Showing posts with label administrative order. Show all posts
Showing posts with label administrative order. Show all posts

Sunday, 5 November 2017

What is distinction between administrative order and judicial order?

The next question is whether such an order could be classified as an administrative order. One thing is clear, that the mere fact that the order is passed in the course of the administration of the assets of the company and for realising those assets is not by itself sufficient to make it an administrative, as distinguished from a judicial, order. For instance, the determination of amounts due to the company from its debtors which is also part of the process of the realisation of the assets of the company is a matter which arises in the course of the administration. It does not on that account follow that the determination of the particular amount due from a debtor who is brought before the Court is an administrative order.

It is perhaps not possible to formulate a definition which would satisfactorily distinguish, in this context, between an administrative and a judicial order. That the power is entrusted to or wielded by a person who functions as a Court is not decisive of the question whether the Act or decision is administrative or judicial. But we conceive that an administrative order should be one which is directed to the regulation or supervision of matters as distinguished from an order which decides the rights of parties or confers or refuses to confer rights to property which are the subject of adjudication before the Court. One of the tests would be whether a matter which involves the exercise of discretion is left for the decision of the authority, particularly if that authority were a Court, and if the discretion has to be exercised on objective, as distinguished from a purely subjective, consideration, it would be a judicial decision. It has sometimes been said that the essence of a judicial proceeding or of a judicial order is that there should be two parties and a lis between them which is the subject of adjudication, as a result of that order or a decision on an issue between a proposal and an opposition. No doubt, it would not be possible to describe an order passed deciding a lis before the authority, that it is not a judicial order but it does not follow that the absence of a lis necessarily negatives the order being judicial. Even viewed from this narrow standpoint it is possible to hold that there was a lis before the Company Judge which he decided by passing the order. On the one hand were the claims of the highest bidder who put forward the contention that he has satisfied the requirements laid down for the acceptance of his bid and was consequently entitled to have the sale in his favour confirmed, particularly so as he was supported in this behalf by the official liquidators. On the other hand there was the 1st respondent and not to speak of him, the large body of unsecured creditors whose interests, even if they were not represented by the 1st respondent, the Court was found to protect. If the sale of which confirmation was sought was characterised by any deviation from the conditions subject to which the sale was directed to be held or even otherwise was for a gross undervalue in the sense that very much more could reasonably be expected to be obtained if the sale were properly held, in view of the figure of Rs. 3,37,000/- which had been bid by Nandlal Agarwalla, it would be the duty of the Court to refuse the confirmation in the interests of the general body of creditors and this was the submission made by the 1st respondent. There were thus two points of view presented to the Court by two contending parties or interests and the Court was called upon to decide between them. And the decision vitally affected the rights of the parties to property. In this view we are clearly of the opinion that the order of the Court was, in the circumstances, a judicial order and not an administrative one and was,therefore not inherently incapable of being brought up in appeal.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 214 of 1960

Decided On: 24.01.1963

Shankarlal Aggarwal and Ors. Vs. Shankarlal Poddar and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
J.R. Mudholkar, K. Subba Rao, N. Rajagopala Ayyangar and Syed Jaffer Imam, JJ.
Citation:(1964) 1 SCR 717, 



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Thursday, 30 May 2013

Even an administrative order which involves civil consequences must be made consistently with rules of natural justice.

Even an administrative order which involves civil consequences must be made consistently with the rules of natural justice. The person concerned must be informed of the case of the State and the evidence in support thereof and must be given a fair opportunity to meet the case before an adverse decision is taken. In the present case no such steps were admittedly taken; the High Court was therefore right in setting aside the order of the State.
Supreme Court of India
State Of Orissa vs Dr. (Miss) Binapani Dei & Ors on 7 February, 1967
Equivalent citations: 1967 AIR 1269, 1967 SCR (2) 625
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Wednesday, 20 March 2013

Whether Contempt power is attracted in case of disobedience of administrative orders of charity commissioner?


It cannot be disputed that the Apex Court has held
that   the   Assistant   Charity   Commissioner   appointed   under
Section 5 of the Bombay Public Trusts Act is a ‘Court’ for
:the purposes of the Contempt of Courts Act.  The question is
while   exercising   jurisdiction   under   Section   41A   of   the
Bombay   Public   Trusts   Act,   whether   the   Charity
Commissioner   acts   as   a   ‘Court’   and   exercises   judicial   or
quasi judicial power.  This Court has already taken a view in
the case of Damodar v. Dy. Charity Commissioner, reported
in  2011(6)   Mh.L.J.   431,   and  Vanmala  v.  Dy.   Charity
Commissioner,   reported   in  2012(3)   Mh.L.J.   594,   that   the
power conferred by Section 41A of the Bombay Public Trusts
Act  is   purely   an   administrative   power   and  it  is   neither   a judicial or quasi judicial power. Hence, in such proceedings,
the Charity Commissioner does not act as a  ‘Court’ within
the meaning of the Contempt of Courts Act.  The provision of
Section 2(b) of the Contempt of Courts Act is not attracted.:

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
NAGPUR BENCH, NAGPUR
CONTEMPT PETITION NO.227 OF 2012

 Budhasao Sitaramsao Dhenge, V V.G. Katgaye,

Coram : R.K. Deshpande, J.
Citation;2013(2) MH L J 220
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