In our opinion, the words 'Arbitral Tribunal' in Section 9(3) of the Act have to take colour from all the said provisions and thus have to be interpreted as Arbitral Tribunal constituted to adjudicate the disputes which have arisen and been referred to arbitration and with respect whereto Arbitrators have been appointed and notified of their appointment. Much prior to the incorporation of Sub-Section (3) in Section 9, Supreme Court in Firm Ashok Traders Vs. Gurumukh Das Saluja MANU/SC/0026/2004 : (2004) 3 SCC 155 held, that under the 1996 Arbitration Act, unlike the predecessor Act of 1940, the Arbitral Tribunal is empowered by Section 17 of the Act to make orders amounting to interim measures; the need for Section 9 of the Act, inspite of Section 17 having been enacted, is that Section 17 of the Act would operate only during the existence of the Arbitral Tribunal and its being functional; during that period, the power conferred on the Arbitral Tribunal under Section 17 of the Act and the power conferred on the Court under Section 9 of the Court may overlap to some extent but so far as the period pre and post the arbitral proceedings is concerned, the party requiring an interim measure shall have to approach only the Court. Seen in this light, the Arbitral Tribunal constituted with reference to the disputes which had earlier arisen, even though from the same agreement, cannot be the Arbitral Tribunal within the meaning of Section 9(3) of the Act even if were to be of the same composition. Section 9(3) of the Act does away with the jurisdiction of the Court with respect to interim measures also, once the Arbitral Tribunal is constituted. However, if a separate Arbitral Tribunal even if of same composition is to be constituted for disputes arising out of successive causes of action, Arbitral Tribunal constituted for adjudication of disputes arisen from a earlier cause of action cannot be the Arbitral Tribunal constituted for the disputes arising from a subsequent cause of action and qua which interim measures are sought.
32. We are thus unable to agree with the view taken by the learned Single Judge, of the petition of Hero being barred by Section 9(3) of the Act.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI
32. We are thus unable to agree with the view taken by the learned Single Judge, of the petition of Hero being barred by Section 9(3) of the Act.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI
FAO (OS) (COMM) 60/2020 and CM No. 10461/2020
Decided On: 07.07.2020
Hero Wind Energy Private Ltd. Vs. Inox Renewables Limited and Ors.
Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Rajiv Sahai Endlaw and Asha Menon, JJ.
Author: Rajiv Sahai Endlaw, J.
Citation: MANU/DE/1349/2020