Supreme Court: Distinction Between Section 14(1) and 14(2) of Hindu Succession Act : Antecedent Rights as the Determining Criterion

 The question raised in this appeal has been considered in detail and is concluded by the judgment of this Court in Gulwant Kaur v. Mohinder Singh [  MANU/SC/0514/1987 : 1987:INSC:177 : (1987) 3 SCC 674] wherein it is observed: (SCC p. 679, para 4)

It is obvious that Section 14 is aimed at removing restrictions or limitations on the right of a female Hindu to enjoy, as a full owner, property possessed by her so long as her possession is traceable to a lawful origin, that is to say, if she has a vestige of a title. It makes no difference whether the property is acquired by inheritance or devise or at a partition or in lieu of maintenance or arrears of maintenance or by gift or by her own skill or exertion or by purchase or by prescription or in any other manner whatsoever. The explanation expressly refers to property acquired in lieu of maintenance and we do not see what further title the widow is required to establish before she can claim full ownership Under Section 14(1) in respect of property given to her and possessed by her in lieu of maintenance. The very right to receive maintenance is sufficient title to enable the ripening of possession into full ownership if she is in possession of the property in lieu of maintenance. Sub-section (2) of Section 14 is in the nature of an exception to Section 14(1) and provides for a situation where property is acquired by a female Hindu under a written instrument or a decree of Court and not where such acquisition is traceable to any antecedent right." {Para 2}

3. After this decision there are number of other decisions taking the same view and it is now settled law that if a female Hindu acquires property under a written instrument or a decree of the Court and where such acquisition is not traceable to any antecedent right then sub-section (2) of Section 14 alone would be attracted and where an antecedent right is traceable, a document in the nature of will is of no consequence and the case will be covered by provisions contained in Section 14 Sub-section (1)..."

There have been no averments suggesting that the maintenance given to Smt. Veerabhadramma was insufficient to warrant interference in line with Punni Devi (supra), which states that it has to be sufficient to grant the lady so awarded maintenance to be able to continue a lifestyle, which she has been used to thus far.

12. The law, as laid down by Gulwant Kaur (supra) and confirmed by Jaswant Kaur (supra), is clear. Property given in lieu of maintenance would solidify into absolute ownership by action of Section 14(1) of HSA, 1956. In other words, the right of maintenance on its own is apposite for such property to transfer into her sole, unquestionable, and absolute right. The partition deed of 1933, it has been held, is clear that 3.55 Cents of land would be enjoyed by Smt. Veerabhadramma as a life interest and thereafter would devolve upon the two lines of succession, i.e., the sons of late Kallakuri Swami through his first wife and also his second wife.

13. In that view of the matter, the appeal fails and is, accordingly, dismissed.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 5389 of 2012

Decided On: 21.11.2024

Kallakuri Pattabhiramaswamy (Dead) through Lrs. Vs. Kallakuri Kamaraju and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

C.T. Ravikumar and Sanjay Karol, JJ.

Author: Sanjay Karol, J.

 Citation: 2024 INSC 883, MANU/SC/1231/2024

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Distinction between antecedent right and remedial right

All rights are either substantive or procedural and all substantive rights are either "antecedent" or "remedial." An antecedent right is a right to have an act done for its own sake, and a 'remedial right' is a right to have an act done on default of another act: (see Holland on Jurisprudence, Edn. 10, p. 141). The right to the delivery of goods under a contract is an 'antecedent right.' The right to have damages for breach of contract is a remedial right because it is claimable on default of the original right of delivery of goods. The antecedent right, out of which a remedial right may arise, may be a right of property or may not be a right of property. For instance, a right to personal safety and freedom, a right to the society land control of one's dependents, a right to one's reputation and a right to immunity from damages by fraud-these being rights in rem; the conjugal right of a husband against his wife, the right of chastisement or restraint of a father against his child, the right of a guardian to restrain his ward-these being rights in personam -are all rights which cannot be classed as 'property.' If any of these rights is infringed there may arise a right to get damages by way of compensation, but such right to damages does not arise out of what may be termed a 'property right.'

18. On the other hand, antecedent rights may be of possession and ownership-rights in rem or to the specific performance of a contract e.g., a contract for delivery of goods a right in personam. These are all property rights. Any remedial right arising out of these rights may be said to arise out of property rights. In our opinion this distinction furnishes a clue to the real significance of the word "mere" in phrase 'mere right to sue for damages,' Where a right to sue for damages arises out of an antecedent right which is a right of property, it is not a 'mere' right to sue for damages. But where it arises out of an antecedent right which is not a right of property, it may be termed as a 'mere right to sue for damages.' Again, the expression mere right to sue for damages' can be validly applied to a case in which the antecedent right of property is severed by transfer or otherwise from its remedial right. Where the antecedent right vests in one person and the 'remedial right to sue for damages' vests in another person, then also the 'right to sue for damages' may legitimately be said to be 'a mere right to sue for damages.' We would, therefore, hold that a mere right to sue for damages' is a right which either does-not arise out of a right of property, or though originally arising out of a right of property has been severed from it by transfer or otherwise and vests in a person different from the person who holds the antecedent right of property.

In Halsbury's Laws of England, vol. II, Article 255, p. 186, the law has been stated as follows:

All rights of action which relate directly to the [bankrupt's property and can be turned into assets for 'the payment of debts pass to the trustee, but where a cause of action arises from the bodily or mental suffering or personal inconvenience of the bankrupt, or from injury to his person or reputation, then the right of action remains with the bankrupt.

Allahabad High Court

Bans Gopal Sheo Narain And Anr. vs P.K. Banerji And Ors. on 24 November, 1948

Equivalent citations: AIR 1949 All 433

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