Showing posts with label character. Show all posts
Showing posts with label character. Show all posts

Sunday, 17 February 2019

When previous bad character of accused is relevant in criminal prosecution?

Sections 54 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 prohibits the use of previous bad character evidence except when the convict himself chooses to lead evidence of his good character. The implication of this clearly is that the past adverse conduct of the convict ought not to be taken into consideration for the purposes of determining the quantum of sentence, except in specified circumstances.

60. There are exceptions to this general rule. For example, Section 376-E of the Indian Penal Code provides as follows:

376E. Punishment for repeat offenders.-Whoever has been previously convicted of an offence punishable Under Section 376 or Section 376-A or Section 376AB, or Section 376D or Section 376DA or Section 376DB and is subsequently convicted of an offence punishable under any of the said Sections shall be punished with imprisonment for life which shall mean imprisonment for the remainder of that person's natural life, or with death.

61. Similarly, Section 16(2) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 provides as follows:

16. Penalties.-

(1) xxx xxx xxx

(2) If any person convicted of an offence under this Act commits a like offence afterwards it shall be lawful for the court before which the second or subsequent conviction takes place to cause the offender's name and place of residence, the offence and the penalty imposed to be published at the offender's expense in such newspapers or in such other manner as the court may direct. The expenses of such publication shall be deemed to be part of the cost attending the conviction and shall be recoverable in the same manner as a fine.

62. Finally, it is worthwhile to refer to Section 75 of the Indian Penal Code which provides for enhanced punishment for certain offences under Chapter XII or Chapter XVII of the Indian Penal Code after previous convictions. This Section reads as follows:

75. Enhanced punishment for certain offences under Chapter XII or Chapter XVII after previous conviction.-Whoever, having been convicted,-

(a) by a Court in India, of an offence punishable under Chapter XII or Chapter XVII of this Code with imprisonment of either description for a term of three years or upwards, shall be guilty of any offence punishable under either of those Chapters with like imprisonment for the like term, shall be subject for every such subsequent offence to imprisonment for life, or to imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years.

63. The scope of Section 75 of the Indian Penal Code was discussed in the 42nd Report of the Law Commission of India in the following words:

[This] is an attempt to deal with the problem of habitual offenders and recidivism. Other penal systems also have tried to grapple with this complex problem, but nowhere have the attempts met with marked success, perhaps because the causes of crime are themselves complex. Because the previous sentence has failed both in its object of reforming the offender and in its object of deterring him from crime, the law, as a measure of last resort, concentrates on protecting society from the offender by sending him to jail for a longer term than before.

64. It is worthwhile to note that the three provisions of law quoted above deal with instances where there is a prior conviction and do not deal with the pending trial of a case involving an offence. Therefore, while it is possible to grant an enhanced sentence, as provided by statute, for a recurrence of the same offence after conviction, the possibility of granting an enhanced sentence where the statute is silent does not arise. Consequently, it must be held that in terms of Section 54 of the Indian Evidence Act the antecedents of a convict are not relevant for the purposes of awarding a sentence, unless the convict gives evidence of his good character.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Review Petition (Criminal) Nos. 306-307 of 2013 in Criminal Appeal Nos. 145-146 of 2011

Decided On: 12.12.2018

Rajendra Pralhadrao Wasnik  Vs.  State of Maharashtra

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Madan B. Lokur, S. Abdul Nazeer and Deepak Gupta, JJ.


Citation: AIR 2019 SC 1
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Monday, 1 May 2017

Whether previous bad character is relevant in criminal proceeding?

Violation of the provisions of Section 54 of the Indian Evidence
Act, in taking into consideration the past history of the
appellants to find them guilty of commission of offence :-Considering the evidence on record, we find that the PW 7 made a
statement in course of his examination-in-chief with regard to the
antecedents of the appellants. However, after thorough consideration of the
impugned judgement, we do not find that those antecedents of the appellants
were considered by the learned trial Judge for finding the appellants guilty of
commission of offence. So, alleged violation of the provision of section 54 of
the Indian Evidence Act, is a begging question on the part of the appellants.
IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction
Present:
Justice Debasish Kar Gupta
 And
 Justice Md. Mumtaz Khan
CRA No. 800 of 2006
Munkir Sk. & Anr.
V
The State of West Bengal


Judgment on: 05/10/2016
Citation: 2017 CRLJ 1193
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Monday, 30 May 2016

Leading Judgment on cross examination of witness as to his character

What types of questions can be asked to witness in cross examination for examining his character?
 Section 146 of the Indian Evidence Act appears in the chapter entitled "of the examination of witnesses" and permits certain questions to be put in the cross-examination of a witness.Sections 133 to 145 of the Evidence Act prescribe the order and the manner of the examination of witnesses. Those Sections also deal with the provisions relating to other questions such as when the leading questions should and should not be asked and questions as to the evidence of matters in writing, Section 146 says that when a witness is cross-examined, he may, in addition to the question referred to in the earlier Sections, also be asked questions which tend.
(1) to test his veracity, (2) to discover who he is and what is his position in life, or (3) to shake his credit, by injuring his character, although the answer to such questions might tend directly or indirectly to criminate him, or might expose or tend directly or indirectly to expose him to a penalty or forfeiture.
Clauses (1) and (2) are self-explanatory. Clause (3) of Section 146 permits question in the cross-examination to shake the credit of a witness and for this purpose his character may he injured. In other words, injuring the character of a witness for the purpose of shaking the credit of that witness can be the subject matter of the assault. The assault on the character of a witness permitted by Clause (3) of Section 146 must be directed only for the purpose of shaking the credit of the witness and not for any other purpose, In other words, if the cross-examination was intended to shake the credit of a witness it must naturally be to impugn the credibility of that witness in relation to the matter which is involved and relevant under one or the other provisions of the Evidence Act. It is not permissible to have recourse to Clause (3) of Section 146 to ask all sorts of questions which are not necessary to shake the credibility of that witness.
9. The three types of questions which are permitted Under Section 146 may be relevant under the other provisions of the Evidence Act or they may not be relevant though they are permitted to be asked Under Section 146. In case the question relates to a matter relevant to the suit or the proceeding the provisions of Section 132 shall apply to that question as provided Under Section 147. If, on the other hand, such questions relate to a matter not relevant to the suit or proceeding, powers have been given to Court to decide whether the witness Shall be compelled to answer and prescribe the limits and the manner in which that question can be asked and answer to that question be given. This is provided by Section 148 of the Evidence Act which however is not applicable if the question which is not relevant relates to the shaking of the credibility of the witness by injuring his character as provided in Clause (3) of Section 146. The question aimed at injuring the character of a witness must be only with the object of shaking his credit and therefore limitation on that question is contained in Clause (3) of Section 146 itself. That the permission given under Clause (3) of Section 146 of the Evidence Act cannot be allowed to degenerate into a licence for the purpose of shaking the character of a witness indiscriminately is fairly well-established. In S. Pillay v. G. S. T. Shaikh Thumby, AIR 1940 Rang. 113 : 41 Cri LJ 790 the practice of asking questions indiscriminately by having recourse to the provisions of Section 146has been rightly frowned upon. Mosley, J. has commented on a matter of which he regretted to find frequent recurrences in trial in Rangoon Magistrate's Court, The question in issue in that case was whether the trade-mark claimed by the complainant as his own belonged to him, and if so, whether the accused had committed the offences complained of. Possession of tins with a counterfeit trade-mark, or possession of dies of that trade-mark. The complainant was however subjected to a long cross-examination on matters entirely unconnected with the case as to profit and loss and as to stock-in-trade, as to account books and as to loans incurred by him. Even the Income-tax Officer was cited as a witness to give inadmissible evidence as to the complainant's account books. Mosley, J. proceeded to say :--
.....Section 146, Evidence Act, allows question in cross-examination to shake the credit of the witness by injuring his character. Section 148 of the Act lays down that where a question is only relevant to character, the Court should decide whether the question should be asked, and such questions are improper if the imputation which they convey is of such character that the truth of the imputation would not affect or would only slightly affect the opinion of the Court as to the credibility of the witness on the matter to which he testifies.
He commented that there was an impression prevalent that any witness may be asked any questions at any time as to whether he is a man of substance, and that if the accused can show that the complainant or other witness is in embarrassed circumstances, or is not a man of substance, that necessarily affects the credibility of the witness on any matter to which he deposes.
10. To the same effect are the following observations of the Privy Council in The Bombay Cotton Manufacturing Co., Limited v. Raja Bhadur Shivlal Motilal, 17 Bom LR 455 : AIR 1915 PC 1 Cross-examination to credit is necessarily irrelevant to any issue in an action, its relevancy consists in being addressed to the credit or discredit of the witness in the box so as to show that his evidence for or against the relevant issue is untrustworthy ;
In R. B. Chari v. State it has been held that Sections 145, 148 and 155 indicate that the credit of a witness can be said to have been shaken only if it can be shown that he is not a man of veracity, and not that he is of bad moral character. A black-marketeer is not necessarily untruthful nor a non-black-marketeer necessarily a man of veracity. There is therefore no reason for rejecting the evidence of a witness on the ground alone that he is a black-marketeer.
It is not necessary to multiply the authorities but from what has been stated above and considering the clear terminology of Sections 146 to 148 it is clear that Clause (3) of Section 146does not open the gates to unbridled cross-examination of a witness in order to assail his character except in so far as it is necessary to shake his credit in relation to the matter in issue. This proposition is now a matter of text-book knowledge. Sir James Fitzjames Stephen has been quoted in Sar-kar on Evidence (on page 1318, 12th Edition) as follows :
I shall not believe, unless and until it is so decided upon solemn agreement, that by the law of England a person who is called to prove a minor fact not really disputed, in a case of little importance, thereby exposes himself to having every transaction in his past life, however private, inquired into by persons who may wish to serve the basest purposes of fraud or revenge by doing so, Suppose for instance, a medical man were to prove the fact that slight wound had been inflicted and been attended to by him would it be lawful under pretence of testing his credit, to compel him to answer upon oath a series of questions as to his private affairs extending over many years and tending to expose transactions of the most delicate and secret kind, in which the fortune and character of other persons might be involved? If this is the law, it should be altered.
11. Fortunately that is not the law of this land.
12. Considering the abovementioned legal position which according to us is the correct legal position, it is obvious that the question which has been put to the complainant and to which the objection was taken on his behalf by an application made on 4th November 1976 is the question which is clearly inadmissible Under Section 146 of the Evidence Act. The article edited by him in the magazine in its issue of January 1975 regarding Nehru family is totally irrelevant and is not covered by any of the clauses of Section 146. It is for example not to test his veracity nor is it to discover who he is and what is his position in life because it is well-known to everyone concerned that he is the editor of the magazine. This question is not intended to shake his credit by injuring his character because the question is not aimed at his character at all in relation to a matter in issue. The question is patently asked for the purpose of scandalizing and embarrassing the witness. Such a question is not allowed Under Section 146 of the Evidence Act and as already mentioned in the Court below it was not shown how this question was relevant under any other provisions of the Evidence Act.
13. Mr. Badkar avers that looking to the past trend of the cross-examination and looking to the past other pieces of inadmissible evidence already admitted it is possible that same type of questions will be asked and the process of the Court will be abused. As stated earlier we do not comment upon the evidence which has already been brought on record and the learned Magistrate at the time of giving the judgment will undoubtedly ignore inadmissible evidence which has been inadvertently brought on record. If the questions of the type which has been impugned in this case are allowed to be asked without there being warrant for the same by the provisions of the Evidence Act the process of the Court will undoubtedly be abused. Normally it is not advisable for the High Court to interfere with the discretion exercised by the trial Court. Mr. Badkar's grievance that the complainant has been subjected to gruelling cross-examination of eight hours may or may not be valid. It is not possible for a court to impose an embargo on the time that can be taken for the cross-examination. Ultimately the extent and the manner of cross-examination will depend upon the facts and circumstances of the case and the issues involved in it as pointed out by this Court in Yeshpal Jashbhai Parikh v. Rasiklal Umedchand Parikh, 57 Bom LR 282 : 1955 Cri LJ 1159, as follows--
As a general rule, the Court would not be justified in imposing a time limit upon the cross-examination of a witness. But the Court may, in the course of a trial, come to the conclusion that the cross-examination has been unnecessary or irrelevant or even rambling, and in such a case the Court has power to control the cross-examination of a witness by counsel of the opposite party. Such power should be exercised in a reasonable way.
It is therefore clear that the trial Court at no stage of the proceeding should lose con trol over the same and should see that the cross-examination does not go on in a rambling way or extend to questions impermissible under the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act. Subject to these qualifications the powers of a trial Court are wide and indeed they should be. We are sure that the learned trial Magistrate will bear in mind the observations made by Sir James Fitzjames Stephen quoted by us above and will not allow the cross-examination which is not permissible Under Section 146 or any other provisions of the Indian Evidence Act. To allow the accused to cross-examine the complainant merely because the complainant has chosen the arena of the Magistrate's Court and to assail his character not for the purposes covered by the provisions of the Evidence Act but for some other purposes such as embarrassing him and to ask such other further questions which are not relevant but which will only embarrass and expose him to other proceedings will amount to an abuse of the process of the Court.
Bombay High Court
Dr. Baburao Patel vs Bal Thackeray And Anr. on 4 March, 1977
Equivalent citations: 1977 CriLJ 1637,1979MHLJ11

Bench: Shah, Jahagirdar
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Monday, 21 December 2015

Whether bad character of complainant will entitle accused to get acquittal?

In appreciating evidence in trap cases, the character of
the   complainant   assumes   importance.     The   judicial
pronouncements have recognized that there are various types of
complainants.  There are some complainants who basically want
some favour from a public servant illegally and because of the
refusal of the public servant to oblige him, decide to lodge a
complaint against him.   There are other types of complainants
whose genuine and legitimate work is unnecessarily held up by a
public  servant with the object  of  obtaining illegal gratification
from   such   complainants.     In   this   case,   the   complainant,
admittedly, being a person who had acted contrary to law and
who faced the danger of inviting action by the local authorities
against the unauthorized construction work carried out by him,
his evidence needs to be scrutinized with due care.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1152 OF 2004
RAVINDRA MAHADEO KOTHAMKAR )...APPELLANT
V/s.
THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA  )...RESPONDENT

CORAM : ABHAY M. THIPSAY, J.
DATE : 9th OCTOBER 2015.
Citation; 2015(4) Crimes 222 Bombay

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