Supreme Court: Tectonic shift in PMLA jurisprudence, transforming investigative complexity into a primary ground for bail

We have given our thoughtful consideration to the rival submissions and have carefully perused the record. The court while dealing with the prayer for grant of bail has to consider gravity of offence, which has to be ascertained in the facts and circumstances of each case. One of the circumstances to consider the gravity of offences is also the term of sentence i.e., prescribed for the offence, the Accused is alleged to have committed5. The court has also to take into account the object of the special Act, the gravity of offence and the attending circumstances along with period of sentence. All economic offences cannot be classified into one group as it may involve various activities and may differ from one case to another. Therefore, it is not advisable on the part of the Court to categorize all the offences into one group and deny bail on that basis6. It is well settled that if the State or any prosecuting agency including, the court, concerned has no wherewithal to provide or protect the fundamental right of an Accused, to have a speedy trial as enshrined Under Article 21 of the Constitution, then the State or any other prosecuting agency should not oppose the plea for bail on the ground that the crime committed is serious. Article 21 of the Constitution applies irrespective of the nature of the crime7. The aforesaid proposition was quoted with approval by another two-Judge Bench of this Court and it was held that long period of incarceration for around 17 months and the trial not even having commenced, the Appellant in that case has been deprived of his right to speedy trial8. {Para 15}

16. A two-Judge Bench of this Court in v. Senthil Balaji's case9 has held that under the statutes such as PMLA, where maximum sentence is seven years, prolonged incarceration pending trial may warrant grant of bail by Constitutional Courts, if there is no likelihood of the trial concluding within a reasonable time. Statutory restrictions cannot be permitted to result in indefinite pretrial detention in violation of Article 21.

17. A three Judge Bench of this Court in Padam Chand Jain (supra), reiterated that prolonged incarceration cannot be allowed to convert pretrial detention into punishment and that documentary evidence already seized by the prosecution eliminates the possibility of tampering with the same.

18. The right to speedy trial, enshrined Under Article 21 of the Constitution, is not eclipsed by the nature of the offence. Prolonged incarceration of an undertrial, without commencement or reasonable progress of trial, cannot be countenanced, as it has the effect of converting pretrial detention into form of punishment. Economic offences, by their very nature, may differ in degree and fact, and therefore cannot be treated as homogeneous class warranting a blanket denial of bail.

 The Appellant has been in custody since 09.07.2024. The disposal of immovable properties occurred on 24.12.2024 and 17.02.2025 and pertains to M/s. Marichika Properties, with which no material link to the Appellant has been established. There is no evidence that the Appellant was signatory to any sale document. The allegation of dissipation of proceeds of crime by him is, therefore, untenable at this stage.{Para 22}

23. For the foregoing reasons, the impugned judgment and order dated 19.08.2025 is quashed and set aside. The Appellant-Arvind Dham shall be released on bail during the pendency of the trial arising out of prosecution complaint-ECIR Case Nos. ECIR/GNZO/13/2024 and ECIR/GNZO/14/2024, pending before the Special Judge (PC Act) (CBI)-02(Duty Judge), Rouse Avenue District Court, under provisions of the PMLA. The terms and conditions for grant of bail shall be fixed by the Trial Court.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 47 of 2026

Decided On: 06.01.2026

Arvind Dham Vs. Directorate of Enforcement

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

P.V. Sanjay Kumar and Alok Aradhe, JJ.

Author: Alok Aradhe, J.

Citation: MANU/SC/0028/2026.

Print Page

Whether S 45 of The Prevention of Money Laundering Act is applicable to Anticipatory bail application?

We have heard learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respective parties at length. At the outset, it is required to be noted that Respondent No. 1 is apprehending his arrest in connection with the complaint/case by the ED for the offence of money laundering Under Section 3 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 and punishable Under Section 4 of the said Act. An enquiry/investigation is going on against Respondent No. 1 for the scheduled offence in connection with FIR No. 12/2019. Once the enquiry/investigation against Respondent No. 1 is going on for the offence under the Act, 2002, the rigour of Section 45 of the Act, 2002 would be attracted. Section 45 of the Act, 2002 reads as under:

45. Offences to be cognizable and non-bailable.--

(1) [Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), no person Accused of an offence [under this Act] shall be released on bail or on his own bond unless--]

(i) the Public Prosecutor has been given an opportunity to oppose the application for such release; and

(ii) where the Public Prosecutor opposes the application, the court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such offence and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail:

Provided that a person, who, is under the age of sixteen years, or is a woman or is sick or infirm [or is Accused either on his own or along with other co-Accused of money-laundering a sum of less than one crore rupees], may be released on bail, if the Special Court so directs:

(2) The limitation on granting of bail specified in [* * *] Sub-section (1) is in addition to the limitations under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) or any other law for the time being in force on granting of bail. {Para 5 }

5.1. By the impugned judgment and order, while granting anticipatory bail the High Court has observed that the provisions of Section 45 of the Act, 2002 shall not be applicable with respect to the anticipatory bail applications/proceedings Under Section 438 Code of Criminal Procedure. For which the High Court has relied upon the decision of this Court in the case of Nikesh Tarachand Shah (supra). In the case of Dr. V.C. Mohan (supra), this Court has specifically observed and held that it is the wrong understanding that in the case of Nikesh Tarachand Shah (supra) this Court has held that the rigour of Section 45 of the Act, 2002 shall not be applicable to the application Under Section 438 Code of Criminal Procedure. In the case of Dr. V.C. Mohan (supra) in which the decision of this Court in the case of Nikesh Tarachand Shah (supra) was pressed into service, it is specifically observed by this Court that it is one thing to say that Section 45 of the Act, 2002 to offences under the ordinary law would not get attracted but once the prayer for anticipatory bail is made in connection with offence under the Act, 2002, the underlying principles and rigours of Section 45 of the Act, must get triggered-although the application is Under Section 438 Code of Criminal Procedure. Therefore, the observations made by the High Court that the provisions of Section 45 of the Act, 2002 shall not be applicable in connection with an application Under Section 438 Code of Criminal Procedure is just contrary to the decision in the case of Dr. V.C. Mohan (supra) and the same is on misunderstanding of the observations made in the case of Nikesh Tarachand Shah (supra). Once the rigour Under Section 45 of the Act, 2002 shall be applicable the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court granting anticipatory bail to Respondent No. 1 is unsustainable.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 534 of 2023 

Decided On: 24.02.2023

The Directorate of Enforcement  Vs. M. Gopal Reddy and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

M.R. Shah and C.T. Ravikumar, JJ.

Author: M.R. Shah, J.

Citation: MANU/SC/0166/2023.

Print Page