Supreme Court: Dispute On Apportionment Of Compensation under National Highways Authority Act Can Only Be Determined By 'Principal Civil Court Of Original Jurisdiction'

 We are of the view that when it comes to resolving the dispute relating to apportionment of the amount determined towards compensation, it is only the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction which can do so. Principal Civil Court means the Court of the District Judge. {Para 33}

34. Our final conclusion is as under: If any dispute arises as to the apportionment of the amount or any part thereof or to any person to whom the same or any part thereof is payable, then, the competent authority shall refer the dispute to the decision of the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction within the limits of whose jurisdiction the land is situated. The competent authority possesses certain powers of the Civil Court, but in the event of a dispute of the above nature, the summary power, vesting in the competent authority of rendering an opinion in terms of Sub-section (3) of Section 3H, will not serve the purpose. The dispute being of the nature triable by the Civil Court that the law steps in to provide for that to be referred to the decision of the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction. The dispute regarding apportionment of the amount or any part thereof or to any person to whom the same or any part thereof is payable, would then have to be decided by that Court.

35. In such circumstance referred to above, the order passed by the District Magistrate, Mau dated 16.01.2020 is hereby quashed and set aside. The writ application No. 7310 of 2020 stands allowed. In view of the dispute between the parties as regards apportionment of the amount of compensation, the Special Land Acquisition Officer shall now refer the dispute to the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in accordance with sub-clause (4) of Section 3H of the Act 1956.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 5107 of 2022

Decided On: 07.07.2023

Vinod Kumar and Ors. Vs. District Magistrate, Mau and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

B.R. Gavai and J.B. Pardiwala, JJ.

Author: J.B. Pardiwala, J.

Citation:  MANU/SC/0748/2023.

Print Page

Whether daughter of tribal person is entitled to get right in ancestral property by survivorship as per The Hindu Succession Act?

A short question which is posed for consideration of this Court is whether the appellant/petitioner being the daughter is entitled to the share in the compensation with respect to the land acquired, on survivorship basis under the provisions of Hindu Succession Act? At the outset, it is required to be noted that the appellant belongs to tribal community and is a member of Scheduled Tribe. As per Section 2(2) of the Hindu Succession Act, the Hindu Succession Act will not be applicable to the members of the Scheduled Tribe. Therefore, as such as rightly observed by the High Court the appellant cannot claim any right of survival under the provisions of the Hindu Succession Act.

Therefore, so long as Section 2(2) of the Hindu Succession Act stands and there is no amendment, the parties shall be governed by the provisions of Section 2(2) of the Hindu Succession Act. Therefore, though on equity we may be with the appellant being daughter and more than approximately 70 years have passed after the enactment of the Hindu Succession Act and much water has flown thereafter and though we are prima facie of the opinion that not to grant the benefit of survivorship to the daughter in the property of the father can be said to be bad in law and cannot be justified in the present scenario, unless Section 2(2) of the Hindu Succession Act is amended, the parties being member of the Scheduled Tribe are governed by Section

2(2) of the Hindu Succession Act.  {Para 6}

6.1 If the claim of the appellant on the basis of the survivorship

under the Hindu Succession Act is accepted in that case it would

tantamount to amend the law. It is for the legislature to amend the law and not the Court.

7. Under the circumstances in view of Section 2(2) of Hindu

Succession Act and the appellant being the member of the Scheduled Tribe and as the female member of the Scheduled Tribe is specifically excluded, the appellant is not entitled to any right of survivorship under the provisions of Hindu Succession Act. No error has been committed by the High Court. The appeal therefore deserves to be dismissed and is accordingly dismissed.

7.1 Before parting, we may observe that there may not be any justification to deny the right of survivorship so far as the female member of the Tribal is concerned. When the daughter belonging to the nontribal is entitled to the equal share in the property of the father, there is no reason to deny such right to the daughter of the Tribal community. Female tribal is entitled to parity with male tribal in intestate succession. To deny the equal right to the daughter belonging to the tribal even after a period of 70 years of the Constitution of India under which right to equality is guaranteed, it is high time for the Central Government to look into the matter and if required, to amend the provisions of the Hindu Succession Act by which the Hindu Succession Act is not made applicable to the members of the Scheduled Tribe.

 REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6901 OF 2022

Kamla Neti (Dead) through LRs  Vs The Special Land Acquisition

Officer & Ors.

Author: M.R. SHAH, J.

Dated: December 9, 2022.

Print Page

Whether MACT can grant compensation to the victim of motor accident towards inevitable expenses in proceeding under Section 163A of the Motor vehicles Act?

  Learned Single Judge of this court in case of National Insurance Company Limited v/s. Chandraprabha and Ors., (supra) has held that the claim petition having been filed under section 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act would be governed by the structured formula of compensation provided in the second schedule of the Motor Vehicles Act. This court in the said

judgment adverted to the judgment of the Supreme Court in case of Sarla Varma (supra) and held that under section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, the claimant is entitled to just compensation. Supreme Court also made it clear in paragraph (20) of the said judgment in case of Sarla Varma (supra) that it was not dealing with the case under section 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, which indicates that the ratio laid down in the said decision is applicable only to the cases under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Unless there is an amendment to the provisions of section, namely Section 163-A of the M.V. Act, it would not be permissible for the Tribunal to award the amount over and above one which is prescribed under the head of non pecuniary damages.{Para 48}

49. This court accordingly held that the Tribunal had committed an error in granting funeral expenses of Rs.25,000/- and Rs.10,000/- on account of love and affection which are not in conformity with the provision of second schedule. In my view, the said judgment of this court squarely applies to the facts of this case. I am respectfully bound by the said judgment. The

Tribunal thus could not have awarded a sum of Rs.23,25,000/- towards inevitable expenses in the impugned judgment and award contrary to Section 163-A read with Second Schedule. In my view, this part of the award allowing compensation towards inevitable expenses in the sum of Rs.23,25,000/- is contrary to the principles of law laid down by this court in case of National Insurance Company Limited v/s. Chandraprabha and Ors., (supra) and above referred judgments and thus deserves to be set aside.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

FIRST APPEAL NO. 54 OF 2013

ICICI Lombard General Insurance  Company Limited,  Vs  Kumar Aftab Nasim Ansari

Print Page

Whether MACT can apportion liability for payment of compensation to the victim of the motor accident between two tortfeasors?

 Insofar as judgment of Supreme Court in case of Khenyei v/s. New India Assurance Co. Ltd. and Ors., (supra) relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondent no.1 is concerned, it is held by the Supreme Court that the apportionment of compensation between two tortfeasors vis a vis the plaintiff/claimant is not permissible. It is held by the Supreme Court that liability of the joint tortfeasor is joint and several. It would not be appropriate for the court/tribunal to determine the extent of composite

negligence of the drivers of two vehicles in the absence of impleadment of other joint tortfeasors. In such a case, impleaded joint tortfeasor should be left, in case he so desires, to sue the other joint tortfeasor in independent proceedings after passing of the decree or award. He can recover at his option whole damages from any of them. There is no dispute about the proposition of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in case of Khenyei v/s. New India Assurance Co. Ltd. and Ors., (supra) relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondent no.1.{Para 44}

45. In my view, since the respondent no.1 had filed an application for

compensation under section 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, there was no question of the respondent no.1 proving any negligence or default against any of the tortfeasors. A perusal of the impugned judgment and award passed by the Tribunal clearly indicates that the Tribunal has rendered a perverse finding that the compensation amount of Rs.38,94,200/- was required to be apportioned equally between the owner of the offending vehicle and the owner of the Tata Magic vehicle in which the respondent no.1 was travelling. In my view, the impugned judgment and award deciding the negligence at the first instance on the part of the driver of the offending vehicle as well as Tata Magic vehicle itself is contrary to the section 163 of the Motor Vehicles Act and shows total perversity. There is thus no question of apportionment of any liability in the ratio of 50 : 50 or in any other ratio between the owner of the offending vehicle and the owner of the Tata Magic vehicle. The judgment and award of the Tribunal thereby rendering the findings on the issue of negligence for the purpose of deciding the extent of contributory negligence and thereafter dividing the compensation at two parts is ex-facie perverse.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

FIRST APPEAL NO. 54 OF 2013

ICICI Lombard General Insurance  Company Limited,  Vs  Kumar Aftab Nasim Ansari

Print Page

Whether the claimant can seek compensation for injury due to a motor accident in both U/S 163A and S 166 of the Motor vehicles Act?

Supreme Court in the said judgment clearly held that having regard to the fact that Section 166 of the Act provides for a complete machinery for laying a claim on fault liability, the question of giving an option to the claimant to pursue their claims either under Section 163-A or under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act does not arise. It is held that the remedy for payment of compensation both under Section 163-A and Section 166 being final and independent of each other as statutorily provided, a claimant

cannot pursue his remedies thereunder simultaneously. One must opt/elect to go either for a proceeding under Section 163-A or under Section 166 of the Act, but not under both. {Para  28 }

In my view, the scheme of the Motor Vehicles Act providing for

compensation on the basis of structured formula under Section 163-A read with Second Schedule and compensation under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act is different. Though in the application under Section 166 for compensation, the Tribunal can consider the compensation prescribed under Second Schedule as a guide, Tribunal cannot consider the compensation payable under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act while considering an application under Section 163-A. The Tribunal can award the compensation in an application under Section 163-A only on the basis of structured formula prescribed under Second Schedule appended to the Motor Vehicles

Act, 1988. The Tribunal cannot allow part of the compensation by granting part benefit under Second Schedule appended to the Motor Vehicles Act and partly by awarding compensation payable under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. The claimant once having applied for compensation under Section 163-A on the basis of structured formula prescribed under Second Schedule, cannot simultaneously seek compensation also under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988.{Para 38 }

There is no merit in the submission of the learned counsel that while awarding just compensation though the application was filed under section 163A, Tribunal was empowered to grant compensation payable under section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

FIRST APPEAL NO. 54 OF 2013

ICICI Lombard General Insurance  Company Limited,  Vs  Kumar Aftab Nasim Ansari

CORAM : R.D. DHANUKA, J.

PRONOUNCED ON : 26th JUNE, 2020

Citation: 2021(2) MHLJ 295

Print Page

Whether executing court can go into the question of genuineness and validity of the Will in execution of decree?

The present petitions raise an important question of law as to whether an Executing Court giving effect to an award passed by the Land Acquisition Collector can go into the genuineness and validity of the Will set up by one of the heirs of the deceased, in whose favour compensation already stands confirmed.

The rationale behind conferring wide powers on executing courts is clearly to ensure that in case of passage of time and happening of any event-including death of a particular person, parties' rights are adjudicated expeditiously and competing claimants are not relegated to civil courts for retrial, which could delay the execution of decrees to a great extent. There is no reason as to why a different principle ought to be adopted in the case of an Executing Court which is disbursing compensation for land acquisition.

25. The Executing Court has already framed an issue in this matter. The Executing Court can enquire into the genuineness and validity of the Will by recording the evidence of the witnesses, whose evidence may be adduced by the parties. There is no impediment as to why an Executing Court cannot go into the genuineness and validity of a Will. No special rule needs to be adopted in respect of compensation matters concerning land acquisition, inasmuch as the award, which has been passed and has attained finality, has to be implemented and given effect to by the Executing Court just like any other decree. In Delhi, there is no requirement for the Will to be probated. The genuineness of the Will, can be ascertained in executing proceedings, and the Executing Court can then proceed in accordance with law.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI

CM (M) 49/2018, CM App. 1317/2018, CM (M) 50/2018, CM App. 1341/2018, CM (M) 67/2018 and CM App. 1713/2018

Decided On: 27.04.2020

 Hari Singh  Vs.  Union of India 

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Prathiba M. Singh, J.

Print Page

Procedure to be followed by govt for acquiring land which is given on license by govt

The propositions so
broadly stated are, in our judgment,
not accurate. The Act contemplates
acquisition of land for a public
purpose. By acquisition of land is
intended the purchase of such interest
outstanding in others as clog the
right of the Government to use the
land for the public purpose. Where the
land is owned by a single person, the
entire market value payable for
deprivation of the ownership is
payable to that person: if the
interest is divided, for instance,
where it belongs to several persons,
or where there is a mortgage or a
lease outstanding on the land, or the
land belongs to one and a house
thereon to another, or limited
interests in the land are vested in
different persons, apportionment of
the compensation is contemplated. The
Act is, it is true, silent as to the
acquisition of partial interests in
the land, but it cannot be inferred
therefrom that interest in land
restricted because of the existence of
rights of the State in the land cannot
be acquired. When land is notified for
acquisition for a public purpose and
the State has no interest therein,
market value of the land must be
determined and apportioned among the
persons entitled to the land. Where
the interest of the owner is clogged
by the right of the State, the
compensation payable is only the
market value of that interest, subject
to the clog.
5. We are unable to agree with the
High Court of Madras that when land is
notified for acquisition, and in the
land the State has an interest, or the
ownership of the land is subject to a
restrictive covenant in favour of the
State, the State is estopped from
setting up its interest or right in
the proceedings for acquisition. The
State in a proceeding for acquisition
does not acquire its own interest in
the land, and the Collector offers and
the Civil Court assesses compensation
for acquisition of the interest of the
private persons which gets
extinguished by compulsory acquisition
and pays compensation equivalent to
the market value of that interest.
There is nothing in the Act which
prevents the State from claiming in
the proceeding for acquisition of land
notified for acquisition that the
interest proposed to be acquired is a
restrictive interest.”
Non-Reportable
 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
 CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
 REVIEW PETITION (C) NO. 888 OF 2015
 IN
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1810 OF 2009
COLLECTOR OF LAND ACQUISITION & ORS. …APPELLANTS
Vs.
M/S ANDAMAN TIMBER INDUSTRIES & ORS. ……RESPONDENTS
Dated;February 22,2016
Citation;(2016)4 SCC406

Print Page

When insurance companies can not claim that liability to pay compensation be apportioned between them?

 The learned counsel Shri Kukday does not
dispute the fact that thee was no pleading before the Tribunal
by the respondent No. 2 Reliance
General Insurance
Company in the written statement that in case it is found that

the owners are entitled to reimbursement, then the liability to
pay the compensation awarded should be proportionately
divided between the two insurance companies with whom the
vehicle was insured on the date of occurrence of accident on
29.01.2008. The contention, therefore, does not deserve any
consideration at this appellate stage.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
NAGPUR BENCH, NAGPUR
FIRST APPEAL NO. 344 OF 2015
Gopalrao Punjaji Gayki,

...VERSUS...
Gopal s/o Dnyandeo Wakode,

CORAM:R. K. DESHPANDE, J.
DATE : 14 th January, 2016 .
Citation;2016(2) ALLMR386

Print Page

Reference under S. 18 for enhanced compensation can be sought by claimant after an order of apportionment is passed

Madan v. State of Maharashtra, (2014) 2 SCC 720

Land Acquisition Act, 1894

Ss. 18 and 30 - Relative scope and applicability - Limitation period under S. 18, when commences in a case where no

apportionment is made by Collector i.e. when S. 30 applies - S. 18 applies to situations where apportionment made in

award is objected to by a beneficiary thereunder while S. 30 applies when no apportionment whatsoever is made by

Collector on account of conflicting claims - Thus, held, a reference under S. 18 for enhanced compensation can be

legitimately sought by the claimant after an order of apportionment is passed either by the court in reference under S. 30

or in a civil suit in his favour, and limitation period under S. 18(2) shall in such a case only commence from date when

such order/award of apportionment is either communicated to the party concerned or is known by the party concerned

either actually or constructively, 

Land Acquisition Act, 1894

Print Page

Whether court permit addition of third party while deciding apportionment of compensation under land acquisition?

I already said that it is well-settled that the jurisdiction of the District Court while disposing a reference under the Land Acquisition Act is restricted by the terms of the reference itself. This being so, if a dispute that arose before the Collector among the parties who are before him is referred to the District Court, it necessarily follows that a person who was not before the Collector and who claims to have interest in the land and, therefore, is entitled to the payment of a compensation or part thereof is raising a new dispute and, as such, such person cannot be impleaded. The above observations in Municipality, Nalgonda v. Hakeem Mohiuddin & Co., , undoubtedly support the view I have taken

that if a person who was not a party before the Collector is allowed to be impleaded by the District Court in a reference lto it, the nature of the dispute referred to will be substantially changed, for a new dispute incorporating the claim of such a person will be raised. This is not permissible, as the jurisdiction of the District Court in a reference under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act is restricted to the precise terms of the reference. Such impleading would amount to an enlargement of the terms of the reference and as such, the District Court would act without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, if it so orders.

Bombay High Court

Govind Narayan Loktlikar vs Savitribal Roghurira Lotlikar ... on 17 July, 1986

Bench: G Couto

 Citation: AIR1987Bom32, 1986MhLJ844

Print Page

Pleading and proof in reference u/s 30 of land acquisition Act

 Section 53 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 states that the Code of Civil Procedure will apply to proceedings before the Court save in so far as the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure are  inconsistent with anything contained in the said Act. There can be no dispute that a reference under Section 30 the said Act are civil proceedings.

The nature of this proceedings as has always been understood is that they are in the nature of a interpleader's suit. The Full Bench of the Kerala High Court in the case of Thevaril Ranee Sidhan and Anr. v. The Special Tahsildar for Land Acquisition and Ors.

relying on an earlier decision of the Division Bench of that Court in Chandan Vydiar v. Chakkuti Vidyar (1969 Kerala L R 691) has stated that the proceedings for apportionment of compensation are in the nature of an interpleader suit and the parties to these proceedings are free to litigate in the ordinary way as in an ordinary suit to determine what their respective rights in respect of the amount of compensation or any portion thereof are. The proceedings being of civil nature, the parties certainly are required to plead their case and lead evidence in support of the same. The ordinary rule of pleadings that no amount of evidence can be looked into in support of a plea not taken ought to be followed in such cases as well. The respondents therefore, after pleading that the land belonged to the Comunidade were not entitled to lead evidence claiming that they were owners of the same. In other words, the respondents were not entitled to deviate from the plea taken. The respondents having filed a written statement duly verified and having claimed prescription as against the Comunidade, were not entitled to depose contrary to the said pleadings and claim a right that they were the owners of the acquired property and that too without producing any documents of title. Any other view would create untold hardships to other parties who would not know as to what case they have to meet.

Bombay High Court

Jacinto Minguel De Quadros ... vs Haridas Maruti Kamat, Mahadev ... on 18 October, 2005

Equivalent citations: 2006 (2) BomCR 84, (2005) 107 BOMLR 879

Bench: R Lodha, N Britto

Print Page