How to interpret the question of territorial jurisdiction u/s 498A of IPC?

Recently I participated in a moot court. Central theme of moot problem was revolving around Sec. 498A of IPC. One of the main issues of that problem was territorial jurisdiction. While researching for that issue, I found a grey area. Initially, I thought the law on the issue of territorial jurisdiction was quite straight forward but as the research proceeded my opinion changed. How? Let’s check that out in the blog post. 

Territorial Jurisdiction where cause of action arose –

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When offence of cruelty U/S 498A of IPC can not be said to be continuing offence?

Criminal - Territorial jurisdiction - Validity of - Section 498A of Indian Penal Code, 1860 and Section 178 of Code of Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 - Present appeal filed against order whereby High court held that First Information Report for offence under Section 498A of Code lodged by Respondent was liable to be tried by Court at place where wife's parents resided, which had jurisdiction to try offence - Whether impugned order of territorial jurisdiction of Court at wife's native place to try offence alleged against Appellants was maintainable - Held, offence of cruelty cannot be said to be a continuing one as contemplated by Section 178 of Code - From FIR it was found that all incidents alleged by complainant in respect of alleged cruelty were said to have occurred at place where both Appellant and his wife resided after marriage - High Court was not right in holding that in present case mental cruelty inflicted upon Respondent "continued unabated" on account of no effort made by Appellants to take her back to her matrimonial home, and threats given by Appellants over telephone - High Court did not make reference to any particular piece of evidence regarding threats said to have been given by Appellants over telephone - Thus, going by complaint, it could not be held that Court at wife's native place had jurisdiction to try offence since appropriate Court at place where both Appellant and his wife resided after marriage would have jurisdiction to try said offence - Accordingly, impugned order of High court was set aside - Appeal allowed. [paras 7 and 8]

Equivalent Citation: 2015ALLMR(Cri)4502,  I(2015)DMC126SC, 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 546 of 2009

Decided On: 04.08.2014

 Amarendu Jyoti  Vs. State of Chattisgarh

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:S.J. Mukhopadhaya and S.A. Bobde, JJ.

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Whether offence under S 498A of IPC is continiuing offence?

It can thus be clearly seen that the Apex Court in clear terms had held that the offence underSection 498-A is not a continuing offence. Merely because the complainant has left the matrimonial house on account of the ill treatment by her husband and resides with her parents, cannot be a ground to bestow the court at the place where the parents reside, a jurisdiction to entertain the complaint.

Bombay High Court

Shekhar Shivdas Mahire vs Sou. Sarikabai Shekhar Mahire on 13 April, 2010

Bench: B.R. Gavai

Citation; 2010(2) Bom C R(cri)672

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How to ascertain jurisdiction of court in case of offence under S 498A and 406 of IPC?

“12. The crucial question is
whether any part of the cause of
action arose within the
jurisdiction of the court
concerned. In terms of Section 177
of the Code, it is the place where
the offence was committed. In
essence it is the cause of action
for initiation of the proceedings
against the accused.”
It is true that Section 177 of the Code
refers to the local jurisdiction where
the offence is committed. Though the
expression “cause of action” is not a
stranger to criminal cases, in view of
Sections 178 and 179 of the Code and in
the light of the specific averment in
the complaint of the appellant herein,
we are of the view that the said
decision is not applicable to the case
on hand.
10. Mr. Sanyal also relied on a
decision of this Court in Bhura Ram
and Others vs. State of Rajasthan and
Another, (2008) 11 SCC 103 wherein
following the decision in Y. Abraham
Ajith and Others (supra), this Court
held that “cause of action”; having
arisen within the jurisdiction of the
court where the offence was committed,
could not be tried by the court where
no part of offence was committed. For
the same reasons, as mentioned in the
earlier paragraph, while there is no
dispute as to the proposition in view
of the fact that in the case on hand,
the offence was a continuing one and
the episode at Gaya was only a
consequence at the continuing offence
of harassment and ill-treatment meted
out to the complainant, clause (c) of
Section 178 is attracted. In view of
the above reason, both the decisions
are not applicable to the facts of
this case and we are unable to accept
the stand taken by Mr. Sanyal.
11. We have already adverted to the
details made by the appellant in the
complaint. In view of the specific
assertion by the appellant-wife about
the ill-treatment and cruelty at the
hands of the husband and his relatives
at Ranchi and of the fact that because
of their action, she was taken to her
parental home at Gaya by her husband
with a threat of dire consequences for
not fulfilling their demand of dowry,
we hold that in view of Sections 178
and 179 of the Code, the offence in
this case was a continuing one having
been committed in more local areas and
one of the local areas being Gaya, the
learned Magistrate at Gaya has
jurisdiction to proceed with the
criminal case instituted therein. In
other words, the offence was a
continuing one and the episode at Gaya
was only a consequence of continuing
offence of harassment of illtreatment
meted out to the complainant, clause
(c) of Section 178 is attracted.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN
AT JODHPUR
ORDER
S.B.CR. MISC. PETITION NO.1581/2010
Kuldeep Singh & Ors.
Vs.
State of Rajasthan & Anr.
Date of Order : 21st February, 2014
PRESENT
HON'BLE MR JUSTICE VIJAY BISHNOI

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Whether offence of ill-treatment and humiliation in matrimonial home is continuing offence?

 Mr. Sanyal also relied on a decision of
this Court in Bhura Ram and Others vs.
State of Rajasthan and Another, (2008) 11
SCC 103 wherein following the decision in
Y. Abraham Ajith and Others (supra), this
Court held that “cause of action”; having
arisen within the jurisdiction of the court
where the offence was committed, could not

be tried by the court where no part of
offence was committed. For the same
reasons, as mentioned in the earlier
paragraph, while there is no dispute as to
the proposition in view of the fact that in
the case on hand, the offence was a
continuing one and the episode at Gaya was
only a consequence at the continuing
offence of harassment and ill-treatment
meted out to the complainant, clause (c) of
Section 178 is attracted. In view of the
above reason, both the decisions are not
applicable to the facts of this case and we
are unable to accept the stand taken by Mr.
Sanyal.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT
JODHPUR

S.B. CRIMINAL MISC. PETITION NO.2163/2013
Harikesh Dhanak & Anr.
V/S
State of Rajasthan & Anr.
Date of Order : 10th April, 2014
PRESENT
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VIJAY BISHNOI
Citation; 2015(2)crimes 322 Raj

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What is continuing offence and instantaneous offence?

In Balakrishna Savalram Pujari Waghmare Ors. v. Shree Dnyaneshwar Maharaj Sansthan  Ors., AIR 1959 SC 798, this Court dealt with the aforementioned issue, and observed that a continuing offence is an act which creates a continuing source of injury, and renders the doer of the act responsible and liable for the continuation of the said injury. In case a wrongful act causes an injury which is complete, there is no continuing wrong even though the damage resulting from the said act may continue. If the wrongful act is of such character that the injury caused by it itself continues, then the said act constitutes a continuing wrong. The distinction between the two wrongs therefore depends, upon the effect of the injury. In the said case, the court dealt with a case of a wrongful act of forcible ouster, and held that the resulting injury caused, was complete at the date of the ouster itself, and therefore there was no scope for the application of Section 23 of the Limitation Act in relation to the said case.
Thus, in view of the above, the law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that, in the case of a continuing offence, the ingredients of the offence continue, i.e., endure even after the period of consummation, whereas in an instantaneous offence, the offence takes place once and for all i.e. when the same actually takes place. In such cases, there is no continuing offence, even though the damage resulting from the injury may itself continue.

Supreme Court of India

Udai Shankar Awasthi vs State Of U.P.& Anr on 9 January, 2013

Bench: B.S. Chauhan, Jagdish Singh Khehar

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When offence U/S 498A of IPC will be continuing offence?

As observed by this Court in State of Bihar v. Deokaran Nenshi and Anr. (AIR 1973 SC 908), continuing offence is one which is susceptible of continuance and is distinguishable from the one which is committed once and for all, that it is one of those offences which arises out of the failure to obey or comply with a rule or its requirement and which involves a penalty, liability continues till compliance, that on every occasion such disobedience or non-compliance occurs or recurs, there is the offence committed.

A similar plea relating to continuance of the offence was examined by this Court in Sujata Mukherjee (Smt.) v. Prashant Kumar Mukherjee (1997 (5) SCC 30). There the allegations related to commission of alleged offences punishable under Section 498A, 506 and 323 IPC. On the factual background, it was noted that though the dowry demands were made earlier the husband of the complainant went to the place where complainant was residing and had assaulted her. This Court held in that factual background that clause (c) of Section 178 was attracted. But in the present case the factual position is different and the complainant herself left the house of the husband on 15.4.1997 on account of alleged dowry demands by the husband and his relations. There is thereafter not even a whisper of allegations about any demand of dowry or commission of any act constituting an offence much less at Chennai. That being so, the logic of Section 178 (c) of the Code relating to continuance of the offences cannot be applied.

Supreme Court of India

Y. Abraham Ajith & Ors vs Inspector Of Police, Chennai & Anr on 17 August, 2004

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