Basic principles to be followed by court While deciding review application

Summarising the principles when review will be maintainable and review will not be 26 maintainable following was held in paragraphs 20.1 and 20.2:

"20.1. When the review will be maintainable:

(i) Discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within knowledge of the petitioner or could not be produced by him;

(ii) Mistake or error apparent on the face of the record;

(iii) Any other sufficient reason. The words "any other sufficient reason" have been interpreted in Chhajju Ram v. Neki,AIR 1922 PC 112, and approved by this Court in Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos v. Most Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius, AIR 1954 SC 526, to mean "a reason sufficient on grounds at least analogous to those specified in the rule". The same principles have been reiterated in Union of India v. Sandur Manganese & Iron Ores Ltd.(2013)8 SCC 337.

20.2. When the review will not be maintainable:

(i) A repetition of old and overruled argument is not enough to reopen concluded adjudications.

(ii) Minor mistakes of inconsequential import.

(iii) Review proceedings cannot be equated with the original hearing of the case.

(iv) Review is not maintainable unless the material error, manifest on the face of the order, undermines its soundness or results in miscarriage of justice.

(v) A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is reheard and corrected but lies only for patent error.

(vi) The mere possibility of two views on the subject cannot be a ground for review.

(vii) The error apparent on the face of the record should not be an error which has to be fished out and searched.

(viii) The appreciation of evidence on record is fully within the domain of the appellate court, it cannot be permitted to be advanced in the review petition.

(ix) Review is not maintainable when the same relief sought at the time of arguing the main matter had been negatived."

21. In view of above, it is clear that scope, ambit and parameters of review jurisdiction are well defined. Normally in a criminal proceeding, review applications cannot be entertained except on the ground of error 28 apparent on the face of the record. Further, the power given to this Court under Article 137 is wider and in an appropriate case can be exercised to mitigate a manifest injustice. By review application an applicant cannot be allowed to re-argue the appeal on the grounds which were urged at the time of the hearing of the criminal appeal.

Even if the applicant succeeds in establishing that there may be another view possible on the conviction or sentence of the accused that is not a sufficient ground for review. This Court shall exercise its jurisdiction to review only when a glaring omission or patent mistake has crept in earlier decision due to judicial fallibility. There has to be error apparent on the face of the record leading miscarriage of justice to exercise the review jurisdiction under Article 137 read with Order 40 Rule 1. There has to be a material error manifest on the face of the 29 record with results in the miscarriage of the justice.

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Vikram Singh @ Vicky Walia and ANR. Vs. State of Punjab and ANR.

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What is scope of power of review of Criminal court?

After hearing the counsel for the parties, we are of the view
that the High Court has erred in taking the aforesaid view. Section
362 of the Code is the material provision, which reads as under:
“362. Court not to alter judgment:- Save as
otherwise provided by this Code or by any other law
for the time being in force, no Court, when it has
signed its judgment or final order disposing of a
case, shall alter or review the same except to
correct a clerical or arithmetical error.”
The aforesaid provision debars the Court from altering or
reviewing the judgment only in those cases when it has signed its
judgment or when it has passed final order disposing of a case. In
the instant case, as mentioned above, the Trial Court on the
earlier occasion had simply deferred taking cognizance under the
impression that the sanction under Section 19 of the PC Act is
required. There was no final order passed disposing of the case
inasmuch as had the sanction been brought, (cognizance would have
been taken in any case), the Trial Court is authorised to take
cognizance which is not disputed by the learned counsel for the
respondent as well. The question whether a sanction is required or
not would be a different matter. We may point out here that the
Trial Court was not oblivious of the aforesaid aspect while taking
cognizance of offences under the PC Act against the respondent and
others. It specifically recorded that it does not amount to
reviewing its own decision. Vide order dated 13.09.2012 passed by
the Trial Court earlier, it had merely asked the Investigation
Officer to file sanction orders against A4 to A8 and deferred the
order of cognizance against them. There was no decision much less
conclusive decision taken by the Court. The Trial Court rightly
pointed out that it was only in the nature of reminding the duty of
the Investigation Officer to meet certain requirements for taking
cognizance of offence under the PC Act. However, when the
Investigation Officer brought to its notice, on the subsequent
date, that no such sanction was required, the Trial Court finding
it to be correct position in law took cognizance. By this, the
Trial Court was not reviewing any order. According to us order
dated 13.09.2012 could not be construed as final order, more so,
when there was no final determination of the issue regarding
requirement of sanction for prosecution against the respondent
herein.
The aforesaid view of the High Court is, therefore, clearly
erroneous and the impugned order is hereby set aside.
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO(S).398/2016

STATE THROUGH CBI/ACB,HYDERABAD A.P 
 V
DHARMANA PRASED RAO.
Dated:APRIL 26, 2016.
Citation:(2016) 13 SCC 261

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