Place Of Insurer's Office Doesn't Confer Territorial Jurisdiction For Motor Accident Claim : Supreme Court Explains S.166(2) MV Act

In the present case, the claimant himself impleaded the insurer as a party to the claim application and it raised an objection to territorial jurisdiction before the Tribunal itself. As the claim application of the claimant awaits adjudication by the Tribunal on merits, the requirements of Section 166(2) of the Act of 1988 have to be satisfied and Section 21(1) of the Code is not attracted.

I. Consideration of the impugned order:

15. When the averments made in the claim application are examined in this backdrop, it becomes clear that the claimant resides at Chittoor, Andhra Pradesh, as pleaded. The accident occurred in District Tirupati. There is no averment in the claim application stating that the claimant carries on business elsewhere. Even the driver of the offending vehicle is stated to reside in District Chittoor. It is, thus, clear that no part of cause of action had arisen within the local limits of District Chennai so as to clothe the Tribunal there with territorial jurisdiction. The error committed by the Tribunal at Chennai in holding that it had territorial jurisdiction was rightly corrected by the High Court by setting aside that order. It is true that the Act of 1988 is a piece of legislation intended at redressing the hardships flowing from a motor vehicle accident, amongst other objects. It must be interpreted keeping these objectives in mind. However, an interpretation which does not flow from the plain reading of the statutory provisions despite a purposive interpretation cannot be commended. An interpretation that does not find any statutory support cannot be accepted and an interpretation that is in tune with the plain language of the statute ought to be preferred.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 10706 of 2026

Decided On: 16.09.2026

K. Rashik Vs. National Insurance Company Ltd. and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Ujjal Bhuyan and A.S. Chandurkar, JJ.

Author: A.S. Chandurkar, J.

Citation:2026 INSC 996,MANU/SC/1027/2026

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Supreme Court : Jurisdiction to try case U/S 138 of NI Act is to the court within whose jurisdiction payee's home branch, was situated irrespective of cheque was deposited in any other branch of same bank

What is discernible from the aforesaid exposition is that this Court considered the requirement of "maintaining of the account" implicit in "for collection through an account". In other words, once it is identified that the cheque in question is an account payee cheque, the delivery must be to such branch in which the payee maintains the account as it is this branch of the bank that will receive the funds in the account maintained by the payee, from the drawee bank which will debit the drawer's account to send such amount. However, the necessity of delivery of an account payee cheque to the home branch is only legal and not commercial. It is to address commercial exigencies that the legislature enacted the Explanation to Section 142(2)(a). The deeming fiction in the Explanation ensures that even if a cheque is delivered to a branch other than the home branch for commercial convenience, it shall be considered to have been delivered to the home branch for the legal purpose of determining jurisdiction. {Para 72}

76. It was as clear as a noon day that the jurisdiction to try a complaint filed under Section 138 in respect of a cheque delivered for collection through an account, i.e., an account payee cheque, was vested in the court within whose local jurisdiction the branch of the bank in which the payee maintains the account, i.e., the payee's home branch, was situated. Therefore, there was no force in the petitioner's argument that as per the relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the jurisdiction to try the complaint under Section 138 was vested in the court within whose local bounds the drawee bank was situated where the cheque was dishonoured. This court say so because the enactment of the Amendment Act, 2015 and the introduction of Section 142(2) thereby, being a special legislation, occupies the field over a general procedural legislation viz. Code of Criminal Procedure. Thus, the MM, Kolkata did not have jurisdiction to try the case.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Transfer Petition (Crl.) No. 1099 of 2025 

Decided On: 28.11.2025

Jai Balaji Industries Ltd. and Ors. Vs. HEG Ltd.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan, JJ.

Author: J.B. Pardiwala, J.

Citation: MANU/SC/1600/2025.

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Narrower Than It Looks: Why DV Act territorial Jurisdiction Is Tighter Than Section 125 CrPC"

 

A recurring battleground in matrimonial litigation is the courtroom itself — quite literally, which court has the power to hear the case. A recent appellate order arising out of a Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act (PWDVA) proceeding throws sharp light on why the territorial jurisdiction clause under the DV Act is drafted narrower than its cousin provision for maintenance under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC). Litigants, and even trial courts, often assume the two provisions operate identically. They do not, and the difference can determine whether an application survives a preliminary objection or collapses at the threshold.

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Supreme Court: S. 225 BNSS | Magistrate Must Conduct Inquiry Or Order Probe Before Proceeding Against Accused Outside Jurisdiction

A Magistrate must conduct an inquiry himself or direct an investigation under Section 225 BNSS before issuing process against an accused who resides outside the territorial jurisdiction of the Court. Direct issuance of summons or process without complying with the mandatory procedure under Section 225 BNSS is impermissible. 

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. OF 2026

(@ SLP (CRL.) No.5873/2026)

RAJEEV MEHTA @ RAJIV KISHOR KIRTILAL MEHTA 

Vs

PARAM BIR SINGH

Dated: APRIL 10, 2026

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Delhi HC: Forcible removal of minor child by parent to new place doesn’t make that place an ordinary residence

 A reading of the above would show that, for invoking the jurisdiction of the Family Court under the G&W Act, it has to be shown that the minor ‘ordinarily resides’ within its jurisdiction. The forceful removal of a minor child from his original place of residence and shifting him to a new residence will not make him an ordinary resident of the new place. {Para 42}

43. In Lahari Sakhamuri (supra), where the child was born in the USA and was brought to India by the appellant therein despite an interim order of the USA Court, and an application for the custody of the minor child was filed in the learned Family Court at Hyderabad within 20 days of her arrival in India, the Court held that the minor child was not an ordinary resident of Hyderabad (India), as envisaged under Section 9(1) of the G&W Act.

44. This Court in Paul Mohinder Gahun (supra), while considering a case where the respondent therein had come to India along with the child for a planned short vacation and, thereafter, filed a petition under Section 9 of the G&W Act in India, held that a residence by compulsion, howsoever long, cannot be treated as a place of ordinary residence. Where the child is removed by mischief to an interim location, the place of his/her original residence would alone have jurisdiction.

45. In Philip David Dexeter (supra), the Court emphasized that to ordinarily reside at a place should be more than a flying visit to or a casual stay at a particular location.

47.  As noted hereinabove, such forceful removal/detention, even by a parent, at a place that is not the natural habitation of the minor child, would not render such other place the ordinary place of residence of the minor child.

48. While it is correct that for purposes of invoking jurisdiction under Section 9 of the G&W Act, it is not necessary for the child to be a permanent resident of the place and even a temporary residence shall suffice, such temporary residence should not be illegal or forceful. The court, on an overall reading of the petition shall have to determine whether the child can be said to be ordinarily residing within its jurisdiction.

49. In the present case, on a bare reading of the petition filed by the wife under the G&W Act, and the surrounding circumstances that are admitted by her, the minor child could not be said to be ordinarily residing within the jurisdiction of the learned Family Court.

 In the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi

(Before Navin Chawla and Renu Bhatnagar, JJ.)

Mat. APP.(F.C.) 135/2024

Sunaina Rao Kommineni   Vs Abhiram Balusu 

Citation: 2025 SCC OnLine Del 4176, 2025:DHC:4483-DB

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Allahabad HC: Ordinary residence of child for the purpose of S 9 of Guardian and wards Act is mixed question of law and fact and it can not be decided in application for rejection of plaint

 In the instant case, the factum of 'ordinary residence' of the minor is a disputed question of fact and thus, the question whether the Court at Ghaziabad has territorial jurisdiction to entertain the petition under Section 25 of the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 is a mixed question of law and fact. The aforesaid question cannot be determined without holding an enquiry into the factual aspects of the controversy and without framing a distinctive issue in this regard. The scope of scrutiny at the stage of consideration of an application under Order VII, Rule 11 of Civil Procedure Code 1908 is confined only to the averments made in the petition. Thus, the question whether the Court has territorial jurisdiction being mixed question of law and fact cannot be decided by way of an application under Order VII, Rule 11 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908. {Para 31}

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD

First Appeal No. 373 of 2024

Decided On: 15.05.2024

Dheeraj Vs. Chetna Goswami

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

V.K. Birla and Syed Qamar Hasan Rizvi, JJ.

Author: Syed Qamar Hasan Rizvi, J.

 Citation: 2024:AHC:87786-DB, MANU/UP/1908/2024

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Punjab & Haryana HC: Jurisdiction of district court under S 9 of guardian and wards Act is mixed question of law and fact

 It is evident from a bare reading of the above that the solitary test for determining the jurisdiction of the court under Section 9 of the Act is the 'ordinary residence' of the minor. The expression used is "Where the minor ordinarily resides". Now whether the minor is ordinarily residing at a given place is primarily a question of intention which in turn is a question of fact. It may at best be a mixed question of law and fact, but unless the jurisdictional facts are admitted, it can never be a pure question of law, capable of being answered without an enquiry into the factual aspects of the controversy. The factual aspects relevant to the question of jurisdiction are not admitted in the instant case. There are serious disputes on those aspects to which we shall presently refer. {Para 14}

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH

CR No. 3925 of 2024 (O&M)

Decided On: 07.01.2025

Sulbhi and Ors. Vs. Bhavnesh Kumar

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Deepak Gupta, J.

Citation:  MANU/PH/0001/2025,2025PHHC000299.

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Supreme Court: If a High Court strikes down a Central Act as unconstitutional, that decision would have effect throughout India, unless stayed or overruled by the Supreme Court.

 This question is rooted in the following observation of the Supreme Court in Kusum Ingots and Alloys Ltd. v. Union of India 2004 (6) SCC 254 : An order passed on writ petition questioning the constitutionality of a Parliamentary Act whether interim or final keeping in view the provisions contained in Clause (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution of India, will have effect throughout the territory of India subject of course to the applicability of the Act.

The landmark Supreme Court judgment in Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. v. Union of India (2004) clarified a crucial question of territorial jurisdiction of High Courts under Article 226 of the Constitution, particularly when challenging the validity of Central laws.

Key Facts and Issue:

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Supreme Court: Motor Accident Claim Need Not Be Filed Before MACT Of Area Where Accident Occurred

The primary ground on which transfer has been sought is that the accident had taken place at Siliguri in the district of Darjeeling, West Bengal and, therefore, it would be expedient for the MACT at Darjeeling to decide the claim petition. {Para 3}

4. The provisions of the Act do not make it mandatory for the claimants to lodge an application for compensation under Section 166 thereof before the MACT having jurisdiction over the area where the accident occurred. On the contrary, sub-section (2) of Section 166 provides an option for the claimants to approach the MACT within the local limits of whose jurisdiction they (claimants) reside or carry on business or the defendant resides. The claimants having chosen the option to approach the MACT, Farrukhabad at Fatehgarh, U.P., a forum that law permits them to choose, no grievance can be raised by the petitioner. The contention is misconceived and, hence, stands overruled.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Transfer Petition(s)(Civil) No.1792/2023; 

PRAMOD SINHA  Vs SURESH SINGH CHAUHAN & ORS.

Author: DIPANKAR DATTA; J.

Dated: 31-07-2023.

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Whether family court mumbai can entertain divorce petition on the ground that marriage reception took place at mumbai?

ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION :

13. The question for determination in the present proceedings is whether the Family Court at Mumbai has jurisdiction to try and entertain under section 19 (iii) of Hindu Marriage Act, the Divorce Petition filed by Husband under Section 13 (1)(ia) of Hindu Marriage Act ?

14. There is no dispute between the parties that all the rituals of the marriage took place on 7 June, 2015 at Jodhpur, Rajasthan. In Mumbai, there was only a wedding reception on 11 June, 2015. In my view, there can't be any doubt that a wedding reception can't be called as a part of marriage ritual.

15. Admittedly, for a period of less than 10 days, the husband and wife stayed in the home of the parents of husband at Mumbai and thereafter the husband left for U.S.A. on 15 June, 2015 and the wife left on 1 August, 2015 to U.S.A. there is no dispute that the husband and the wife started living separately from 15 October, 2019 therefore, approximately around four years they stayed together in U.S.A. and occasionally in these four years, visited India.

16. Admittedly the wife has filed the divorce petition in U.S.A. and the husband has filed a divorce petition in Family Court at Mumbai. The fact that the wife has filed a divorce petition at U.S.A. this itself shows that the wife is not admitting the jurisdiction of Family Court in Mumbai, Maharashtra.

21. In the present proceedings, the husband was in U.S.A. at the time of presentation of Divorce Petition in Mumbai, which was notarized in U.S.A. so therefore, the Divorce Petition could not be filed in Mumbai, as Section 19 (iv) of the Hindu Marriage Act, contemplates that the Divorce Petition can be filed at the place where petitioner is residing, if the wife is residing outside India.

29. In the present proceedings the Husband has notarized his petition in U.S.A. and filed it in Mumbai through Power of Attorney. In my opinion in the present proceedings, the last residing together of the couple would be U.S.A., and it can't be Mumbai, where the couple briefly stayed for less than 10 days immediately after marriage, in the home of parents of Husband, hence the Family Court in Mumbai will have no jurisdiction, under sub-section (iii) of 19 of Hindu Marriage Act, to entertain Divorce Petition in Mumbai.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Writ Petition No. 8829 of 2023

Decided On: 15.04.2024

Shikha Lodha Vs. Suketu Shah and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Rajesh S. Patil, J.

Citation: MANU/MH/2423/2024.

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Whether the Court entertaining transit anticipatory bail has duty to ascertain proximity between the Accused and the territorial jurisdiction of the Court?

  Conversely, the offence may be committed in one State, the FIR may be lodged in another State and the Accused may reside in a third State. In which of the Courts of the three States would the Accused approach for grant of anticipatory bail? We feel that having regard to the salutary concept of access to justice, the Accused can seek limited transit anticipatory bail or limited interim protection from the Court in the State in which he resides but in such an event, a 'regular' or full- fledged anticipatory bail could be sought from the competent Court in the State in which the FIR is filed.  {Para 39}

40. We are conscious that this may also lead the Accused to choose the Court of his choice for seeking anticipatory bail. Forum shopping may become the order of the day as the Accused would choose the most convenient Court for seeking anticipatory bail. This would also make the concept of territorial jurisdiction which is of importance under the Code of Criminal Procedure pale into insignificance. Therefore, in order to avoid the abuse of the process of the Court as well as the law by the Accused, it is necessary for the Court before which the plea for anticipatory bail is made, to ascertain the territorial connection or proximity between the Accused and the territorial jurisdiction of the Court which is approached for seeking such a relief. Such a link with the territorial jurisdiction of the Court could be by way of place of residence or occupation/work/profession. By this, we imply that the Accused cannot travel to any other State only for the purpose of seeking anticipatory bail. The reason as to why he is seeking such bail from a Court within whose territorial jurisdiction the FIR has not been filed must be made clear and explicit to such a Court. Also there must be a reason to believe or an imminent apprehension of arrest for a non-bailable offence made out by the Accused for approaching the Court within whose territorial jurisdiction the FIR is not lodged or the inability to approach the Court where the FIR is lodged immediately.

41. Having regard to the vastness of our country and the length and breadth of it and bearing in mind the complex nature of life of the citizens, if an offence has been committed by a person in a particular State and if the FIR is filed in another State and the Accused is a resident in a third State, bearing in mind access to justice, the Accused who is residing in the third State or who is present there for a legitimate purpose should be enabled to seek the relief of limited anticipatory bail of transitory nature in the third State.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal Nos. ... of 2023 (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) Nos. 11423-11426 of 2023 (Arising out of Diary No. 7943 of 2023))

Decided On: 20.11.2023

Priya Indoria Vs. State of Karnataka and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

B.V. Nagarathna and Ujjal Bhuyan, JJ.

Author: B.V. Nagarathna, J.

Citation:  MANU/SC/1246/2023.

Read full Judgment here: Click here

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Whether Police Must Secure Transit Remand For Arrests Outside State To Safeguard Rights of accused Under Article 22 of constitution?

  Section 48 of Code of Criminal Procedure permits the police to pursue an Accused in other jurisdictions. A police officer, for the purpose of arresting without a warrant, one whom he is allowed to arrest, may pursue an individual anywhere in India. Prior to effecting the arrest outside a particular jurisdiction, the police is obligated to secure the transit remand i.e. the remand of the Accused, for taking him from one place to another in their own custody, usually for the purpose of producing him before the concerned magistrate who has jurisdiction to try/commit the case. The primary purpose of such a remand is to enable the police to shift the person in custody from the place of arrest to the place where the matter can be investigated and tried.

{Para 34}

35. Perhaps the need and necessity for transit anticipatory bail has occasioned because the police has been conferred power under the Code of Criminal Procedure to pursue an Accused in other jurisdictions. Immediately upon affecting the arrest of a person outside the jurisdiction where the offence is registered, the police is obligated to secure a transit remand. The arrested person has to be produced before the nearest magistrate. If such a magistrate finds that he has no jurisdiction to try the case in which the Accused has been arrested, he may order the Accused to be forwarded to a magistrate having the jurisdiction to try the case or to commit it for trial. Thus, the police is obligated to secure a transit remand of the Accused for taking him from the place where he is arrested to the place where the crime is registered, for production before the competent magistrate in terms of the requirement of Article 22. As we have already noted, the primary purpose of such a transit remand is to enable the police to shift the person in custody from the place of arrest to the place where the matter can be investigated. 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal Nos. ... of 2023 (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) Nos. 11423-11426 of 2023 (Arising out of Diary No. 7943 of 2023))

Decided On: 20.11.2023

Priya Indoria Vs. State of Karnataka and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

B.V. Nagarathna and Ujjal Bhuyan, JJ.

Author: B.V. Nagarathna, J.

Citation:  MANU/SC/1246/2023.

Read full Judgment here: Click here

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Supreme Court lays down conditions for grant of transit anticipatory bail

 In view of what we have discussed above, we are of the view that considering the constitutional imperative of protecting a citizen's right to life, personal liberty and dignity, the High Court or the Court of Session could grant limited anticipatory bail in the form of an interim protection Under Section 438 of Code of Criminal Procedure in the interest of justice with respect to an FIR registered outside the territorial jurisdiction of the said Court, and subject to the following conditions:

(i) Prior to passing an order of limited anticipatory bail, the investigating officer and public prosecutor who are seized of the FIR shall be issued notice on the first date of the hearing, though the Court in an appropriate case would have the discretion to grant interim anticipatory bail.

(ii) The order of grant of limited anticipatory bail must record reasons as to why the Applicant apprehends an inter-state arrest and the impact of such grant of limited anticipatory bail or interim protection, as the case may be, on the status of the investigation.

(iii) The jurisdiction in which the cognizance of the offence has been taken does not exclude the said offence from the scope of anticipatory bail by way of a State Amendment to Section 438 of Code of Criminal Procedure.

(iv) The Applicant for anticipatory bail must satisfy the Court regarding his inability to seek anticipatory bail from the Court which has the territorial jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offence. The grounds raised by the Applicant may be -

a. a reasonable and immediate threat to life, personal liberty and bodily harm in the jurisdiction where the FIR is registered;

b. the apprehension of violation of right to liberty or impediments owing to arbitrariness;

c. the medical status/ disability of the person seeking extra- territorial limited anticipatory bail.

{Para 36}

37. It would be impossible to fully account for all exigent circumstances in which an order of extra territorial anticipatory bail may be imminently essential to safeguard the fundamental rights of the applicant. We reiterate that such power to grant extra-territorial anticipatory bail should be exercised in exceptional and compelling circumstances only which means where, denying transit anticipatory bail or interim protection to enable the Applicant to make an application Under Section 438 of Code of Criminal Procedure before a Court of competent jurisdiction would cause irremediable and irreversible prejudice to the applicant. The Court, while considering such an application for extra-territorial anticipatory bail, in case it deems fit may grant interim protection instead for a fixed period and direct the Applicant to make an application before a Court of competent jurisdiction.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal Nos. ... of 2023 (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) Nos. 11423-11426 of 2023 (Arising out of Diary No. 7943 of 2023))

Decided On: 20.11.2023

Priya Indoria Vs. State of Karnataka and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

B.V. Nagarathna and Ujjal Bhuyan, JJ.

Author: B.V. Nagarathna, J.

Citation:  MANU/SC/1246/2023.

Read full Judgment here: Click here

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Whether 'transit anticipatory bail' can be granted by a High Court or Court of Session to a person apprehending arrest?

If a rejection of the plea for limited/transitory anticipatory bail is made solely with reference to the concept of territorial jurisdiction it would be adding a restriction to the exercise of powers Under Section 438. This, in our view, would result in miscarriage and travesty of justice, aggravating the adversity of the Accused who is apprehending arrest. It would also be against the principles of access to justice. We say so for the reason that an Accused is presumed to be innocent until proven guilty beyond reasonable doubt and in accordance with law. In the circumstances, we hold that the Court of Session or the High Court, as the case may be, can exercise jurisdiction and entertain a plea for limited anticipatory bail even if the FIR has not been filed within its territorial jurisdiction and depending upon the facts and circumstances of the case, if the Accused apprehending arrest makes out a case for grant of anticipatory bail but having regard to the fact that the FIR has not been registered within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court or Court of Session, as the case may, at the least consider the case of the Accused for grant of transit anticipatory bail which is an interim protection of limited duration till such Accused approaches the competent Sessions Court or the High Court, as the case may be, for seeking full-fledged anticipatory bail. {Para 46}

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal Nos. ... of 2023 (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) Nos. 11423-11426 of 2023 (Arising out of Diary No. 7943 of 2023))

Decided On: 20.11.2023

Priya Indoria Vs. State of Karnataka and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

B.V. Nagarathna and Ujjal Bhuyan, JJ.

Author: B.V. Nagarathna, J.

Citation:  MANU/SC/1246/2023.

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Whether the trial of the offence of money-laundering should follow the trial of the scheduled/predicate offence or vice versa?

 Section 43(1) of the Act provides for the constitution of Special Courts, by the Central Government, in consultation with the Chief Justice of the High Court. Sub-section (2) of Section 43 empowers a Special Court constituted Under Section 43(1), also to try an offence other than the offence punishable Under Section 4 of the PMLA, with which the Accused may be charged at the same trial under the Code of Criminal Procedure. In other words, a Special Court is constituted Under Section 43(1) primarily for the purpose of trying an offence punishable Under Section 4. But Sub-section (2) of Section 43 confers an additional jurisdiction upon such a Special Court to try any other offence with which the Accused may be charged at the same trial. Section 43 reads as follows:

43. Special Courts.--(1) The Central Government, in consultation with the Chief Justice of the High Court, shall, for trial of offence punishable Under Section 4, by notification, designate one or more Courts of Session as Special Court or Special Courts for such area or areas or for such case or class or group of cases as may be specified in the notification.

Explanation.--In this Sub-section, "High Court" means the High Court of the State in which a Sessions Court designated as Special Court was functioning immediately before such designation.

(2) While trying an offence under this Act, a Special Court shall also try an offence, other than an offence referred to in Sub-section (1), with which the Accused may, under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), be charged at the same trial. {Para 21}

22. Section 44 deals with the question of territorial jurisdiction of the Special Court, constituted Under Section 43(1). At the outset, Section 44(1) takes note of two different contingencies, namely, (i) cases where the scheduled offence as well as the offence of money-laundering are committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the same Special Court constituted Under Section 43(1); and (ii) cases where the Court which has taken cognizance of the scheduled offence, is other than the Special Court which has taken cognizance of the complaint of the offence of money-laundering. Section 44(1) reads as follows:

44. Offences triable by Special Courts.--(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974),--

(a) an offence punishable Under Section 4 and any scheduled offence connected to the offence under that Section shall be triable by the Special Court constituted for the area in which the offence has been committed:

Provided that the Special Court, trying a scheduled offence before the commencement of this Act, shall continue to try such scheduled offence; or;

(b) a Special Court may, upon a complaint made by an authority authorised in this behalf under this Act take cognizance of offence Under Section 3, without the Accused being committed to it for trial;

Provided that after conclusion of investigation, if no offence of money-laundering is made out requiring filing of such complaint, the said authority shall submit a closure report before the Special Court; or

(c) if the court which has taken cognizance of the scheduled offence is other than the Special Court which has taken cognizance of the complaint of the offence of money-laundering Under Sub-clause (b), it shall, on an application by the authority authorised to file a complaint under this Act, commit the case relating to the scheduled offence to the Special Court and the Special Court shall, on receipt of such case proceed to deal with it from the stage at which it is committed.

(d) a Special Court while trying the scheduled offence or the offence of money-laundering shall hold trial in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), as it applies to a trial before a Court of Session.

Explanation.--For the removal of doubts, it is clarified that,--

(i) the jurisdiction of the Special Court while dealing with the offence under this Act, during investigation, enquiry or trial under this Act, shall not be dependent upon any orders passed in respect of the scheduled offence, and the trial of both sets of offences by the same court shall not be construed as joint trial;

(ii) the complaint shall be deemed to include any subsequent complaint in respect of further investigation that may be conducted to bring any further evidence, oral or documentary, against any Accused person involved in respect of the offence, for which complaint has already been filed, whether named in the original complaint or not.

23. What is dealt with by Section 44(1)(a) is a situation where there is no complication. Section 44(1)(a) lays down the most fundamental Rule relating to territorial jurisdiction, by providing that an offence punishable Under Section 4 of the PMLA and any scheduled offence connected to the same shall be triable by the Special Court constituted for the area in which the offence has been committed. It is relevant to note that Section 44(1)(a) uses the expression "offence" in three places in contradistinction to the expression "scheduled offence" used only once. This usage is not without significance. In all three places where the word "offence" alone is used, it connotes the offence of money-laundering. The place where the expression "scheduled offence" is used, it connotes the predicate offence. By prescribing that an offence punishable Under Section 4 of the PMLA and any scheduled offence connected to the same shall be triable by the Special Court constituted for the area in which "the offence" has been committed, Section 44(1)(a) makes it crystal clear that it is the Special Court constituted Under Section 43(1), which will be empowered to try even the scheduled offence connected to the same.

24. After mapping out/laying down such a general but fundamental rule, the Act then proceeds to deal with a more complicated situation in Section 44(1)(c). The question as to what happens if the Court which has taken cognizance of the scheduled offence is other than the Special Court which has taken cognizance of the offence of money-laundering, is what is sought to be answered by Clause (c) of Sub-section (1) of Section 44. If the Court which has taken cognizance of the scheduled offence is different from the Special Court which has taken cognizance of the offence of money-laundering, then the authority authorised to file a complaint under PMLA should make an application to the Court which has taken cognizance of the scheduled offence. On the application so filed, the Court which has taken cognizance of the scheduled offence, should commit the case relating to the scheduled offence to the Special Court which has taken cognizance of the complaint of money-laundering.

25. Therefore, it is clear that the trial of the scheduled offence should take place in the Special Court which has taken cognizance of the offence of money-laundering. In other words, the trial of the scheduled offence, insofar as the question of territorial jurisdiction is concerned, should follow the trial of the offence of money-laundering and not vice versa.

26. Since the Act contemplates the trial of the scheduled offence and the trial of the offence of money-laundering to take place only before the Special Court constituted Under Section 43(1), a doubt is prone to arise as to whether all the offences are to be tried together. This doubt is sought to be removed by Explanation (i) to Section 44(1). Explanation (i) clarifies that the trial of both sets of offences by the same Court shall not be construed as joint trial.

27. A careful dissection of Clauses (a) and (c) of Sub-section (1) of Section 44 shows that they confer primacy upon the Special Court constituted Under Section 43(1) of the PMLA. These two clauses contain two Rules, namely, (i) that the offence punishable under the PMLA as well as a scheduled offence connected to the same shall be triable by the Special Court constituted for the area in which the offence of money-laundering has been committed; and (ii) that if cognizance has been taken by one Court, in respect of the scheduled offence and cognizance has been taken in respect of the offence of money-laundering by the Special Court, the Court trying the scheduled offence shall commit it to the Special Court trying the offence of money-laundering.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 12 of 2023

Rana Ayyub  Vs. Directorate of Enforcement.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

V. Ramasubramanian and J.B. Pardiwala, JJ.

Author: V. Ramasubramanian, J.

Decided On: 07.02.2023.

Citation: MANU/SC/0096/2023.

Read full Judgment here: Click here

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To What extent provisions of CRPC are applicable to proceedings under The Prevention of Money Laundering Act?

 It is only because of the Special Court constituted Under Section 43(1) being conferred primacy that Section 44(1) begins with the words "notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure". Though the PMLA contains a non-obstante Clause in relation to the Code of Criminal Procedure, both in Section 44(1) and in Section 45(1), there are two other provisions where the Code of Criminal Procedure is specifically declared to apply to the proceedings before a Special Court. Section 46(1) specifically makes the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure applicable to proceedings before a Special Court. Similarly, Section 65 of the PMLA makes the provisions of Code of Criminal Procedure apply to arrest, search and seizure, attachment, confiscation, investigation, prosecution and all other proceedings under the Act. {Para 28}

29. Therefore, it is clear that the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure are applicable to all proceedings under the Act including proceedings before the Special Court, except to the extent they are specifically excluded. Hence, Section 71 of the PMLA providing an overriding effect, has to be construed in tune with Section 46(1) and Section 65.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 12 of 2023

Rana Ayyub  Vs. Directorate of Enforcement.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

V. Ramasubramanian and J.B. Pardiwala, JJ.

Author: V. Ramasubramanian, J.

Decided On: 07.02.2023.

Citation: MANU/SC/0096/2023.

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What is the distinction between the territorial jurisdiction of the court in civil and criminal cases?

 While the question of territorial jurisdiction in civil cases, revolves mainly around (i) cause of action; or (ii) location of the subject matter of the suit or (iii) the residence of the Defendant etc., according as the case may be, the question of territorial jurisdiction in criminal Cases revolves around (i) place of commission of the offence or (ii) place where the consequence of an act, both of which constitute an offence, ensues or (iii) place where the Accused was found or (iv) place where the victim was found or (v) place where the property in respect of which the offence was committed, was found or (vi) place where the property forming the subject matter of an offence was required to be returned or accounted for, etc., according as the case may be.

19. While jurisdiction of a civil court is determined by (i) territorial and (ii) pecuniary limits, the jurisdiction of a criminal court is determined by (i) the offence and/or (ii) the offender. But the main difference between the question of jurisdiction raised in civil cases and the question of jurisdiction arising in criminal cases, is two-fold.

(i) The first is that the stage at which an objection as to jurisdiction, territorial or pecuniary, can be raised, is regulated in civil proceedings by Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. There is no provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure akin to Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

(ii) The second is that in civil proceedings, a plaint can be returned, Under Order VII, Rule 10, Code of Civil Procedure, to be presented to the proper court, at any stage of the proceedings. But in criminal proceedings, a limited power is available to a Magistrate Under Section 201 of the Code, to return a complaint. The power is limited in the sense (a) that it is available before taking cognizance, as Section 201 uses the words "Magistrate who is not competent to take cognizance" and (b) that the power is limited only to complaints, as the word "complaint", as defined by Section 2(d), does not include a "police report".

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Transfer Petition (Crl.) Nos. 456, 666 and 681 of 2019 (Petitions Filed Under Order XXXIX for Transfer of F.I.R. No. 452 Dated 14.09.2018)

Decided On: 30.09.2020

Kaushik Chatterjee  Vs.  State of Haryana and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

V. Ramasubramanian, J.

Citation: MANU/SC/0729/2020.

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What procedure must police follow while executing a search warrant beyond the jurisdiction of the court issuing it?

  When we turn back to Section 101, we find that the procedure contained therein must mandatorily be followed while dealing with the seizure of the articles found in execution of the search warrant, when it is under Section 78 or 79. It must also be mandatorily followed, when it is done under Section 105, though in exceptional cases, a departure from Section 101 procedure is permissible.{Para 34}

35. Section 101 is an omnipotent provision, it being the only of it's kind which deals with disposal of things found in the search, whether under Section 78 or Section 79 or Section 105 and so it has universal application to all searches made by resorting to any of the three modes of the execution of warrants, barring the power of the Magistrate to depart from it in a rare case under Section 105. Language of Section 101 has an imperative character. This is evident from the use of an expression indicative of a mandate therein. The mandate is expressed in words “such things, together with the list of same prepared under the provisions hereinafter contained, shall be immediately taken before the Court”. Uses of the modal verb “shall” here signifies nothing but command of the legislature which must be followed. The command is that the things found in the search must be taken before the Court issuing the warrant but, if such Court is situated farther than the Court within whose local jurisdiction the things are found, the things are required to be taken before such nearer Court. When the things are produced before the nearest Magistrate having jurisdiction over the place searched, along with list of the articles found, such Magistrate is required to make an order authorizing the things to be taken to the Court issuing the warrant, unless he finds a good cause to the contrary.

36. Such procedure prescribed in Section 101 has a purpose behind it. When the Court issuing the warrant is situated at a distant place, considerable time may be required for the officer to produce the things seized before the Court issuing it. Sometimes heavy expenses for transportation of such things may have to be incurred, sometimes seized articles being valuable may be at the risk of being tampered with or forcibly taken away by somebody, sometimes a need may arise for giving back the custody of the seized articles to the person on his executing a bond undertaking to produce the property before the Court as and when required, sometimes there may be also a need for providing for faster transportation of the seized articles to the Court issuing the warrant, sometimes goods being perishable, a command for issuing appropriate directions for their preservation may arise and sometimes seizure of wrong articles, police excesses, and misuse of powers may take place. Such contingencies can only be taken care of adequately by taking the things to the nearest Magistrate and therefore, there is a mandate for taking the things found in the search before the nearest Magistrate. This is the purpose which is sought to be achieved by the prescription contained in Section 101 that whenever it is not possible for an officer to take the things found in the search to the Court issuing the warrant, on account of that Court being situated at a distance farther than the Court within whose jurisdiction the search warrant is executed, the officer must produce the seized articles before such nearest Magistrate. It is also with this object in mind that a discretion has been given to the Magistrate to not authorize taking of the things to the Court issuing the warrant whenever he finds good cause to the contrary. But, we must add here that any refusal to give such authorisation must be by way of an exception, only when there is good cause to do so, and that reasons in writing must be recorded for such refusal. Reason being that when there is a discretion, it always comes with it's own compunction, the compunction of being fair and reasonable. Reasons recorded in writing serve as a barometer to test the parameters of reasonableness, fairness and transparency in exercise of the discretion. of course, in such a case also, disagreeing with the argument of learned counsel for the petitioners, there would be no need for the Magistrate to issue notice to the person from whose custody the articles are seized and give him an opportunity of hearing. There is nothing in Section 101 which indicates giving of such an opportunity of hearing to such person. However, the Magistrate is required to apply his mind to the contents of the search-warrant, list of seized articles and other relevant facts and decide the question of grant of permission or otherwise for the things to be taken before the Magistrate issuing the warrant.

37. In Section 105(2)(d)(ii), it is laid down that where a search warrant has been executed, things found in the search shall, so far as possible, be dealt with in accordance with the procedure prescribed by Section 101. According to the learned counsel for respondent Nos. 1 and 5, the use of the words “so far as possible” clearly indicate that whenever Section 105 mode is adopted for execution of a search warrant, it is not necessary that in every case the procedure prescribed in Section 101 as regards production of seized articles before the nearest Magistrate must be followed and that in fit cases, instead of doing so the things seized could be directly produced before the Court issuing the warrant, no matter at what distance the Court is situated from the place where the search warrant is executed. 

38. We are of the view that learned counsel for respondent Nos. 1 and 5 are right in their submission that ordinarily Section 101 procedure should be followed while executing the search warrant in accordance with the procedure prescribed by Section 105, but in exceptional cases, such procedure, in so far as it relates to producing the seized articles before the nearest Magistrate, can be dispensed with by the concerned Court depending on the fact situation of each case. The reason being that Section 105 procedure is a Court monitored mode of execution of the search warrant which is not so in case of the modes referred to any Sections 78 and 79. When the Court having jurisdiction over the place being subjected to search takes upon itself the job of execution of the search warrant, it may, in fit cases, permit the officer executing the search warrant to take the seized articles directly to the Court issuing the warrant instead of the nearest Court by prescribing certain conditions in order to prevent misuse of the power by the executing officer. Such Court is presumed in law to possess the necessary power and means to ensure proper execution of the warrant and prevent abuse of process of law while the officer takes away the things found for their being produced directly before the Court issuing the warrant. Such means not having been possessed by the officer causing the warrant to be executed or executing the warrant under Sections 78 and 79, the officer executing the warrant would have to mandatorily follow the procedure prescribed by Section 101 of Cr.P.C.

39. In view of above, we are of the view that Section 101, procedure governing the disposal of things found in search beyond jurisdiction is mandatory when the modes of execution of warrant laid down in Sections 78 and 79 are resorted to and without any exception. We further find that when the mode of execution of warrant referred to in Section 105 is taken recourse to, ordinarily the procedure prescribed by Section 101 for production of seized articles must be followed and it is only in exceptional cases when warranted by fact situation of a particular case that departure therefrom, for reasons to be recorded in writing, can be permitted to be made by the Court getting the warrant executed and that too upon prescription of suitable conditions and adequate safeguards to ensure misuse of powers by the executing officer.

In the High Court of Bombay(Nagpur Bench)

(Before Sunil B. Shukre and Avinash G. Gharote, JJ.)

Angel Click,  Vs State of Karnataka, 

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Whether search and seizure of articles will become illegal if police fail to follow S 101 of CRPC while executing search warrant beyond the court's jurisdiction issuing it?

 Seized articles constitute important piece of evidence and, therefore, the effort must be to ensure that no doubt is left at any stage of the whole process of search, seizure and production of the articles before the trial Court for the purpose of proving the prosecution case against the accused. In order to minimize the possibility of creating any doubt in the whole process, the legislature has, in Section 101, mandated a particular procedure to be followed. If this mandate is not followed, the piece of evidence formed by the seized articles would become vulnerable. Doubt would be expressed about the genuineness and authenticity of the whole process and it would be very difficult for the prosecution to protect the evidence from such attack. On the other hand, if all the procedural requirements as given under Section 101 are followed it would be very difficult for the accused to contend that seizure of articles cannot be believed as there was possibility of articles being tampered with or wrong articles being seized and so on and so forth.

{Para 42}

43. The procedure laid down in Section 101, with it's object explained earlier could be seen as the mandate of law prescribed to prevent miscarriage of justice, and so it has to be followed, except in a rare case discussed earlier. 

44. It follows then that there is wisdom in obeying the command of law of procedure as contained in Section 101 rather than to say that it is for the officer executing the warrant to decide in his discretion, to follow or not to follow the procedure prescribed by Section 101 of the Cr.P.C. If the interpretation made by learned counsel for respondent Nos. 1 and 5 about the discretionary and optional nature of procedure prescribed in Section 101 to the extent it requires seized articles to be produced before the nearest Magistrate is accepted, it may lead to subverting rather than sub-serving the cause of substantive justice. It is for this reason that we say, at the cost of repetition, that there are certain situations which call for harmonising the two principles of law, the procedure is handmaiden of substantive justice and mandate of law to do a thing in a particular manner alone, with each other. As such, we find that whenever the search warrant is executed by taking recourse to the modes prescribed in Sections 78 and 79, the procedure prescribed by Section 101 of the Cr.P.C. must be mandatorily followed, and that it must also be followed when the warrant is executed through the route of Section 105 of the Cr.P.C., except in a rare case, in view of the provisions made in Section 105(2)(d)(ii) of the Cr.P.C., which we have already discussed.

45. Having understood the law governing the subject of the execution of search warrant that now we have to examine the correctness or the otherwise of the procedure adopted by Gangavathi Court in issuing the warrant and getting it executed at Nagpur. It is an admitted fact that the warrant which was to be executed at two places situated within the territorial jurisdiction of Nagpur Court was not forwarded to the Nagpur Court having the jurisdiction, as prescribed under Section 105 or to any authority having the jurisdiction as prescribed under Section 78 and the warrant was directed to police officer of police station Gangavathi for executing the same at Nagpur and it appears that this was done by resorting to the mode given under Section 79 of the Cr.P.C. The police officer, on his part, obtained the authorization of the officer in-charge of the jurisdictional police station and executed the search warrant at two places situated in Nagpur district. This was as per the procedure laid down under Section 79 of the Cr.P.C. But, thereafter, it is seen that the procedure governing disposal of things found in the search as prescribed by Section 101 was not followed by the police officer who executed the warrant. We have already found that procedure contained in Section 101 of the Cr.P.C., in so far as it relates to Sections 78 and 79, is mandatory and no exception to it and no departure from it are permitted. Karnataka police do have an explanation in this regard like the resistance put up by the locals and the fear of the locals forcibly taking away the rice bags which made the officer to directly take the seized rice bags before Gangavathi Court. Such justification will be of no help to Gangavathi police when we find that there is no escape from the rigor of procedure prescribed in Section 101 in respect of two modes of execution of warrant given under Sections 78 and 79 of the Cr.P.C. As stated earlier, the mode adopted here for execution of the search warrant was as given in Section 79 and not Section 105. Therefore, any violation of procedure prescribed by Section 101, which indeed has taken place in the present case, would vitiate the whole search and seizure operation and that would mean that the seizure of the rice bags made by Karnataka police in the present case is illegal.

46. In the circumstances, we are of the view that this petition deserves to be partly allowed and accordingly it is allowed in terms of prayer clause (I).

47. It is declared that the seizure of the rice bags (6140 rice bags of Heritage brand made from godown of petitioner No. 1 and 999 rice bags of Heritage brand made from the godown of petitioner No. 2 situated within Nagpur district) is illegal.

 In the High Court of Bombay(Nagpur Bench)

(Before Sunil B. Shukre and Avinash G. Gharote, JJ.)

Angel Click,  Vs State of Karnataka, 

Criminal Writ Petition No. 39 of 2021

Decided on May 7, 2021, 

Citation: 2021 SCC OnLine Bom 682

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Whether Magistrate can issue a search warrant U/S 97 Cr.P. C. to search for the person confined outside the territorial jurisdiction of said Court?

 Secondly, respondent No. 1 along with respondent No. 2 was residing at village Bhadgaon, District Jalgaon, Maharashtra and, therefore, the SDM, Burhanpur had no jurisdiction to issue any search warrant out of the territory of State of Madhya Pradesh, hence the proceedings initiated before the SDM, Burhanpur was without any jurisdiction.

Madhya Pradesh High Court

Gajendra vs Smt. Jayshree on 3 November, 2015

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