Showing posts with label land acquisition. Show all posts
Showing posts with label land acquisition. Show all posts

Tuesday, 8 September 2026

Bombay HC: What procedure the Executing court should follow if conditional stay is granted by higher court?

 Having regard to the aforesaid discussion, it becomes necessary to clarify the position so that such situations do not arise repeatedly. Whenever a superior Court grants stay to an award under the Land Acquisition Act subject to deposit of the awarded amount or any part thereof, the Executing Court shall insist upon satisfactory proof showing compliance of such condition. Mere statement that a stay order has been granted would not by itself be sufficient. The Executing Court must satisfy itself that the condition attached to the stay order has actually been complied with within the period prescribed by the superior Court. {Para 9}

10. If the judgment debtor, the State or the Acquiring Body fails to place proof showing compliance with the condition of deposit within the stipulated period, the Executing Court shall not postpone execution proceedings merely because a conditional stay order exists. In such circumstances, the Executing Court shall proceed further with execution in accordance with law. It shall also make all reasonable efforts to dispose of such proceedings expeditiously so that the claimants are not unnecessarily deprived of compensation already determined in their favour.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

FIRST APPEAL NO.2109 OF 2025

State of Maharashtra Vs Zubeda Fakir Mohammad 

CORAM : AMIT BORKAR, J.

DATED : JUNE 9, 2026

Print Page

Sunday, 14 June 2026

Bombay HC: Under which circumstances registration of two independent proceedings for one and the same offence is permissible

The petitioners raised one more objection that impugned directions would result into registration of two independent proceedings for one and the same offence, as directions are given to Collector to lodge FIR/police report and further directions are given to Assistant Superintendent of Court to file separate complaints with Judicial Magistrate. This Court finds that aforesaid objection is fallacious. On the basis of evidence led during course of trial, Reference Court noticed that manipulated reference letter and documents were used on record of Court for presentation, registration of prosecution of land acquisition references and offences of preparation of false or manipulated documents are committed before presentation of references in connivance with many other persons, who are not parties to petition or directly involved in prosecution of references. In that backdrop, for offence covered under Section 215(1)(b) of BNSS, 2023, directions are given to Assistant Superintendent of Court to file separate complaints with Magistrate and for offences which are committed outside Court prior to presentation of references, directions are given to Collector to lodge FIR/police report. In this backdrop, in light of law laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Iqbal Singh Marwah (supra), Reference Court formed opinion regarding commission of offence referred under Section 195(1)(b) of Cr.P.C. (Section 215(1)(b) of BNSS, 2023) and followed further procedure and left Collector to lodge FIR in respect of offences which are not committed on record of Court. This Court finds no fault in course adopted by Reference Court while issuing two different directions. {Para 20}

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (AURANGABAD BENCH)

Writ Petition No. 1676 of 2026

Decided On: 06.05.2026

Raghunath and Ors. Vs. The State of Maharashtra and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

S.G. Chapalgaonkar, J.

Citation: 2026:BHC-AUG:21519,MANU/MH/4472/2026

Print Page

Bombay HC: Forgery of court record at the time of filing of land acquisition proceeding, person who were not practicing advocate at relevant time are not liable for prosecution

Criminal Procedure - Forged Documents - Filing of - Section 215(1)(b) of Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) - Present petition filed by advocates challenging the Reference Court's order directing the District Collector to lodge an FIR and the Assistant Superintendent of Court to file complaints against claimants and advocates for offences related to forged documents in land acquisition references - Whether the Reference Court's directions were vitiated due to lack of opportunity of hearing for the advocates, and whether the directions would result in multiple proceedings for the same offence - Held, the Reference Court formed its opinion based on evidence presented during the trial, not as a finding of guilt, and therefore, there was no statutory requirement to provide an opportunity of hearing before directing a complaint; principles of natural justice are generally not applicable at the stage of reporting a criminal offence as it would frustrate proceedings and defeat justice - The court clarified that the directions to the Assistant Superintendent of Court relate to offences committed on the record of the Court, while the directions to the Collector relate to offences committed outside the Court prior to the presentation of references, and therefore, there would not be multiple proceedings for the same offence - The court found that petitioner nos. 1 and 3 were not practicing advocates when the land acquisition references were originally submitted and could not be held responsible for the presentation of forged documents - Petition partly allowed for petitioner nos. 1 and 3; impugned directions quashed to the extent they apply to them; petition dismissed for petitioner no. 2.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (AURANGABAD BENCH)

Writ Petition No. 1156 of 2026

Decided On: 06.05.2026

Akshay Ravindra Bornare and Ors. Vs. The State of Maharashtra and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

S.G. Chapalgaonkar, J.

 Citation: 2026:BHC-AUG:21518, MANU/MH/4467/2026
Print Page

Bombay HC: A preliminary inquiry and opportunity of hearing are not mandatory before a court directs filing a complaint U/S 379 of BNSS

Criminal Procedure - Forgery - Complaint against advocate - Section 379 of Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) - Present petition filed by advocate challenging directions of Reference Court to lodge FIR and file complaints against him and claimants for offences related to forged documents used in land acquisition reference proceedings - Whether the Reference Court's directions to lodge an FIR and file complaints against the petitioner and claimants are valid, and whether a preliminary inquiry and opportunity of hearing are mandatory before making such directions - Held, the Reference Court, based on evidence presented during the land acquisition reference proceedings, formed an opinion that the petitioner and claimants had knowledge of the forgery of documents and used them to mislead the court - Section 379 of BNSS (formerly Section 340 Cr.P.C.) does not mandate a complaint in every case, but only if it is "expedient in the interest of justice," and allows for a preliminary inquiry to determine this - A preliminary inquiry and opportunity of hearing are not mandatory before a court directs filing a complaint, as the inquiry is not to determine guilt or innocence - The person against whom a complaint is made has a legal right to be heard by the Magistrate during subsequent proceedings - Principles of natural justice are generally not applicable at the stage of reporting a criminal offence, as this would frustrate proceedings - The Reference Court's opinion was based on an in-depth inquiry during the trial, and is not a finding of guilt against the petitioner - The directions to the Assistant Superintendent of Court to file complaints for offences committed on court record and the directions to the Collector to lodge FIR/police reports for offences committed outside the court are distinct and valid - Petition dismissed.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (AURANGABAD BENCH)

Writ Petition No. 1660 of 2026

Decided On: 06.05.2026

Kishor Vs. The State of Maharashtra and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

S.G. Chapalgaonkar, J.

 Citation: 2026:BHC-AUG:21520,MANU/MH/4470/2026

Print Page

Tuesday, 26 May 2026

National Highway Land Arbitration Revisited: Supreme Court’s Section 26 Roadmap for Fair Compensation


1. Introduction: Why This Judgment Matters

The Supreme Court’s decision in Project Director, NHAI v. Alfa Remidis Ltd. (2026 INSC 480) is a must-read for anyone handling land acquisition compensation under the National Highways Act, 1956 — whether as Arbitrator under Section 3G(5), as District Judge under Section 34, or as appellate court under Section 37. The ruling transforms what often becomes a battle of sale exemplars into a disciplined, statute-driven exercise anchored in Sections 26–28 of the 2013 Land Acquisition Act.

At a practical level, the judgment answers questions that frequently arise in NH acquisitions:

  • Can a residential sale deed be used to value industrial land?

  • Is a single sale deed enough for Section 26(1)(b)?

  • When does the Ready Reckoner rate take the lead?

  • When does a flawed valuation become “patent illegality” under Section 34?

2. Facts in Brief: How Valuation Went Astray

Print Page

Supreme Court Tightens the Screws: National Highway Land Arbitration and the Limits of Compensation

 Applying the rigours of Section 26(1) of the 2013 LA Act to the case on hand, we find that the Arbitrator demonstrably erred in relying upon the sale deed dated 29.03.2017 relating to residential land in an adjoining village to determine the market value of Respondent No. 1's land, which was being used for an industrial purpose. Clearly, the two lands were not of a 'similar type' for the purposes of Section 26(1)(b) of the 2013 LA Act and the price in the said sale deed could not have been adopted. Further, the methodology for working out the 'average sale price' Under Section 26(1)(b), as set out in Explanations 1 to 4 thereunder, does not permit placing reliance on a single sale deed for that purpose. Reference may be made to Madhya Pradesh Road Development Corporation v. Vincent Daniel and Ors.   MANU/SC/0399/2025 : 2025:INSC:408 : (2025) 7 SCC 798, wherein this Court considered the scheme of Section 26(1) of the 2013 LA Act and observed that the language used therein implied that there should be multiple deeds available for reference, as singular deals may not supply adequate and reliable data. {Para 11}


12. Though the High Court laboured over various decisions of this Court, the position obtaining under the statutory provision and the legal principles laid down in the above referred judgments were neither noted nor given effect to. Section 34(2A) of the Arbitration Act provides for setting aside an arbitral award if it is found to be vitiated by patent illegality appearing on the face of it. Though the proviso thereto stipulates that an arbitral award should not be set aside merely on the ground of erroneous application of law or by reappreciation of evidence, we are of the opinion that the cloak of protection afforded by the proviso cannot be extended to the present arbitral award. The Arbitrator completely ignored the directives of Section 26(1)(b) of the 2013 LA Act and the Explanations thereunder, by adopting a sale exemplar of a totally dissimilar type of land and, at that, a single sale exemplar, which was contrary to the statutory mandate. Respondent No. 1 had itself cited the Government rate available in the Ready Reckoner, i.e, ` 2,020/- per square meter, being the rate applicable for lands on the highway in Zone 4. Mauza Pardi (Rithi) finds mention amongst the villages named in Zone 4. That being so, the statutory provision that should have been applied for determination of the market value of Respondent No. 1's land was Section 26(1)(a) of the 2013 LA Act.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. ... of 2026 (Arising out of Special Leave Petition (C) No. 33773 of 2025)

Decided On: 12.05.2026

Project Director, National Highways Authority of India Vs. Alfa Remidis Ltd. and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

P.V. Sanjay Kumar and K. Vinod Chandran, JJ.

Author: P.V. Sanjay Kumar, J.

Citation: 2026 INSC 480,MANU/SC/0469/2026

Print Page

Sunday, 15 June 2025

Supreme Court: Whether the court should abate a proceeding for death of some of parties where parties having separate rights have jointly filed any proceeding?

34. In the light of the above discussion, we hold:-


(1) Wherever the plaintiffs or appellants or petitioners are found to have distinct, separate and independent rights of their own and for purpose of convenience or otherwise, joined together in a single litigation to vindicate their rights the decree passed by the Court thereon is to be viewed in substance as the combination of several decrees in favour of the one or the other parties and not as a joint and inseverable decree. The same would be the position in the case of defendants or respondents having similar rights contesting the claims against them.


(2) Whenever different and distinct claims of more than one are sought to be vindicated in one single proceedings as the one now before us, under the Land Acquisition Act or in similar nature of proceedings and/or claims in assertion of individual rights of parties are clubbed, consolidated and dealt with together by the Courts concerned and a single judgment or decree has been passed, it should be treated as a mere combination of several decrees in favour of or against one or more of the parties and not as joint and inseparable decrees.


(3) The mere fact that the claims or rights asserted or sought to be vindicated by more than one are similar or identical in nature or by joining together of more than one of such claimants of a particular nature, by itself would not be sufficient in law to treat them as joint claims, so as to render the judgment or decree passed thereon a joint and inseverable one.


(4) The question as to whether in a given case the decree is joint and inseverable or joint and severable or separable has to be decided, for the purposes of abatement or dismissal of the entire appeal as not being properly and duly constituted or rendered incompetent for being further proceeded with, requires to be determined only with reference to the fact as to whether the judgment/decree passed in the proceedings vis-a-vis the remaining parties would suffer the vice of contradictory or inconsistent decrees. For that reason, a decree can be said to be contradictory or inconsistent with another decree only when the two decrees are incapable of enforcement or would be mutually self-destructive and that the enforcement of one would negate or render impossible the enforcement of the other.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Appeal (civil) 1027-1028 of 1992,

Decided On: 17.12.2002

S. Amarjit Singh Kalra (dead) by Lrs. and Ors. Vs. Pramod Gupta (dead) by Lrs. and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

G.B. Pattanaik, C.J., M.B. Shah, Doraiswamy Raju, S.N. Variava and D.M. Dharmadhikari, JJ.

Author: Doraiswamy Raju, J.

Citation:  MANU/SC/1214/2002,2002 SCALE 9 5772003 AIR SC 27992002 AIOL 592003 SCC 3 2722003 BOMCR SC 4 4462003 SUPREME 1 2622003 AIR SC 25882003 AIR SCW 2799 

Print Page

Tuesday, 25 February 2025

Supreme Court: An arbitral award can be set aside under S 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996 on limited grounds

Firstly, when we are of the opinion that the learned Arbitrator has committed patent illegality in applying two different notifications in determining the market value, keeping in view the scope available Under Section 34 of Act, 1996 it would not be open for this Court to substitute our view to that of the learned Arbitrator and modify the award. Further, the learned Additional Solicitor General sought to refer to Special Instruction No. 6 in the notification of 2014 to arrive at the market value even if it is accepted that the value of industrial land is not indicated in the notification. These are aspects to which the learned Arbitrator is required to advert so as to arrive at the conclusion. In the circumstance where we have opined that the award passed by the learned Arbitrator suffers from patent illegality and appropriate consideration is necessary, the only course open is to set aside the award and allow the learned Arbitrator to reconsider the matter on that aspect. {Para 48}

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 4671 of 2022.

Decided On: 11.07.2022

National Highways Authority of India Vs. P. Nagaraju and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Indira Banerjee and A.S. Bopanna, JJ.

Author: A.S. Bopanna, J.

Citation: MANU/SC/0850/2022.
Print Page

Wednesday, 25 December 2024

Supreme Court direct National highway authority of india to make part payment of compensation for acquired land

 Having heard learned counsel for the parties, we deem it appropriate to dispose of the present proceedings with the following directions:

i. The NHAI shall deposit 50 per cent of the compensation amount, as awarded by the Arbitral Court, with the Executing Court within a period of four weeks. The said amount shall be released to the land owners unconditionally.

ii. The learned District Court, before whom the proceedings under Section-34 of the Arbitration Act are pending, shall make an endeavour to decide such proceedings within a period of six months.

iii. The balance amount of compensation as per the Award to be passed under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, shall be deposited by the NHAI with the Executing Court within four weeks after such determination. The said amount shall also be released by the Executing Court in favour of the landowners subject to the rights and remedies available, to the parties in law. {Para 6}

 In the Supreme Court of India

(Before Surya Kant and Abhay S. Oka, JJ.)

Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (C) No(s). 12409/2022

Project Director National Highways Authority of India Vs Saraswatibai Chandrakant Shinde and Others 

Decided on August 1, 2022

Citation: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1115.

Print Page

Sunday, 2 June 2024

Supreme Court: Right To Property | 7 Sub-Rights of land owner Which State Must Protect During Land Acquisition

 The Right to property: A net of intersecting rights: There is yet another aspect of the matter. Under our constitutional scheme, compliance with a fair procedure of law before depriving any person of his immovable property is well entrenched. {Para 24}


25. While it is true that after the 44th Constitutional Amendment4, the right to property drifted from Part III to Part XII of the Constitution, there continues to be a potent safety net against arbitrary acquisitions, hasty decision-making and unfair redressal mechanisms. Despite its spatial placement, Article 300A5 which declares that "no person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law" has been characterized both as a constitutional and also a human right6. To assume that constitutional protection gets constricted to the mandate of a fair compensation would be a disingenuous reading of the text and, shall we say, offensive to the egalitarian spirit of the Constitution.


26.  The binary reading of the constitutional right to property must give way to more meaningful renditions, where the larger right to property is seen as comprising intersecting sub-rights, each with a distinct character but interconnected to constitute the whole. These sub-rights weave themselves into each other, and as a consequence, State action or the legislation that results in the deprivation of private property must be measured against this constitutional net as a whole, and not just one or many of its strands.


27. What then are these sub-rights or strands of this swadeshi constitutional fabric constituting the right to property? Seven such sub-rights can be identified, albeit non-exhaustive. These are:


i) duty of the State to inform the person that it intends to acquire his property - the right to notice, ii) the duty of the State to hear objections to the acquisition - the right to be heard, iii) the duty of the State to inform the person of its decision to acquire - the right to a reasoned decision, iv) the duty of the State to demonstrate that the acquisition is for public purpose - the duty to acquire only for public purpose, v) the duty of the State to restitute and rehabilitate- the right of restitution or fair compensation, vi) the duty of the State to conduct the process of acquisition efficiently and within prescribed timelines of the proceedings - the right to an efficient and expeditious process, and vii) final conclusion of the proceedings leading to vesting - the right of conclusion.


28. These seven rights are foundational components of a law that is tune with Article 300A, and the absence of one of these or some of them would render the law susceptible to challenge. The judgment of this Court in K.T. Plantations (supra)9 declares that the law envisaged Under Article 300A must be in line with the overarching principles of Rule of law, and must be just, fair, and reasonable. It is, of course, precedentially sound to describe some of these sub-rights as 'procedural', a nomenclature that often tends to undermine the inherent worth of these safeguards. These seven sub-rights may be procedures, but they do constitute the real content of the right to property Under Article 300A, non- compliance of these will amount to violation of the right, being without the authority of law.


29. These sub-rights of procedure have been synchronously incorporated in laws concerning compulsory acquisition and are also recognised by our constitutional courts while reviewing administrative actions for compulsory acquisition of private property. The following will demonstrate how these seven principles have seamlessly become an integral part of our Union and State statutes concerning acquisition and also the constitutional and administrative law culture that our courts have evolved from time to time.


30. Following are the seven principles:


30.1. The Right to notice: (i) A prior notice informing the bearer of the right that the State intends to deprive them of the right to property is a right in itself; a linear extension of the right to know embedded in Article 19(1)(a). The Constitution does not contemplate acquisition by ambush. The notice to acquire must be clear, cogent and meaningful. Some of the statutes reflect this right.

30.2. The Right to be heard: (i) Following the right to a meaningful and effective prior notice of acquisition, is the right of the property-bearer to communicate his objections and concerns to the authority acquiring the property. This right to be heard against the proposed acquisition must be meaningful and not a sham.

30.3. The Right to a reasoned decision: i) That the authorities have heard and considered the objections is evidenced only through a reasoned order. It is incumbent upon the authority to take an informed decision and communicate the same to the objector.

30.4. The Duty to acquire only for public purpose: (i) That the acquisition must be for a public purpose is inherent and an important fetter on the discretion of the authorities to acquire. This requirement, which conditions the purpose of acquisition must stand to reason with the larger constitutional goals of a welfare state and distributive justice.

30.5. The Right of restitution or fair compensation: (i) A person's right to hold and enjoy property is an integral part to the constitutional right Under Article 300A. Deprivation or extinguishment of that right is permissible only upon restitution, be it in the form of monetary compensation, rehabilitation or other similar means. Compensation has always been considered to be an integral part of the process of acquisition.


30.6. The Right to an efficient and expeditious process: (i) The acquisition process is traumatic for more than one reason. The administrative delays in identifying the land, conducting the enquiry and evaluating the objections, leading to a final declaration, consume time and energy. Further, passing of the award, payment of compensation and taking over the possession are equally time consuming. It is necessary for the administration to be efficient in concluding the process and within a reasonable time. This obligation must necessarily form part of Article 300A.

30.7. The Right of conclusion: (i) Upon conclusion of process of acquisition and payment of compensation, the State takes possession of the property in normal circumstances. The culmination of an acquisition process is not in the payment of compensation, but also in taking over the actual physical possession of the land. If possession is not taken, acquisition is not complete. With the taking over of actual possession after the normal procedures of acquisition, the private holding is divested and the right, title and interest in the property, along-with possession is vested in the State. Without final vesting, the State's, or its beneficiary's right, title and interest in the property is inconclusive and causes lot of difficulties. The obligation to conclude and complete the process of acquisition is also part of Article 300A.

31. The seven principles which we have discussed are integral to the authority of law enabling compulsory acquisition of private property. Union and State statutes have adopted these principles and incorporated them in different forms in the statutes provisioning compulsory acquisition of immovable property. The importance of these principles, independent of the statutory prescription have been recognised by our constitutional courts and they have become part of our administrative law jurisprudence.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 6466 of 2024 


Kolkata Municipal Corporation and Ors. Vs. Bimal Kumar Shah and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha and Aravind Kumar, JJ.

Author: Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha, J.

Decided On: 16.05.2024

Citation: MANU/SC/0450/2024.

Print Page

Monday, 2 October 2023

Whether Cross Objections Have All Trappings Of Regular Appeal and it Must Be Considered In Full?

 In the present case at hand, the Appellants herein, in the court of first appeal filed a cross objection. It is the claim of the Appellants herein that his cross objection was not considered by the High Court while passing the impugned judgment. At this stage, it must be noted that while cross objections, unlike a regular appeal, are filed within an already existing appeal, however, as per Order 41 Rule 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure, cross objections have all the trappings of a regular appeal, and therefore, must be considered in full by the court adjudicating upon the same.{Para 17}

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 4172 of 2023 

Decided On: 04.07.2023

 Dheeraj Singh Vs. Greater Noida Industrial Development Authority and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Krishna Murari and Bela M. Trivedi, JJ.

Author: Krishna Murari, J.

Citation:  MANU/SC/0727/2023.

Read full Judgment here: Click here

Print Page

Whether Second appellate court should remand the case if first appellate court has failed to give it findings on cross objection?

 In the present case at hand, the Appellants herein, in the court of first appeal filed a cross objection. It is the claim of the Appellants herein that his cross objection was not considered by the High Court while passing the impugned judgment. At this stage, it must be noted that while cross objections, unlike a regular appeal, are filed within an already existing appeal, however, as per Order 41 Rule 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure, cross objections have all the trappings of a regular appeal, and therefore, must be considered in full by the court adjudicating upon the same. {Para 17}


18. A bare perusal of the impugned order would show that the issues raised by the Appellants in their cross objections have not been considered by the High Court. No mention of the cross objections filed by the Appellants herein have been found in the said judgment. While the High Court has given a detailed analysis of all other issues raised in the appeal and the both the lower court orders, however, the cross objections in specific, finds no discussion, much less even a mention.


19. In the case of Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari (Dead) by LRs. MANU/SC/0091/2001 : (2001) 2 SC 407, this Court held that the court of appeal has a duty to apply its mind to all issues raised before it, and to discharge such duty, it must also record its findings against all such issues raised. 


21. Further, in the case of Jitendra Prasad Nayak v. Anant kumar Sah and Anr. MANU/SC/1506/1998 : (1998) 9 SCC 383, this Court, in an identical circumstance wherein the cross objections filed by the Appellant therein was not considered by the court of first appeal, held that remanded the case back to the High Court and observed as under:


....Admittedly, a cross-objection was filed by the Appellant-landlord against the rejection by the first appellate court of the existence of one of the two grounds of eviction. However, while deciding the appeal of the Respondent-tenant in his favour against the decision of the first appellate court on the other ground, the existence of the cross objection appears to have been missed by the High Court with the result that there is no decision given on the cross objection. The impugned judgment cannot, therefore, be sustained inter alia for this reason. We are also of the opinion that the question relating to existence of the ground of bona fide need which has been decided in favour of the tenant requires a fresh determination by the High Court along with the other point relating to default in payment of rent which was the subject matter of cross-objection


22. The abovementioned discussions and judgments, when contextualized to the present case, would show that the High Court was under an obligation to consider the cross objections filed by the Appellants herein. Since such an obligation was not discharged while passing the judgment in appeal, we are of the considered opinion that the matter is fit for remand to the High Court for fresh adjudication on the grounds raised in the cross objections during appeal by the Appellants herein. Accordingly, the present appeals are therefore allowed to such an extent.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 4172 of 2023 

Decided On: 04.07.2023

 Dheeraj Singh Vs. Greater Noida Industrial Development Authority and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Krishna Murari and Bela M. Trivedi, JJ.

Author: Krishna Murari, J.

Citation:  MANU/SC/0727/2023.

Print Page

Supreme Court: Dispute On Apportionment Of Compensation under National Highways Authority Act Can Only Be Determined By 'Principal Civil Court Of Original Jurisdiction'

 We are of the view that when it comes to resolving the dispute relating to apportionment of the amount determined towards compensation, it is only the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction which can do so. Principal Civil Court means the Court of the District Judge. {Para 33}


34. Our final conclusion is as under: If any dispute arises as to the apportionment of the amount or any part thereof or to any person to whom the same or any part thereof is payable, then, the competent authority shall refer the dispute to the decision of the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction within the limits of whose jurisdiction the land is situated. The competent authority possesses certain powers of the Civil Court, but in the event of a dispute of the above nature, the summary power, vesting in the competent authority of rendering an opinion in terms of Sub-section (3) of Section 3H, will not serve the purpose. The dispute being of the nature triable by the Civil Court that the law steps in to provide for that to be referred to the decision of the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction. The dispute regarding apportionment of the amount or any part thereof or to any person to whom the same or any part thereof is payable, would then have to be decided by that Court.


35. In such circumstance referred to above, the order passed by the District Magistrate, Mau dated 16.01.2020 is hereby quashed and set aside. The writ application No. 7310 of 2020 stands allowed. In view of the dispute between the parties as regards apportionment of the amount of compensation, the Special Land Acquisition Officer shall now refer the dispute to the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in accordance with sub-clause (4) of Section 3H of the Act 1956.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 5107 of 2022

Decided On: 07.07.2023

Vinod Kumar and Ors. Vs. District Magistrate, Mau and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

B.R. Gavai and J.B. Pardiwala, JJ.

Author: J.B. Pardiwala, J.

Citation:  MANU/SC/0748/2023.

Print Page

Sunday, 17 September 2023

Whether the appellate court can permit parties to adduce additional evidence if they have amended memo of appeal not original proceeding?

 We have noticed hereinbefore that the amendments have not been carried out in the pleadings in terms of Order VI, Rule 18 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The said provision being mandatory, if not complied with the consequences flowing therefrom shall ensue.The purported amendments of the Memo of Appeal and the Reference applications, therefore, could not have been the basis for allowing adduction of additional evidence as has been done by the High Court. {Para 76}

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal Nos. 6825-26 and 6827-6832/2003, 

Decided On: 07.09.2005

Union of India (UOI)  Vs. Pramod Gupta (D) by L.Rs. and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Ashok Bhan and S.B. Sinha, JJ.

Citation:  MANU/SC/0549/2005.

Read full Judgment here: Click here

Print Page

Whether the court can determine rights of parties on the basis of other reported judgments?

 The High Court in its judgment has referred to various decisions showing that the rates specified in the notification issued by the Union of India would be admissible in evidence. There is nothing to show that the said judgments were brought on record in accordance with law. There is also nothing to show that any application under Order VI Rule 17 of the CPC was filed and allowed by the High Court permitting the Respondents to bring the said judgment on records. In fact, several reported judgments have been referred to by the High Court not for the purpose of applying the ratio therein as precedent that such notifications are admissible in evidence but for the purpose of computing the amount of compensation on the basis of the rates at which the market price was fixed therein. The High Court had referred to the judgments whereby the market value of the land had been calculated on the basis of the rates specified in such notification in respect of Vasant Vihar, Defence Enclave and several other areas, without arriving at any finding that the said judgments are admissible in evidence or otherwise have relevance for determination of the market value of the land in question. The rights of the parties, it is well- settled, must be determined on the basis of the case pleaded and proved by leading proper evidence and just not on the basis of other reported judgments [See Surendra Kumar Vakil and Ors. v. Chief Executive Officer, M.P. and Ors., MANU/SC/0227/2004 : (2004)10SCC126 and Sanjay Gera v. Haryana Urban Development Authority and Anr. MANU/SC/0127/2005 : (2005)3SCC207 ].

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal Nos. 6825-26 and 6827-6832/2003, 

Decided On: 07.09.2005

Union of India (UOI)  Vs. Pramod Gupta (D) by L.Rs. and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Ashok Bhan and S.B. Sinha, JJ.

Citation:  MANU/SC/0549/2005.

Read full Judgment here: Click here


Print Page

Whether pleading before trial court is deemed to be amended if said amendment in incorporated in Memo of appeal?

 The learned counsel urged that the Respondents had already filed an application for amendment of Memo of Appeal in terms of Order 41, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which having been allowed, would amount to amendment of the claim application in the reference case itself. Strong reliance in this behalf has been placed on Harcharan v. State of Haryana MANU/SC/0166/1982 : AIR1983SC43 Ghaziabad Development Authority v. Anoop Singh and Anr. MANU/SC/0041/2003 : [2003]1SCR522 .We do not agree. The pleadings before the Trial Court are the basis for adduction of evidence either before the Trial Court or before the Appellate Court. By amending the memo of appeal the original pleadings cannot be amended. {Para 73}

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal Nos. 6825-26 and 6827-6832/2003, 

Decided On: 07.09.2005

Union of India (UOI)  Vs. Pramod Gupta (D) by L.Rs. and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Ashok Bhan and S.B. Sinha, JJ.

Citation:  MANU/SC/0549/2005

Print Page

Sunday, 16 April 2023

Under which circumstances land acquisition will not lapse even if compensation is not paid or possession of acquired land is not taken?

 366. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we answer the questions as under:


366.1. Under the provisions of Section 24(1)(a) in case the award is not made as on 1-1-2014, the date of commencement of the 2013 Act, there is no lapse of proceedings. Compensation has to be determined under the provisions of the 2013 Act.


366.2. In case the award has been passed within the window period of five years excluding the period covered by an interim order of the court, then proceedings shall continue as provided Under Section 24(1)(b) of the 2013 Act under the 1894 Act as if it has not been repealed.


366.3. The word "or" used in Section 24(2) between possession and compensation has to be read as "nor" or as "and". The deemed lapse of land acquisition proceedings Under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act takes place where due to inaction of authorities for five years or more prior to commencement of the said Act, the possession of land has not been taken nor compensation has been paid. In other words, in case possession has been taken, compensation has not been paid then there is no lapse. Similarly, if compensation has been paid, possession has not been taken then there is no lapse.


(emphasis supplied)


366.4. The expression "paid" in the main part of Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act does not include a deposit of compensation in court. The consequence of non-deposit is provided in the proviso to Section 24(2) in case it has not been deposited with respect to majority of landholdings then all beneficiaries (landowners) as on the date of notification for land acquisition Under Section 4 of the 1894 Act shall be entitled to compensation in accordance with the provisions of the 2013 Act. In case the obligation Under Section 31 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 has not been fulfilled, interest Under Section 34 of the said Act can be granted. Non-deposit of compensation (in court) does not result in the lapse of land acquisition proceedings. In case of non-deposit with respect to the majority of holdings for five years or more, compensation under the 2013 Act has to be paid to the "landowners" as on the date of notification for land acquisition Under Section 4 of the 1894 Act.


366.5. In case a person has been tendered the compensation as provided Under Section 31(1) of the 1894 Act, it is not open to him to claim that acquisition has lapsed Under Section 24(2) due to non-payment or non-deposit of compensation in court. The obligation to pay is complete by tendering the amount Under Section 31(1). The landowners who had refused to accept compensation or who sought reference for higher compensation, cannot claim that the acquisition proceedings had lapsed Under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act.


366.6. The proviso to Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act is to be treated as part of Section 24(2), not part of Section 24(1)(b).


366.7. The mode of taking possession under the 1894 Act and as contemplated Under Section 24(2) is by drawing of inquest report/memorandum. Once award has been passed on taking possession Under Section 16 of the 1894 Act, the land vests in State there is no divesting provided Under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act, as once possession has been taken there is no lapse Under Section 24(2).


366.8. The provisions of Section 24(2) providing for a deemed lapse of proceedings are applicable in case authorities have failed due to their inaction to take possession and pay compensation for five years or more before the 2013 Act came into force, in a proceeding for land acquisition pending with the authority concerned as on 1-1-2014. The period of subsistence of interim orders passed by court has to be excluded in the computation of five years.


366.9. Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act does not give rise to new cause of action to question the legality of concluded proceedings of land acquisition. Section 24 applies to a proceeding pending on the date of enforcement of the 2013 Act i.e. 1-1-2014. It does not revive stale and time-barred claims and does not reopen concluded proceedings nor allow landowners to question the legality of mode of taking possession to reopen proceedings or mode of deposit of compensation in the treasury instead of court to invalidate acquisition.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 2749/2023 

Decided On: 11.04.2023

Land and Building Department through Secretary and Ors. Vs.

Attro Devi and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Abhay Shreeniwas Oka and Rajesh Bindal, JJ.

Author: Rajesh Bindal, J

Citation: MANU/SC/0361/2023.

Read full Judgment here: Click here

Print Page

Can the previous owner of acquired land be considered a trespasser if they retain or re-take possession of the land?

 

The issue as to what is meant by "possession of the land by the State after its acquisition" has also been considered by Constitution Bench of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Indore Development Authority's case (supra). It is opined therein that after the acquisition of land and passing of award, the land vests in the State free from all encumbrances. The vesting of land with the State is with possession. Any person retaining the possession thereafter has to be treated trespasser. When large chunk of land is acquired, the State is not supposed to put some person or police force to retain the possession and start cultivating on the land till it is utilized. The Government is also not supposed to start residing or physically occupying the same once process of the acquisition is complete. If after the process of acquisition is complete and land vest in the State free from all encumbrances with possession, any person retaining the land or any re-entry made by any person is nothing else but trespass on the State land. Relevant paragraphs 244, 245 and 256 are extracted below:


244. Section 16 of the Act of 1894 provided that possession of land may be taken by the State Government after passing of an award and thereupon land vest free from all encumbrances in the State Government. Similar are the provisions made in the case of urgency in Section 17(1). The word "possession" has been used in the Act of 1894, whereas in Section 24(2) of Act of 2013, the expression "physical possession" is used. It is submitted that drawing of panchnama for taking over the possession is not enough when the actual physical possession remained with the landowner and Section 24(2) requires actual physical possession to be taken, not the possession in any other form. When the State has acquired the land and award has been passed, land vests in the State Government free from all encumbrances. The act of vesting of the land in the State is with possession, any person retaining the possession, thereafter, has to be treated as trespasser and has no right to possess the land which vests in the State free from all encumbrances.


245. The question which arises whether there is any difference between taking possession under the Act of 1894 and the expression "physical possession" used in Section 24(2). As a matter of fact, what was contemplated under the Act of 1894, by taking the possession meant only physical possession of the land. Taking over the possession under the Act of 2013 always amounted to taking over physical possession of the land. When the State Government acquires land and drawns up a memorandum of taking possession, that amounts to taking the physical possession of the land. On the large chunk of property or otherwise which is acquired, the Government is not supposed to put some other person or the police force in possession to retain it and start cultivating it till the land is used by it for the purpose for which it has been acquired. The Government is not supposed to start residing or to physically occupy it once possession has been taken by drawing the inquest proceedings for obtaining possession thereof. Thereafter, if any further retaining of land or any re-entry is made on the land or someone starts cultivation on the open land or starts residing in the outhouse, etc., is deemed to be the trespasser on land which in possession of the State. The possession of trespasser always inures for the benefit of the real owner that is the State Government in the case.

256. Thus, it is apparent that vesting is with possession and the statute has provided Under Sections 16 and 17 of the Act of 1894 that once possession is taken, absolute vesting occurred. It is an indefeasible right and vesting is with possession thereafter. The vesting specified Under Section 16, takes place after various steps, such as, notification Under Section 4, declaration Under Section 6, notice Under Section 9, award Under Section 11 and then possession. The statutory provision of vesting of property absolutely free from all encumbrances has to be accorded full effect. Not only the possession vests in the State but all other encumbrances are also removed forthwith. The title of the landholder ceases and the state becomes the absolute owner and in possession of the property. Thereafter there is no control of the landowner over the property. He cannot have any animus to take the property and to control it. Even if he has retained the possession or otherwise trespassed upon it after possession has been taken by the State, he is a trespasser and such possession of trespasser enures for his benefit and on behalf of the owner.

{Para 12}

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 2749/2023 

Decided On: 11.04.2023

Land and Building Department through Secretary and Ors. Vs.

Attro Devi and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Abhay Shreeniwas Oka and Rajesh Bindal, JJ.

Author: Rajesh Bindal, J

Citation: MANU/SC/0361/2023,

Print Page

Can the reference court grant enhanced compensation to a claimant relying on a sale deed mentioned in the award, even though the sale deed was not proved before the court?

 It is necessary to note that the evidence tendered by the claimants in these cases is extremely scanty. The claimants have merely stated about the crops fetched by the claimants from their agricultural lands. They have produced only two sale transactions of village Deulgaon-Mahi to show that one acre of land was sold @ Rs. 3,25,000/- per acre.  Apart from these documents, nothing has been produced by the claimants before the reference Court. However, the reference Court considered the transaction at serial number 11 in the award of the land acquisition officer, dated 15.06.2005 to hold that the transaction at serial number 11 fetched the market value @ Rs. 1,22,448/- per hectare. The reference Court was not justified in considering the sale transaction at serial number 11 in the award passed by the land acquisition officer on 15.06.2005 to grant enhanced compensation to the claimants at the rate ranging from Rs. 1,15,000/to Rs. 1,64,000/per hectare. The learned Counsel for the appellantVidarbha Irrigation Development Corporation has rightly relied on the decision of the Full Bench of this Court reported in 2007 (5) BCR 847 (State of Maharashtra v. Prashram Jagannath Aute), which had considered the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in MANU/SC/0071/1988 : 1988 (3) SCC 751 (Chimanlal Hargovinddas v. Special Land Acquisition Officer) which laid down the principle that the reference Court cannot take into account the material relied upon by the land acquisition officer in his award unless the same material is produced and proved before the reference court as the reference Court under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act is not an appeal against an award passed by the land acquisition officer. In view of the well settled principle of law that the reference Court could not have relied upon the material relied upon by the land acquisition officer in his award, the reference Court in these cases could not have taken into account the transaction at serial number 11 in the award passed by the land acquisition officer dated 15.06.2005 when the saledeed or the extract of sale index of the transaction at serial number 11 of the award was not produced and proved by the claimants before the reference Court. {Para 7}

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (NAGPUR BENCH)

First Appeal No. 589 and 590/2010 and Cross Objection No. 18 and 19/2010, 

Vidarbha Irrigation Development Corporation Vs.  Kamlaji Balaji Jadhav and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Vasanti A. Naik, J.

Decided On: 07.10.2010

Citation: MANU/MH/1445/2010,2011(3)BomCR331, 2011(1)MhLj231
Print Page