Supreme Court: Dispute On Apportionment Of Compensation under National Highways Authority Act Can Only Be Determined By 'Principal Civil Court Of Original Jurisdiction'

 We are of the view that when it comes to resolving the dispute relating to apportionment of the amount determined towards compensation, it is only the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction which can do so. Principal Civil Court means the Court of the District Judge. {Para 33}

34. Our final conclusion is as under: If any dispute arises as to the apportionment of the amount or any part thereof or to any person to whom the same or any part thereof is payable, then, the competent authority shall refer the dispute to the decision of the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction within the limits of whose jurisdiction the land is situated. The competent authority possesses certain powers of the Civil Court, but in the event of a dispute of the above nature, the summary power, vesting in the competent authority of rendering an opinion in terms of Sub-section (3) of Section 3H, will not serve the purpose. The dispute being of the nature triable by the Civil Court that the law steps in to provide for that to be referred to the decision of the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction. The dispute regarding apportionment of the amount or any part thereof or to any person to whom the same or any part thereof is payable, would then have to be decided by that Court.

35. In such circumstance referred to above, the order passed by the District Magistrate, Mau dated 16.01.2020 is hereby quashed and set aside. The writ application No. 7310 of 2020 stands allowed. In view of the dispute between the parties as regards apportionment of the amount of compensation, the Special Land Acquisition Officer shall now refer the dispute to the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in accordance with sub-clause (4) of Section 3H of the Act 1956.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 5107 of 2022

Decided On: 07.07.2023

Vinod Kumar and Ors. Vs. District Magistrate, Mau and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

B.R. Gavai and J.B. Pardiwala, JJ.

Author: J.B. Pardiwala, J.

Citation:  MANU/SC/0748/2023.

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Whether the court can partially set aside an arbitration award if it is in violation of provisions of The Indian Contract Act?

 Thus, to summarize where a debtor, owing several distinct debts to one person, makes a payment indicating that the payment is to be applied to the discharge of some particular debt, the payment must be applied accordingly in terms of S. 59 of the Contract Act. However, where the debtor omits to so intimate, the creditor may apply it at his discretion to any lawful debt actually due and payable to him from the debtor, whether its recovery is or is not barred by the law in force for the time being as to the limitation of suits, according to S. 60.Where neither party makes any appropriation, the payment shall be applied in discharge of the debts in order of time, whether they are or are not barred by limitation in terms of Section 61 of the Contract Act. {Para 51}

52. In the present case, there is neither any averment nor any evidence that the respondent while making payments to the appellant in terms of the Contract ever indicated the manner of apportionment. When neither party specifies the manner of apportionment, then the amount has to be first adjusted towards earlier debts irrespective of limitation as indicated by Section 61 Contract Act. Thus, the money which was continuously being received from the respondent was to be apportioned to the previous amounts that were due in the earlier Agreements as has been reflected in the ledger accounts. The amount as due in 2018 was the claimed amount of Rs. 2,64,99,671/-.

53. The learned Arbitrator while was correct in observing that the arbitration had been invoked pursuant to the Contract of 12.11.2012 renewed in 2015, but he overlooked the statutory provisions under Contract Act for apportionment of money received from the Respondent from time to time. Rather the documents of Respondent especially the confirmation letters and also the Reply to the Legal Notice, not only reflect his own admissions of the outstanding liability but also that the apportionment of money was done in accordance with Section 61 of the Contract Act.

III. Award suffers from patent illegality as is based on no evidence and in contravention of substantive Law:

54. Section 28(1)(a) of the A&C Act, 1996 mandates the arbitral Tribunal to decide the dispute in accordance with the substantive law for the time being in force in India.

55. Section 28(1)(a) and (3) of the AC Act, 1996, which reads as follows-

“28. Rules applicable to substance of dispute.—(1) Where the place of arbitration is situate in India,—

(a) in an arbitration other than an international commercial arbitration, the arbitral tribunal shall decide the dispute submitted to arbitration in accordance with the substantive law for the time being in force in India;

.—(3) In all cases, the arbitral tribunal shall decide in accordance with the terms of the contract and shall take into account the usages of the trade applicable to the transaction.”

56. Hence, if the award is passed in violation of the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act or in violation of the Indian Contract Act, it necessarily suffers from patent illegality and has to be set aside.

57. The Ld. Arbitrator, in the present case has not only based his findings overlooking the admissions of the respondent coupled with no evidence being led by the respondent but has completely overlooked the statutory provisions of the Contracts Act, 1996 which is a substantive law applicable in the present proceedings. It is also evident that the admission/acknowledgement of the outstanding dues was in reference to the two Agreements dated 12.11.2012 and 31.03.2015. Therefore, the conclusions arrived at by the learned Arbitrator that the claim did not pertain to the two Agreements under which the arbitration had been invoked is based on non-appreciation of the evidence and ignoring the admissions which were on record and also in contravention of the statutory provisions of law.

 In the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi

(Before Neena Bansal Krishna, J.)

Amazing Research Laboratories Ltd. Vs  Krishna Pharma 

O.M.P. (COMM) 376/2020

Decided on March 13, 2023

Citation: 2023 SCC OnLine Del 1498

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Whether daughter of tribal person is entitled to get right in ancestral property by survivorship as per The Hindu Succession Act?

A short question which is posed for consideration of this Court is whether the appellant/petitioner being the daughter is entitled to the share in the compensation with respect to the land acquired, on survivorship basis under the provisions of Hindu Succession Act? At the outset, it is required to be noted that the appellant belongs to tribal community and is a member of Scheduled Tribe. As per Section 2(2) of the Hindu Succession Act, the Hindu Succession Act will not be applicable to the members of the Scheduled Tribe. Therefore, as such as rightly observed by the High Court the appellant cannot claim any right of survival under the provisions of the Hindu Succession Act.

Therefore, so long as Section 2(2) of the Hindu Succession Act stands and there is no amendment, the parties shall be governed by the provisions of Section 2(2) of the Hindu Succession Act. Therefore, though on equity we may be with the appellant being daughter and more than approximately 70 years have passed after the enactment of the Hindu Succession Act and much water has flown thereafter and though we are prima facie of the opinion that not to grant the benefit of survivorship to the daughter in the property of the father can be said to be bad in law and cannot be justified in the present scenario, unless Section 2(2) of the Hindu Succession Act is amended, the parties being member of the Scheduled Tribe are governed by Section

2(2) of the Hindu Succession Act.  {Para 6}

6.1 If the claim of the appellant on the basis of the survivorship

under the Hindu Succession Act is accepted in that case it would

tantamount to amend the law. It is for the legislature to amend the law and not the Court.

7. Under the circumstances in view of Section 2(2) of Hindu

Succession Act and the appellant being the member of the Scheduled Tribe and as the female member of the Scheduled Tribe is specifically excluded, the appellant is not entitled to any right of survivorship under the provisions of Hindu Succession Act. No error has been committed by the High Court. The appeal therefore deserves to be dismissed and is accordingly dismissed.

7.1 Before parting, we may observe that there may not be any justification to deny the right of survivorship so far as the female member of the Tribal is concerned. When the daughter belonging to the nontribal is entitled to the equal share in the property of the father, there is no reason to deny such right to the daughter of the Tribal community. Female tribal is entitled to parity with male tribal in intestate succession. To deny the equal right to the daughter belonging to the tribal even after a period of 70 years of the Constitution of India under which right to equality is guaranteed, it is high time for the Central Government to look into the matter and if required, to amend the provisions of the Hindu Succession Act by which the Hindu Succession Act is not made applicable to the members of the Scheduled Tribe.

 REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6901 OF 2022

Kamla Neti (Dead) through LRs  Vs The Special Land Acquisition

Officer & Ors.

Author: M.R. SHAH, J.

Dated: December 9, 2022.

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How the principle of apportionment is applicable to the fixation of standard rent of a premises under the Bombay Rents Act?

Apportionment or equal distribution of the burden of rent on every portion-is a rule of justice and good sense. If the standard rent of a whole was a specific amount, it stands to reason that the standard rent of a part or sub-division of that whole should not ordinarily exceed that amount. Therefore, if in the circumstances of a given case the Court feels that for securing the ends of justice and giving effect to the provisions and policy of the Act, it is reasonably necessary and feasible to work out the standard rent by apportionment, it can legitimately do so. This principle, however, is applicable where on the basic date, that portion of which the standard rent is to be determined, had not been let separately as on unit, but the whole, of which it is a part, had been let on that date. Apportionment postulates that on account of its having been let on the basic date, the whole had acquired a standard rent which has to be allocated to smaller units subsequently carved out of it.

30. It is thus clear that the principle of apportionment is not alien to the spirit of the Act, and has indeed been often invoked by the courts in fixing standard rent under this Act. In Narayanlal Bansilal's case (supra), a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court determined standard rent of another part of this very estate of the Mills in accordance with that principle.

31. However, while conceding that apportionment is not foreign to the scheme, purpose and policy of the Act, we will like to emphasise the need for caution and circumspection in invoking it. It is not to be rigidly and indiscriminately applied as a cast-iron rule of law regardless of time and circumstances or the equities of the case. A doctrinaire approach, not consistent with a just and fair determination, stultifies the whole salutary purpose of justice to both, the landlord and the tenant. If necessary, it can be adjusted, adapted and attuned in the light of the particular circumstances of the case, to satisfy the statutory requirement of fixing the standard rent as at a "just amount. Thus if after the material date, the landlord has made investments and improvements in the premises, it will be just and reasonable to take that factor also into account and to give him a fair return on such investments. Further, in apportioning the rent, the Court must consider other relevant circumstances, such as "size, accessibility, aspect, and other physical advantages" enjoyed by the tenant of the premises of which the standard rent is in question, as compared with those of the rent of the property in which it is comprised [see Bainbridge v. Contdon 1925 2 K.B. 261. Where after the basic date, the premises completely change their identity, apportionment as a method of determining just standard rent, loses its efficacy and may be abandoned altogether. We have only illustrated, not exhaustively enumerated the relevant circumstances and their implications.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal Nos. 1186-1188 of 1972

Decided On: 12.03.1974

Raja Bahadur Motilal Bombay Mills Ltd. Vs.  Govind Ram Brothers (P) Ltd.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

R.S. Sarkaria and V.R. Krishna Iyer, JJ.

Citations: AIR 1974 SC 1708, 1974 SCR (3) 577,MANU/SC/0395/1974

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