Supreme Court: Non-filing of a copy of the chargesheet cannot become a ground for default bail if chargesheet is filed within stipulated time

 In the above backdrop, we are of the considered view that the present Appellant is not entitled to the relief of default bail. Undoubtedly, it is borne from the record that the chargesheet/police report stood filed within the prescribed statutory time before the magistrate on 02.09.2025. The contents thereof, being in compliance with Section 193(3) BNSS. Consequently, on 02.09.2025, the right to default bail became extinguished and the Appellant ought to have applied for regular bail. Moreover, it is also a matter of record that cognizance has also been taken on the chargesheet filed by the investigating agency. This order has not been challenged to date, thereby implying that the contents of the charge-sheet are in accordance with law. {Para 26}

27. Consequently, in our view, the Courts below have rightly held that the non-filing of a copy of the chargesheet cannot become a ground for default bail and the submission of the Appellant cannot be accepted.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 3094 of 2026 (Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 4333 of 2026)

Decided On: 01.07.2026

Shaurya Sunil Kumar Singh Vs. Central Bureau of Investigation

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Sanjay Karol and N. Kotiswar Singh, JJ.

Author: Sanjay Karol, J.

Citation: 2026 INSC 666, MANU/SC/0658/2026

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Constitutional Bail Jurisprudence under BNSS and Special Statutes

1. Contextual Foundations: Article 21 and the Architecture of Liberty

In the Indian criminal justice system, bail is the primary instrument through which the guarantee of personal liberty under Article 21 is made real at the trial‑court level. The Supreme Court, beginning with State of Rajasthan v. Balchand and Gudikanti Narasimhulu, has consistently affirmed that “bail is the rule and jail is the exception”, subject only to clearly articulated risks such as absconding, witness intimidation, or repeated offending.

For a District Judge, the adjudication of bail is therefore not a matter of discretion in the loose sense, but a structured constitutional function: to balance individual liberty and the presumption of innocence against the State’s obligation to maintain public order and ensure a fair trial. The trial court becomes the first and most important “custodian of the sword of justice”, ensuring that pre‑trial detention remains a protective measure, not a pre‑emptive punishment.

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Can Accused Get Default Bail under NDPS Act If FSL Report Isn't Submitted With Chargesheet Within Prescribed Time? Supreme Court Refers To Larger Bench

In view of there being diversity of views of different Benches of this Court even on the question of granting interim bail, we are of the opinion that a larger Bench may decide the question as to whether failure on the part of the prosecution to include the FSL report pertaining to the seized contraband article(s) along with the chargesheet, within the time specified in Section 167(2) of the Code read with Section 36A of the NDPS Act, would entitle the accused to default bail or not.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Petition (s) for Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No. 15293/2023 and IA No. 245374/2023

Date of Order: 19.03.2024

Hanif Ansari Vs. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi)

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Aniruddha Bose and P.V. Sanjay Kumar, JJ.

Citation: MANU/SCOR/53980/2024

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Bombay HC: What consequences will follow if arrest of accused is declared illegal by court?

The precious guarantee of 'Life and Liberty' as enshrined in Art. 21 of Constitution of India available to a citizen of this Country can not be denied to a convict, an accused in custody and surely not to a suspect who is sought to be converted to an accused on investigation and then from an accused to a convict on trial. It is an obligation upon State to ensure that there is no infringement of indefeasible right of citizen to life and liberty, which he can not be deprived of without following the procedure established by law. The Code of Criminal Procedure which outlines the manner and to the extent to which a person can be denuded of his liberty, hence, needs a strict compliance. Any deviation from the prescribed procedure in the matter of arrest can therefore, be not countenanced and is liable to be declared as illegal. In such circumstances action of respondent No. 1 - CBI in arresting the petitioner at 22.00 hrs on 20.2.2018 is in violation and utter disregard to Section 46(4) of Code of Criminal Procedure and hence declared as illegal. Needless to say that all consequent actions more particularly that of CBI remand of the petitioner by order dated 21.2.2018 by learned Special Judge are of no legal consequences, null and void. {Para 17}

The officers of the respondent-CBI who are responsible for the flagrant violation of the said provisions are liable for the disciplinary proceedings. The competent authorities are at liberty to initiate such an action against the erring officers, so that officers from such a responsible agency shall deter from committing such an overt act of violation of the statutory provisions, which aim at ensuring an individual's life and liberty and depriving the same in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law.

18. In result, of the aforesaid discussion, the writ petition is allowed in terms of prayer clause (a) and it is held that the arrest of the petitioner is illegal and contrary to the provisions of Section 46(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. However, the CBI is not precluded to arrest the petitioner if investigation warrants so, by following the due procedure of law

The competent authorities are at liberty to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the erring officers, for flagrant violation of the statutory provisions.

The respondent No. 1 shall pay costs of Rs. 50,000/- to the petitioner within the period of eight weeks from date of this order. The respondent No. 1 is at liberty to recover the said cost from erring officer/s responsible for violations, as may be concluded after disciplinary proceedings.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Writ Petition No. 1142/2018

Decided On: 10.05.2018

Kavita Manikikar Vs. Central Bureau of Investigation BS & FC and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

S.J. Kathawalla and Bharati H. Dangre, JJ.

Author: Bharati H. Dangre, J.

Citation: 2018 SCC ONLINE BOM 1095,MANU/MH/1098/2018.

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Bombay HC: What order the Magistrate or Session Judge should pass if arrest of accused is found in contravention of provisions of BNSS?

ORDER

1. The arrest of the petitioner in connection with C.R. No.532/2024 of Tembhurni police station is declared to be illegal.

2. The petitioner-Payal Hariom Verma is directed to be released on bail on her executing P.R. Bond in the sum of Rs.30,000/- with one or two sureties in the like amount in connection with C.R. No.532/2024 of Tembhurni police station.

3. The investigating agency is not precluded from arresting the petitioner, if the investigation warrants so, by following the due procedure of law.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Writ Petition (st) No. 23969 of 2024

Decided On: 09.01.2025

Payal Hariom Verma Vs. The State of Maharashtra and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Sarang V. Kotwal and S.M. Modak, JJ.

Author: Sarang V. Kotwal, J.

Citation:  MANU/MH/0177/2025,2025:BHC-AS:1576-DB

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P & H HC: Even when the regular bail petition is pending before the High Court, the Sessions Court or Magistrate court are competent to grant default bail

Resultantly, a pendency of bail petition either in the High Court or the Sessions Court would not disentitle the Magistrate or even the Sessions Court, as the case may be, from their statutory powers under Section 187(2) BNSS, 2023 or Section 167(2) CrPC, 1973. On the contrary, if the Magistrate or the Sessions Court does not grant default bail, in such circumstances, then there might be a possibility of such Court(s) violating the fundamental right or contravening the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court. {Para 16}

17. Given the above and in the light of the binding judicial precedents, the answer to the proposition is that even when the regular bail petition was pending before the High Court, the Sessions Court is competent to grant default bail, also known as compulsive bail or statutory bail, and similarly the Magistrate is competent to grant default bail even when the regular bail petition was pending before the Sessions Court or the High Court.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH

CRM-M-21371-2025

Decided On: 05.08.2025

Gurmeet Singh Vs. State of Punjab

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Anoop Chitkara, J.

Citation: 2025:PHHC:100608, MANU/PH/1919/2025

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Bombay High Court Declares Arrest Illegal For Failure To Produce Accused Within 24 Hours

The Hon'ble Bombay High Court (Division Bench) held that arrest begins when liberty is restrained, not when formally recorded. Since the Petitioner was not produced within 24 hours of being taken into custody, the arrest was declared illegal and violative of constitutional safeguards.The 'arrest" is complete when such restraint by an authority commences. The arrest commences with the restraint placed on the liberty of the person and not with the time of "arrest" recorded by the Arresting Officer.

31. In the case in hands, the journey of the Petitioner, in custody of the Police, from Palanpur to Ahmedabad to Mumbai, was followed with the Police team taking him to the office of the EOW where he was detained and shown to be arrested at 2.20 PM. There is no explanation as regards the transportation of the Petitioner, after medical examination, for an overnight stay in the lock-up, only to be produced in the Court of the Magistrate, at 1.15 PM, on 17.08.2024. In the light of the above facts, the violation of Article 22(2) is writ large. Section 58 does not contemplate the exclusion of the time required for such a journey, interjected with several events, while computing the time of 24 hrs.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Writ Petition No. 54 of 2025

Decided On: 27.06.2025

Hanumant Jagganath Nazirkar Vs. The State of Maharashtra

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

M.S. Sonak and Jitendra Jain, JJ.

Author: Jitendra Jain, J.

Citation: MANU/MH/3610/2025.

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Bombay HC: Right to seek default bail in MCOCA case will arise next day after sanction to prosecute is refused by competent authority

 The issue can be examined from a different angle. If we assume for the sake of argument that the effect of the order refusing sanction to prosecute the accused as amounting to not disclosing of any offence under the MCOC Act, the further consequence thereof would, at the most, be that the custody extension order will cease to have any effect at the end of the day on which sanction is refused and till that day, the extension order would have to be held as valid. Even from this view point, the petitioners are not entitled to be released on default bail as the essential condition required for accrual of indefeasible right under Section 167(2) of Cr.P.C. to the petitioners is not fulfilled. This can be seen from the facts available on record, which show that charge-sheet has been filed on 22/08/2022 and on the same day, the application under Section 167(2) of Cr.P.C. was moved by the petitioners. Of course, it is the contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioners that the application of the petitioners was filed about 30 minutes before the charge-sheet was filed and, therefore, their application was first in point of time and as such there was an accrual of right of default bail to the petitioners. The argument, in our view, is really not relevant for deciding the controversy involved in the petition. The reason being that, the day on which sanction was refused by the authority, would have to be considered to be the day on which the extended period of custody expired and, therefore, the right to seek default bail would arise on the immediate next day. It also means that when sanction is refused, as for example on Monday, this day of Monday would be the last day on which extended period of custody would come to an end, though in normal circumstances it would have expired later, and therefore, the Investigating Officer would have to take care that he files the final report on that day or otherwise he risks the grant of default bail to the accused. This is because of the fact that the provisions made under Section 167(2) of Cr.P.C. speak not in terms of hours, minutes and seconds, but only in terms of number of days completed. For the purpose of ascertaining as to when the period of authorized custody comes to an end, it is only the number of completed days, which is relevant and not the time at which the event having the effect of rendering the custody as unauthorized took place. {Para 21}

22. If we examine the issue from the above alternative, which we have proposed only by way of assumption and for the sake of argument, still the petitioners cannot be said to be fulfilling the essential requirement of Section 167(2) of Cr.P.C. in order to avail of right of default bail. The application under Section 167(2) of Cr.P.C. was filed by them on 22/08/2022 and that was the day when the sanction to prosecute the petitioners was refused. It was thus the day which became the last day of their authorized custody, which was otherwise extended up to 23/08/2022. Therefore, the right to avail of default bail in terms of Section 167(2) of Cr.P.C. really arose in their favour only from 23/08/2022.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (NAGPUR BENCH)

Criminal Writ Petition No. 817 of 2022

Decided On: 23.12.2022

Naresh and Ors. Vs. The State of Maharashtra and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

S.B. Shukre and M.W. Chandwani, JJ.

Author: M.W. Chandwani, J.

Citation: MANU/MH/4539/2022.

Read full judgment here: Click here.

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Bombay HC: Refusal Of Sanction To Prosecute under MCOCA Does Not Invalidate Extension Of Judicial Custody Given By Special Court

A question remains, whether or not refusal of sanction by the A.D.G.P. under the provisions of the MCOC Act by itself will invalidate the grant of extension of period up to 180 days and would automatically reduce the judicial custody remand to it's original period of 90 days, especially when the extension had been granted under a judicial order, not challenged by the petitioners. It is to be noted the investigation for an offence and cognizance of the offence under the provisions of MOCC Act are governed by Section 23 of the MCOC Act, which are reproduced here. {Para 6}

"23. Cognizance of, and investigation into, an offence-

(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code,-Section 167

(a) no information about the commission of an offence of organised crime under this Act, shall be recorded by a police officer without the prior approval of the police officer not below the rank of the Deputy Inspector General of Police;

(b) no investigation of an offence under the provisions of this Act shall be carried out by a police officer below the rank of the Deputy Superintendent of Police.

(2) No. Special Court shall take cognizance of any offence under this Act without the previous sanction of the police officer not below the rank of Additional Director General of Police."

17. It is worthy to note here that the power to extend the period to complete the investigation up to 180 days is exercised under Section 167(2) of Cr.P.C. by invocation of provisions made under Section 21 of the MCOC Act and whereas power to grant or refuse sanction to prosecute has it's source in Section 23 of the MCOC Act. Former power is exercised by the Court and latter power by a Police Officer. Objects of both kinds of powers are different. Custody extension is done for, inter alia, ensuring effective and speedy investigation, without any hindrance, while sanction is necessary to enable the Special Court to take cognizance of an offence under the MCOC Act, which is disclosed by the charge-sheet. In other words, former power exists for facilitating the investigation, while the latter power is to facilitate trial of the accused. Thus, both these powers operate in different fields. After considering the magnitude of the investigation required in a particular case, the Special Judge enables in depth investigation by extending custody period, and whereas, there is an embargo created by Section 23(2) of the MCOC Act on the cognizance taking by the Special Court without previous sanction of the A.D.G.P. The purpose of incorporating such embargo is to provide double filter before roping in anybody under the stringent provisions of law.

18. Thus, extending further time of 90 days for completing the investigation by the Special Judge is one thing and giving sanction by the A.D.G.P. is a different thing. Once, the Special Court after giving reasons has extended the period of investigation up to 180 days, the refusal of sanction will not take away the extended period of 90 days granted by the Special Court or even curtail the extended period granted by the Special Court. The detention here was authorized by a legal order of the Court under Section 21(2)(b) of the MCOC Act, after considering the material then available with police and with reasoned order and it was never challenged and, therefore, it became a final order. The detention of the petitioners after 90 days thus can not be said to be unauthorized detention.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (NAGPUR BENCH)

Criminal Writ Petition No. 817 of 2022

Decided On: 23.12.2022

Naresh and Ors. Vs. The State of Maharashtra and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

S.B. Shukre and M.W. Chandwani, JJ.

Author: M.W. Chandwani, J.

Citation: MANU/MH/4539/2022

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Bombay High Court Quashes Arrest for Breach of 24-Hour Rule and Failure to Inform Nominated Person

Background of the Case

In Hemang Jadavji Shah v. State of Maharashtra & Ors., Writ Petition No. 2989 of 2025, the Bombay High Court was called upon to decide the legality of the arrest and subsequent detention of the petitioner, Hemang Jadavji Shah, a businessman embroiled in a family dispute that escalated into criminal allegations. The case revolved around an FIR registered late at night based on a complaint by the petitioner's brother, involving alleged offences under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS), and a Look Out Circular (LOC) issued to prevent the petitioner from leaving India.

Sequence of Events

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Whether supplying ground of arrest to father of petitioner who had filed complaint against petitioner and was not nominated person is sufficient compliance of S 48 of BNSS?

We have perused the reports placed on record to examine the second ground, which was argued regarding the grounds of arrest not supplied as required under section 48 of BNSS. The material on record only indicates that the grounds of arrest were supplied to the petitioner. The contention raised on behalf of the investigating agency that the grounds of arrest were intimated to the petitioner's father and his lawyer is rather surprising and shocking, as there is no dispute that even the petitioner's father has filed a complaint against the present petitioner. Thus, we see no reasonable ground to support such an argument that the ground of arrest supplied to the petitioner's father would amount to sufficient compliance under section 48 of the BNSS, particularly when the petitioner's father has filed a complaint against the petitioner. No material produced on record indicates that the petitioner had ever nominated or disclosed his father's or his lawyer's name for supplying the grounds of arrest as contemplated under section 48 of the BNSS. Therefore, we find substance in the second ground raised on behalf of the petitioner that the grounds of arrest were not supplied as contemplated under section 48 of the BNSS. {Para 26}

 In the High Court of Bombay

Writ Petition No. 2989 of 2025

Hemang Jadavji Shah Vs State of Maharashtra 

(Before Gauri Godse and Somasekhar Sundaresan, JJ.)

Decided on May 30, 2025

Citation: 2025 SCC OnLine Bom 2145, 2025:BHC-AS:22305-DB

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Supreme Court upheld Karnataka High court judgment on police custody remand under S 187 of BNSS(Old S 167 of CRPC)

 The concerned Court itself came to the conclusion that police custody is not required and has dismissed the application(s) of the prosecution as well as the Complainant. We see no reason to interfere with the order of the High Court, in exercise of our jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India.

 S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A

 RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No(s). 18063/2024

[Arising out of impugned final judgment and order dated 13-12-2024

in WP No. 33526/2024 (GM-RES) passed by the High Court of Karnataka  at Bengaluru]

HYDER ALI Vs STATE OF KARNATAKA & ORS.

Date : 08-01-2025 This petition was called on for hearing today.

CORAM :

 HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUDHANSHU DHULIA

 HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE PRASHANT KUMAR MISHRA

Read Karanataka HC Judgment here: Click here.

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Karnataka HC laid down the principles for grant of police custody under S 187 of BNSS(Old S 167 of CRPC)

 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS:

(i) A slight tweak in the new regime qua 187(3) of BNSS in juxtaposition to Section 167(2) of the earlier regime - the Cr.P.C. has not changed the purpose of the provision.

(ii) The phraseology of the words 'ten years or more' found in sub-clause (i) of Section 187(3) of the BNSS would mean, the minimum threshold punishment imposable on an offence under the BNS should be ten years.

(iii) The offence in the case at hand, does not bear a minimum threshold sentence of ten years, but is extendable or to an extent of ten years, which would mean, discretion available to the concerned Court to impose punishment up to ten years. Therefore, the minimum threshold is not ten years.

(iv) Completion of investigation in a punishment which is up to ten years is undoubtedly 60 days. Rest of the other offences, be it death, life imprisonment of ten years and more, would be 90 days.

(v) If the investigation is to complete within 60 days, the period of police custody would run from day one day forty of registration of the crime. If it is 90 days, it would run from day one to day 60, maximum period in both the cases is 15 days of police custody.

(vi) In the case at hand, the offence is punishable up to ten years, Therefore, the police custody is only from day one to day forty.

Summary of Judgment

The High Court of Karnataka addressed the issue of whether police custody could be extended beyond 40 days for accused Kalandar Shafi and others, charged with offenses under the BNS, which carry a maximum punishment of up to ten years. The State of Karnataka and the complainant argued for a 90-day investigation period, claiming the offenses warranted it. However, the court interpreted Section 187 of the BNSS, akin to Section 167 of the Cr.P.C., to mean that only offenses with a minimum threshold punishment of ten years qualify for a 90-day period. Since the alleged offenses were punishable up to ten years, the court upheld the Magistrate's decision to deny extended police custody, affirming that the investigation should be completed within 60 days, with police custody permissible only within the first 40 days. 

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU

Criminal Petition No. 13459 of 2024 and Writ Petition No. 33526 of 2024 (GM - RES)

Decided On: 13.12.2024

State of Karnataka Vs. Kalandar Shafi and Ors.

and

Hyder Ali Vs. State of Karnataka and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Maheshan Nagaprasanna, J.

Citation: MANU/KA/4163/2024.

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Whether accused can claim benefit of default bail if investigation regarding other accused is going on?

  It is a well-settled principle of interpretation of statute that it

is to be read in its entirety. Construction of a statute should be

made in a manner so as to give effect to all the provisions

thereof. Remand of an accused is contemplated by Parliament

at two stages; pre-cognizance and post-cognizance. Even in

the same case, depending upon the nature of charge-sheet

filed by the investigating officer in terms of Section 173 of the

Code, a cognizance may be taken as against the person

against whom an offence is said to have been made out and

against whom no such offence has been made out even when

investigation is pending. So long a charge-sheet is not filed

within the meaning of sub-section (2) of Section 173 of the

Code, investigation remains pending. It, however, does not

preclude an investigating officer, as noticed hereinbefore, to

carry on further investigation despite filing of a police report, in

terms of sub-section (8) of Section 173 of the Code.

39. The statutory scheme does not lead to a conclusion in

regard to an investigation leading to filing of final form under

sub-section (2) of Section 173 and further investigation

contemplated under sub-section (8) thereof. Whereas only

when a charge-sheet is not filed and investigation is kept

pending, benefit of proviso appended to sub-section (2) of

Section 167 of the Code would be available to an offender;

once, however, a charge-sheet is filed, the said right ceases.

Such a right does not revive only because a further

investigation remains pending within the meaning of subsection

(8) of Section 173 of the Code.”{Para 38}

25. In view of the afore-stated legal position, we have no hesitation in holding that the chargesheet having been filed against the respondents-accused within the prescribed time limit and the cognizance having been taken by the Special Court of the offences allegedly committed by them, the respondents could not have claimed the statutory right of default bail under Section167(2) on the ground that the investigation qua other accused was pending. Both, the Special Court as well as the High Court having committed serious error of law in disregarding the legal position enunciated and settled by this Court, the impugned orders deserve to be set aside and are accordingly set aside.

 REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 391 OF 2024

( @ SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (Crl.) No. 11775 OF 2023)

CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION Vs

KAPIL WADHAWAN & ANR

Author: BELA M. TRIVEDI, J.

Dated: JANUARY, 24TH 2024.

Citation: 2024 INSC 58.

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Supreme Court: Day Of Remand Should Be Included For Considering Default Bail Claim

In Ravindran(supra) and Bikramjit (supra), which followed the Constitution Bench in Sanjay Dutt(supra) it was rightly held that if the Accused persons avail their indefeasible right to default bail before the chargesheet/final report is filed, then such right would not stand frustrated or extinguished by any such subsequent filing. We therefore declare that the stipulated 60/90 day remand period Under Section 167 Code of Criminal Procedure ought to be computed from the date when a Magistrate authorizes remand. If the first day of remand is excluded, the remand period, as we notice will extend beyond the permitted 60/90 days' period resulting in unauthorized detention beyond the period envisaged Under Section 167 Code of Criminal Procedure. In cases where the chargesheet/final report is filed on or after the 61st/91st day, the Accused in our considered opinion would be entitled to default bail. In other words, the very moment the stipulated 60/90 day remand period expires, an indefeasible right to default bail accrues to the Accused.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal Nos. 701-702 of 2020

Decided On: 27.03.2023

Enforcement Directorate, Government of India Vs. Kapil Wadhawan and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

K.M. Joseph, Hrishikesh Roy and B.V. Nagarathna, JJ.

Citation:  MANU/SC/0329/2023,

Author: Hrishikesh Roy, J.

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Supreme Court : The Day on which accused is remanded by Magistrate should be counted for the purpose of default bail

 Thus, the default bail Applications were filed well before the chargesheet. In Ravindran(supra) and Bikramjit (supra), which followed the Constitution Bench in Sanjay Dutt(supra) it was rightly held that if the Accused persons avail their indefeasible right to default bail before the chargesheet/final report is filed, then such right would not stand frustrated or extinguished by any such subsequent filing. We therefore declare that the stipulated 60/90 day remand period Under Section 167 Code of Criminal Procedure ought to be computed from the date when a Magistrate authorizes remand. If the first day of remand is excluded, the remand period, as we notice will extend beyond the permitted 60/90 days' period resulting in unauthorized detention beyond the period envisaged Under Section 167 Code of Criminal Procedure. In cases where the chargesheet/final report is filed on or after the 61st/91st day, the Accused in our considered opinion would be entitled to default bail. In other words, the very moment the stipulated 60/90 day remand period expires, an indefeasible right to default bail accrues to the Accused.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal Nos. 701-702 of 2020

Decided On: 27.03.2023

Enforcement Directorate, Government of India  Vs. Kapil Wadhawan and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

K.M. Joseph, Hrishikesh Roy and B.V. Nagarathna, JJ.

Author: Hrishikesh Roy, J.

Citation: MANU/SC/0329/2023,(2024) 7 SCC 147

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Under which circumstances the court can cancel default bail after filing of chargesheet?

 The submission on behalf of the respondent – original Accused No. 1 and the view taken by the High Court in the impugned judgment and order that once an accused is released on default bail under Section 167(2) Cr.P.C., his bail cannot be cancelled on merits is accepted, in that case, it will be giving a premium to the lethargic and/or negligence, may be in a given case of deliberate attempt on the part of the investigating agency not to file the chargesheet within the prescribed time period. In a given case, even if the accused has committed a very serious offence, may be under the NDPS or even committed murder(s), still however, he manages through a convenient investigating officer and he manages not to file the chargesheet within the prescribed time limit mentioned under Section 167(2) Cr.P.C. and got released on default bail, it may lead to giving a premium to illegality and/or dishonesty. As observed hereinabove, such release of the accused on default bail is not on merits at all, and is on the eventuality occurring in proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 167. However, subsequently on curing the defects and filing the chargesheet, though a strong case is made out that an accused has committed the very serious offence and non-bailable crime, the Court cannot cancel the bail and commit the person into custody and not to consider the gravity of the offence committed by the accused, the Courts will be loathe for such an interpretation, as that would frustrate the justice. The Courts have the power to cancel the bail and to examine the merits of the case in a case where the accused is released on default bail and released not on merits earlier. Such an interpretation would be in furtherance to the administration of justice. {Para 12}

13. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court dismissing the application for cancellation of the bail filed by the C.B.I. under Section 439(2) Cr.P.C. deserves to be quashed and set aside and is accordingly quashed and set aside.

The issue involved in the present appeal is answered in the affirmative and it is observed and held that in a case where an accused is released on default bail under Section 167(2) Cr.P.C., and thereafter on filing of the chargesheet, a strong case is made out and on special reasons being made out from the chargesheet that the accused has committed a non-bailable crime and considering the grounds set out in Sections 437(5) and Section 439(2), his bail can be cancelled on merits and the Courts are not precluded from considering the application for cancelation of the bail on merits. However, mere filing of the chargesheet is not enough, but as observed and held hereinabove, on the basis of the chargesheet, a strong case is to be made out that the accused has committed non-bailable crime and he deserves to be in custody.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

 CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

Coram:  M.R. SHAH; J., C.T. RAVIKUMAR; J. 

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 37 OF 2023; 

The State Through Central Bureau of Investigation Vs T. Gangi Reddy @ Yerra Gangi Reddy

Author: M.R. SHAH, J.

Dated: JANUARY 16, 2023 

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Whether the court can release the accused on default bail If chargesheet is filed without CA report in NDPS Act?

 The investigating officer has forwarded letter to C.A./F.S.L. with samples for analysis on 2nd August, 2019. The CA report is now part of proceedings. The report is ordinarily filed in the form prescribed. One of the requirement for submission of Police Report is whether any offence appears to have been committed. In the decisions referred to above it is held that, even through experts report did not accompany charge-sheet, it cannot be said that it is incomplete charge- sheet. Once a charge-sheet is filed within stipulated time, the  question of default bail does not arise. It cannot be held that additional documents cannot be produced subsequently. There is no specific provision due to which no additional documents can be produced. When the charge-sheet is submitted without reports of experts well within the period of 60/90/180 days, merely because the report of expert was not filed along with it, the accused is not entitled to be released on bail under Section 167(2) of Cr.P.C. In the present case C.A./F.S.L. report shows that what was seized from accused is Ganja. The submission that in NDPS case the report under Section 173(2) of the code is incomplete in the absence of expert report cannot be accepted. By virtue of section 293 of the Code any document in the form of report of C.F.S.L. can be used as evidence in any enquiry, trial or other proceedings, under the Code. It is open to the Court to summon and examine scientific expert. The satisfaction of investigating officer/members of raiding party during seizure of contraband that what is recovered is Narcotic drug/Psychotropic substance or controlled substance cannot be doubted at this stage. The purpose of submission of the police report with the details is to enable the Court to satisfy whether on the basis of report and the material filed along with report, case for taking cognizance has been made out or not. In the light of observations in several decisions referred hereinabove,  the police report or charge-sheet containing the details specified under Section 173(2) of the Code is filed within prescribed period, default bail cannot be granted.

{Para 37} 

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

BAIL APPLICATION NO. 301 OF 2020

Date of Order: 31.01.2022

 Navinkumar Pandu Jatot  Vs. State of Maharashtra

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Prakash D. Naik, J.

Citation: MANU/MHOR/14738/2022

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What is the public prosecutor's role in hearing the application for grant of default bail to the accused?

 14.2. It must also be added and it is well settled that issuance of notice to the State on the application for default bail filed under the Proviso to Section 167(2) is only so that the Public Prosecutor can satisfy the Court that the prosecution has already obtained an order of extension of time from the Court; or that the challan has been filed in the designated Court before the expiry of the prescribed period; or that the prescribed period has actually not expired. The prosecution can accordingly urge the Court to refuse granting bail on the alleged ground of default. Such issuance of notice would avoid the possibility of the Accused obtaining default bail by deliberate or inadvertent suppression of certain facts and also guard against multiplicity of proceedings.

However, Public Prosecutors cannot be permitted to misuse the limited notice issued to them by the Court on bail applications filed Under Section 167(2) by dragging on proceedings and filing subsequent applications/reports for the purpose of 'buying extra time' and facilitating filling up of lacunae in the investigation by the investigating agency.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 699 of 2020 

Decided On: 26.10.2020

M. Ravindran  Vs. The Intelligence Officer, Directorate of Revenue Intelligence

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

U.U. Lalit, Mohan M. Shantanagoudar and Vineet Saran, JJ.

Author: Mohan M. Shantanagoudar, J.

Citation: AIR 2020 SC 5245,MANU / SC / 0788 / 2020,

( 2021 ) 2 SCC 485. Read full Judgment here: Click here

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Can the court refuse default bail to the accused if the prosecution files a second complaint after filing the bail application by the accused?

Conclusion

17. In the present case, admittedly the Appellant-Accused had exercised his option to obtain bail by filing the application at 10:30 a.m. on the 181st day of his arrest, i.e., immediately after the court opened, on 01.02.2019. It is not in dispute that the Public Prosecutor had not filed any application seeking extension of time to investigate into the crime prior to 31.01.2019 or prior to 10:30 a.m. on 01.02.2019. The Public Prosecutor participated in the arguments on the bail application till 4:25 p.m. on the day it was filed. It was only thereafter that the additional complaint came to be lodged against the Appellant.

Therefore, applying the aforementioned principles, the Appellant-Accused was deemed to have availed of his indefeasible right to bail, the moment he filed an application for being released on bail and offered to abide by the terms and conditions of the bail order, i.e. at 10:30 a.m. on 01.02.2019. He was entitled to be released on bail notwithstanding the subsequent filing of an additional complaint.

17.1. It is clear that in the case on hand, the State/the investigating agency has, in order to defeat the indefeasible right of the Accused to be released on bail, filed an additional complaint before the concerned court subsequent to the conclusion of the arguments of the Appellant on the bail application. If such a practice is allowed, the right Under Section 167(2) would be rendered nugatory as the investigating officers could drag their heels till the time the Accused exercises his right and conveniently files an additional complaint including the name of the Accused as soon as the application for bail is taken up for disposal. Such complaint may be on flimsy grounds or motivated merely to keep the Accused detained in custody, though we refrain from commenting on the merits of the additional complaint in the present case. Irrespective of the seriousness of the offence and the reliability of the evidence available, filing additional complaints merely to circumvent the application for default bail is, in our view, an improper strategy.

Hence, in our considered opinion, the High Court was not justified in setting aside the judgment and order of the Trial Court releasing the Accused on default bail.

17.2. We also find that the High Court has wrongly entered into merits of the matter while coming to the conclusion. The reasons assigned and the conclusions arrived at by the High Court are unacceptable.

18. Therefore, in conclusion:

18.1 Once the Accused files an application for bail under the Proviso to Section 167(2) he is deemed to have 'availed of' or enforced his right to be released on default bail, accruing after expiry of the stipulated time limit for investigation. Thus, if the Accused applies for bail Under Section 167(2), Code of Criminal Procedure read with Section 36A(4), NDPS Act upon expiry of 180 days or the extended period, as the case may be, the Court must release him on bail forthwith without any unnecessary delay after getting necessary information from the public prosecutor, as mentioned supra. Such prompt action will restrict the prosecution from frustrating the legislative mandate to release the Accused on bail in case of default by the investigative agency.

18.2 The right to be released on default bail continues to remain enforceable if the Accused has applied for such bail, notwithstanding pendency of the bail application; or subsequent filing of the chargesheet or a report seeking extension of time by the prosecution before the Court; or filing of the chargesheet during the interregnum when challenge to the rejection of the bail application is pending before a higher Court.

18.3 However, where the Accused fails to apply for default bail when the right accrues to him, and subsequently a chargesheet, additional complaint or a report seeking extension of time is preferred before the Magistrate, the right to default bail would be extinguished. The Magistrate would be at liberty to take cognizance of the case or grant further time for completion of the investigation, as the case may be, though the Accused may still be released on bail under other provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

18.4 Notwithstanding the order of default bail passed by the Court, by virtue of Explanation I to Section 167(2), the actual release of the Accused from custody is contingent on the directions passed by the competent Court granting bail. If the Accused fails to furnish bail and/or comply with the terms and conditions of the bail order within the time stipulated by the Court, his continued detention in custody is valid.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 699 of 2020 

Decided On: 26.10.2020

M. Ravindran  Vs. The Intelligence Officer, Directorate of Revenue Intelligence

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

U.U. Lalit, Mohan M. Shantanagoudar and Vineet Saran, JJ.

Author: Mohan M. Shantanagoudar, J.

Citation: AIR 2020 SC 5245,MANU / SC / 0788 / 2020,

( 2021 ) 2 SCC 485

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