alongwith his wife and other family members. There is nothing to show that the defendant's wife had any means to secure such alternative premises. Further the admissions of the defendant as noted above to use alternative premises as a family house were crystal clear. In such circumstances, the learned counsel for the plaintiff would be correct in relying upon the decision in Hari Sharma vs. Mr. Amarjit Singh Ramana MANU/DE/0646/1999 : ILR 1999 Delhi 129 wherein the Court in para 10 held as under:

"10. I am afraid that would not be proper course to decide as to whether any acquisition of a vacant residential house by wife would amount to acquisition by tenant. There was nothing on record suggesting that there was a dispute between the wife and the husband either in terms of their living together or otherwise. There was nothing on record to show that they were not sharing the common mess, rather, the evidence on record was to the contrary. It was brought on the record that wife of the tenant and other children were living together under the same roof, they had a common kitchen. In such a case, the ratio of B.R. Mehta's case (supra) regarding domain has to be construed. Whether, that domain which B.R. Mehta's case spoke of, would be in the nature of domain in terms of contribution of finances towards acquisition of alternative accommodation? Let us go to the ethos of our society in the realm of marriage, according to which the husband will have domain over wife not only in respect of physical terms but also to what she is possessed of including property. But we may not adopt that definition. What has to be seen in such a context to determine whether the family as a unit is living together, sharing a common kitchen and mess we have to see ground realities.

11. In a broader conspectus of universe family is the smallest unit and when husband, wife, parents and children hold the property jointly, they would be considered ordinarily as members of one unit and the requirement of one would be the requirement of the other. In view of the evidence on record that the tenant and his wife were living together one has acquired suitable residential accommodation and there is no evidence to the effect that they had not been looking upon themselves as one unit the acquisition of suitable residential accommodation by wife would be considered to be the acquisition of a suitable residential accommodation by the tenant. As has been stated earlier, there is nothing on record which has been brought to show that the husband and wife were not having cordial relations or there was inter se dispute between both of them or they were not living as one unit. Look at the testimony of respondent-RW 4. He has stated that his wife and son and his parents were living with him. In cross-examination he has further admitted that his wife and his son are living with him permanently in the suit premises since the time they took the premises on rent in 1975. He further stated in the cross-examination that they had a common kitchen. In this case the wife of the tenant Smt. Sudesh Ramana also appeared in the witness box as RW 9. Specifically in the cross-examination she deposed:-

"It is correct that relation between myself and my husband and our son has always been cordial."

12. That being the situation can it be said that the acquisition of residence at Panchsheel Park by wife wherein she is realising rent at the rate of Rs. 50,000/- per month, whereas the husband tenant before me is paying rent at the rate of Rs. 1,500/- per month be permitted to do business on account of protection provided under the Act? The answer is in the negative.

13. There is no dispute between husband and wife. They constitute normal Hindu family where husband would have domain over his wife's property until disharmony, distrust or separation is pleaded. This view was taken by Punjab & Haryana High Court in the case of Laxmi Dass Aggarwal Vs. A.K. Bahal 1986 (1) RCJ 190. Similar view was taken by Gujarat High Court in Hamukhlal Raichand Shah Vs. Arvind bhai Mohanlal Kapadia MANU/GJ/0179/1987 : 1988 (2) RCJ 573.

14. As a matter of fact, the law has been succinctly reflected in the judgment of N.K. Rastogi Vs. karori Lal MANU/DE/0658/1993 : 1993 RLR 358:

"The close analysis of this judgment given in case of B.R. Mehta (supra), which was a judgment given by two Hon'ble Judges, would show that ratio of which can be called from the judgment given in the case of Prem Chand's case (supra) a judgment given by three Hon'ble Judges, had not been in any manner whittled down. The legal position of now very clear that it is not that every acquisition of a residential accommodation by the wife would mean acquisition of a residence by the tenant, but it will depend upon the facts of each case in order to decide whether alternate residential accommodation has become available to the tenant over which the tenant and his family members have a domain."

15. I am of the considered view that in B.R. Mehta's case (supra) the supreme Court has not whittled down the decision of Prem Chand's case (supra). In B.R. Mehta's case, Supreme Court held:-

"The said decision rested on the facts of the case. There in that case, this Court found that the respondent's wife had purchased a flat in Saket and further found that the flat was available to the respondent. In those circumstances it was held that there was acquisition of vacant possession of a residence and as such Section 14(1)(h) of the Act would be attracted. It cannot however be laid down as a general proposition of law that acquisition of flat by the wife in all circumstances would amount to acquisition of flat by the tenant."

What is necessary is that unless there is a positive evidence and here there is none, of acquisition of property prima facie in the name of the tenant or allotment or flat to the tenant, it cannot be said to have been acquired by or allotted to some members of the tenant's family other than the wife in her name. That cannot defeat the tenant's right under Clause (h) of Section 14(1). If there is such an acquisition by or on behalf of the tenant then the tenant and members of the tenant's family would have dominion over the acquired residence. Such acquisition would bring to the tenant the mischief of Section 14(1)(h) of the Act.

19. Thus considering the legal position in the facts of the present case, the plaintiff needs to succeed in the suit in question and would become entitled to a decree of eviction and possession against the defendant on the ground of the defendant having acquired suitable alternate accommodation as Section 13(1)(l) of the Bombay Rent Act would mandate.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Writ Petition No. 5045 of 1998

Decided On: 04.09.2017

Navinchandra Nanji and Ors. Vs. Jivraj Bhanji and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

G.S. Kulkarni, J.

Citation: 2017(2) RCR(Rent) 419

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What is distinction between expressions 'genuinely requires' and 'reasonably requires'?

 As to alternative accommodation disentitling the landlord to the relief of possession it was held that it must be reasonably equivalent as regards suitability in respect to the accommodation he was claiming. This statement of law was cited with approval before a Full Bench of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in Damodar Sharma and Anr. v. Nandram Deviram MANU/MP/0162/1960 : AIR1960MP345 . Pandey, J. recording the majority opinion emphasised the distinction between the expressions 'genuinely requires' and 'reasonably requires' and said:

It is wrong to say that "genuinely requires" is the same as "reasonably requires". There is a distinction between the two phrases. The former phrase refers to a state of mind; the latter to an objective standard. "Genuine requirement" would vary according to the idiosyncrasy of the individual and the time and circumstances in which he lives and thinks. Reasonable requirement belongs to the "knowledge of the law" and means reasonable not in the mind of the person requiring the accommodation but reasonable according to the actual facts. 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

C.A. No. 4166 of 1999

Decided On: 30.08.1999

Shiv Sarup Gupta Vs. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

V.N. Khare and R.C. Lahoti, JJ.

Citation: AIR 1999 SC 2507

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Whether eviction decree should be passed against tenant if he fails to search alternative premises?

 The Rent Act does not contemplate that the landlord should continue to live in an inhuman condition only because the tenant may suffer decree of eviction. In my judgment, the lower Appellate Court was perfectly justified in holding that the requirement of the landlord was reasonable and bonafide.

5. Shri Angal then submitted that in any event the conclusion as regards hardship recorded by the Appellate Court is not correct. The learned counsel urged that the lower Appellate Court overlooked that in the part of the premises the tenant was carrying an electrical business and the decree of eviction would not only deprive the tenant of the shelter but would completely ruin the business of the tenant. The submission has no merit. The lower appellate Court very rightly pointed out that the tenant made no efforts whatsoever to secure another accommodation in spite of the suit remaining pending right from the year 1975 onwards. The lower Appellate Court was fully conscious that some hardship would be caused to the tenant by decree of eviction and lower Appellate Court felt that reasonable time to vacate would meet the ends of justice. The time which has expired from the date of the decree passed by the Assistant Judge is over five years and by no stretch of imagination can it be suggested that this time was not sufficient for the tenant to secure alternate accommodation. In cases where there is hardship both to the tenant and the landlord, there is no reason why the landlord should be deprived of decree for possession. In my judgment, the decree passed by the lower Appellate Court does not suffer from any infirmity and the petition must fail.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Writ Petition No. 4484 of 1983

Decided On: 13.01.1989

Narayan Dawal Patil Vs.  Mohammad Asgar Mohamad Hanif

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
M.L. Pendse, J.

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Whether eviction decree can be passed against tenant if he acquires alternative residence in different town?

 It is necessary to bear in mind that the Legislature in enacting Section 13(1)(1) of the Act did not say that as soon as the tenant gets some residence equal or larger in area than the former residence under the landlord, the tenant should be evicted. The emphasis of the Legislature is on the word "suitable". Therefore, in every case it will have to be seen, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, whether the tenant can be said to have acquired or allotted suitable alternative accommodation. In our opinion, the accommodation suitable for the tenant's residence would ordinarily mean that if a person is required to reside in a particular place in connection with his allocation or profession or business, the alternative accommodation must be suitable for his residence there and not at the place which is located far away. For instance, if tenant in Mumbai acquires premises say in Nagpur or Wardha, it will not ipso facto amount to acquisition of alternative suitable accommodation. If it is further demonstrated that the tenant has shifted to his alternative accommodation with his family then and in that case provisions of Section 13(1)(1) of the Act will be certainly attracted. However, ultimately, the question will have to be decided having regard to the facts and circumstances of each case.

11. We are not inclined to agree with the view expressed by Rebello J. in Rajendraprasad's case. It seems that the learned Judge was of the opinion that even if the tenant has constructed house in Pune or Delhi, he would be construed to have acquired suitable residential premises under Section 13(1)(1) on the basis that such acquisition shows that he had the capacity to construct the house elsewhere. In our view the capacity of a tenant to acquire suitable premises is not a relevant consideration for considering eviction under Section 13(1)(1) while it may be relevant for considering the hardship under Section 13(2) of the Bombay Rent Act while decreeing his claim on the ground of reasonable requirement under Section 13(1)(g) of the said Act. We are in respectful agreement with the view expressed by C.S.Dharmadhikari J. that ordinarily acquisition or allotment of residential premises outside the local area will not automatically forfeit the protection given by the Rent Act. It will ultimately depend upon the facts and circumstances of a particular case and if the court comes to the conclusion that acquisition of such premises is suitable for residence of a tenant decree can be passed under Section 13(1)(1) of the Rent Act.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Writ Petition No. 5305 of 1989

Decided On: 16.07.2004

J. Marathe Vs. P.V. Kaloke

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
A.P. Shah, Actg. C.J. and S.U. Kamdar, J.
Citation:  2004 (4) ALL MR 468

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Whether court can dismiss eviction suit if alternative accommodation is in possession of tenant?

Now, it is true that when premises are given on leave and licence, the licensor continues, from a juridical point of view, to be in possession of the premises and the licensee is merely given occupation and therefore, strictly speaking the High Court was right in observing that the Truth Bungalow, which was given on leave and licence to Dr. Bharucha, was in the possession of the Appellant.

The Court then pointed out:

But for the purpose of determining whether the requirement of the Appellant for the ground floor premises was reasonable and bona fide, what is necessary to be considered is not whether the Appellant was juridically in possession of the Truth Bungalow, but whether the Truth Bungalow was available to the Appellant for occupation so that he could not be said to need the ground floor premises. If the Truth Bungalow was in occupation of Dr. Bharucha on leave and licence, it was obviously not available to the Appellant for occupation and it could not be taken into account for negative the need of the Appellant for the ground floor premises.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

C.A. No. 785 of 1987 (Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 12354 of 1986)

Decided On: 12.03.1987

 Prativa Devi Vs. T.V. Krishnan

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

A.N. Sen, G.L. Oza and V. Balakrishna Eradi, JJ.

Citation:(1996) 5 SCC 353

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Guidelines of bombay high court for demolition of dangerous building by Municipal Corporation

According to the Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai in view of the difficulties faced by them in implementation of such notices under Section 354 of the said Act in the absence of any specific provisions in the said Act for removal/evacuation of occupants of dilapidated buildings, and to make it effective and workable, considering the human problems, it is necessary to issue certain guidelines. It is the case of the Corporation that there is no proper response from the police and the Corporation officers are not in a position to enforce the notices under Section 354 of the said Act.

9. Accordingly, for the present, in the absence of any policy in that behalf, the following guidelines are issued:-

a) The present order will be applicable only in respect of those buildings which are highly dilapidated and dangerous and/or classified in Category C-1 by the Corporation, whether owned by a private party or by the Corporation or any other authority and in respect of which building, either a notice under section 354 has been issued or the Corporation has issued a Letter of Evacuation to their tenants and/or occupiers of the buildings.

b) The Corporation will, before classifying a building under category C-1, conduct their own independent inspection and assessment with the help of the Engineers of their Department and carry out a survey of such building(s). The report of Structural Audit shall be taken into account.

c) The Corporation shall consider the report of Structural Engineer appointed by the owners and/or occupants classifying the building as dilapidated and dangerous. If the owners and/or the occupants bring conflicting reports on the status of the building, the Corporation shall refer the matter to Technical Advisory Committee (TAC) under the Chairmanship of Director (ES & P) with at least 3 other members, viz. City Engineer, Chief Engineer (DP) and Chief Engineer (P & D).

d) The TAC shall:

i) Carry out a visual inspection of the state of the internal and external plaster, plumbing, drainage, whether the doors and windows close properly, whether steel in columns is exposed, whether there is settlement in the foundation, deflections/sagging, major cracks in columns/beams, seepages/leakages, staircase area and column condition, lift well walls, U.G. tank, O.H. tank column condition, parapet at terraces, chhajas, common areas, terrace water proofing.

ii) Carry out specific tests like ultrasonic pulse velocity test, rebound hammer test, half cell potential test, carbonation depth test, core test, chemical analysis, cement aggregate ratio as may be considered by TAC as necessary.

e) If it is found after due notice that the building(s) is in a highly dangerous or in dilapidated condition, then in that event, the Corporation shall also make a list of the names of the tenants and/or occupiers in the said building and the carpet area of the premises in their respective occupation and possession including the floor at which the same has been occupied.

f) A copy of such list will be furnished to the landlord and/or owner/builder of the said building. The Corporation thereafter, will issue a notice under section 354 of the said Act calling upon such tenants and/or occupiers to vacate the said premises and if such notice under section 354 of the said Act has already been issued, then in that event the Corporation will give 7 days' notice to such tenants/occupiers, copies whereof will be furnished to the landlord for vacating the said building(s). If such tenant and/or occupier is not available, the Corporation shall affix such notice or Letter of Evacuation on any part of such premises.

g) The Corporation shall then take steps to turn off the water, supply, electric power and gas to such building immediately before the removal of occupiers.

h) In the case of a municipal owned building(s), the Corporation will issue Letter of Evacuation to every person in occupation of the said building or part thereof to vacate the said building along with their belongings within the said period of 7 days from date of issuance of such notice of Letter of Evacuation in respect of municipal owned building(s). The notice issued to such occupiers shall contain the name of the occupier and the area in his occupation and also the floor at which the premises are located. In case, if such tenant and/or occupier is not available, the Corporation shall affix such notice or Letter of Evacuation on any part of such premises.

i) In the event, a person occupying such tenement whether of the privately owned building(s) or building(s) owned by Corporation or any other authority refuses to vacate the said premises, then the police shall remove such person from the said premises by using nominal force if required for the same.

j) The police may use such force as is reasonably necessary to remove such person and/or occupiers and/or allottee along with their belongings from the said premises, without causing damage to their movables.

k) The Corporation may then demolish such dangerous and dilapidated building.

l) The rights of the tenants and/or occupiers and/or owners in respect of the said premises/property will not be affected by virtue of evacuation or demolition carried out by the Corporation of such dilapidated and dangerous building in exercise of the power under section 354 of the said Act or by virtue of the fact that the Corporation is the owner of the premises. Such tenant and/or occupier and/or owner will be entitled to re-occupy the premises in respect of the same area after the reconstruction of the building, subject to the prevalent provisions of law pertaining to redevelopment of the property or subject to any arrangement or agreement arrived at by and between such tenants and/or occupiers with the owner of the building. Any action of evacuation/removal/demolition will not affect the inter se rights of owners if there be more than one owner or there is a dispute as to the title of the property.

m) If there are any pending suits/proceedings and there are any restraint orders passed, the Corporation shall be free to apply for vacating and/or modifying such orders, which applications shall be decided on its own merits and in accordance with law.

n) In respect of the Municipal buildings, it shall be the duty of the Corporation to provide alternate accommodation as early as possible in any of their premises to such tenant and/or occupier of the Corporation owned building till and until the said building is reconstructed by the Corporation or the tenancy of any of such occupier is determined in accordance with law.

o) In respect of the private owned buildings, if such building falls in cessed category as contemplated under the provisions of the Maharashtra Housing and Area Development Act, 1976, then in that event, it will be the duty of MHADA/MBR & RB to provide temporary alternate arrangement in a transit camp for transit accommodation, in accordance with law, as early as possible.

p) In case privately owned buildings are demolished by the Corporation in exercise of power under Section 354 read with the present order, then the Corporation shall, while granting sanction of redevelopment, impose a condition in IOD (Intimation of Disapproval) that no Commencement Certificate will be issued under section 45 of the MRTP Act, 1966 unless and until an Agreement either providing a Permanent Alternate Accommodation in a newly constructed building or a settlement is arrived at by and between the tenants and/or occupiers and the landlord in respect of the said demolished premises, is filed with the Corporation at the earliest.

q) In case of buildings which have suddenly collapsed, to determine the reasons for such collapse, it is desirable that forthwith a Committee be constituted headed by a former Municipal Commissioner and consisting of Former Chief Engineer of MHADA alongwith a Professor of VJTI and a Professor of IIT, Powai having expertise in Structural Engineering as also an employee of the Corporation, holding a post not lower than that of the Director (E.S. & P.) and such Committee will determine the cause of such collapse and inter-alia identify whether any Architect and/or Consultant and/or Municipal officers or other person/s is/are responsible in any manner whatsoever for such a collapse. The reference to the Committee will not in any way be a hindrance in the criminal investigations/proceedings that may have commenced or may be commenced under the relevant criminal law. This no way would restrict the State of Maharashtra to pass appropriate order for any such inquiry or investigation.

10. The above order in no way restricts the power and scope and purpose of Section 354 of said Act. The Commissioner/Corporation and its Officers shall act in accordance with law. These guidelines will not affect any orders passed in pending proceedings and are not to be read and interpreted to restrict or permit the Corporation or any party to go beyond the statutory provisions of law. This order is necessitated essentially to make Section 354 effective and to see that human lives are not in any manner compromised. The Corporation and its officers to follow other pre-steps and provisions before issuing Section 354 notices and/or such other notices.

11. The list of dilapidated/dangerous C-1 category buildings/structures shall be published in advance on the website of the Corporation so that effective steps can be taken by all concerned, by all available modes and methods. A copy of this order shall also be published on the website of the Corporation and State of Maharashtra as also other Local Authorities etc..

12. It is reiterated that this order covers only C-1 category buildings which are unsafe and declared as dangerous, and the demolition, if any, shall be carried out by the Corporation in accordance with law and in no manner pre-empts/curtails the rights of any person/s from objecting and/or approaching the Court and if a case is made out to pass appropriate orders on its own merits and in accordance with law. It is also clarified that during the interregnum, in appropriate cases, the Corporation would be at liberty to take all safety measures, including propping up, etc., of the buildings/premises and enclose/fence the surrounding area in accordance with law.

13. The rights and the contentions of the other parties to raise and/or agitate distinctive and individual pleas/issues of their respective matters separately, are kept open. All the aggrieved parties shall be at liberty to approach the Court in case any clarification is required. Pendency of this Petition would not preclude the State Government to come out with appropriate policy to address the grievances of the tenants/occupiers or for that matter, the owners thereof.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Writ Petition (L) No. 1135 of 2014

Decided On: 23.06.2014

 Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai Vs. State of Maharashtra

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Anoop V. Mohta and A.A. Sayed, JJ.

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Golden rules for determining quantum of mesne profits

 Having taken survey of the various cases and methods of valuation, it can be broadly summarised as under:

i) The claim for 'Mesne Profit' remains floating till the decree of possession is passed in favour of the plaintiff, which can also be termed as royalty;

ii) The measure of Mesne Profits is the value for the use of the premises and not necessarily the value of the property;

iii) Value for use will be determined by:

a. What that value will be in the hands of the person in wrongful possession;

b. comparables, if available and applicable in real sense;

c. finding out the prevailing rate of rental at which the wrongful person ought to have found equivalent accommodation.

 No, if one turns to the facts of the present case in general and the order dated 29.11.2006 passed by the Court Receiver in particular, the foundation thereof is the valuation report of M/s. S.S. Joshi Associates dated 28.11.2006, in which the test applied for determination of the amount of royalty is the estimated returns from the suit property. What is taken into account is the estimated value of the property and estimated loss of profit or income suffered by the owner. The proper measure of Mesne Profits ought to be value of the user of the land or the premises to a person in wrongful possession as ruled by the Apex Court in the case of Fateh Chand {supra). The Apex Court has clearly ruled that an estimated value of the property and estimated returns thereof cannot be the basis for computing the mesne profits. The valuer in addition to the method adopted ought to have ascertained the value of the user of the suit premises in the hands of the defendant. In addition, the valuer ought to have found out the comparables coupled with the prevailing rate of rentals or the prevailing rate of rent at which the wrongful person could have found equivalent accommodation on the date of the suit. In addition to this annual letting value of the suit premises determined by the Municipal Corporation ought to have been taken into account for determining the quantum of monthly royalty floating mesne profit till the decree for possession is passed in favour of the plaintiffs.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Chamber Summons Nos. 1539 of 2006 and 1820 of 2007 in Suit No. 1996 of 2006

Decided On: 23.04.2008

 Humayun Dhanrajgir and Ors.Vs. Ezra Aboody

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
V.C. Daga, J.
Citation: 2009(1) ALLMR 844

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Landmark judgment on eviction of tenant on ground of bonafide need

In case of Tarachand Hassaram Shamdasani (supra), the learned Single Judge of this Court has held that it is obligatory for the landlord to disclose in the pleadings and in his evidence that the fact that he owns other premises which were capable of being utilized for the requirement pressed into service in the suit filed against the tenant and to further disclose and explain that in spite of those acquisitions, ownership of other premises, the requirement which is pressed into service against the tenant would still survive. It is only then the landlord would be entitled to invoke the ground of reasonable and bona fide requirement and would succeed in establishing that the need is indeed bona fide and reasonable. In the said case also, there were no disclosures and the material with regard to ownership of other premises came on record only during the course of cross-examination. This was possible because the tenants through their efforts managed to obtain information. This Court, upset the concurrent findings as to bona fide and reasonable requirement, where the landlord has suppressed such material particulars. The relevant observations are contained in paragraphs, 7, 8 and 9, extract of which reads thus:

"7. ................... That building can be used for residence. These facts were indeed relevant for deciding the issue of bonafide and reasonableness of the requirement of the Plaintiff, but were not disclosed either in the pleadings or atleast in the examination-in-chief when the Plaintiff entered the witness box. However, were elicited only during the cross examination conducted by the Defendant-tenant. This was possible only because all these details were within the knowledge of the Defendant-tenant. In spite of such overwhelming evidence on record, the Courts below have proceeded to answer the issue of bonafide and reasonable requirement in favour of the Respondent landlord. That cannot be countenanced, to say the least.

8. To my mind, however, it is obligatory for the landlord to disclose in the pleadings and in his evidence the fact that he owns other premises which were capable of being utilized for the requirement pressed into service in the suit filed against the tenant and to further disclose and explain that inspite of those acquisitions and ownership of other premises, the requirement which is pressed into service against the tenant would still survive. It is only then the landlord would be entitled to invoke this ground and would succeed in establishing his need to be bonafide and reasonable.

9. I have no hesitation in taking the view that in the fact situation of the present case the Plaintiffs has failed to plead and also depose in his evidence (examination-in-chief) about the ownership of other premises capable of being used for the requirement pressed into service in the subject suit. Besides, he has failed to disclose and explain that even the other premises were not sufficient to satisfy the requirement pressed into service in the suit against the tenant. Only when the landlord pleads and proves all these material facts that the Court would be able to adjudicate fully, completely and effectually as to whether the requirement pressed into service by the landlord in the suit so filed is bonafide and reasonable. As mentioned earlier, it is well settled that the landlord is not only required to establish his need to be bonafide but also to be reasonable. If the landlord fails to plead or establish either of this ingredient then the ground under Section 13(1)(g) of the Act for eviction is unavailable to the landlord. Inherent in this test is that if the landlord has failed to disclose relevant materials in the pleading and in his evidence (examination-in-chief), dejure, the landlord has not approached the court with clean hands. In such a case, it will be the duty of the court to non-suit the landlord with regard to this ground. It will be useful to place reliance on the enunciation of the Apex court in the case of S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu's case (supra). The Apex Court has observed that duty is cast upon the Plaintiff to disclose all the facts, it is the duty of the Plaintiff to come to Court with true case and prove it by true evidence. The Apex Court has further observed that deliberate deception with the desire of securing something by taking unfair advantage of another, it is a deception in order to gain by another's loss, it is a cheating intended to get an advantage. Further, in Paragraph 6 it has observed that, non disclosure of all the material and relevant facts at the trial tantamount to playing fraud on the Court. A litigant, who approaches the Court, is bound to produce all the documents executed by him which are relevant to the litigation. Withholding of any vital document in this case information, in order to gain advantage on the other side then he would be guilty of fraud on the Court as well as on the opposite party. Such a person can be summarily thrown out at any stage of the litigation. If this principle is to be applied to the facts of the present case, I have no manner of doubt that the Respondent-Landlord will have to be non suited on this ground. Because, it is a case of non disclosure of material facts and information, therefore, one of approaching the Court with unclean hands. And as observed by the Apex Court tantamount to playing fraud on the court as well as the opposite side. In this case sheerly because the Petitioner tenant was vigilant enough, could muster the necessary information to confront the Respondent landlord regarding his need being not bonafide and reasonable.

(emphasis supplied)

59. In case of Narendra Gulabrao Zade v. Shiocharan Ghashiram Gupta since deceased through Lrs. Smt. Radhabai Shivcharan Gupta & anr. MANU/MH/1308/2010 : 2011 (1) Mh.L.J. 839, in the context of the necessity of disclosure by the landlord, this Court has made following observations:

"9. The application as filed by the petitioner before the Rent Controller does not contain a reference to other house belonging to him and situated at Rajapeth i.e. within the Municipal limits. The law requires the petitioner to prove his bonafide need and for that to approach the Court of law with clean hands. The petitioner could have explained inadequacy or other lacunae in Rajapeth accommodation to justify his preference of ground floor in occupation of the tenant. Had there been such a case and pleading, the respondent - tenant would have then got an opportunity of cross examination and then bonafides or otherwise of the need of the landlord could have been judicially appreciated. Unfortunately, such a course of action is not possible here. The respondent - tenant has through cross examination of the petitioner placed on record only the suppression of availability of other house at Rajapeth with further fact that proceedings for eviction of Mohan Singh Thakur therefrom were actually initiated and later on compromised when Mohan Singh Thakur agreed to increase the rent. Thus, this material brought on record by the tenant is sufficient to substantiate that there is no bonafide need of the landlord. Subsequent utilization of premises vacated by Shri Mohan Singh Thakur for establishing a business again raises several questions and as this fact is not on record, the same cannot be considered here.

10. The reliance upon the judgment delivered by me and reported in the case of Murlimanohar v. Prabha Bhattacharya, (supra) in this situation is misconceived. There, the landlady and her sisters qualified gynecologists were seeking eviction of tenant to start maternity home and hospital. The tenant was urging that they can have their complex and in that complex, the tenant also can be accommodated. The evidence which has come on record there has been appreciated and such insistence on the part of the tenant was found to be unjustified. This Court has found that in such situation, the landlord is the best judge of his need. The judgment, therefore, has no application in present facts. The landlord can claim to be a best judge of his need after he fairly discloses all options available to him and shows some reason for choosing particular option i.e. premises. It is this election, effected by him after full knowledge and appreciation, which cannot be interfered with judicially. Here, the premises at Rajapeth were suppressed and hence it cannot be said that the landlord has judged his need bonafide in accordance with law. In this situation, I find that the petitioner - landlord can initiate fresh proceedings in accordance with law."
IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Civil Revision Application No. 770 of 2013, Civil Application No. 210 of 2015,

Decided On: 04.08.2015

Vasant Mahadeo Gujar and Ors. Vs. Baitulla Ismail Shaikh and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
M.S. Sonak, J.
 Date of Pronouncing the Judgment  :   04 August 2015
Citation: 2016 (4) ALLMR 174

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