Showing posts with label customary divorce. Show all posts
Showing posts with label customary divorce. Show all posts

Saturday, 11 October 2025

Bombay HC: Husband can not rely on customary divorce if he has not proved any custom to take such customary divorce.

 The Courts below have recorded the findings that there was a marriage between the applicant and non-applicant in the year 1961. The contention of the applicant/husband that there was a customary divorce between the parties, has been negated by the revisional Court. There is no separate adjudication by any competent Court on the point of customary divorce and even no specific point was framed by the Judicial Magistrate First Class while entertaining the contention of the applicant/husband that there was a customary divorce and as per the term in the said divorce deed, the wife is not entitled for the maintenance. It is admitted position that, there was no legal divorce between the parties. Therefore, the revisional Court in paragraph 8 of its judgment held that,

After going through the record, it appears that original of the said document was brought by Gulabrao at the time of evidence. On the basis of that this xerox copy was exhibited. However it is material to note that there is absolutely no evidence on record about any such customary divorce. I find that the said document has no legal sanctity. Thus, the document purporting to be a divorce deed is of no value in the eye of law and hence that is of no help for deciding the dispute between the parties. {Para 31}

32. On perusal of the contents of the application and upon hearing learned Advocate appearing for the applicant, no case is made out to upset the aforesaid findings recorded by the revisional Court. Therefore, there was no legal divorce. The customary divorce has not been proved by the applicant by way of bringing any evidence on record about any such custom to take such customary divorce.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (NAGPUR BENCH)

Criminal Application No. 3897 of 2007

Decided On: 15.12.2009

Gulabrao Nagorao Ingole Vs. Dwarkabai Gulabrao Ingole

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Sambhaji Shiwaji Shinde, J.

Citation: 2010 CRLJ 1471,MANU/MH/1468/2009.

Read full judgment here: Click here.

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Bombay HC: husband is deemed to have refused and neglected to maintain wife if husband is residing with second wife or another woman

 Even assuming for a moment that there was a divorce between the parties, it would be relevant at this juncture to refer to the reported judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Rajathi v. C. Ganesan MANU/SC/0412/1999 : AIR 1999 SC 2374. The Hon'ble Court in paragraph 7 held thus

Even though wife was unable to prove that husband has remarried, yet the fact remained that the husband was living with another woman. That would entitle the wife to live separately and would amount to neglect or refusal by the husband to maintain her. Statement of the wife that she is unable to maintain herself would be enough and it would be for the husband to prove otherwise. {Para 33}

34. It clearly follows from the aforesaid observation of the Hon'ble Supreme Court that if the husband is remarried and living with another woman that itself entitles the wife to live separately and would amount to neglect or refuse by the husband to maintain her.

In the instant case, it is admitted position that, the applicant has remarried with some another woman. Therefore, in the facts of this case it was not necessary for the wife to prove that, the husband has neglected or refused to maintain her. In fact as per the aforesaid pronouncement, the burden was on the husband to prove otherwise.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (NAGPUR BENCH)

Criminal Application No. 3897 of 2007

Decided On: 15.12.2009

Gulabrao Nagorao Ingole Vs. Dwarkabai Gulabrao Ingole

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Sambhaji Shiwaji Shinde, J.

Citation: 2010 CRLJ 1471,MANU/MH/1468/2009.

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Bombay HC: Marital tie between the parties cannot be put to an end by execution of the customary divorce deed

However, the customary divorce deed was also brought into existence on the same day, but it is now settled position of law that the deed of divorce under which the wife is said to have given up her claim for maintenance, cannot be enforced in law because the said customary divorce deed is illegal and has no effect on the relinquishment of maintenance thereunder is of no consequence. The marital tie between the parties cannot be put to an end by execution of the customary divorce deed and the parties can avail the remedies under the civil law if at all they want to compromise the matter by mutual consent. It is obvious that unless there is a decree of divorce passed by the competent Court under Section 13-A or 13-B of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, it is not possible to accept that the marriage can be dissolved by entering into the consent deed and/or divorce deed.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (NAGPUR BENCH)

Cri. W.P. No. 402 of 2002

Decided On: 25.02.2005

Tejaswini and Ors. Vs. Chandrakant Kisanrao Shirsat and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

S.T. Kharche, J.

Citation: 2005(3) MHLJ 137(Bom), MANU/MH/0338/2005.

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Tuesday, 2 January 2024

Whether the court can quash proceeding under Domestic violence Act if husband takes the plea of customary divorce?

 Even if assuming that the learned Judicial Magistrate is vested with jurisdictional competence to determine the validity of a customary divorce deed, yet no such determination could take place merely on an application moved by the respondent-husband. The respondent is obliged to lay proper foundation in pleadings, impeccable evidence to prove long time custom and then establish that their marriage was validly dissolved by resorting to customary rights. Unless the respondent proves prevalence of the custom in conformity with public policy and consequential enforceability of the divorce deed dated 05.01.2014, there is a statutory presumption of subsisting marriage between the parties. In that case, the complaint under the D.V. Act cannot be quashed at the threshold, on the ground of its nonmaintainability. The High Court thus legally erred in assuming the validity of customary divorce deed 05.01.2014 and then in proceeding to quash the proceedings under the D.V. Act on the premise that the parties are no longer legally wedded husband and wife. Such an inference can be drawn only after the respondent successfully proves the validity and enforceability of customary divorce deed dated 05.01.2014. We reiterate that the onus to prove the customary divorce deed lies on the respondent who is relying upon the same, and on the appellant to prove to the contrary. {Para 12}

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA 

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION 

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.2905 OF 2023

 SANJANA KUMARI Vs VIJAY KUMAR

Coram: SURYA KANT; J., DIPANKAR DATTA; J. 

Dated: September 18, 2023.

Read full Judgment here: Click here

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Sunday, 31 December 2023

Whether Hindu Marriage Can Be Dissolved Through Customary Divorce If Existence Of Such A Customary Right Is not Established ?

It is to be noted that the deed in question is purported to be a document which is claimed to be in conformity with the customs applicable for divorce in the community to which the parties to this litigation belong to. As per the Hindu law administered by courts in India divorce was not recognised as a means to put an end to marriage, which was always considered to be a sacrament, with only exception where it is recognised by custom. Public policy, good morals and the interests of society were considered to require and ensure that, if at all, severance should be allowed only in the manner and for the reason or cause specified in law. Thus such a custom being an exception to the general law of divorce ought to have been specially pleaded and established by the party propounding such custom since the said custom of divorce is contrary to the law of the land and which, if not proved, will be a practice opposed to public policy. Therefore, there was an obligation on the trial court to have framed an issue whether there was proper pleadings by the party contending the existence of a customary divorce in the community to which the parties belonged and whether such customary divorce and compliance with the manner or formalities attendant thereto was in fact established in the case on hand to the satisfaction of the court. In the instant case, we have perused the pleadings of the parties before the trial court and we do not find any material to show that prevalence of any such customary divorce in the community, based on which the document of divorce was brought into existence was ever pleaded by the defendant as required by law or any evidence was led in this case to substantiate the same. It is true that in the courts below the parties did not specifically join issue in regard to this question and the lawyers appearing for the parties did orally agree that the document in question was in fact in accordance with the customary divorce prevailing in the community to which the parties belonged but this consensus on the part of the counsel or lack of sufficient pleading in the plaint or in the written statement would not, in our opinion, permit the court to countenance the plea of customary divorce unless and until such customary divorce is properly established in a court of law. In our opinion, even though the plaintiff might not have questioned the validity of the customary divorce, the court ought to have appreciated the consequences of there not being a customary divorce based on which the document of divorce has come into existence bearing in mind that a divorce by consent is also not recognisable by a court unless specifically permitted by law…”

(Emphasis supplied) {Para 7}

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA 

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION 

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.2905 OF 2023

 SANJANA KUMARI Vs VIJAY KUMAR

Coram: SURYA KANT; J., DIPANKAR DATTA; J. 

Dated: September 18, 2023.

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Sunday, 29 January 2023

Whether a woman who has accepted alimony under Customary divorce is entitled to get maintenance under Domestic violence Act?

  As far as the ground of customary divorce and the

divorce granted to the respondent by a competent Court of

Law is concerned, the Law is well settled that the divorce

which has been granted under Hindu Marriage Act is only legal

and valid. Only in certain circumstances where the custom

exists and is observed continuously then the customary divorce

may be considered. For claiming any customary right, the

parties claiming such right are bound to prove that the customs

of their caste or race still exist and the community at large is

regularly observing such customs. Since the applicant

approached the Civil Court for divorce, it can safely be held

that the customary divorce was not in existence in their caste.

Therefore, the respondent cannot claim that after the

customary divorce, the domestic relationship ceased, and the

applicant is not entitled to the reliefs under D.V. Act. {Para 17}

18. As far as the effect of subsequent legal and valid divorce

is concerned, after or during the pendency of D.V. Act is

concerned, the said issue was dealt with by the Hon'ble Apex

Court in the case of V. D. Bhanot Vs. Savita Bhanot, (2012) 3

SCC 183, which was subsequently followed in the case of

Juveria Abdul (cited supra). The Hon'ble Supreme Court laid

down the Law that where an act of domestic violence is once

committed then subsequent decree of divorce will not absolved

the liability of the respondent from the offence committed or

deny the benefit to which the aggrieved person is entitled to.


19. The facts of the case, as discussed above, reveal that the

decree of divorce was passed by the competent Civil Court of

Law after filing the application under the D.V. Act would not

disentitle the aggrieved person to apply for the reliefs under

the said Act. In view of the Law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex

Court as regards the entitlement of the reliefs under D.V. Act to

the aggrieved person, there appears no force in the arguments

advanced by the learned counsel for the respondent that since

the applicant is divorced, she cannot claim the reliefs under

D.V. Act.

20. The last material point that the learned counsel for the

respondent raised was that since the lumpsum alimony was

accepted, the wife is not entitled to maintenance. To bolster his

argument, he relied on the case of Vitthal (cited supra). It was

a case under Section 125 of the Criminal Procedure, and this

Court observed in the said case that in view of the agreement

and acceptance of the lumpsum alimony, at least the said

document would have to be treated as a document indicating

mutual consent to live separately as contemplated by

provisions of Sub Section 4 of Section 125 of the Code of

Criminal Procedure, 1973. On the basis of this material, the

wife was refused maintenance under Section 125 of the Cr.P.C.

21. The Law is well settled that the person aggrieved may

take recourse under various Laws if the right exists. Since

maintenance is allowed under Section 125 of the Cr.P.C., the

Law does not bar the person entitled to claim the relief under

D.V. Act. Section 36 of D.V. Act provides that the D.V. Act is not

in derogation of any other law. It is an additional provision of

Law not affecting the other provisions of Law available for

similar relief. The inquiry under the D.V. Act is independent

and has an object to provide for more effective protection of

the rights of a woman who are victims of violence of any kind

occurring within the family and for matters connected

therewith or incidental thereto. Since the proceeding under

D.V. Act is independent, the ratio laid down in the case of

Vitthal (cited supra) would not assist the applicant.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

BENCH AT AURANGABAD

CRIMINAL REVISION APPLICATION NO.290 OF 2018

Gajanan S/o Parashram Rathod  Vs Surekha Gajanan Rathod,

CORAM : S. G. MEHARE, J.

PRONOUNCED ON : 24.01.2023.

Citation: 2023 Lawweb (Bom HC ) 7.

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Saturday, 27 February 2021

Whether a party can rely on customary divorce in the absence of a declaration of validity of said divorce by the civil court?

 In the utter absence of any evidence, let alone conclusive, that the divorce decree executed purportedly between respondent no.11 and her deceased husband was endorsed by any valid custom, the exception envisaged in Section 29(2) of the 1955 Hindu Marriage Act would not be attracted. Thus, the spouses had to revert back to Section 13 of the Act, which sanctions dissolution of marriage only by a decree of divorce, for the dissolution of marriage to be valid in the eye of law.


25. Such facts, coupled with the fact that pension was granted earlier in

favour of respondent no.11 upon a valid sanction being issued by the

respondent-authorities, it would be unjust to deprive respondent

no.11 from such pension at the behest of the petitioner, merely on the

basis of the petitioner’s assertion on oath in this writ petition that a

deed of divorce, supported by valid and recognized customs, was

executed between respondent no.11 and her deceased husband.

 In the High Court at Calcutta

Constitutional Writ Jurisdiction

Appellate Side

WPA No. 2346 of 2018

Smt. Krishna Veni Vs. The Union of India and others


Judgment on : 18.02.2021

Coram: The Hon’ble Justice Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya

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Saturday, 14 October 2017

Whether customary divorce between husband and wife is binding on third party?

 From the evidence available on record from the side of the wife, it is clear that the said is not acceptable evidence with regard to the customary divorce. A custom cannot be created by an agreement between the a parties as found in this case as "Farkatnama" so as to bind on others.

Clause (a) of Section 3 of the Hindu Marriage Act reads as under:

"(a) the expressions "Custom" and "usage" signify any rule which, having been continuously and uniformly observed for a long time, has obtained the force of law among Hindus in any local area, tribe, community, group or family:

Provided that the rule is certain and not unreasonable or opposed to public policy; and Provided further that in the case of a rule applicable only to a family it has not been discontinued by the family."
Thus the custom must have been observed for a long time and must be ancient. In pages 49 and 50 of the Mayne's Hindu Law & Usage, it is observed that,

"The beginnings of law were in Customs. Law and usage act, and react upon each other. A brief in the propriety, or the imperative nature of a particular course of conduct, produces a uniformity of behaviour in following it; and an uniformity of behaviour in following a particular course of conduct produces a belief that it is imperative, or proper, to do so. When from either cause, or from both causes, a uniform and persistent usage has moulded the life, and regulated the dealings, of a particular class of community, it becomes a custom, which is a part of their personal law."
16. In the present case, the wife has not led any evidence to show existence of customary divorce preceding the Act. The oral and documentary evidence do not establish that there was customary divorce prevailing in the community to which the party belongs. The evidence of Rajendra shows that he knows that for obtaining divorce one has to approach to the Court. The another witness is sister of the wife. She is totally silent as to on what basis she is deposing that there is a custom in their community to obtain the customary divorce. In the absence of such a positive evidence, merely because she is deposing in favour of the wife is hardly of any use to support the case of the wife. Therefore, it is clear that the evidence adduced on record by the side of the wife cannot take place of custom.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (NAGPUR BENCH)

Family Court Appeal No. 90/2015

Decided On: 09.03.2017

 Shalini Vs. Dhanraj

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
V.A. Naik and V.M. Deshpande, JJ.

Citation: 2017(5) MHLJ 199
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Whether it is mandatory to prove custom by clear and unambiguous evidence?

In another case in Udaya Swain. v. Satya Swainani reported in MANU/OR/0197/1970 : 1970 The Cuttack Law Times, 1330, the learned single Judge of the Orissa High Court found as under:

"The question to be examined, therefore, is as to whether the defendant has been able to establish the custom alleged by him. This custom must be ancient, certain and reasonable, and being in derogation of the general rules of law must be construed strictly. It is essential that it should be established to be so by clear and unambiguous evidence. It is only by means of such evidence that Courts can be assured of its existence, and of the fact that it possesses the conditions requisite of recognition.

8. As was indicated in a very old decision of the Madras High Court in Gopalayyan v. Raghunatiayyan and continuity of the usage and the conviction of those following it that they were acting in accordance with law, and this conviction must be inferred from the evidence. It was further stated that the evidence of acts of the kind, acquiescence in those acts, their publicity, decisions of courts, or even of panchayats upholding such acts, the statements of experienced and competent persons on their belief that such acts were legal and valid will all be admissible but it is obvious that, although admissible evidence of this latter kind will be of little weight unsupported by actual evidence of usage asserted. The rule laid down by the Board in the case of Ramalakshmi Ammal v. Sivanatha Perumal Sathuravar, has been quoted with approval on several occasions by their Lordships of the Judicial committee and runs to the following effect:

"It is of the essence of special usages, modifying the ordinary law of succession that they should be ancient and invariable; and it is further essential that they should be established to be so by clear and unambiguous evidence. It is only by means of such evidence that the Courts can be assured of their existence, and that they possess the condition of antiquity and certainty on which alone their legal title to recognition depends."

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (NAGPUR BENCH)

Family Court Appeal No. 90/2015

Decided On: 09.03.2017

 Shalini Vs. Dhanraj

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
V.A. Naik and V.M. Deshpande, JJ.

Citation: 2017(5) MHLJ 199
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Wednesday, 6 July 2016

How to prove customary divorce between husband and wife?

 This Court also will simultaneously deal with the issue
whether there was any actual and legal dissolution of the marriage of the
plaintiff no.1 with her first husband Waman Chavan. Unless the plaintiffs
would have pleaded and proved the divorce of plaintiff no.1 with her
husband Waman Chavan before contracting the marriage with Namdeo
Jadhav and unless it was proved that the defendant no.1 also had taken
divorce from Namdeo Jadhav according to the recognized custom in
Maratha community privately, whether the presumption could be drawn
about the valid marriage between the plaintiff no.1 with Namdeo Jadhav.
 Before this court deals with this issue in the later part of the
judgment, it is necessary to summarize the law laid down by the Supreme
Court in case of Yamanaji H.Jadhav vs. Nirmala (supra). It has been held
that as per the Hindu law administered by Courts in India, divorce was
not recognized as a means to put an end to marriage, which was always
considered to be a sacrament, with only exception where it is recognized
by custom, public policy, good morals and the interests of society were
considered to require and ensure that, if at all, severance should be
allowed only in the manner and for the reason or cause specified in law. It
is held that such a custom being an exception to the general law of
divorce ought to have been specially pleaded and established by the party
propounding such custom since said custom of divorce is contrary to the
law of the land and which, if not proved, will be a practice opposed to
public policy. Supreme Court has held that there was an obligation on the
trial court to have framed an issue whether there was proper pleadings by
the party contending the existence of a customary divorce in the
community to which the parties belonged and whether such customary
divorce and compliance with the manner or formalities attendant thereto
was in fact established in the case on hand to the satisfaction of the Court.
Supreme Court has held that even if the plaintiff might not have
questioned the validity of the customary divorce, the Court ought to have
appreciated the consequences of their not being a customary divorce
based on which the document of divorce has come into existence bearing
in mind that a divorce by consent is also not recognizable by a Court

unless specifically permitted by law.
A perusal of the evidence of all the witnesses examined by
the plaintiffs clearly indicates that none of the witness examined by the
plaintiffs could prove that in the Maratha community, divorce was
permissible and could be obtained by execution of deed of divorce in
presence of panchas or other witnesses. The witnesses admitted in the
cross examination that they had not attended any other alleged customary
divorce in the Maratha community. Except bare words in the plaint that
such divorce was permissible by executing a deed of divorce before
panchas in the plaint, the plaint was totally vague. There was no specific
evidence led by the witnesses examined by the plaintiffs on the issue of
alleged customary divorce in the Maratha community by executing deed
of divorce before panchas and such alleged customary divorce was not
proved at all.

 The learned trial judge in my view has rightly rendered a
finding that the alleged customary divorce by execution of deed of

divorce in the presence of panchas was not proved by the plaintiffs.
In so far as the substantial question of law no.(vii) is
concerned, in my view, the plaintiffs have failed to prove the customary
divorce. The alleged divorce deed Exhibit 79 was not sufficient to prove
the dissolution of marriage of plaintiff no.1 and Waman Chavan in
absence of proof of any custom or customary divorce in the Maratha
Community by execution of the document in presence of Panchas. The
said question of law no.(vii) is accordingly answered in negative.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
 CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
SECOND APPEAL NO.108 OF 1993
Kashibai Namdeo Jadhav 
Versus
 Yamunabai w/o Namdeo Jadhav 
 CORAM : R.D. DHANUKA, J.
  PRONOUNCED ON :   25th February 2016
Citation:AIR 2016 (NOC)387 BOM
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Sunday, 5 July 2015

Whether wife can be denied maintenance on the ground of customary divorce?


It   is   to   be   noted   in   the   present   case   that   the 
parties   are   governed   by   the   Hindu   Law.     Both   the   Courts 
below have recorded specific and clear­cut finding that the 
petitioner/husband could not establish the custom prevailing 
in their caste, by which customary divorce can be given.   In 
absence of any custom, any document purported to be the 
divorce deed, has no value in the eye of law.  In that view of 
the   matter,   the   submission   of   the   learned   counsel   for   the 
petitioner   that   in   view   of   the   divorce   deed   [Exh.29],   the 
application   itself   is   not   maintainable   can   not   be   accepted. 
Further,   the   learned   revisional   Court   has   rightly   observed 

that   the   proceedings   u/s   125   of   the   Code   of   Criminal 
Procedure   were   filed   on   22/09/1999,   whereas   the   divorce 
deed is executed on 26/09/1999.   The learned trial Court, in 
the light of the admission given by the husband that he got 
the   divorce   deed   executed   because   he   wanted   to   perform 
second   marriage,   rightly   recorded   finding   that   the   divorce 
deed got executed by the husband from the wife, can not be 

relied upon.     Further, once the husband failed to point out 
the  custom, the  husband is  dis­entitled to  take  any benefit 
from such customary divorce deed.                                                                        
      
CRIMINAL WRIT PETITION NO. 528 OF 2002
          IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY   
                                BENCH AT AURANGABAD

Gangadhar  Manika Huge Vs  Rekhabai  Gangadhar Huge

           
    CORAM : V.M.DESHPANDE, J.
                                
        DATE OF JUDGMENT : 9th FEBRUARY, 2015   
Citation;2015 ALLMR(CRI)2243
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