Showing posts with label correspondence. Show all posts
Showing posts with label correspondence. Show all posts

Wednesday, 2 October 2019

Whether court can pass judgment on admission on the basis of email and reply exchanged between parties?

In Uttam Singh Dugal & Co. Ltd. v. Union Bank of India MANU/SC/0485/2000 : (2000) 7 SCC 120, the Supreme Court observed that the object of Order 12 Rule 6 CPC is to enable the party to obtain a speedy judgment at least to the extent of the relief to which, according to the admission of the defendant, the plaintiff is entitled. The contention urged before the Supreme Court was that the resolutions or minutes of the meetings of the Board of Directors could not amount to a pleading or come within the scope of Order 12 Rule 6 CPC as such statements were not made in the course of the pleadings or otherwise. However, the Supreme Court observed that when a statement is made to a party and such statement is brought before the Court showing admission of liability, by way of an application filed under Order 12 Rule 6 CPC and the other side has sufficient opportunity to explain the said admission and if such explanation is not accepted by the Court, the trial Court would not be helpless. The Supreme Court further observed that when the trial Court found that the statement made in the proceedings of the Board of Directors meetings and the letter sent as well as the pleadings, when read together, led to an unambiguous and clear admission and only the extent to which the admission was made, being in dispute, the trial Court would have a duty to decide the same and grant a decree. The Supreme Court categorically held that this approach would be unexceptionable.

9. This being the legal position, it is manifest that the opinion of the trial Court that an admission for the purposes of Order 12 Rule 6 CPC necessarily has to be made only in the pleadings cannot be countenanced. Even correspondence can be looked into for the purpose of determining as to whether the requirements of Order 12 Rule 6 CPC are satisfied. The petitioner-plaintiff relies upon not only the e-mails exchanged between the parties but also the reply dated 09.12.2015 of the respondent-defendant through its Advocate, in response to the legal notice dated 10.11.2015 issued by the petitioner-plaintiff. Unfortunately, the trial Court lightly brushed aside this document while coming to the conclusion that no admission had been made in terms of Order 12 Rule 6 CPC. The trial Court seems to have gone mostly by the fact that the e-mails did not mention any 'due amounts' and therefore, there was no admission, though the reply notice dated 09.12.2015 stood on a different footing. As pointed out by the Supreme Court in Charanjit Lal Mehra (supra), an admission in terms of Order 12 Rule 6 CPC can also be inferred from the facts and circumstances of the case. Therefore, the trial Court necessarily had to consider not only the e-mails but also the reply notice dated 09.12.2015, together and in their entirety, before concluding as to whether any admission had been made by the respondent-defendant, warranting exercise of power by the trial Court by taking recourse to Order 12 Rule 6 CPC. As the trial Court failed to undertake this exercise and proceeded on the wrong assumption that for the purposes of Order 12 Rule 6 CPC, an admission necessarily had to be made in writing and only in the course of the pleadings, we are left with no alternative but to set aside the order under revision and remit the matter to the trial Court for consideration afresh of the subject I.A. on its merits and in accordance with law.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT HYDERABAD 

C.R.P. No. 3877 of 2018

Decided On: 20.12.2018

 Blue Cube Germany Assets GmbH and Co. KG Vs. Vivimed Labs Limited

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
P.V. Sanjay Kumar and M. Ganga Rao, JJ.

Citation: AIR 2019(NOC) 557 Hyd
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Tuesday, 20 November 2018

Whether arbitration clause can be inferred from correspondence between the parties?

The learned counsel for the Appellant also submitted that
the Appellant did not sign the Charter Party and cannot be
treated as a party to the agreement. There is no dispute that
the contract is governed by the English law under which there

is no requirement for the Charter Party to be signed by the
parties to make it binding. We have no doubt in approving the
conclusion of the High Court on this point and rejecting the
submission made on behalf of the Appellant. Abundant
material was examined by both the Arbitrator and the High
Court to record a finding that there existed a valid arbitration
agreement. Article II of the First Schedule of the Act defines
arbitration agreement as including an arbitral clause in a
contract or an arbitration agreement, signed by the parties or
contained in an exchange of letters or telegrams. The High
Court found that the Charter Party which contained the
arbitration agreement was agreed to and entered upon by the
parties and the same is supported by the correspondence
between the parties. The term “agreement in writing” in
Article II is very wide. An arbitral clause need not necessarily
be found in a contract or an arbitral agreement. It can be
included in the correspondence between the parties also. In
the present case the arbitration agreement is found in the
Charter Party which has been accepted by both the Arbitrator
and the High Court. We see no reason to differ from the view
taken by the High Court on this point.
Reportable
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL No .4834 of 2007

P.E.C. LIMITED Vs AUSTBULK SHIPPING SDN BHD
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Thursday, 31 March 2016

Whether litigant can be punished for contempt of court if he is making private correspondence with Judge?

At the same, time it has to be borne in mind that
the power to punish a person for having committed criminal
contempt has to be used cautiously and sparingly. A proper
balance has to be struck between freedom of speech and
right of the judicial officers to administer justice without any
obstruction from the litigants or anyone else for that matter.
Litigants, at the same time, cannot be allowed to take law
into their own hands and start browbeating and insulting the
Court before whom his matter is pending for adjudication.
Litigants therefore cannot scandalize the Court by writing
letters to him/her at his/her residential or office address.
Litigants cannot file applications for adjournment or for any
other purpose and send it to the Court's residence or office.
Litigants cannot threaten or induce the Court through
correspondence. If this is permitted, all litigants will start
writing letters to the Court and this would seriously hamper
fair and transparent administration of justice. In the present
case, the Respondent/Contemnor has done this with impunity
and has stated that he is not afraid and has tried to justify his
conduct.
In our view, the conduct of the Respondent does
not amount to fair criticism of a judicial act not does it
amount to any statement made by him in good faith.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
REFERENCE NO. 4 OF 2014
Smt. S.A. Sinha 
Metropolitan Magistrate, 
7th Court, Borivali, Mumbai  
 Vs.
Dr. Leo Rebello 
CORAM: V.M. KANADE &
 REVATI MOHITE DERE, JJ.
PRONOUNCED ON: 29th February, 2016
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