Showing posts with label Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act 1967. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act 1967. Show all posts

Thursday, 26 June 2025

India's Anti-Terror Legal Framework: A Comparative Analysis of UAPA and BNS

 In the evolving landscape of India's counter-terrorism legal architecture, two significant legislations stand at the forefront: the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (UAPA) and the recently enacted Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS). This article provides a comprehensive analysis of these laws, examining their provisions, procedural frameworks, and the complex interplay between them in addressing terrorism and national security concerns.

Historical Evolution of UAPA

The Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act was first enacted in 1967 to address anti-national activities and secessionist movements in India, particularly following the peasants' uprising in Naxalbari. Originally designed to prevent unlawful activities threatening India's sovereignty and integrity, the Act has undergone significant transformations through amendments in 2004, 2008, 2013, and 2019.

Print Page

Saturday, 18 May 2019

Whether accused is entitled to get default bail if investigating officer has sought extension of time for investigation?

There is merit in the contention of the learned senior counsel for
the appellant/State that the question is more of substance than form, an
aspect even emphasised in Hitendra Vishnu Thakur7 case, which has
been relied upon by learned counsel for both the parties. The second
document in the form of an application has been filed on the same day. It
is not as if the first document, which is an application of the IO was
withdrawn to file the second document, which purports to be the report
of the public prosecutor. It is on the analysis of the first document that
the second document has been filed, albeit both containing the
endorsement of the public prosecutor. There are averments in the second

application referring to the progress of the investigation and the rejoinder
before us elucidates that the public prosecutor had the benefit of
scrutinising these papers. There are additional and expanded grounds set
out in the second document.
38. Mr. Mukul Rohatgi, learned senior counsel appearing for the
appellant/State has rightly contended that there is a material difference in
the facts of the present case and those of Hitendra Vishnu Thakur case,
inasmuch as the application in that case was in the form of an affidavit of
the IO, whose signatures were identified by an endorsement of the public
prosecutor. It is in those circumstances it was held that mere
identification by the public prosecutor, of the deponent of the affidavit
could not justify the application to be treated as a report of the public
prosecutor. In the present case, the second document contains a clear
endorsement of the public prosecutor in support of the averments made
therein.
39. No doubt, in para 23 of Hitendra Vishnu Thakur case, this Court
laid emphasis on the importance of the scrutiny by a public prosecutor so
as to not leave the detenu in the hands of the IO alone, being the police

authority. The public prosecutor, thus, has the option to agree or disagree
with the reasons given by the IO for seeking extension of time but in the
facts of the present case, the second document in the form of an
application shows scrutiny of the first document and thereafter details
grounds and expanded reasons for the requirement of further time to
complete the investigation.
40. Undoubtedly the request of an IO for extension of time is not a
substitute for the report of the public prosecutor but since we find that
there has been, as per the comparison of the two documents, an
application of mind by the public prosecutor as well as an endorsement
by him, the infirmities in the form should not entitle the respondents to
the benefit of a default bail when in substance there has been an
application of mind. The detailed grounds certainly fall within the
category of “compelling reasons” as enunciated in Sanjay Kedia case.
41. We are, thus, not able to persuade ourselves to agree with the
conclusions of the learned single Judge of the Bombay High Court in the
impugned order and hold that the respondents would not be entitled to
the benefit of default bail and consequently the impugned order is set
aside.
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL No.264 of 2019

THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA Vs  SURENDRA PUNDLIK GADLING

SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J.
Dated:February 13, 2019.
Print Page