Whether old grantee of govt land can stay in possession of land in perpetuity?

 If a grantee of an expired grant had incurred the liability to surrender possession of the granted property, such liability would remain enforceable notwithstanding the repeal of the Regulations under which such liability arose. The argument that the liability gets extinguished by reason of Regulation 144(1)(a) of the 1966 Regulations is, in our opinion, legally unsound. We say so, for two reasons. Firstly, because the contention flies in the face of Regulation 211 which continues the obligation incurred under the 1926 Regulations. So long as the liability incurred is recognized and continued by the repealing Regulation, the same can be enforced in law. Secondly, because the interpretation of Regulation 144(1)(a) itself does not admit of a situation where the liability to surrender possession not only becomes extinct but is enlarged into a right to stay in possession in perpetuity. All that Regulation 144 stipulates, in our opinion, is that a grantee under the old Regulations would continue to be under the same obligation/liability or enjoy the same rights as are permissible under the 1966 Regulations. The right to continue would however, depend on whether the person in occupation has a valid grant in his favour, even on the date the 1966 Regulations came into force. If the answer is in affirmative, such grant may be treated to be a grant under the 1966 Regulations, no matter, it was in fact a grant under the 1926 Regulations.

 To the extent of the unexpired period of grant, as on the date, the 1966 Regulations came into force, the grantee would continue to enjoy his right and be subject to liability under the 1966 Regulations. Upon expiry of the period of grant, however, the grantee will be liable to surrender possession just as the grantee is liable to do under Regulation 146 in regard to a grant made under the 1966 Regulations. The essence of the Regulation in so far as right of a grantee to continue in possession is concerned, is the same under the 1926 Regulations and the subsequent Regulations of the year 1966.

 In either of the cases, the grantee cannot stay in possession for more than 60 years. The argument that an yold grantee can stay in possession in perpetuit so long as there is no violation of Regulation 151, therefore, needs to be noticed only to be rejected. The Appellants, in the present case, no doubt may have protection under the 1966 Regulations because the grant in their favour was deemed to have been renewed upto 1994 was in existence in 1966 but such protection would cease with the expiry of the 60 years period in 1994.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 3352 of 2014 (Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 8702 of 2011)

Decided On: 07.03.2014

Appellants: Shiv Chander More and Ors.
Vs.
Respondent: Lieutenant Governor and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:T.S. Thakur and C. Nagappan, JJ.

Citation;MANU/SC/0230/2014,2014 ALLSCR2973

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Whether Civil Court can direct Collector to grant temporary leases or permanent leases to lessee of govt land?

As to the second Substantial Question of
Law, I find that grant of temporary or permanent

lease is clearly regulated by the provisions of the
Maharashtra Land Revenue Code and the Maharashtra
Land Revenue (Disposal of Govt. Lands) Rules, 1971.
These provisions are self-contained code by
themselves. Merely because the Revenue Officer did
not decide the applications filed by the
respondent-plaintiff for grant of temporary or
permanent leases, as the case may be, the
respondent-Plaintiff could not have approached the
Civil Court to ask for a direction, since he could
have easily approached the authorities provided
under the provisions of the Maharashtra Land Revenue
Code, or the High Court having extraordinary writ
jurisdiction. The jurisdictions of the Civil Court
cannot be widened to enable it to issue directions
to the Govt. to grant temporary or permanent
leases. That is purely a governmental function
governed by the provisions of the Maharashtra Land
Revenue Code and the Rules thereunder. Civil Court

could not have directed that the Collector should
grant temporary leases or permanent leases to the
respondent-plaintiff even on the ground that others
were granted. Therefore, in my opinion, the Civil
Court could not have issued a direction to grant
permanent or temporary leases, which had already
expired by efflux of time and the period of leases
did not exist at the time when the judgment was
delivered by the Civil Court. That being so,
second Substantial Question of Law will have to be
answered in negative.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY,
BENCH AT AURANGABAD.
Second Appeal No. 344 of 1997
With
Second Appeal No. 345 of 1997
With
Second Appeal No. 346 of 1997
[A] Second Appeal No. 344 of 1997 

State of Maharashtra, Vs Bhikulal Mahadeo Agrawal,

CORAM : A.B.CHAUDHARI, J.
Date : 13th March, 2014.
Citation;2015(2) ALLMR282

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When Jurisdiction of civil court is barred in suit against govt for any act or omission of Revenue officer?

Section 11 of the Bombay Revenue
Jurisdiction Act, 1876 reads thus:-
11. Except as otherwise expressly
provided in the Maharashtra Land
Revenue Code, 1966, no Civil Court
shall entertain any suit against the
Government, on account of any act or
omission of any Revenue Officer unless
the plaintiff first proves that
previously to bringing his suit, he has
presented all such appeals allowed by
the law for the time being in force as,
within the period of limitation allowed
for bringing such suit, it was possible
to present.
 Upon reading of the above provisions, it is
amply clear that if the act or omission on the part
of a Revenue Officer of the Govt., is alleged in a
civil suit, unless the remedies provided by the
Maharashtra Land Revenue Code are exhausted,
jurisdiction of Civil Court is barred. In the
present case, it was the case of the respondent plaintiff
throughout that initially he got lease
for a temporary period and he applied for renewal

thereof or continuation, and not only that he also
applied for grant of permanent lease. It is an
admitted position that the period of lease had
already expired, and the applications made by the
plaintiff before the Collector of the district for
renewal of lease or for grant of permanent lease
remained pending, and were not decided. Thus, the
respondent-plaintiff alleged omission on the part
of Revenue Officer in not deciding his applications
for renewal of lease or grant of leases. Such
matter squarely falls within the ambit of Section
11 of the Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Act and,
therefore, the Civil Court could not have
entertained the suits. Hence the first Substantial
Question of Law will have to be answered in
affirmative.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
BENCH AT AURANGABAD.
Second Appeal No. 344 of 1997


State of Maharashtra Vs  Bhikulal Mahadeo Agrawal,

CORAM : A.B.CHAUDHARI, J.

Date : 13th March, 2014.
Citation;2015(2) ALLMR 282

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When old grantee can not stay in possession of govt land in perpetuity?

Govt grant of land -Expiry of period of grant -No renewal made after definite period in favour of grantees-grantees under old regulations-would be under same obligation/liability or enjoy same rights permissible under new regulations-old grantee can not stay in possession in perpetuity.

If a grantee of an expired grant had incurred the liability to surrender possession of the granted property, such liability would remain enforceable notwithstanding the repeal of the Regulations under which such liability arose. The argument that the liability gets extinguished by reason of Regulation 144(1)(a) of the 1966 Regulations is, in our opinion, legally unsound. We say so, for two reasons Firstly, because the contention flies in the face of Regulation 211 which continues the obligation incurred under the 1926 Regulations. So long as the liability incurred is recognized and continued by the repealing Regulation, the same can be enforced in law. Secondly, because the interpretation of Regulation 144(1)(a) itself does not admit of a situation where the liability to surrender possession not only becomes extinct but is enlarged into a right to stay in possession in perpetuity. All that Regulation 144 stipulates, in our opinion, is that a grantee under the old Regulations would continue to be under the same obligation/liability or enjoy the same rights as are permissible under the 1966 Regulations. The right to continue would however, depend on whether the person in occupation has a valid grant in his favour, even on the date the 1966 Regulations came into force. If the answer is in affirmative, such grant may be treated to be a grant under the 1966 Regulations, no matter, it was in fact a grant under the 1926 Regulations.

29 To the extent of the unexpired period of grant, as on the date, the 1966 Regulations came into force, the grantee would continue to enjoy his right and be subject to liability under the 1966 Regulations. Upon expiry of the period of grant, however, the grantee will be liable to surrender possession just as the grantee is liable to do under Regulation 146 in regard to a grant made under the 1966 Regulations. The essence of the Regulation in so far as right of a grantee to continue in possession is concerned, is the same under the 1926 Regulations and the subsequent Regulations of the year 1966.

30 In either of the cases, the grantee cannot stay in possession for more than 60 years. The argument that an old grantee can stay in possession in perpetuity so long as there is no violation of Regulation 151, therefore, needs to be noticed only to be rejected. The appellants, in the present case, no doubt may have protection under the 1966 Regulations because the grant in their favour was deemed to have been renewed upto 1994 was in existence in 1966 but such protection would cease with the expiry of the 60 years period in 1994.

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

(HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA)

Hon'ble Judges:T.S.Thakur and C.Nagappan JJ.

Shiv Chander More Versus Lieutenant Governor

Civil Appeal No. 3352 of 2014 ; *J.Date :- MARCH 07, 2014
Citation;

JT 2014 (4) SC 143,AIR 2014 SC2669

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