Supreme Court: Under which circumstances the appellate court can reduce sentence given for conviction U/S 279,338 and 304A of IPC?

 The main charge against the appellant is about causing death

by rash and negligent driving of the mini Lorry which resulted in

the death of the pillion rider of the motorcycle. For conviction

under Section 304(A) and Section 338 of the IPC, there is no

minimum sentence prescribed but the term of sentence may extend to 2 years. The sentence can also be limited to fine without any term of imprisonment. For the offence under Sections 279 and 337 of the IPC, the maximum punishment prescribed is 6 months and punishment can also be fine only.

{Para 10}

12. A three-Judges Bench of this Court, on 30.06.2021, while

considering the case of negligent driving by a bus driver in

Surendran v. Sub-Inspector of Police, 2021 17 SCC 799, ordered for substitution of sentence, for the conviction under Sections 279 and 338 of the IPC, to fine only. The Court took into account that the accident had happened over 26 years ago and the concerned accused was on bail throughout the trial.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. OF 2024

GEORGE  Vs STATE OF KERALA .

Dated: SEPTEMBER 03, 2024.

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Whether conviction for rash driving and causing injury is maintainable where driver was facing real threat of imminent death?

 In the present case, the evidence shows that the Applicant did not drive the taxi at higher speed on his own volition. It was the case of the Applicant that he was forced to drive at a high speed by robbers at the point of razor. It is the case of the Applicant that he himself had suffered an injury on his neck caused by razor. The defence witness Dr. Loya has described the injury which was attributable to razor. The Applicant was referred to Dr. Loya by the police themselves. At the relevant time, Dr. Loya was attached to Nair Hospital. The Applicant has sufficiently proved his case on the touchstone of probability. The burden on the Applicant to prove his case was not as heavy as that on the prosecution. Therefore, in my considered view, the Applicant has proved that he was made to drive the taxi at the point of razor and he himself suffered injury on his neck. It is his case that he was under real and reasonable apprehension of suffering grievous injury or even of death at the hands of the culprits who had forcibly entered his taxi. Therefore, it cannot be said that he drove his taxi rashly and negligently on his own volition but he was forced to do so.

20. In the context of the circumstances of this case, Section 106 of the IPC is relevant, which reads thus:

“106. Right of private defence against deadly assault when there is risk of harm to innocent person.--If in the exercise of the right of private defence against an assault which reasonably causes the apprehension of death, the defender be so situated that he cannot effectually exercise that right without risk of harm to an innocent person, his right of private defence extends to the running of that risk.”

21. Therefore, though in the process four innocent pedestrians have suffered minor injuries, the Applicant cannot be held guilty of causing those injuries. The Applicant was deprived of his free will because of the real threat of imminent death at the hands of the person carrying razor. Therefore, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the Applicant cannot be said to have committed the offences for which he is convicted and sentenced.

In the High Court of Bombay

(Before Sarang V. Kotwal, J.)

Hamza Mohd. Ibrahim Ansari  v. State of Maharashtra 

Criminal Revision Application No. 257 of 2002

Decided on March 29, 2019

Citation: 2019 SCC OnLine Bom 547

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Whether police officer can compound offence under S 279 of IPC?

In the present case, the accused had injured himself in
the accident and the police officer is the complainant. The police
officer cannot come forward to compound the offence. 


IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY AT GOA
CRIMINAL WRIT PETITION NO. 12 OF 2014

Shri Vishal Agarwal,  Vs   State of Goa,

 CORAM: SMT. MRIDULA R. BHATKAR, J.
 DATE: 20TH FEBRUARY, 2014
Citation;2016 CRLJ(NOC)71 Bom

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When prosecution U/S 279 of IPC can be quashed?

In the present case, the accused had injured himself in
the accident and the police officer is the complainant. The police
officer cannot come forward to compound the offence. The car of the
petitioner dashed the mini bus and thus, the owner of the bus is fact
an aggrieved person. Thus, if at all that aggrieved person is ready to
settle the matter and has no grievance in quashing the proceeding then
only the offence under section 279 can be compounded and the
proceeding can be quashed. In the absence of such person who is not
the complainant owner,victim or an aggrieved person, quashing of the
proceeding will be unjust to him as he will be losing a forum to put
up his grievance when his vehicle was dashed and damaged.
Therefore, it is necessary for such aggrieved person to come before
the Court.
 In the present case earlier the aggrieved person was not
made a party. However, with leave he was made party respondent
along with State and appearance is filed by the owner of the bus
through his counsel. He has produced an Affidavit -in-Reply of the
aggrieved person along with his identity. Learned counsel for the
respondent submitted that though his bus met with an accident there
was a minor damage to front portion of his bus and subsequently he
sold the bus. As of today, he does not have any grievance against the
petitioner. He also has no claim for repair against the petitioner and
therefore he gives no objection if the proceedings are compounded,
quashed and set aside.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY AT GOA
CRIMINAL WRIT PETITION NO. 12 OF 2014
Shri Vishal Agarwal,

 V 
 State of Goa,

 CORAM: SMT. MRIDULA R. BHATKAR, J.
 DATE: 20TH FEBRUARY, 2014.2 Wpcr 12 2014
Citation;2016 CRLJ(NOC)71 Bom

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Whether Bicycle rider can be prosecuted for offences U/S 279, 338 and 304A IPC?

According to the petitioner, he was only a cyclist,

who was pedalling a bicycle, which allegedly hit on the

motor bike and, therefore, he can only be termed as a

pedestrian on the road. The further argument is that as the


cycle was not automatically propelled, offences under

Sections 279, 338 and 304A IPC will not lie. The allegation

against the petitioner is that all of a sudden, he came by

pedalling a bicycle from the pocket road to the main road

and caused the same to hit on the motor bike that was being

ridden    by    the   deceased     through    the main   road.

Consequently, he suffered extensive injuries and he died.
It cannot be said that in such a case, the offences

under Sections 279, 338 and 304A IPC will not lie.            If

proved, the said offences will lie even against a cyclist. If a

pedestrian is causing such an accident, the offence under

Section 279 IPC will not lie. At the same time, in such case,

the other two offences will lie.         Matters being so, this

Crl.M.C. is too premature and the same is only to be

dismissed and, I do so. 
  IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

                                                      PRESENT:

                         THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE B.KEMAL PASHA

              MONDAY,THE 28TH DAY OF SEPTEMBER 2015

                                           Crl.MC.No. 3021 of 2015 ()
                                            

            JAMALUDHEEN C.G., 
Vs
         THE STATION HOUSE OFFICER, MINICOY POLICE STATION,
      

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Whether rash and negligent driving can be presumed on the basis of high speed of vehicle?

  In the present case, except the bare words of 2 
witnesses, who are interested witnesses, that the bus was in 

high speed, there is no evidence to show that the bus was 
driven rashly and negligently by the applicant.     The Courts 
below   ought   to   have   extended   benefit   of   doubt   to   the 
applicant.   Accordingly, the said benefit is extended in favour 
of   the   applicant   and   the   Judgment   and   the   Order   of 
conviction dated 03/04/1996 passed by the learned J.M.F.C., 
and the Order of conviction dated 01/02/2002 passed by the 
learned   Additional   Sessions   Judge,   Nanded   in   Criminal 
Appeal 33/1996 are hereby quashed and set aside.                                                                            
          IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY   
                                BENCH AT AURANGABAD
      
CRIMINAL REVISION APPLICATION NO. 45 OF 2002
Gundappa Madolappa Samangave

                  
V E R S U S

The State of Maharashtra
                          
         CORAM  : V.M.DESHPANDE, J.
       DATE OF JUDGMENT : 12 th JANUARY, 2015 
     Citation;2015 ALLMR(CRI)1060

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